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The presented work is devoted to study the validity of overclaiming technique (OCT) as a measure of 
response (positivity) bias. Three main aims of the analyses performed were: a) assess methods’ utility 
to enhance predictive validity of self-report by accounting for response biases, b) investigate proposed 
mechanisms of overclaiming, c) expand nomological network of the method by presenting a wide set 
of both individual-level and cluster-level (school) correlates. 
The obtained results pointed that OCT can be used in order to account for response biases in self-
report data. Important differences regarding use and interpretation of the different OCT scoring 
systems were found and commented. Two systems, one based of signal detection theory (SDT), other 
on item response theory model (IRT), were proposed as viable scorings of OCT. Choice between them 
is not trivial as it influences results’ interpretation and model specification. 
Three possible mechanisms of overclaiming were tested: a) motivated response bias (self-favouring 
bias, socially desirable responding), b) memory bias (overgeneralised knowledge or faulty memory 
control) and c) response styles and careless responding. The results pointed that all three mechanisms 
are probable and that overclaiming is most probably a heterogenous phenomenon of multiple causes. 
However, the analyses pointed out that one of the memory bias hypotheses, the overgeneralised 
knowledge account, does not hold and that there is much more evidence for the competitive 
metacognitive account. It is to said that overclaiming is at least partially attributable to insufficient 
monitoring of one’s knowledge. Evidence for a relation between careless responding and overclaiming 
was also obtained, indicating that at least some of the overclaimed responses can be attributed due 
to inattentive responding. Obtained results on the relations between response styles and overclaiming 
were complicated; they warrant further studies as the results here probably greatly depend on the 
technical details of analysis, e.g. response style definition and coding adopted.  
The analysed cluster-level covariates demonstrated that only very limited portion of OCT variance can 
be ascribed to the school-level of analysis. Gender, socio-economic status and locus of control proved 
to be significantly related to overclaiming among the individual-level correlates assessed. Boys yielded 
higher overclaiming bias than girls and students of external locus of control were more biased in their 
self-reports in comparison to students of internal locus of control. 
The work comprises also analysis of the PISA’s OCT latent structure. The results evidenced bifactor 
structure of the scale, with the general factor interpreted as math ability while the two specific factors 
were given a tentative explanation concentrated around item difficulty (one specific factor emerged 
for easy items, one for hard items). These findings point to a multi-dimensional character of OCT and 
a large role played by domain ability in OCT responding. 
Moreover, latent class analysis (LCA) performed identified an “overclaiming” group among the 
participants which was characterised by high overclaiming and unwarrantedly high self-report profile 
regarding math-related abilities and social life. However, this group counted only around 9% of the 
total sample. 
Implications of these findings are commented in the work, along with theoretical integration and ideas 
for future studies with the use of OCT.   




Abstract in Polish (extended) [Abstrakt po polsku] 
 
Przedstawiona praca analizuje trafność metody szacowania poziomu zawyżania oceny własnej wiedzy 
(overclaiming technique; OCT) jako narzędzia do kontroli i korekty efektu zbyt pozytywnego obrazu 
samego siebie (positivity bias; self-favouring bias) w badaniach samoopisowych niskiej stawki. 
OCT jest metodą, gdzie sprawdzana jest deklarowana wiedza badanych w danej tematyce, np. w 
zakresie pojęć matematycznych. Do tego celu wykorzystuje się dwa rodzaje pozycji testowych: 
istniejące rzeczywiście pojęcia (np. „potęga”) oraz pojęcia fałszywe, nieistniejące w rzeczywistości (np. 
„ułamek oznajmujący”). Przypisywanie sobie przez badanych wiedzy na temat pojęć fałszywych jest 
uważane za przejaw tworzenia zbyt pozytywnego obrazu samego siebie, co stanowi systematyczne 
obciążenie pomiaru i prowadzi do zmniejszenia trafności samoopisu. W pracy rozważany jest pomiar 
samoopisowy, gdzie respondent udziela informacji sam o sobie w reakcji na pytania kwestionariusza 
bez pośrednictwa ankietera (self-administered self-report). 
Praca miała trzy cele: 
• walidacja OCT jako metody kontrolowania efektów respondenckich w badaniach 
samoopisowych niskiej stawki, 
• ustalenie mechanizmów prowadzących do przypisywania sobie nadmiernej wiedzy, 
• zbadanie korelatów OCT. 
Celem głównym było zbadanie praktycznej użyteczności metody przypisywania nadmiernej wiedzy do 
kontroli systematycznego błędu pomiaru w badaniach samoopisowych. Ważnym celem było również 
prześledzenie możliwych mechanizmów, które prowadzą do zawyżenia sądów na temat własnej 
wiedzy. Celem pomocniczym było zbadanie korelatów tego zjawiska, jako dodatkowego źródła 
informacji na temat możliwych mechanizmów zjawiska. 
Najważniejszym elementem walidacji było ustalenie użyteczności wyników OCT do podniesienia 
trafności predykcyjnej miar samoopisowych oraz zwiększenia proporcji wyjaśnionej wariancji w 
modelu regresji, gdzie zmienną zależną był obiektywny pomiar umiejętności matematycznych (test 
PISA), a zmienną niezależną- wskaźniki zawyżania wiedzy.   
Wyniki badania użyteczności OCT dowodzą, że metoda może być stosowana do kontroli błędów 
pomiaru w badaniach samoopisowych. Do oceny tego efektu przeprowadzono systematyczne badanie 
modeli supresji, które pozwoliły ustalić, że użycie miar OCT jako zmiennej kontrolnej prowadzi do 
zwiększenia trafności predykcyjnej samoopisu. 
Przeprowadzone analizy doprowadziły również do ważnych wniosków na temat stosowanych do tej 
pory sposobów kwantyfikacji OCT. Wyniki prowadzą do wniosku, że używane niekiedy do tej pory 
miary nie powinny być stosowane i należy je zastąpić innymi wskaźnikami. Uzyskane wyniki pozwoliły 
na ustalenie, że miary oparte na teorii detekcji sygnałów (signal detection theory; SDT), jak również 
modelu odpowiadania na pozycję testową (item response theory; IRT) mogą zostać polecone jako 
wskaźniki OCT. Jednakże, jak wskazują przeprowadzone analizy, użycie jednej lub drugiej grupy 
wskaźników może pociągnąć za sobą uzyskanie odmiennych wyników, gdyż interpretacje obu grup 
wskaźników różnią się. Praca przynosi porównanie metod kwantyfikacji OCT i zwraca uwagę na 
kluczowe kwestie związane ze stosowaniem tych miar w modelach regresji i innych analizach 
ilościowych. Po raz pierwszy również zaprezentowano model interakcyjny miar, gdzie analizuje się 
moderację wskaźnika precyzji sądów przez wskaźnik nadmiernych sądów w ramach miar opartych na 
teorii detekcji sygnałów. 
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W pracy omówiono również trzy możliwe, sugerowane w literaturze, mechanizmy powstawania 
nadmiernych sądów o swojej wiedzy: a) motywowane zniekształcenie poznawcze, np. na skutek 
potrzeby aprobaty społecznej (social desirability respodning; SDR), b) niemotywowane zniekształcenia 
pamięciowe oraz c) przypisywanie sobie nadmiernej wiedzy jako produkt uboczny innych zniekształceń 
pomiaru (response biases), np. stylów odpowiedzi lub odpowiadania nieuważnego. 
Zgromadzone wyniki wskazują, że motywowane zniekształcenia poznawcze mogą prowadzić do 
nadmiernych sądów, jednak wydaje się, że ten efekt nie jest silny i że takie efekty nie mogą wyjaśnić 
całej wariancji OCT. 
Zniekształcenia pamięciowe wydają się istotnym kandydatem do wyjaśnienia wariancji zawyżania 
sądów na temat własnej wiedzy. Poczynione w pracy ustalenia wydają się wyraźnie sugerować, że 
efekty pamięciowe mają tutaj charakter błędów w monitorowaniu pamięci, a nie w nadmiernej 
generalizacji posiadanej wiedzy w skutek np. wzbudzenia rozbudowanej sieci semantycznej. Rezultaty 
wskazują, że zawyżanie sądów na temat własnej wiedzy lub umiejętności charakteryzuje raczej osoby 
o mniejszym poziomie kompetencji matematycznych zmierzonych testem kognitywnym. 
Zawyżone sądy są również związane z odpowiadaniem nieuważnym, jednak dokładny wzorzec tego 
związku powinien zostać ustalony w kolejnych badaniach. 
Analizy przeprowadzone w pracy zdają się sugerować, że metoda nadmiernych sądów ma 
heterogeniczną wariancję, na którą składa się kilka, niezależnych od siebie mechanizmów. Jakkolwiek 
zebrane dane nie pozwalają wnioskować wprost o zależnościach przyczynowo-skutkowych, to 
stanowią cenne źródło refleksji nad możliwymi mechanizmami zawyżania wiedzy przez badanych. 
Zgromadzona w pracy wiedza poszerzyła również informacje na temat relacji między odpowiadaniem 
nieuważnym, stylami odpowiedzi i metodami nadmiernych sądów. Praca jest pierwszym studium, 
gdzie użyto tak szerokiej palety wskaźników odpowiadania nieuważnego do analizy ich związków 
korelacyjnych z miarami OCT. Jest również pierwszym badaniem, gdzie użyto nowoczesnych, 
poprawnych metodologicznie miar stylów odpowiedzi do zbadania ich relacji z OCT.  
Innowacją pracy jest również prześledzenie korelacji między normami społecznymi i innymi zmiennymi 
z poziomu szkoły a miarami OCT. Wyniki wskazują na marginalne znaczenie zmiennych szkolnych dla 
wariancji OCT. 
Praca jest również pierwszym opracowaniem, które tak szczegółowo zbadało strukturę latentną skali 
zawyżonych sądów, doprowadzając do dopasowania modelu dobrze oddającego charakter danych 
empirycznych. Model ten wnosi interesujące implikacje teoretyczne, gdyż sugeruje, że badani nie 
odróżniają zbyt dobrze dwóch rodzajów pozycji testowych (prawdziwych i fałszywych), z których składa 
się metoda nadmiernych sądów. Rezultaty tego badania wskazują na kluczowe znaczenie umiejętności 
matematycznych dla przypisywania sobie zawyżonej wiedzy. Pokazuje ono również, że obiektywna 
fałszywość pewnych pojęć nie prowadzi do powstania jakościowo różnych mechanizmów 
odpowiadania na takie pozycje przez badanych. Wydaje się, że respondenci traktują takie pozycje jak 
trudne i mało znane pojęcia prawdziwe. Uzyskane informacje z analizy struktury czynnikowej OCT 
prowadzą również do praktycznych ustaleń na temat konstrukcji takich zadań w przyszłości. 
Zgromadzone w pracy informacje i ustalenia istotnie powiększają wiedzę na temat samej metody, jak 
również możliwych mechanizmów zniekształceń pomiaru w badaniach samoopisowych. Praca 
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Chapter 1- INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Key concepts and definitions. 
The use of survey and questionnaire techniques is nowadays omnipresent in almost every area of social 
sciences (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Scandura & Williams, 2000; Ziegler, 2015), going also beyond the 
boundaries of this domain to medicine, technological sciences or biology (e.g. Fotios & Gibbons, 2018; 
Giromini, Viglione, Pignolo & Zennaro, 2019). Research conducted by Woszczynski and Whitman 
(2004) showed that around a third of articles published in top organizational psychology journals used 
self-report as their sole research methods, whereas Brutus, Gill and Duniewicz (2010) stated that self-
report methods were used in around 60% of published organizational psychology studies. This 
popularity of the self-report methods is due to their cost-efficiency, ease of administration and 
flexibility to assess a broad range of constructs (Simsek & Veiga, 2001). Moreover, they are believed 
to provide valid, interpretative, standardized and comparable information across subjects (Lucas & 
Baird, 2004). This standardized information can then be easily translated into numerical data for 
further use in statistical modelling and formal testing of research hypotheses.  
Because of that popularity it is essential that the measurement provided be as accurate as possible. 
Unfortunately, this method is subject to many errors threatening quality of the measurement and thus 
also of the inference. In a popular survey error classification Robert Groves mentions various potential 
sources of deviations (Groves et al., 2009). One of the prominent sources of error is the respondent 
himself/herself. Assumptions that respondents interpret, process and use the given response 
categories (options) in the same way (comparability assumption) and give unbiased and honest 
responses are not always held (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Wetzel, Böhnke & Brown, 2016). If this is the 
case it creates a deviation between the “true” level of a trait to be measured and the level actually 
measured (Groves et al., 2009). This deviance (gap) is commonly called “measurement error”. 
However, this error can stem from many systematic and non-systematic processes. The non-systematic 
processes, called response variance, are based on a group of “haphazard processes”, unpredictable 
over measurement occasions, bringing instability to traits’ estimates (Groves et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, there are the processes leading to systematic measurement error that truly pose a 
concern for every researcher employing survey questions. These systematic processes are jointly called 
“response biases”, often defined as “systematic tendency to respond to a range of questionnaire items 
on some basis other than the specific item content” (Paulhus, 1991) or “systematic distortion of a 
response process” (Groves et al., 2009). The main consequence of response biases presence in a survey 
or questionnaire measurement is a systematic under- or overreporting of a given trait level, thus, 
response biases introduce a systematic source of error variance to the measurement, reducing its 
validity and comparability (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003; Wetzel et al., 2016; Ziegler, 
2015).  
Numerous processes related to response biases have been identified, many of them stemming directly 
from respondents’ traits or from an interaction of these traits and characteristics of a given research 
tool or measurement context (Ziegler, 2015). The response biases can be further divided into response 
styles (RS) and response sets (Cronbach, 1946; Jackson & Messick, 1958), the latter being a tendency 
that is to some extent dependent on particular measurement context and not generalisable to other 
occasions, whereas the former being defined as fixed, generalised disposition, that is stable over 
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measurement situations and even non-measurement behaviour (Jackson & Messick, 1958, 1962; 
Paulhus, 2002). It has to be noted however, that the differentiation on response sets and styles is not 
used universally by all researchers, despite the clear definitions provided by Cronbach (1946), Jackson 
and Messick (1958), Damarin and Messick (1965) and recently by Paulhus (2002). Sometimes only one 
of the terms is used, they are used interchangeably or response sets are seen as a type of response 
styles or vice versa (Groves et al., 2009; Weijters, Geuens, & Schillewaert, 2010)1. 
Sometimes a third type of bias is introduced, most often under the name of careless/insufficient effort 
responding (C/IER), also known under the terms of (pseudo)random responding, inattentive 
responding or inconsistent responding (Bowling & Huang, 2018; Curran, 2016; Fronczyk, 2014; Gibson 
& Bowling, 2019; Goldsmith & Clark, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Meade & Craig, 2012; Meyvis, Oppenheimer 
& Davidenko, 2009; Osborne & Blanchard, 2010). C/IER is at times included into the response styles 
framework (Loosveldt & Beullens, 2017; Van Vaerenbergh & Thomas, 2013) but in this work it will be 
treated as a third, distinct type of response bias. C/IER is defined as responding survey items without 
properly processing them cognitively, e.g. without reading the instructions or even the items 
themselves or reading the questions without full understanding (Kam, 2019). All of the response biases 
are believed to be inter-individually varied (Bolt & Johnson, 2009; John & Robins, 1994; Ziegler, 2015).  
The processes laying on the basis of response biases are mainly researched under two frameworks. 
One of them is satisficing, defined as responding without putting maximum effort: respondents do 
only as little as they need to proceed through the survey (Krosnick & Alwin, 1988; Krosnick, 1991; 
1999). The process is seen as a continuum between responding without any effort whatsoever (hard 
satisficing), responding with little effort (soft satisficing) and responding with optimal, required effort 
(optimising), sometimes even up to maximising (doing one’s best). Although the framework is widely 
popular (the Krosnick’s 1991 article has been cited almost 2000 times as yet) it is still believed to be 
somewhat under-researched, as the exact causes and correlates of satisficing (e.g. respondents’ 
individual traits, research contexts, measurement tool characteristics and their interactions related to 
the degree of satisficing) are still elusive (Roßmann, Gummer, & Silber, 2017; Silber, Danner & 
Rammstedt, 2019). 
The second framework is centred around the notion of socially desirable responding (SDR), which is 
defined as yielding overly positive self-descriptions, mostly by exaggerating one’s positive traits or 
behaviours and diminishing negative ones (Paulhus, 2002). The given self-image is tailored according 
to the socially-appropriate characteristics (socio-cultural norms), as perceived by the respondent 
(DeJong, Pieters & Fox, 2010). The construct is often divided into various subtypes, depending on the 
theory there are two, three or even four forms of SDR postulated (Paulhus, 2002). Most often this 
concept is researched in two specific research situations: a) in high-stakes recruitment situations, 
where a particular type of SDR is often called “faking” (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; 2011; Ziegler, 
MacCann & Roberts, 2012) and b) in situations where respondents are to answer the so-called sensitive 
questions (e.g. questions about intimate or illegal issues) (Furnham, 1986; Krumpal, 2013; Tourangeau 
& Yan, 2007). These two situations clearly point to SDR as a motivated and deliberate process, but 
other researchers provide examples where SDR takes place without an apparent reason (at least 
external to respondent) and where it is considered a non-intentional process. Paulhus proposes a 
 
1 An example of such confusion is e.g. Rorer’s (1965) proposal to name motivated distortions as sets and 
unmotivated as styles. This proposition was declined by many researchers on the ground that it advanced 




framework of four SDR forms, two of them steered towards public impressions and two steered 
towards one’s own view of the self (2002; see also Blasberg, Rogers & Paulhus, 2014). 
Situations where research participants engage in SDR despite low-stakes and non-threatening 
measurement context are often considered a manifestation of a general cognitive bias of self-
perception (overly positive bias of self-perception) (Bensch, 2018; Wojciszke, 2011; Ziegler, 2011). This 
overly positive view of the self (and often other elements of the world) is believed to have an 
adjustment component in maintaining well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988, but see a meta-analysis by 
Dufner, Gebauer, Sedikides & Denissen, 2019 for a more nuanced view of this issue). However, there 
are concepts that has been differentiated from the overall positivity bias, as being less adaptive. One 
of them is self-enhancement defined as “exaggerating one’s positive qualities” (Paulhus & Holden, 
2009). There is an ongoing debate whether self-enhancement is a stable, trait-like tendency to 
evaluate oneself better than one really is, or is it only a state-like inclination, driven by research context 
or other transient factors (Robins & Beer, 2001; Taylor & Armor, 1996). Recent theoretical 
considerations incline towards stating that it is both, in a sense that there are forms of SDR that are 
context-dependent and there are forms driven by more stable motives (Paulhus, 2002). However, it is 
worth to note that self-enhancement operates also in contexts that are distinctive from the situations 
where SDR is most often researched (faking, high-stakes assessments and sensitive questions). It 
means that the research on SDR is often too narrowly focused, as this response bias is operational in 
a much larger number of research contexts, including the low-stakes one (which are typical for most 
of the situations in basic research context). 
Thus, it can be summed up that there are three frameworks under which the response bias research 
is grouped: a) satisficing, where roots of bias are seen in respondents’ low motivation or ability to 
participate in a survey, b) “classical” socially desirable responding, where participants are believed to 
deliberately manipulate their answers in order to adhere to socio-cultural norms or in order to make 
certain impression on others and c) “non-traditional” socially desirable responding, where participants’ 
responses deviate from reality, without an apparent goal. The former SDR is believed deliberate, the 
latter, at least to some extent, non-deliberate and automatic. Sometimes differentiation on motivated 
and unmotivated cognitive biases is postulated, where “motivated”, are understood as driven by 
intentional or unintentional motives, e.g. distorted self-perception, ego/self-esteem protection, etc. 
and “unmotivated” as stemming from other cognitive processes, e.g. memory biases (Muller, 2019; 
Muller & Moshagen, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). It is noteworthy though, that memory biases may also serve 
various self or social motives (Sedikides & Green, 2000), thus the boundaries of the 
unmotivated/motivated division of self-enhancement and other response biases are to be set more 
thoroughly with additional research. 
Henceforth, any self-report measurement validity is threatened by many, often only partially 
ascertained, processes. Despite that many methods have been devised to control for response biases, 
to date no “golden standard” has been achieved so far. There are many methods proposed, some of 
them of dubious or unverified utility and almost all of them without a thorough validation. This 
situation is especially clear and enchaining in case of SDR in low-stakes, non-intrusive measurement 
situations where many methods developed for SDR prevention or control in high-stakes settings simply 
cannot be implemented. However, some new SDR control methods have been relatively recently 
proposed that are potentially available to capture this bias also in low-stakes measurement situations. 
Method that would to become truly useful for basic and applied research purposes, including 
international large-scale assessments (ILSAs), has to be easy to use and score and also pose low 
cognitive burden on participants. Moreover, it should be cost- and time-efficient and characterised by 
high level of flexibility, usable in diverse modes, populations and contexts. Most importantly, it has to 
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be a valid indicator of positivity bias, capable of controlling response bias variance and rising self-
reports validity (Bing, Kluemper, Davison, Taylor & Novicevic, 2011; Ferrando, 2005; Ludeke & 
Makransky, 2016).  
One of the most promising candidates for such a method is the overclaiming technique (OCT; Paulhus, 
Harms, Bruce & Lysy, 2003). The OCT is based on an idea proposed by Phillips and Clancy (1972), who 
asked their participants about their knowledge of some commercial products (e.g. books, movies, etc.), 
however, in order to control for social desirability tendencies, among the list of existent products, they 
have also placed some non-existent ones. In a list of famous politicians “Barack Obama” would be an 
example of an existent item, while “Peter Lawn” would be an illustration of a non-existent one. The 
terms “reals” and “foils” are often used to address these kind of items, respectively (Paulhus et al., 
2003). Phillips and Clancy also proposed the terms “overclaiming” and “overclaimer”. Overclaiming is 
thus defined as “overstating one’s knowledge, by claiming to know non-existent items” (Muller, 2019). 
Obviously, apart from knowledge, participants can also assess their skills, abilities, behaviours, 
possessions, etc. The idea of this technique is simple- if participants claim to know non-existent items 
or to possess non-existent skills and abilities it is considered as a clear indication of their self-enhancing 
tendencies. Many solutions were proposed on how to score OCT data (and quite a few on how to use 
them in statistical analyses further on), but the most established method is based on signal detection 
theory (SDT), that offer a wide array of indices indicating participants’ accuracy and penchant for 
biased responses alike (Paulhus & Petrusic, 2010). 
The OCT has gained a sizeable popularity after Paulhus and his colleagues published their seminal 
article; since then, it has been cited almost 500 times so far, as indicated by the Google Scholar 
database. The OCT occurs in two main forms: a) questionnaires resembling general knowledge tests, 
like the one developed by Paulhus and colleagues (2003), called further the overclaiming questionnaire 
(OCQ), being close to the original idea of Phillips and Clancy (1972), where participants are asked about 
their knowledge or familiarity with a given set of items, b) tools resembling more a vocabulary test, 
like the vocabulary and overclaiming test (VOC-T) developed by Ziegler, Kemper and Rammstedt 
(2013), being a variation of lexical decision task paradigm (Meyer & Schaneveldt, 1971) or a similar 
task, vocabulary overclaiming in English (VOCE) developed by Dubois (2015). Among the first type of 
tools further differentiation for domain-specific and domain-general questionnaires can be proposed. 
An example of the former is the task developed especially for the PISA 2012 study (Kyllonen & Bertling, 
2013), comprised of existent and non-existent mathematical terms embedded in the math concepts 
familiarity scale.  
However, despite pegging the OCT as a very promising method to control for SDR in self-reports the 
results of its use are quite inconsistent. Along with corroborations of its utility to contain SDR variance 
(Bing, Kluemper, Davison, Taylor & Novicevic, 2011; Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; Paulhus, 2011), many 
results question its usefulness in this context (Feeney & Goffin, 2015; Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Kam, 
Risavy & Perunovic, 2015; Muller, 2019). The precise evaluation of the OCT’s validity and utility to 
control for the unwanted error variance in self-reports is difficult, as among the numerous validity 
studies the majority of them was conducted in the faking paradigm, where measurement simulates 
high-stakes contexts, e.g. job application or college admission. The findings point that the context is 
not without the consequence on scores and validity of the OCT as some studies showed that OCT is a 
valid suppressor of SDR tendencies only in high-stakes, but not in low-stakes contexts (Bing et al., 
2011). This and similar results question the technique’s ability to contain for self-enhancement 
tendencies. Furthermore, even the technique’s usability in controlling for impression management 
variance was challenged by the results provided by Feeney and Goffin (2015) and Ludeke and 
Makransky (2016), who found no relation between OCT bias index and typical measures of positivity 
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bias. The research to date shows that in certain contexts OCT can be a good method to control for 
faking, that is to say deliberate impression management leading to overly positive self-reporting of 
possessions, skills or knowledge (Dunlop et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the question whether OCT is 
capable of being a valid method to control for self-enhancement tendencies also in low-stakes contexts 
and in other paradigms than “faking” is still open to discussion. The current body of evidence does not 
offer any conclusive settling of this issue, thus warranting further research.  
In order to plan a research aimed at answering this question there is a necessity to evaluate the 
theories regarding what processes are potentially engaged in responding to reals and foils. The 
accumulated research brought contending hypotheses on the mechanisms underlying embracing 
items in OCT. Traditionally, the technique was created in order to control for SDR, even before its 
various forms where recognised and named (Phillips & Clancy, 1972). Later on, it was seen mainly as a 
tool to account for deliberate reporting of an overly positive self-image, mainly in job-applicant or 
related contexts (e.g. Anderson, Warner & Spencer, 1984; Pannone, 1984), aiming at controlling the 
detrimental influence of what was named impression management (Paulhus, 1986; 2002). This kind of 
SDR is also often called faking, especially in the applied research context (Ziegler, 2011; Ziegler, 
MacCann & Roberts, 2012). However, controlling other form of SDR, self-deception, was also thought 
possible with the use of OCT (Randall & Fernandes, 1991) and this hope was explicitly stated and tested 
by Paulhus and colleagues (2003).  
Nonetheless, in spite of the evidence heralding OCT’s validity to account for both impression 
management and self-deception (e.g. Paulhus, 2011; Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus et al., 2003; 
Paulhus & Williams, 2002), there is also an ample evidence indicating that the high hopes related to 
OCT may not be fulfilled. The construct validity of OCT was routinely checked by correlating the 
technique with measures of various SDR forms. To this end questionnaires made to gauge SDR, the so-
called SDR scales, were used, along with many techniques used to assess discrepancy between self-
report and some more objective criterion (e.g. cognitive test, peer-report). Apart from measures of 
SDR and discrepancy also self-report scales of psychological traits related to SDR, e.g. narcissism and 
self-esteem, were commonly used. However, the result of these validity studies is mixed at best 
(Bensch, Paulhus, Stankov & Ziegler, 2017; Dunlop, Bourdage, de Vries, Hilbig, Zettler & Ludeke, 2017; 
Muller, 2019). Studies conducted by Feeney & Goffin (2015), as well as Ludeke & Makransky (2016) 
and Muller & Moshagen (2018) or Musch, Ostapczuk & Kleiber (2012) provided evidence questioning 
the believed validity of OCT to measure impression management and self-enhancement as OCT failed 
to correlate with measures of faking and discrepancy, as well as with self-report SDR scales, narcissism 
and self-esteem. These results put in doubt the whole nomological network of OCT and challenged its 
use as an SDR measure. Alternative explanations have been proposed, linking overclaiming origin to 
memory biases (Dunlop et al., 2017; Muller & Moshagen, 2019a) or careless responding (Ludeke & 
Makransky, 2016). Moreover, the overclaiming inter-individual variability has been never 
systematically evaluated, despite the evidence that SDR tendencies can vary greatly among the people 
(Leite & Cooper, 2010). 
The nature of overclaiming is still little known and many pieces of important knowledge are missing. 
The technique has not been thoroughly tested so far, hence his work has been envisioned to provide 
additional evidence regarding the mechanisms of overclaiming, its nomological network and its inter-
individual variability. As pointed by the newest articles in the field, these research problems still have 
not been solved adequately (Bensch, Maass, Greiff, Horstmann & Ziegler, 2019; Bensch et al., 2017; 
Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Paulhus, 2011). This research is thus aimed to answer some fundamental 
questions regarding OCT as a measure of SDR and also to further the investigation of its mechanisms 
and correlates.  
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1.2 Research aim and objectives 
The main aim of this research is to comprehensively validate the overclaiming technique as a method 
developed to control for SDR in self-report measures. This will be done by testing whether using OCT 
scores can account for spurious variance in regression equation. 
The second aim is to extend the understanding of the method and refine its interpretation by 
comparing contending theories explaining its mechanisms of origin. Among the proposed mechanisms 
three will be tested here: OCT as result of memory bias (overgeneralisation of acquired knowledge or 
fault of metacognitive memory control), OCT as a result of positivity bias (SDR measure) and OCT as a 
result (by-product) of other response biases, namely response styles and careless responding. 
The third aim is to present the overclaiming correlates in order to broaden knowledge about its 
nomological network. Apart from the individual-level correlates also the group-level (school-level) 
correlates will be explored in order to further understanding of OCT scores. 
The detailed objectives of this research endeavour are to: a) validate the PISA’s OCT and check whether 
it truly serves to control for SDR in low-stakes self-report research, b) expand the understanding of the 
method, by identifying the processes underlying its scores, c) search for its socio-psychological 
correlates, including group-level (school-level) correlates, d) investigate its inter-individual variability, 
e) compare and contrast various ways of scoring the OCT, f) assess latent structure of the analysed OCT 
version in order to inform theory on the basis of this findings and g) comment on the previous OCT 
research to make an integrative attempt at the state-of-the-art. 
1.2.1 Research justification and significance  
Self-report continues to be one of the fundamental research method in social sciences, due to its 
validity and research efficiency (Groves et al., 2009). However, its easiness to use does not come 
without a price to pay. This price is its proneness to faking and response biases. Already in 1960s Cook 
and Selltiz (1964) have pointed out that with self-report measures "the purpose of the instrument is 
obvious to the respondent; the implications of his answers are apparent to him; he can consciously 
control his responses. Thus a person who wishes to give a certain picture of himself-whether in order 
to impress the tester favourably, to preserve his own self-image, or for some other reason-can rather 
easily do so." In this statement Cook and Selltiz have pinpointed major motivated response biases, but 
it is important to remember that response biases can influence measurement also on the basis of 
nonmotivated, non-deliberate processes (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Muller, 2019; Muller & 
Moshagen, 2018; 2019a; 2019b). Top-notch quality measurement is the main requirement for social 
sciences advancement and its lack- “a major block to progress in sociological research” (Hauser, 1969). 
Response biases pose a serious threat to any measurement’s validity by introducing systematic error 
variance (spurious variance or construct-irrelevant variance; CIV; Messick, 1989) which often leads to 
distorted results and inference errors (Groves et al., 2009; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Schmidt, Le & Ilies, 
2003). Leaving this variance uncontrolled can lead to many grievous consequences, all of them 
threatening both construct (Ziegler & Buehner, 2009) and criterion-related validity (Holden, 2007) and 
potentially influencing research conclusions. 
One of the consequences is changed scales’ dimensionality (Kam & Meyer, 2015). The factorial 
structure can be misrepresented, e.g. spurious factors (Huang, 2016; Woods, 2006) or higher-order, 
“method” factors (Bäckström, 2007) can emerge. These consequences often plague personality 
research, where positively- and negatively-formulated items (reversed items) regularly load on 
separate factors, despite the common underlying trait (Kulas, Klahr & Knights, 2018; Woods, 2006). 
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One of the most prominent examples of influence that uncorrected response biases had on research 
conclusions is the so-called general factor of personality- a higher-order factor emerging from 
personality scales, that has won plenty of research attention (DeYoung, Peterson & Higgins, 2002; 
Digman, 1997), but it is now believed to be rather an effect of measurement issues (Ashton, Lee, 
Goldberg & de Vries, 2009; Davies, Connelly, Ones & Birkland, 2015; Paulhus & John, 1998; Revelle & 
Wilt, 2013). Presence of error variance can also lead to infringement of the orthogonality (e.g. of 
factors or subscales) assumptions (Biderman et al., 2011; Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014). 
Measurement error is also, at least to some extent, responsible for the rising popularity of the bifactor 
scale structure, probably due to its potential to control for error variance (Reise, Kim, Mansolf & 
Widaman, 2016). Response biases can thus also distort model fit measures (Billiet & McClendon, 2000), 
influencing in this manner model choice decisions (Reise et al., 2016). 
Another result are distorted means and variances, which can produce skewed distributions or spurious 
group differences, so that group means become uninterpretable (Chun, Campbell, & Yoo, 1974; 
Morren, Gelissen, & Vermunt, 2012). This potentially poses a critical problem in cross-cultural research 
and international large-scale assessments (ILSAs) (Bolt & Newton, 2011; Khorramdel et al., 2017). One 
of the common fallouts of SDR are elevated means (theta shift) of scales, often leading to paradoxical 
results, e.g. negative correlations between two, theoretically positively correlated measures (Kyllonen 
& Bertling, 2013). 
The error variance can also lead to violations of measurement invariance and/or differential item 
functioning between groups of respondents (Bolt & Johnson, 2009), which is of paramount importance 
for any inter-group, especially cross-national, comparisons (Davidov, Muthen & Schmidt, 2018). 
Another effect of error variance presence are deformed multivariate correlations, inducing spurious 
relations between the variables (Khorramdel & van Davier, 2014) or obscuring the true 
interdependencies between the measured constructs (He & van de Vijver, 2013; 2016; Lu & Bolt, 2015; 
Pokropek, 2014; Yang, Barnard-Brak & Lan, 2019).  
Response biases can also deceive the commonly used measures of internal consistency (Fleischer, 
Mead & Huang, 2015), resulting in deflated or inflated measures, depending on the exact bias present 
in a given dataset. 
Obviously, the response bias can influence research decisions and thus inferential errors of both I and 
II type (Johnson, 2005; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). 
Despite the long-realised presence of response biases and its dire consequences still no “golden 
standard” method to control for the response biases variance has been introduced in the field. Many 
methods have been proposed, but most of them can only be used in a narrow research context or is 
of still unverified validity (Wetzel et al., 2016; Ziegler, 2015). The proper discussion of response biases 
control and prevention methods and their vices and virtues is provided in one of the next chapters. 
Here it is however worth to note that among all the methods conceived to tackle with response biases, 
it is the overclaiming technique (OCT) that raised truly high hopes to be “the” method (Wetzel et al., 
2016). 
However, OCT still needs more research to verify its construct validity and usefulness as a method to 
control for self-enhancement tendencies. Moreover, inconsistent results obtained in the previous 
research attempts require disentanglement. What is more, precise interpretation of the method’s 
scores is still elusive as processes underlaying certain response patterns in OCT are not known. 
Additionally, the research presented here will bring more knowledge about the somewhat under-
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researched OCT version, namely the PISA 2012 version of this method (to date the Paulhus’ version 
brought much more research interest). 
Moreover, the herein analyses will investigate the response biases problem in low-demand, low-stakes 
situations in a framework of educational studies, which is a context that is rarely researched in the SDR 
field. Furthermore, the analysed measurement tool type (self-assessment of educational skills) is also 
seldom investigated in the response biases framework, as most of the papers concentrate on 
personality scales, attitude and behaviour measures. Because of that the results of this work will be 
more readily applicable in a policy-oriented research, including international, large-scale assessments 
(PISA, PIAAC, ICILS,PIRLS/TIMSS, ESS, etc.), that comprise an important part of social sciences basic 
research. Response biases in the context of self-assessment of skills are far less researched, in contrast 
to the more readily applied investigations in the contexts of industrial, work and organisational 
psychology (IWO), psychopathology (forensic and clinical contexts) and sensitive questions (Krumpal, 
2013; Perinelli & Gremigni, 2016) . As the recent results show, the response bias validity threat in these 
less-researched contexts is also serious (see also Burski, Chłoń-Domińczak, Palczyńska, Rynko & 
Śpiewanowski, 2013; Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; Khorramdel et al., 2017; Pokropek, 2014), which 
seemed to be overlooked by many researchers (Meyvis et al., 2009). 
Besides, the research presented here is based on a representative, random sample of 15-year-old high 
school students, which is markedly distinct from the most often employed non-random, convenient 
college students samples. Thus, the sample used in this work is larger from most of the other ones 
used in the field, is randomly-drawn and representative for a seldomly researched population (school 
students instead of college students or adults).  
Further, the analyses will concentrate on the data from Poland, which is a rarely-researched culture in 
the context of response biases, as the field is dominated by the research on American samples (Dodou 
& de Winter, 2014). In this research only the data from Poland will be used in order to control for 
cultural and linguistical (questionnaire translation) effects (He & van de Vijver, 2016; Jerrim, Parker & 
Shure, 2019; Khorramdel et al., 2019). 
The proposed research will also bring new evidence on the relation between overclaiming and 
response styles and careless responding, testing another hypothesis about the non-motivated origin 
of overclaiming. Moreover, this work proposes new interpretations of overclaiming, merging the 
methods and theories of various social sciences fields, mainly sociology and cognitive sciences. What 
is more, the analysis of contextual and group effects on overclaiming will be presented in order to 
explore possible relations between group characteristics (school-level) with individual-level 
overclaiming tendencies. 
The proposed research is aimed to fill in the research lacuna by conducting a thorough validity study 
of the overclaiming technique and its utility to control for self-enhancement bias in self-report 
measures in the context of low-stakes educational research. The investigation is to examine the 
internal structure of the OCT questionnaire, its relation with the popular indices of careless responding 
and response style indices, explore its correlations with other self-report measures (e.g. math anxiety, 
math self-efficacy, etc.), and analyse contextual and group effects that may be related to overclaiming 
tendencies. All these aims are newly proposed, and to the best knowledge of the author, have not 
been explored to date or have been only very basically addressed. 
Moreover, the research is also intended to conduct a criterion validity study of the OCT, looking to 
replicate its postulated role as a classical suppressor in a math familiarity-math ability relation (He & 
van de Vijver, 2016; Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; Pokropek, 2014; Yang et al., 2019). This research is in 
line of the three proposed models of SDR effects in the data as: a) suppressor, b) moderator and c) 
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spurious correlation(s) (Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans, 1983). Furthermore, latent class models will 
be used to explore, whether the overclaiming tendencies are distributed universally across the whole 
sample or is it possible to distinguish subsamples that demonstrate large overclaiming or no such 
tendencies at all. Previous research on SDR and RS led to identification of such groups (Leite & Cooper, 
2010; Khorramdel, von Davier & Pokropek, 2019), so it is warranted to explore the inter-individual 
variability of OCT and its correlates. Additionally, an analysis of relation of OCT to various RS and C/IER 
indices will be performed, in order to test the possibility that the overclaiming is a result of these 
processes (Dunlop et al., 2017; 2019). Finally, an analysis of different OCT scoring methods is proposed 
as an expansion of the analyses performed by Paulhus & Petrusic (2010). 
To sum up: the proposed research is aimed to bring additional evidence on overclaiming technique 
utility in accounting for response biases in self-reports. Moreover, it aims to merge SDR, OCT, RS and 
C/IER research fields with the newest developments in social psychology, cognitive psychology and 
sociology. OCT is a very promising SDR control method, but additional information is needed to verify 
its utility, especially in front of evidence that threatens the view of OCT as “direct and unambiguous 
measure of an individual's attempt to deceive on a questionnaire (as the items are known to be non-
existent)” (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). 
Someone may question why PISA 2012 data has been used as a sole source of data in this work. 
However, this choice is justified and enables to fully answer the research questions posed. First of all, 
as it was already commented before, PISA offers a large, representative sample, larger than any study 
using any variation of OCT before. The sample size is not only a value in case of sample 
representativeness or statistical power, but it also enables use of more computationally-intensive 
methods of quantitative analysis, e.g. IRT models, which broadens the gamut of methods than can be 
used to appraise overclaiming features. The sheer size of the sample also helps to explore the inter-
individual variability with the use of cluster analysis, mixture models or similar techniques- a given 
subdivisions of sample tend to be no larger than just a few % of the sample (Meade & Craig, 2012), 
which may be simply unobservable in small samples. 
 Moreover, the sample consists of high school students, which is a distinct sample from the two most 
often measured populations in the response biases research, namely college (psychology) students 
and online adult samples. Since the relation between overclaiming and age is not established (Clariana, 
Castelló & Cladellas, 2016) an opportunity to analyse overclaiming in this rarely researched population 
is most welcomed. Another related matter is that PISA comprises clustered data where students are 
nested within schools, which offers a unique chance to examine group and contextual correlates of 
overclaiming, a topic rarely and only preliminarily studied to date (Jerrim et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, PISA offers data from many cultural contexts, including Poland, a rarely researched 
cultural context in the response biases field. As OCT is characterised by a significant cross-country 
variability (Vonkova et al., 2018) it is important to explore the characteristics of overclaiming in 
different countries, also outside the dominant Anglo-Saxon context (Jerrim et al., 2019). 
What is more, PISA consists of many different self-report measures, an opportunity that provides 
chances for a very wide study of OCT correlates that is crucially needed to sketch technique’s 
nomological network. Additionally, PISA grants an occasion to compare the validity of self-report by 
comparing it to an objective measure- PISA cognitive test of scholastic abilities. Having such a 
convenience is very rare in the discipline, but is highly valued as it enables a direct and valid test of 
OCT as a tool to measure positivity bias. 
Obviously, this opulence of possibilities has been already explored by researchers in the OCT research 
(Fell et al., 2019; He & van de Vijver, 2016; Jerrim et al., 2019; Pokropek, 2014; Vonkova et al., 2018; 
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Yang et al., 2019) but these studies addressed somewhat different topics or in a different fashion than 
it is proposed in this work. What is more, some of them were only preliminary studies by far not 
depleting the analyses that can be performed with the use of such an ample database as offered by 
PISA 2012. 
Finally, due to research effectivity it is better to make use of existing data sources to the maximum 
extend before plunging into collecting new data, especially, if such a large dataset is still underexplored 
in the context of OCT. It is also worthy to add that PISA 2012 is so far a unique occasion as OCT was 
not used in any other LSA since then. 
1.2.2 Study design and research questions 
Secondary data analysis was used in order to achieve the intended research aims. The plentiful PISA 
2012 database was explored (Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; OECD, 2014b). The instrument of interest is a 
math familiarity scale, consisted of 13 items, to which three additional items (foils) were added with 
an intent to measure overclaiming. The scale was implemented in the PISA student questionnaire as 
an indicator of opportunity to learn various mathematical concepts. This concept serves to directly 
assess students’ exposure to different mathematical problems and to indirectly gauge instruction 
quality and students’ abilities (OECD, 2014a). The OCT was used to “guard against the overclaiming” 
and to facilitate the inter-country comparisons in order to avoid the so-called “PISA paradox” (Kyllonen 
& Bertling, 2013). The “PISA paradox” is an effect where a given self-reported scale correlates with a 
different sign on individual, compared to group level of analysis. The effect is thought to be driven by 
response biases and social comparison processes (Khorramdel, von Davier, Bertling, Roberts & 
Kyllonen, 2017). 
The math familiarity, as measured by self-report, should positively correlate with math ability, as 
measured by an objective cognitive assessment (PISA math test). Modelling overclaiming bias together 
with the level of self-described math familiarity should led to higher relation of the self-reported math 
knowledge with the actual knowledge, as measured by the test, thus showing that OCT scores can 
indeed account for response bias variance. To perform this analysis a multilevel linear regressions were 
used. These analyses constitute a criterion validity study of OCT as a method to control for self-
enhancement bias. 
Moreover, the internal structure of the math familiarity scale was thoroughly examined by 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in order to test and verify theoretical assumptions underlying the 
math familiarity scale and the overclaiming technique. This analysis is also meant as a validity study, 
investigating the internal structure as a source of construct validity. 
Latent class analysis (LCA) models were implemented to search for latent subsets of participants, 
characterised by different responding to the math familiarity (and OCT) scale. This method is an 
expansion of the above-mentioned construct and criterion validity studies; it also gives insight into the 
inter-individual variation of self-enhancing tendencies. 
Moreover, an in-depth OCT convergent and divergent validity study was undertaken. Among others, 
OCT correlations with various careless responding (C/IER) and response styles (RS) indices were 
examined. The IRTree framework was used to construct and calculate the RS indices (Böckenholt, 2012; 
Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014). This analysis will also shed light on the mechanisms of origin of the 
overclaiming, being thus another construct validity test. 
As a continuation of convergent/divergent validity studies the correlations between OCT and various 
socio-economical, psychological and educational measures included in the PISA 2012 study were 
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assessed. What is more, most of these concepts were analysed on both individual- and school-level to 
account for individual, contextual and group effects (Raudenbusch & Willms, 1995). 
1.3 Dissertation plan 
Chapters two and three of this dissertation presents the theory and history of the positivity bias 
research with a focus on self-enhancement and SDR. A succinct review of complementing theories and 
related concepts (self-consciousness, self-knowledge) is also presented. 
Chapter four introduces research concentrated on the validity of self-report, followed by thorough 
overview of the methods used to control for SDR variance. 
Chapter five reviews the state-of-the-art in the OCT research field with a special focus on validity 
studies and attempts to explore OCT mechanisms. Precise research hypotheses are verbalised in this 
chapter as they evince from the questions and doubts formulated in the literature. Research lacunae 
are identified and ways to fill them in are proposed. 
Chapter six comprise a general method section, where methodological issues common for all research 
questions are described. A description of the database used and a general overview of PISA research 
is also included here. 
Chapter seven presents the analyses aiming to solve the research questions posited in Chapter five. 
Each research question has its own subchapter, consisting of descriptions of methods and results with 
a discussion as conclusion. 
Chapter eight offers general discussion, where all research questions results are commented, 
synthesised and their implications for the field are presented. Future directions of further research are 
proposed here, along with limitations of the herein analyses. All of the above chapters are followed by 
a succinct chapter summaries (save Chapters 6 and 7 that do not need them). 
The work is concluded with a list of references and technical appendices. 
1.3.1 What this work is NOT about? 
At the end of this part it is also important to mention what this work will not be about. Issues like 
response and wording effects (Bradburn et al., 1979), sensitive questions (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007), 
mode comparisons (Dodou & de Winter, 2014), interviewer frauds (Kemper & Menold, 2014), 
malingering or faking bad (Rogers, Gillis, Bagby & Monteiro, 1991) and SDR in clinical (Logan, Claar & 
Scharff, 2008) or forensic settings (Tan & Grace, 2008) are completely out of the scope of this work.  
Problems regarding cultural differences in response biases will be mentioned only when directly 
relevant to the main topic of the dissertation. A preliminary study of cultural differences in OCT is 
offered by Vonkova, Papajoanu & Stipek (2018) and Fell, Koenig, Jung, Sorg & Ziegler (2019), whereas 
a thorough discussion of RS and their cultural differences is presented e.g. in the works of He and van 
de Vijver (2015a; 2016), Johnson, Kulesa, Cho and Shavitt (2005), Ju and Falk (2019), Peterson, Rhi-
Perez and Albaum (2014) and Van Vaerenbergh and Thomas (2013). One of the first studies (the first?) 
exploring the relations between culture and careless responding was recently published by Grau, 
Ebbeler and Banse (2019). 
Furthermore, research problems related to overclaiming, but distinct from it like e.g. overconfidence 
(Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980), feeling-of-knowing (Hart, 1965; Thomas, Bulevich & Dubois, 
2012), bullshitting (Frankfurt, 1986), pseudo-opinions (Bishop, Tuchfarber & Oldendick, 1986) and 
Kruger-Dunning effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) will be related to only when directly relevant to the 
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main topic of the dissertation, but will not be reviewed and commented in the whole extent. Other 
methods of SDR correction that are not used to validate OCT will be treated in a similar fashion. Their 
comprehensive reviews can be found elsewhere (Franzen & Mader, 2019; Furnham, 1986; Hipsz, 2014; 
Krumpal, 2013; Nederhof, 1985; Paulhus, 1991; 2017). 
1.3.2 Terminological note 
At the end of this part a small terminological note is in place. In the field of response biases many 
concepts of unclear or overlapping meaning are used without sufficient specificity. However, in this 
work, whenever referring to the contemporary state-of-the-art terms like “faking”, “impression 
management” and “self-presentation” will be used to denote process of creating overly positive self-
image in order to achieve certain goal. As Ziegler defined it: “faking is an interaction between person 
and situation resulting in disrupted item responses aimed at a personal profit for the testee”. In this 
view faking is understood more as an evolutionary necessity, game theory consequence (“if I don’t 
fake, I’ll lose, because everybody else is faking”), camouflage, deception- an inherent part of life, that 
is short to blatant lying and manipulating (Depaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Dwyer & Epstein, 1996; Griffith 
& McDaniel, 2006; John & Hogan, 2006; Smith, 2004). This bias is considered a threat only in high-
stakes contexts as in low-stakes assessments there are no profits to be gained. Other typical situations 
where faking is an issue are sensitive questions and similar types of contexts. In this occasions 
respondents may resort to faking in order to conceal their true answers or impress an interviewer. 
However, in low-stakes conditions other kind of bias is more probable the outcomes of which are very 
similar to faking- an overly positive image of respondent. In this work it will be called positivity bias or 
overly positive bias as this is a broader and more precise term than previously used socially desirable 
responding or self-enhancement. However, when referring to historical conceptions and results the 
terminology used by their authors is mainly kept. 
Regarding other terms, names like self-evaluations, self-ratings, self-assessments, self-descriptions are 
treated as close synonyms, whereas words pertaining to certain theories are used in the senses 
denoted by those conceptions. In this group are terms like: self-enhancement, self-evaluation, self-
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Chapter 2- SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING 
2.1 History of the concept 
2.1.1 Philosophical and socio-psychological background 
The concept of self-knowledge and false judgments about oneself were already known in the antiquity. 
Famous Greek statesman and orator, Demosthenes, stated: “Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself; 
for what we wish, we readily believe”, whereas the Delphian temple had the inscription “know thyself” 
engraved above the entrance. This maxima was also adopted by Socrates as a fundamental and most 
important task laying before everyone. Knowing oneself would, according to Socrates, lead to knowing 
also the truth about human being as well as understanding others. Independently from ancient Greeks 
this line of thinking was also popular in the Far East, where philosophical system constructed by Lao 
Tzu equalled knowing oneself to “enlightenment”, the highest and most difficult knowledge to attain. 
Already from these early beginnings of scientific inquiry the philosophers argued not only about the 
nature of the self but also on the sureness of what one can know about oneself. Differentiating of what 
was real and what only apparent was one of the cornerstones already of the pre-Socratic philosophy. 
Plato, in his famous cave example, claimed that we will never get to the exact nature of the things as 
we can only observe the shadows of the ideas. Many years later, Descartes was also sceptical about 
the possibility to know the things, one thing he was certain of, was the independence of self-awareness 
from any physical experiences, senses or matters (this concept dates back at least to Avicenna) and by 
the sole fact of being self-aware one can state that he/she exists. Hume, however, was not so certain 
that we should speak about one “self” as he believed that each and every person is constructed by 
different “selves” constituted by heaps of different, everchanging thoughts, judgements and 
sensations (“perceptions”) and that “self” is nothing more than a “bundle of perceptions”. Daniel 
Dennett went even that far as to state that no self actually exists, it is just a “narrative centre of 
gravity”, part of the world sensemaking process (1992). On the other hand, William James proposed 
an integrative theory of the self by stating that it can be divided into “I” and “Me”. “Me” could be 
further divided into material, social and spiritual self. All three of them were changeable in the course 
of life. The material self is related to one’s body, known people and possessed things. The social self is 
what determines behaviours in every social situation and according to James this changes from a 
situation to situation. The spiritual self encloses subjective knowledge about one’s personality, values, 
etc. All three “selves” are integrated by the “I”, an indivisible entity that integrates and unifies all past, 
present and future experiences into one coherent unity (1890).  
At first philosophers were quite assured about the certainty of self-knowledge due to its proximity to 
self and ease of its “measurement” in the way of inner observation process known as introspection. 
Moreover, all self-related actions and attitudes were perceived as conscious, for being conscious of 
one’s acts was one of the main characteristics of self-awareness, postulated e.g. by Descartes or Locke. 
However, empirical evidence brought an end to this optimistic accounts. As reviewed by Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) introspection and self-inference are prone to fallacies and biases and are rarely capable 
of creating “generally correct or reliable reports”. This evidence was however criticised as limited only 
to certain mental states and methods of reaching self-knowledge (Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Nowadays, 
there is only a general consensus about the methods in which the self-knowledge can be acquired. 
Boghossian (1989) noted three such methods: a) introspection, b) (self-)inference, and c) (self-
)verification by simply thinking about one’s states or thoughts. Other methods, more established in 
the empirical knowledge, included: a) introspection, b) looking glass self- inferring about one’s traits 
on the basis of how others behave towards us, c) social comparisons, d) self-perception- inferring 
about oneself on the basis of one’s behaviour (Baumeister & Bushman, 2011). However, the once-
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postulated privileged access to one’s thoughts seemed to be an overoptimistic account as soon as 
researchers became aware of various biases and limitations of self-knowledge (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Moreover, it was discovered shortly afterwards that people not only conceal their true selves from 
other people but are also good at self-deception. Altogether forming a reliable, coherent image of 
oneself is not an easy task. As it was wittily stated by Benjamin Franklin: “there are three Things 
extremely hard: Steel, a Diamond and to know one’s self”. 
Despite of these difficulties and reservations “knowing oneself” became a key skill required from 
participants of early psychological and sociological research. The advent of the self-report method in 
social sciences is dated at least from 1917 and the first personality scale (then named “data sheet”) 
introduced by Woodworth2. Soon, the self-reports entered also other research fields, including 
attitudes, behaviours, knowledge and skills measurement (Thurstone, 1928), becoming one of the 
dominant research methods whenever human subjects were considered. However, the researchers 
soon became preoccupied by potential response distortions (biases) and the threat to the validity of 
measurement they posed. One of the main troubles was a “tendency to give answers assumed to be 
socially approved” and “being warped by the subject’s desire to be other than he really is” (Bernreuter, 
1933). Other researchers were concerned by “faking”, understood as a lack of “honesty and sincere 
cooperation” from the part of the respondent (Allport, 1928). Frenkel-Brunswick (1939) differentiated 
between sincere and insincere self-reports ascribing the latter to “self-deception” or “auto-illusions”. 
Comparing the self-reports with judges opinions on participants’ behaviour, she noticed that 
participants omitted certain characteristics, characterised vices as virtues, justified the defects and 
minimised their importance among many other distortive tendencies in self-report. Frenkel-Brunswick 
ascribed the self-deceptions to social maladjustment and personality defects, in some cases even to 
psychopathology, and observed that they were correlated with personality traits, but not with 
intellectual ability (1939). She believed that self-deception may perform a role of defensive 
mechanism, being “comforting and helpful”, but also noted that responding to deficits with self-
deception may bring both good and bad consequences. The former from successful “impressive 
mechanisms”, helping adjusting to the environment, the latter from “keeping the individual unaware 
from his shortcomings”, namely, successful self-deception that prevented reading any feedback from 
the society. Obviously these views were borrowing heavily from Freudian theory that self-insight was 
limited by the defensive mechanisms which served to keep negative and harming information away 
from burdening the conscious self (Freud 1938/1941). Unfortunately, Frenkel-Brunswick’s research 
could not be continued due to the Anschluss that forced her to leave her native Austria and flee to the 
USA where she picked up different research topics, much influenced by her pre-war European 
experiences3. 
The above-mentioned studies were among the first where the threat to measurement validity from 
“self-deception” or “faking” was named and explored. However, the early attempts of Frenkel-
Brunswick and others to investigate the correlates and mechanisms of this phenomenon were largely 
replaced by a pragmatic quest to find the best method to capture and control the bias. This atheoretical 
approach (Zickar & Gibby, 2006) caused much trouble to the discipline in the following years. However, 
back in 1930s, as the personality testing business was growing, the researchers were urged to find a 
 
2 I consciously omit here the very early attempts of Wundt and Titchener as they were not addressed by the core 
researchers in the response bias field. 







method to pre-empt response biases or at least control them in order to prevent them from distorting 
the scores of the best-selling measurement tools, widely applied in industrial, work and organisational 
contexts, e.g. in employees selection. This urge was especially fuelled by the research findings of e.g. 
Steinmetz (1932), Bernreuter (1933) or Vernon (1934) that indicated, too much woe of the researchers, 
that participants are both motivated and able to manipulate their responses in order to make certain 
impression or simply to achieve high score enabling to obtain a job. Apart from selecting or promoting 
best suited applicants the early response bias research was also obsessed with screening out the 
maladjusted, disturbed and potentially delinquent candidates/workers (Gibby & Zickar, 2008) that 
could potentially lied or try to “hack” the measurement in order to avoid identification. Another field 
of research that was much preoccupied with participants’ dissimulation was clinical and forensic 
psychology that faced a serious threat of using distorted data in their practice. Hence, the early 
research endeavours identified two types of response distortions: a) deliberate (often referred to as 
“conscious”) tendencies to yield untrue self-image, to deceive others on purpose, most often called 
“faking” or simply “lying” and b) an unconscious (or less conscious) penchant for presenting oneself in 
a better light, most often named “self-deception” or “defensiveness”, which role was believed to 
protect self-esteem and self-beliefs (Paulhus, 1986). However, no established methods were available 
at hand to control for these biases in self-report data. 
2.1.2 Early methods to control for SDR bias 
Therefore, as there was no Delphian oracle nearby to aid them in knowing the participants better, the 
early researchers plunged into conceiving the best methods to control for response biases in self-
report data. One of the first attempts was taken by Hartshorne and May (1930) who were devoted in 
a basic research of finding character (personality) traits that were related to lying and created a self-
report scale that was devised to identify dishonest responders. The researchers also laid the 
foundations for the dual perception of dishonest responses: as stemming from trait-like characteristics 
of respondent but also originating from “transient needs and opportunities to deceive”, created by the 
measurement situation (cf. Ziegler, 2015). This approach was to become a prototype in the field- to 
create a specially tailored self-report scale that, unknowingly to the respondent, would reveal any 
distorting tendencies in her responses. This kind of self-report would later on be known as “lie scales”. 
This was precisely the name given to another such instrument, created by Hathaway and McKinley 
(1943) in order to control for faking in personality self-reports used in clinical settings. This scale was 
soon succeeded by the so-called “K scale”, which role was to “detect (…) defensiveness” (Meehl & 
Hathaway, 1946). The scale was constructed by picking up items that best discriminated between 
subjects diagnosed as abnormal vs. normal by clinicians, but that had normal profiles from the 
personality tests. Moreover, the authors of the scale wanted that the scale itself did not capture any 
specific construct but instead measured only pure response bias. In their own words: “[it] was not 
assumed to be measuring anything which in itself is of psychiatric significance” (Paulhus, 1986). The K 
scale, along with the L scale (for Lie scale), soon became part of the then most popular personality 
questionnaire, the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), constituting one of the 
methods’ validity scales, included to control for response biases (Hathaway & McKinley, 1951). Thus, 
the MMPI entered the research practice guarded by several validity scales: K, measuring self-deception 
tendencies, L, capturing faking good and F, which was an interesting innovation in the MMPI intended 
to measure faking bad (malingering) tendencies.  
The approach consisting in creating special scales to identify distorted response profiles became very 
popular henceforth and it will be addressed again in this dissertation in the review of contemporary 
methods to control for response biases (mainly in the subchapter 4.5).  
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A somewhat distinct method was used by Humm and Humm (1944) in order to control for the “bias of 
frankness” in the validity studies of their personality scale HWTS (Humm-Wadsworth Temperament 
Scale). Their method was named the No-count as it was based on simply counting the number of “No” 
responses among the 318 items of the questionnaire and comparing the count with some quite 
arbitrary norms of what number of “No” answers was deemed acceptable or unacceptable by the 
authors of the scale4. In fact this approach was quite similar to the one adopted in the MMPI, the main 
difference was that Humm and Humm advocated to count the number of certain responses in the 
same measurement tool that was to be shielded from distortion, whereas the MMPI approach was 
based on adding additional tools (and quite long) to the proper construct scale. Humm and Humm later 
on proposed also additional uses of the No-count technique: plotting profile scores and counting a 
deviation of a given score from the mode of scores in a given scale (1947).  
Different method to control for response biases was proposed by Ruch (1942). It was based on 
comparing two scores- one when participants were instructed to respond honestly and one were told 
to respond as if they were applying for a real job. By comparing the two scores Ruch was hoping to 
identify the fakers. However, the method soon revealed its problems- it was difficult if not impossible 
to distinguish someone truly high on a given trait, from a distorted profile achieving the same high 
score (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Despite this inherent limitation the Ruch’s technique gained significant 
popularity and will be also referred to later on in the work (subchapter 4.5). 
2.1.3 Response sets concept 
Apart from faking and self-deception also a third type of response distortion was identified early on in 
the literature- these were the so-called “work methods” (Seashore, 1939) and “response sets” 
(Cronbach, 1946). Seashore defined the former as individualised patterns of behaviour adopted during 
learning or during solving a problem such as a psychological test (including personality measures under 
“test”). He believed them to be a source of significant inter-individual variability and called to control 
them in psychological measures. Cronbach defined the latter as “any tendency causing a person 
consistently to give different responses to test items than he would when the same content is 
presented in a different form”. Despite the different terms and definitions both researchers have 
thought about the same idea- that according to the measurement theory the content of an item should 
be the only source of variability. However, it is not the case, as many other sources exist, e.g. item 
form, measurement context, individual differences in responding techniques, all have its influence on 
score variance. Seashore argued that the very same respondent can achieve very different scores 
depending on the responding technique used (1939). Seashore stated that mainly thinking about 
performance tests (e.g. motor skills measurement), but Cronbach adopted his way of thinking and 
generalised it also to self-reports (1941)5.  
 
4 Scores of 194 or more “No” answers or 144 or less of them were considered unacceptable (Humm & Humm, 
1944). It seems that the numbers were just loose criterions set on the basis of scores distributions. On the basis 
of this it can be inferred that the expected number of “No” answers was estimated around 50% of the total 
number of answers. 
5 Probably the first work that pointed out that other factors than content of items were influencing responses in 
self-reports was Thorndike, who in 1920 described his works on the halo effect. He discovered that ratings on 
seemingly unrelated traits were correlated, indicating that participants used some kind of response technique, 
e.g. they inferred on a trait from other traits, or used an overall impression to rate every other detailed aspect 
of a person. Thorndike was thinking mostly about the physical appearance as the basis of all other ratings, but 
his discovery was further developed by Rundquist & Sletto (1936) and Lorge (1937) towards understanding halo 
effects in a response set manner. Applying acquiescent response set would also result in correlations observed 
by Thorndike (Cronbach, 1946). 
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Among the response sets distinguished by Cronbach were: speed vs. accuracy, caution vs. 
incaution/gambling, acquiescence, differences in defining response categories (especially vague terms 
like “desirable”, “frequently”, etc.) and inclusiveness (1946). The last two effects are now classified as 
response effects, variations in self-report responses resulting from minor characteristics of 
measurement tool form, design or administration, as it was stated above, these group of biases will 
not be described in detail in this work. On the other hand, the other response sets described by 
Cronbach are mostly comprised within the response bias framework and often researched together 
with faking or self-deception topics (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Acquiescence, defined as tendency to 
endorse positive response options (e.g. “true”, “I agree”, “right”, etc.) independently of item content, 
gained a lot of research attention henceforth (Baer, Rinaldo & Berry, 2003)6.  
Cronbach’s another important contribution was the question about the response sets stability- are 
they only “temporary sets” or could they be more stable “habitual techniques of performance”? This 
differentiation between transient and stable character of certain response biases proved to be an 
important differentiation in further research attempts. Cronbach himself found evidence for both 
temporally stable and changing response sets, pointing the latter as the most serious validity threat of 
all the response sets types (1950).  
Similarly important question was whether the response sets are only “incidental sources of error” or 
whether they reflect meaningful traits? Cronbach observed that to a minimal extend the response sets 
were correlated with “external variables such as attitudes, interests and personality” (Cronbach, 1950). 
He even called response sets a paradox, as they are a convolution of meaningful variance and 
measurement interference. However, this character of the response sets may be the result of the 
imprecise nature of the methods used to identify them, hence Cronbach urged the quest to devise “a 
pure measure of the response set itself” (1950). Along the methods proposed to prevent the response 
sets (e.g. tailoring test design, response format, instructions form, etc.) were also methods meant to 
correct for response sets, but separating the “constant error” from trait variance proved to be a very 
difficult task. Cronbach argued that only such pure measures could be used as a suppressor variables, 
which would be an ideal way of separating the variance sources in a regression equation. 
This call was in general backed up by Jackson and Messick (1958), however, they have also proposed 
some alterations to the Cronbach’s concepts. They have suggested to change an ambiguous "set" to a 
simpler "style" and viewed "style" as a potential expression of construct-relevant characteristics, not 
only as a measurement nuisance. They have also criticised the existing measures as confounding style 
with content, hence not offering a clear measurement of neither. Jackson and Messick opposed views 
of Gage, Leavitt and Stone (1957) who claimed that response sets are fortunate, because oftentimes 
they lead to higher criterion-related validity, by pointing that response sets compromise construct 
validity: "conglomerate indices containing both content and style will not suffice and will confuse the 
issues". Jackson and Messick (1958) also advocated the development of new response sets/styles 
measures on the basis of theoretical advancements and criticised the then-popular data-driven 
approach. Finally, they have indicated that various response sets/styles can be related to each other 
and can even interact, as it was often postulated in case of acquiescence and SDR. They research also 
 
6 The effect is believed to be discovered by Martin F. Fritz in 1927, who noticed that in a true-false medical 
knowledge test with a balanced number of correct true and false answers the respondents chosen true response 
option in 62% of the items. Fritz concluded that the guessing “was not equivalent to the tossing of a  penny”. 
Fritz, however, did not use the term “acquiescence” in his publication. It was probably brought to the social 
sciences (in this sense) only by T.F. Lentz in 1938. 
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paved way to the later conceptions seeing SDR more as a personality trait than a measurement 
artefact. 
It is worth to note, that Jackson and Messick’s article also brought some definitional confusion as many 
articles used the terms “response sets” and “response styles” interchangeably, without much 
reflection upon their intended meanings. The matter was clarified by Paulhus (2002), who provided 
clear-cut definitions terming “response styles” as “biases that are consistent across time and 
questionnaires” (according to the Jackson and Messick’s view of response style as an á la trait entity) 
and “response sets” as “short-lived biases attributable to some temporary distraction or motivation” 
(in relation to Cronbach’s idea of sets as measurement errors). Paulhus also added elsewhere (2003) 
that when a distortion is stable across time and measurement contexts and has its own “cognitive 
and/or motivational roots” then “they can be studied as personality traits in their own right (…) with 
their importance going well beyond the self-report measures” (see also Wetzel, Lüdtke, Zettler & 
Böhnke, 2016). Therefore, there are two dimensions around which response sets and styles can be 
defined and differentiated: temporal status and relation to substantial, construct-related variance. 
Response styles are defined as stable and related to some substantial, trait-like variability, whereas 
response sets are believed transient and trivial, conveying only error, construct-irrelevant variance. 
2.1.4 Edwards’ conceptions and their critique 
As a way to find better methods of response sets corrections Cronbach saw item-level analysis, 
pointing out that item is not constant for every person but that the response is to the item and it is a 
function of inter-individual variables and item characteristics. Among the key item features driving 
response set answers were item difficulty and vagueness (1950). Edwards continued with this line of 
reasoning and added another item feature critical for the validity of the scale- item social desirability 
(1953). Edwards provided evidence that the item endorsement is strictly correlated with its perceived 
social desirability. His point of departure was an observation that traits’ social desirability may be 
responsible for high correlations observed among personality scales (1957). In his further research 
attempts he managed to accumulate evidence that social desirability responding (SDR) could be 
qualified a response set sensu Cronbach, but also considered that this tendency can be “a fairly stable 
personality characteristic” (Edwards, 1957).  
He also commented that what participants really perceive as socially desirable need to be thoroughly 
checked, as it tended to change across groups (e.g. professions) or across cultures, thus comparing a 
trait endorsement in a given number of groups, one should first ascertain that the measurement tools’ 
items have similar social desirability in all of the groups. Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
determine whether the differences stem from the difference on trait level or the difference in items’ 
social desirability (1957). Moreover, Gordon (1951) stated that within-group trait desirability is 
correlated with the application of this trait to a given participant, on the basis of which the popularity 
of this trait in a given group is determined and it is from this popularity that the social desirability of a 
trait is determined7. 
Edwards thought that socially desirable responding is present in both faking and self-deception and 
came up with a scale measuring SDR tendencies in self-reports. To this end he mixed the items picked 
from several MMPI scales (K, L, F and Manifest Anxiety(MAS)) that were assessed as most socially 
desirable by a set of judges. From these items he formed a new scale to measure SDR tendencies which 
 
7 In other words: a medical doctor perceiving herself as intelligent would claim that in her professional group 
there are a lot of intelligent individuals and that intelligence is highly valued (socially desirable) among the 
physicians. Someone with different self-perception might have different opinion on this matter. 
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he called Edwards’ Social Desirability Scale (Edwards’ SDS; 1957), providing yet another measurement 
tool to control for response distortions in self-reports. 
However, the validity of this new measure was quickly questioned by Crowne and Marlowe (1960). 
These two researchers criticised the foundations of the Edwards’ scale, namely the method used to 
pick the items from the whole MMPI. Selecting the items from an inventory intended for clinical 
purposes put in doubt the interpretability of scores in case of normal populations. Many items had 
clear psychopathological, abnormal implications, e.g. sleep problems. Hence, a researcher could never 
be sure, whether respondents denying such items in fact did not suffer from these problems or 
whether they were responding desirably. This meant that the scale’s score would be always a confound 
of the socially desirable responding tendencies and psychopathological symptoms. Crowne and 
Marlowe have hence criticised the Edwards’ SDS content validity as it defined SDR only in a very narrow 
sense of denying or accepting maladjustment and clinical problems. To solve these issues they have 
proposed creating a new scale without drawing the items from the MMPI. A new set of items was 
prepared with a main target to contain socially approved and culturally sanctioned behaviours which 
were, however, “improbable of occurrence”. These items were meant to be without any 
psychopathological implications and to measure SDR independently from clinical traits. Crowne and 
Marlowe have confirmed certain independence of their scale by achieving lower correlations with 
various MMPI scales than were achieved by the Edwards’ SDS (1960). By preparing this scale the 
researchers have provided a less extreme scale, better suited for general populations. Also, a new 
conception of SDR was put forth as it was defined as need of social approval, “the need of subjects to 
respond in culturally sanctioned ways”, thus Crowne and Marlowe were playing down the explanations 
like faking and self-deception, paying more attention to the social context of measurement and group 
norms (1960). Their scale, named Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS, written also M-
C SDS or MCSDS), was to become the most popular SDR scale for the next 25 years (Paulhus, 1986). 
However, the research on the dimensionality of the SDR scales and other “stylistic” measures brought 
significant doubts regarding the conclusions reached by Edwards (1957) and Crowne and Marlowe 
(1960). Messick (1960), using factor analysis, provided evidence that SDR scales and similar 
instruments did not converge to one dimension, but instead formed a lot of different item clusters. 
Some of them were small, consisted of item doublets or triplets organised around a semantic issue, 
but some of them seemed legitimate factors representing underlying constructs. Messick not only 
questioned the unidimensionality of SDR (assumed by Edwards’ and Crowne and Marlowe’s 
measures), but also put in doubt that social desirability can be measured in many research populations, 
as subjects may differ markedly in their “conformity to the group consensus of desirability”. It is also 
worth to note, that Messick had significant problems in interpreting the isolated factors. The research 
with the use of factor analysis as a main tool continued and brought interesting results in the work of 
Wiggins (1964), who factor-analysed many scales, including the MMPI, Edwards’ SDS, MCSDS and 
various tools measuring authoritarianism, acquiescence and related concepts. The analysis yielded six 
factors, three of which were interpreted by Wiggins as related to SDR (one was related to 
acquiescence, one to conformity and one to construct related to authoritarian personality). Among the 
three factors related to SDR Wiggins differentiated “non-endorsement of pathology” (labelled alpha 
or “popular responses”), “endorsement of desirable but infrequently possessed traits” (labelled 
gamma or simply “lying”)8 and “cautious, controlled good-impression”. The last two scales were 
 
8 The little informative labels „alpha” and “gamma” are ascribed to Block (1962/1965), who suggested these 
neutral terms to describe the three MMPI stylistic dimensions he discovered due to huge controversies regarding 
their interpretation. Factor I was labelled “alpha”, factor II “beta” and factor III “gamma”. Factor alpha was 
thought-of as self-deception, beta as acquiescence and gamma as lying/faking. Block’s work was published in 
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correlated with each other. The general pattern was similar to the one obtained by other researchers 
in a similar time, e.g. Edwards, Diers and Walker (1962). This evidence also disconfirmed the 
unidimensionality of socially desirable responding, but proposed only tentative approaches regarding 
the interpretation of the isolated factors. Wiggins also noticed that some of the newly proposed one-
dimensional SDR scales, including the MCSDS, loaded on more than one SDR factor, among those found 
in his research (1964). 
2.1.5 First integrations of the field 
Damarin and Messick (1965) were the first to provide a comprehensive review of response styles 
research to date, they have also proposed more elaborative theories about the discerned 
communalities between the SDR scales. To perform this analysis they have reviewed more than 20 
factor analytic studies based on questionnaires and performance tests that were conducted on 
different samples (e.g. college students, school children, air force cadets, etc.). Data from many 
laboratories were used and all major response biases then-known were the scope of their research 
(acquiescence, social desirability responding, extremity response style). 
The researchers noticed that the desirable responding “seems to be at once the most important and 
the most elusive” of all the response styles, pointing to many difficulties in measuring it. Among many 
others they pointed to the lack of methods to verify participants’ accuracy, which is needed both to 
perform criterion validity studies and to truly verify that someone is misrepresenting one’s personality 
or abilities ratings. Moreover, they observed that many measures of SDR tendencies were in fact 
convolution of many variance sources, disentangling of which was not always possible using the factor 
analytic methods. Finally, they have emphasised the importance of theoretical advances that were 
needed to interpret the growing and confusing body of evidence.   
Their extensive review led to the differentiation of two main factors underlying the SDR concept- one 
of them related to bias in self-regard and the other linked with bias in self-report (1965). The former 
is believed to stem from an interaction of certain traits and attitudes towards the self with the process 
of responding in self-reports. Damarin and Messick enumerated various related constructs like anxiety, 
self-esteem or self-confidence. They also turned attention towards autism9, which they defined as 
affective distortion of the “cognitive picture” (attitudes, judgments, etc.) leading to misconceptions 
about one’s traits and attitudes. This “autistic bias of self-regard” (Paulhus, 1986) was described as 
maintaining one’s positive image by distorting the reality in favour of the self once the self-image was 
threatened. In this sense this factor was related to the self-deceptive and defensiveness line of the SDR 
research and was linked with ego-protection/resiliency concept. Damarin and Messick linked it also to 
the research of Frenkel-Brunswick (1939), psychodynamic theories of repression and also to some very 
much practical questions of the accuracy of self-appraisal. They have also pointed out that the 
discovered multidimensionality of these tendencies (e.g. Messick, 1960) might be related to the fact 
that what was perceived as socially desirable or undesirable seemed to be characterised by substantial 
inter-group and inter-individual variability. This remark was used as a basis for a call of more studies 
looking for individual differences in response biases. 
 
1965 as a book, but circulated as a manuscript already from 1962, hence the terms are attributed to him despite 
the Wiggins’ article from 1964 was probably the first to use them in (official) print. 
9 Damarin and Messick (1965) use this term according to Murphy (1947) who defined autism as a state when 
“affective states distort the cognitive picture of reality so that the person is misled”. This definition and its 




On the other hand, the bias in self-report was called as “propagandistic bias”, “aimed at producing a 
specific effect on a specific audience”. This bias was hence regarded as a motivated, deliberate 
manipulating of one’s image in order to achieve certain “goals and purposes”. It was stated that the 
content of such self-presentations could vary from occasion to occasion according to what image was 
deemed more socially approved on a given occasion. This bias was related with the need of social 
approval and conformist behaviour. However, using the MCSDS to measure it was not advocated, as 
the scale correlated with both biases which pointed to its interpretation as a blend of various 
constructs. The propagandistic bias was related to the faking/lying line of research, withal Damarin 
and Messick criticised the use of such umbrella, sobriquet terms as “faking” or “lying” as, in their 
opinion, they did not reflect the level of precision needed to describe all the relevant stages “of 
awareness” between “conscious accuracy and conscious misinterpretation in self-report” (1965). 
The researchers also pondered on the issue of self-report accuracy and its relation with SDR. The point 
of departure of this thinking was a constatation that self-reports are distorted also in low-stakes, non-
threatening and anonymous research conditions where, in fact, there is no special pressure on 
participants to respond desirably. Hence, they have put forward a theory that the observed self-report 
score is an interplay of SDR tendencies, desirability of characteristics underlying the items, accuracy of 
self-perception and biases in the accuracy of self-perception and in the perceived desirability of 
characteristics. Obviously, to assess an individual’s self-accuracy some external criteria (non-self-
report measures) were needed. Regrettably, the researchers did not develop this theory further on 
(Messick, 1987), despite that some other researchers confirmed the importance of self-accuracy in 
reporting (e.g. Paulhus, 1984). 
Damarin and Messick (1965) also noted that the two identified dimensions, bias in self-regard and bias 
in self-report, were “relatively uncorrelated”. This was interpreted as a piece of evidence to 
corroborate the dual nature of SDR- as a personality-like trait and as a situational phenomenon. This 
view was present in the field since the very first research by Hartshorne and May (1930). The Damarin 
and Messick’s research also concluded that bias in self-regard was responsible for more variability in 
the questionnaire scores than bias in self-report. 
The deepened analyses of SDR and its factors brought by Damarin and Messick surprisingly failed to 
fuel further inquiry in the field as the SDR research reached its peak in 1960s and then saw a decline 
in the subsequent decade (Paulhus, 1986; 1991). Probably this was caused by a certain inertia of the 
methods used- the knowledge could not be pushed further with simple factor analyses of self-reports. 
It needed more theoretical and methodological advancements to move forward again. 
2.1.6 Conception of Sackeim and Gur 
The subsequent research was continued by Sackeim and Gur (1978) who concentrated their efforts on 
the larger of the two SDR factors: bias in self-regard/self-deception. The researchers concocted 
experimental psychology, psychophysiological methods, philosophy of mind and psychodynamics 
theory in a mixture that managed to bring new point of view, much needed in the response biases 
field. Sackeim and Gur (1978) departed with a question: “How it is possible at all, that people are 
capable of self-deception?” They continued with a statement that self-deception would constitute an 
insolvable paradox if the consciousness would be regarded as unitary and transparent. Hence, no 
serious research on self-deception is possible without assuming that consciousness is at least non-
transparent, namely that an individual does not have full and immediate access to every element (e.g. 
thought, judgment, etc.) of consciousness. Sackeim and Gur also argued that this non-transparency of 
consciousness is actively organised and motivated by an individual, in other words, that there is a 
certain goal behind each process of self-deception. The authors saw this goal in a defence against 
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threatening stimuli and perceived self-deception as a grounding for all defensive mechanisms. 
Importantly, they have also added that “motivational” does not mean “intentional”, which 
differentiates self-deception from lying or faking and argued that unintentional lying is not possible, 
whereas unintentional deception (self- or other-) is. They have also formulated four conditions 
necessary and sufficient to speak about self-deception: “a) The individual holds two contradictory 
beliefs (p and not-p). b) These two contradictory beliefs are held simultaneously. c) The individual is 
not aware of holding one of the beliefs. d) The act that determines which belief is and which is not 
subject to awareness is a motivated act.” From these points it can be clearly seen that their theory was 
heavily influenced by a psychodynamic approach. In other words, Sackeim and Gur proposed that a 
given individual at the same time holds two contradictory judgements: e.g. “I am good at math” and “I 
am not good at math”, but that only one of these beliefs is available to the conscious self. The non-
threatening “I am good at math” will be selected as the negative “I am not good at math” would be 
most probably frowned upon by teachers and/or parents and would be threatening to one’s self-
esteem.   
Sackeim and Gur (1978) brought some evidence to back-up their theory. In example, in an experiment 
where participants had to recognise voices on tape recordings some of them did not recognise their 
own voice while their psychophysiological responses (e.g. skin conductance) showed that they have 
recognised it correctly. Moreover, the rate of these denials correlated positively with self-report 
measures of self- and other-deception constructed by the authors (1978). In an another article Sackeim 
and Gur (1979) presented validity evidence for their two 20-item each measurement tools: Self-
Deception Questionnaire (SDQ) and Other-Deception Questionnaire (ODQ). The SDQ items concerned 
mainly threatening and unpleasant thoughts and feelings: hatred, guilt, aggression, socially 
disapproved sexual fantasies, etc., in general “statements (…) universally true but psychologically 
threatening” (Paulhus, 1984) and with a “psychoanalytic flavour” (Paulhus, 1986). The items had an 
entirely intrapsychic character as they all treated about internal psychic states and feelings 
unobservable by anyone from outside. On the other hand, the ODQ was a conglomerate of items about 
overt behaviours that were “culled from various lie scales” (Sackeim & Gur, 1979) and depicted socially 
approved but practically infrequent behaviours. The scales correlated negatively with measures of 
psychopathology, e.g. depression. The authors concluded that this did not mean that self-deceivers 
are on average absolved from psychopathology but that they are less susceptible to admit to it. They 
also saw this result as yet another sign that self-deception is a greater threat to self-reports validity 
than other-deception. The SDQ and ODQ correlated positively in their research, suggesting that self- 
and other-deception might have more in common than assumed by Damarin and Messick (1965; 
Sackeim & Gur, 1979). 
2.1.7 Paulhus’ models: toward modern conception of SDR 
Paulhus (1984) stepped in next to verify the SDQ/ODQ validity and to deepen the research on these 
two promising scales. He tested their relationship to the Alpha/Gamma model proposed by Block 
(1965) and Wiggins (1964) by conducting the convergent validity study in which he included all the 
most popular SDR measures then available: MMPI K scale (“lie scale”), Edwards’ SDS, MCSDS and 
Wiggins’ SD scale. The factors that emerged from the analysis clearly resembled the Alpha/Gamma 
dimensions and supported the interpretation of SDQ as a measure of self-deception and the 
understanding of ODQ as a gauge of other-deception. However, the precise analysis of the content of 
the items that loaded on the other-deception factor pushed Paulhus to slightly alter its name and 
interpretation (1984).  
Moreover, he noticed certain psychometric and methodological faults of the SDQ/ODQ. The most 
important of them were: all the SDQ items were negatively-keyed, whereas the ODQ only had 
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positively-keyed positions. This caused obvious methodological problems but also interpretational 
complications- some might rise a suggestion that the SDQ did not measure self-deception but rather 
denial of negative attributes and that the ODQ was not a measure of other-deception but of accepting 
positive attributes. This posed a clear threat of confusing the traits of interest with acquiescence 
response style. What is more, not all of the items loaded highly on their destined factors and some of 
them had minor wording problems. Paulhus (1984) managed to fix these problems by rewriting the 
items and balancing the keying within the scales. He also conducted another convergent validity study 
with the new items and confirmed its construct validity by obtaining correlations with other SDR 
measures consistent to the theory and by extracting the two predicted factors. Similarly as in the 
Sackeim and Gur scales (1979) the two factors were correlated, as confirmed in a subsequent 
confirmatory factor analysis where an oblique model fitted the data better than an orthogonal one. 
Paulhus named the factors self-deception (SD) and impression management (IM) and called his scale 
Balanced Inventory of Desired Responding (BIDR). This scale generated significant interest from the 
researchers worldwide but never completely replaced the MCSDS as a main SDR-measuring tool 
despite its obvious supreme theoretical and psychometric characteristics10. 
In the following endeavours Paulhus (1984) conducted an experimental study in which he used an 
instruction manipulation paradigm similar to the one devised by Ruch (1942). The experiment used a 
between-subjects design where one group answered the BIDR items under standard research 
instructions, in a large-group setting and anonymously. Second group answered them in small groups 
in a proctored session and had to give their name and phone number. Moreover, the instructions 
stated that the experimenters (proctors) were going to review their answers to check if they had 
understood the questions correctly. In this manner Paulhus simulated public condition in which he 
expected the impression management tendencies to emerge more than in anonymous condition. The 
results obtained confirmed his expectations: the IM scores were higher under public condition than 
under anonymous condition but the self-deception scores remained the same in two conditions. This 
urged Paulhus to constate that impression management is a larger threat to the validity of self-reports 
than self-deception (this proposition was contrary to the main beliefs in the field, cf. Sackeim & Gur, 
1978). He also advocated purging its variance from any measures as in his opinion IM was only a 
response set, entirely context-dependent and without any substantive relations to psychological traits 
(“any intrinsic relation to central content dimensions”).  
Paulhus also recommended further research on self-deception character which he believed was 
comprised of two underlying dimensions: defensiveness against psychologically threatening motives 
and an as yet unidentified trait related to high self-esteem and low anxiety. He concluded that the 
latter dimension was a convolution of self-esteem, SDR, anxiety and accurate self-reports that was 
“difficult to tease apart psychometrically” (1984). Paulhus did not precise what motive would underlie 
this third dimension, however, in his next text (1986) he reflected on disentangling this type of self-
deception from a presentation of a genuinely well-adjusted, high self-esteem participant. He 
concluded that a moderate self-deception may have adaptive value and may help in coping with 
everyday difficulties. Paulhus also stated that this mild self-deception may underlie a number of 
psychological constructs, including control perception, achievement motivation and social dominance 
(1986). He also mentioned that due to the lack of adequate methods it was unable to tell apart self-
deceivers from participants accurately yielding a positive image of themselves. Paulhus concluded that 
 
10 It would probably take another PhD to precisely calculate the interest in both scales along the years but the 
Marlowe and Crowne’s main publication about the scale has around 5500 citations so far, including 80 in the 
year 2019, whereas the Paulhus’ 1984 article was as yet cited only 3500 times of which almost 200 come from 
the year 2019. All the numbers come from Google Scholar and obviously can be treated only as very unrefined 
measures of the scales’ popularity. 
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probably all self-report measures of self-deception were to some extent a compound tapping 
adjustment, self-deception and other, unmotivated biases at the same time (1986). He also came 
forward with a proposition to differentiate between acute and chronic self-deception, the first being 
a short and transient form of this phenomenon. The unmotivated biases were considered distinct from 
SDR as driven by cognitive or informational biases (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Cognitive biases stem from 
the way the human cognitive system process information and include, among others, memory biases, 
e.g. hindsight bias (Campbell & Tesser, 1983). Informational biases, on the other hand, are derived 
from restrictions on information availability, e.g. on the basis of social conventions that in general 
enjoin refraining from negative remarks about someone’s performance, behaviour, looks or 
personality or that admonish for passing bad news to people (cf., Tesser & Rosen, 1974). Hence, the 
research on self-deception needed new methods and new theories in order to unravel the self-
deception riddle. However, it was concluded that probably the positive bias of self-perception is a 
universal tendency that manifests itself in many (all?) traits (Paulhus, 1986). 
Paulhus also integrated new evidence on impression management (IM), concluding that there were 
three possible views of this construct: a) strategic presentation, b) motive, c) skill (1986). The first one 
claims that every social situation has an ideal image that can be presented to “the audience” in order 
to achieve some instrumental gains. Jones and Pittman (1982) presented a taxonomy of IM strategies, 
that included ingratiation, threatening and self-promoting among others. However, as it was pointed 
by DeMaio (1984) in many research situations “the audience”11, especially defined as the society in 
general, is a very vague concept and it seems unlikely that in such a wide gamut of measurement 
occasions participants would engage in IM only to pursue “instrumental gains”. In fact, in most of the 
research situations there is nothing to gain, even if we include social reinforcements here. This view 
was supported by Paulhus (1986; 1991) who claimed that in most of the cases IM is not a presentation 
in order to gain something, but a purpose in itself. In this sense IM is an autotelic motive to be liked by 
others or to achieve a respectful social position. Similarly, self-deception can be seen as an autotelic 
motive to like yourself. Finally, IM can be also viewed as a skill- some participants may be able to 
manipulate their images whereas other can be characterised by poor abilities in that matter. It was 
also deemed probable that certain personality types resort to IM more often than others (Paulhus, 
1986). 
Subsequent works were concentrated on refinement of the theoretical classification of different SDR 
types. Moreover, alternative explanations to those formed by Paulhus (1986) were formulated, as 
some researchers, e.g. Roth, Snyder and Pace (1986), proposed that the differentiation on self-
deception and impression management is not necessarily correct as the two-factor structure of SDR 
can be explained by alternative dimensions: enhancement and denial. The former was simply defined 
as affirming positive items (e.g. I am good at math; I am saint), the latter was denying negative items 
(e.g. I am bad at math; I am a sinner). However, the scale prepared by Roth et al. (1986) did not 
separate completely keying direction from positivity of an item, hence a certain ambiguity was left 
regarding whether which model was actually confirmed by their study. 
A thorough comparison of the two models was done by Paulhus and Reid (1991) who wrote 20 
additional items to the BIDR scale in order to measure self-deceptive enhancement and denial 
tendencies separately. The resulting questionnaire, named Self-Deceptive Denial scale (SDD) , was 
similar to the SDQ by Sackeim and Gur (1978) and contained mainly items denying aggressive 
behaviour and sexual fantasies (e.g. I can’t think of anyone I hate deeply; I have never felt like I wanted 
to kill somebody). Paulhus and Reid (1991) conducted three correlational studies where this new scale 
 
11 This notion appeared in the seminal papers of Damarin & Messick (1965) and Sackeim & Gur (1978), cf. Paulhus 
& Reid (1991). 
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was used along with other questionnaires: SDR, self-esteem, self-monitoring and other measures. The 
results showed that only the self-deception factor can be divided into enhancement and denial types, 
the impression management factor did not form separate dimensions. Moreover, self-deceptive denial 
subtype correlated to a large extent with the impression management scale, while correlated only 
modestly with self-deceptive enhancement (Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Study 1 and 2). 
In order to interpret the substantial interpretation of the emerging types of SDR correctly and to 
disentangle the keying-valence confound Paulhus and Reid (1991) constructed yet another scale where 
they separated keying direction from item valence. As a result a 2x2 design was created with items like 
I am a saint and I am not a sinner differing in valence but not in keying direction. A socially desirable 
response is “yes” for both the former and the latter while the former contains a positive word “saint” 
and the latter a negative one- “sinner”. On the other hand, positions like I am a sinner and I am not a 
sinner differ in keying direction but not in valence, as a socially desirable response is “no” for the 
former but “yes” for the latter, whereas both items contain a negative word “sinner”. The results of 
the study yielded much higher correlations between the items that have the same valence and 
different keying than vice versa, e.g. items I am a sinner and I am not a sinner correlated higher than 
items I am a saint and I am not a sinner. Paulhus and Reid interpreted them as pointing in favour of 
the enhancement/denial (valence) hypothesis over the keying direction one (1991, Study 3). Hence, 
the two new types of self-deception were called self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) and self-deceptive 
denial (SDD). What is more, they have also provided a set of intercorrelations between SDR types and 
other measures that showed that SDE is related to good adjustment, e.g. high self-esteem and low 
anxiety, indicating that self-enhancing is somewhat related to building positive esteem. Paulhus and 
Reid hypothesised that the mechanism of it may be creating an illusion of control and competence 
and/or rejecting negative feedback (1991). SDD and IM are related closely to each other, which can be 
interpreted that denial behaviours are related more to conscious, other-related deception than 
unconscious self-deceiving. Paulhus and Reid also saw a possibility that the sensitive character of the 
SDD items was responsible for triggering such behaviour (1991). 
Nonetheless, the research of Roth et al. (1986) and Paulhus and Reid (1991) resulted in conclusion that 
the self-deception variance could be separated into two distinctive constructs: self-deceptive 
enhancement and self-deceptive denial. Both were believed to be distortive for self-perception but 
not related to the presence in front of an audience. It is also worthy to note that these conclusions 
meant that with every other further refinement more and more SDR types were proposed as the 
theory evolved from a one-dimensional proposals (e.g. Edwards’ conception) to a three-dimensional 
one (Paulhus and Reid, 1991).  
The appearance of new SDR forms led to an attempt to study their nomological network further on. 
This endeavour was taken up by Paulhus and John (1998) who analysed links between SDR types and 
numerous socio-psychological traits. In their analysis of the relation between SDR and personality traits 
(Big Five framework was used) they found out that both self-deceptive enhancement and self-
deceptive denial correlated with personality traits but that they also formed a distinctive network, 
similar to a two dimensional structure of self-deception: enhancement was related to traits like 
surgence, dominance or intellect, whereas denial correlated with agreeableness, nurturance and 
dutifulness (similar results in Paulhus et al., 2003, where enhancement was related mostly to 
extraversion). According to the expectations, self-enhancement also correlated with narcissism12, as 
narcissists commonly exaggerate their achievements and skills (Raskin & Hall, 1981). Paulhus and John 
(1998) aimed to interpret this pattern by referring to two values and motives identified in sociology 
 
12 In this line of research narcissism is treated as a personality trait, not as a clinical syndrome. 
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and social psychology: agency and communion. These two notions were identified as basic values 
introduced to everyone in the process of socialisation. Agency is understood as valuing strength, 
competence, independence, individuality, achievement, whereas communion means placing value on 
taking care about relationships, being a good, rule-abiding, agreeable member of society (Bakan, 1966; 
Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Wojciszke, 1994). Communion and agency were also defined as “general 
thematic clusterings (…) which may be mirrored in conscious values, specific attitudes, particular 
interests, stylistic traits, characteristic self-schemata and social motives (…)” (McAdams, 1985). 
Paulhus and John (1998) concluded that the interpretation of self-deception in the light of agency-
communion framework would mean that self-deception is much more than just a response style, but 
it should be rather understood as a fundamental trait of human self-perception as the two basic values 
“give rise to two motives: need for power and need for approval”. These motives result in inter-
individually varied tendencies towards exaggeration of agentic or communal traits. This exaggeration 
results in systematic biases of self-perception. According to this model “values lead inexorably to 
biases” (Paulhus & John, 1998). Importantly, both tendencies were ascribed adaptive, self-protective 
character. Moreover, it was suggested that men and women should have different proneness towards 
the two biases: men should incline more into agentic bias (deception on traits related to agency), 
whereas women should yield more moralistic bias (deception on traits related to communion) (Paulhus 
& John, 1998). 
These results brought change in the theoretical SDR models proposed by Paulhus (1986). In the earlier 
models bias consciousness was the main difference between the SDR types: self-deception was 
believed to be an unconscious tendency and impression management- a conscious one. The new 
results prompted an amendment to this model by setting agency versus communion as the new critical 
difference between different SDR types. Within the two main frameworks both conscious (impression 
management, faking) and unconscious (self-deception, enhancement, denial) biases are possible 
(Paulhus & John, 1998). In line of these conclusions, Alpha and Gamma factors proposed by Wiggins 
(1964) and Sackeim and Gur (1978) were reinterpreted as agentic and communal bias, respectively. In 
this way the noncommittal labels were put into an interpretative framework and set into a nomological 
network of antecedent motives and correlated traits. 
This understanding of SDR would explain its prevalence even in low-stakes, low-threat contexts. 
According to this line of reasoning SDR, strictly speaking one of its types, self-deception, is always 
present in every measurement situation that require any self-insight or self-evaluative action from a 
respondent as any of these actions is distorted by inherent biases of self-perception. These biases led 
to an over-optimistic, over-positive opinion about oneself, an exaggerated “global self-positivity” 
(Paulhus & John, 1998). It is worthy to note, that the scope of self-deceptive biases is much larger than 
previously postulated by Sackeim and Gur who limited them to only sexual and aggressive (in general: 
socially inappropriate) content (1978). Moreover, an adaptive role of self-deceptive tendencies and 
their inter-individual variability were also proposed. What is more, the results and interpretations of 
Paulhus and John (1998) for the first time brought an idea that SDR can actually be both a response 
style (in case of self-deceptive tendencies) and a response set (in case of impression management), 
depending on person characteristics and/or measurement context.     
2.2 Modern views on SDR 
2.2.1 Paulhus’ (2002) model 
In his seminal article from 2002 Paulhus summed up the history of the SDR research and briefed the 
state-of-the-art. SDR was defined as an overly positive image of oneself, with the word “overly” being 
a critical word in this definition as it is the departure from reality that is pivotal to classify a desirable, 
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positive self-description as a response bias. Another crucial consideration regards SDR character and 
context: both proved to be much more general and widespread than it was previously believed. SDR 
evolved from a concept present in a limited number of occasions, mainly threatening, intrusive 
situations (cf. Sackeim & Gur, 1978; 1979) and episodes of seeking social approval (Marlowe & Crowne, 
1960), to a general phenomenon present in every instance when self-report is performed. Moreover, 
the previously accepted key differentiation between SDR types that concentrated on the degree of 
awareness (e.g. Paulhus, 1986; Sackeim & Gur, 1978) has been changed to a crossed classification 
where consciousness of bias and content of self-report is equally important. Paulhus and John (1998) 
pointed that content can define the type of self-presentational strategies. This landmark conclusion 
helped to clarify certain issues in the SDR theory, e.g. why self-deception denial items (SDD) fell on the 
same factor as impression management items (IM)- simply they were both communal in character. 
Moreover, this new classification enabled to show that SDE and SDD scales, not only IM ones were also 
sensitive to instruction manipulations, just the content of instructions has to prompt agentic 
enhancement, not only communal motives. The most up-to-date SDR classification proposed by 
Paulhus (2002) contained four bias types (presented below). 
 
Figure 1. SDR classification system proposed by Paulhus (2002). An extension of the Paulhus (1984) 
model where SDR was divided only on self-deceptive enhancement and impression management. 
This new structure of SDR was reflected by Blasberg, Rogers and Paulhus (2013) who proposed a 
refinement to the BIDR measurement tool in order to contain the most recent theoretical 
advancements. New scales were proposed to measure both agentic and communal impression 
management, called jointly Bidimensional Impression Management Index (BIMI). The authors showed 
validity evidence that enables to confirm the BIMI addition to the BIDR as a valuable tool to measure 
impression management tendencies. However, to date the BIMI scales did not enjoy much interest 
from the researchers and its value is largely unverified.  
The acceptance of the above classification, linked closely to the basic meta-values of agency and 

















lying (as in e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968; Hathaway & McKinley, 1951; c.f. “lie scales” research). The 
new conception enclosed IM to self-presentation framework and the deliberate, motivated 
dissembling was practically limited only to a handful of contexts, among which job application 
occasions predominate where IM is most often called “faking” (faking good). Other context where a 
goal-oriented IM takes place is the forensic and clinical setting where both faking good and faking bad 
(malingering) may take place as a way to distort measurement tools in order to get a benefit (e.g. avoid 
punishment, get out of jail, obtain health leave). Interestingly, recent evidence suggested that faking 
good and faking bad may be driven by distinct mechanisms and that they are not just two sides of the 
same coin (Bensch, Maaß, Greiff, Horstmann, & Ziegler, 2019). Nonetheless, the current dissertation 
is focused on the other branch of the SDR tree and faking, either good or bad, is not in the centre of 
attention here. Excellent book-length compilations on faking (good) were edited by Griffith and 
Peterson (2008) and Ziegler, McCann and Roberts (2011). Malingering was covered e.g. by Morey and 
Lanier (1998) and Rogers and Bender (2018), see also Bensch and others (2019). 
Basing SDR hierarchy on the agency-communion framework leads also to interesting questions about 
the relations between distinct forms of SDR with each other. Results presented by Blasberg et al. (2013) 
showed that agentic and communal IM scales correlated13 only 0.10 under honest conditions, but 0.44 
under fake good conditions. This correlation was believed to stem mainly from “non-faking cluster” 
(around 11% of sample did not fake and this caused a low cluster-low cluster relation that induced 
inter-variable correlations). Interestingly, both scales were reactive to fake good instructions- 
researchers concluded that both agency and communion are valued and that the shape of their 
relation depends on the measurement context (Blasberg et al., 2013). This pattern of relationship is 
corroborated by Wiggins (1991) who determined the two dimensions as separate but with a possibility 
to interact or even enhance each other in certain social contexts. Wiggins claimed that “all 
combinations are possible”, hence an individual can yield large agentic bias and no communal bias or 
vice versa, no bias in both dimensions or large in both as there is no conflict between the dimensions 
(1991). 
The new classification of SDR also entails that under this term a response set or a response style can 
be meant thus ending the long dispute whether SDR is a set or a style. However, the acceptance of this 
view sparked a new debate concentrated around the question whether SDR is just a style or whether 
it can be thought of as a substance, namely a personality trait. Hence, the set versus style dispute was 
replaced by, equally heated, substance versus style debate. Some researchers noticed that positive, 
socially desirable self-reports are often confirmed by external sources of information, e.g. peer reports 
(McCrae & Costa, 1983). Moreover, partialling out SDR variance measured by SDR scales many times 
led to lowering the external validity of self-reports, thus indicating that the scales capture also 
(predominantly?) substantive, not spurious variance (Birenbaum & Montag, 1989; McCrae & Costa, 
1983; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996). There were also conceptions that SDR is in fact a personality 
trait, e.g. Block proposed ego-control and ego-resiliency traits that could capture the SDR variance 
(1965). There were also voices that SDR is not a serious threat as participants do not distort their self-
reports to a significant degree (Ones et al., 1996). Many of the arguments were refuted by Paulhus 
(2002) but the substance versus style discussion will be revisited in the section devoted to SDR control 
methods (4.5). 
 
13 Whenever a specific value of a “correlation” is given it is meant as a value of a zero-order (unpartialled, raw, 
gross) Pearson correlation coefficient unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
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2.2.2 Further integration: nomological network 
Paulhus also summed up the research on SDR nomological network that was significantly broaden by 
modern research efforts (2002). Personality correlates of SDR were found as the SDR scales correlated 
negatively with emotional stability and openness to experience and positively with extraversion and 
conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Ones et al., 1996). Surprisingly, agentic (Alpha-type) bias 
was related to intelligence measures (IQ). Also, larger agentic management for male than female and 
for Europeans than Asians was identified, pointing to cultural differences influencing SDR tendencies 
(Blasberg et al., 2013). Moreover, Paulhus and John (1998) suggested that “low cognitive complexity” 
participants should yield more SDR bias. Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) reported IM links with SDE, 
narcissism and hindsight bias, confirming earlier results of Paulhus and John (1998).  
Similar correlations with self-esteem, life satisfaction and depression scales led researchers to 
conclude that SDR can be related to good adjustment and have beneficial consequences for an 
individual (Paulhus & John, 1998). It is worthy to note, that only suggestions for self-enhancement 
(SDE) with adjustment were raised, impression management and self-deception denial seem unrelated 
to it. However, recent meta-analysis showed that benefits stemming from self-enhancement are 
indeed positive for personal adjustment, but they are “a mixed blessing” for interpersonal adjustment: 
most of the benefits in this area are most likely short-lived and self-enhancement can even lead to 
long-term deterioration of interpersonal adjustment (Dufner et al., 2019). Complementary, but more 
nuanced evidence, was presented by Taylor and Armor (1996) who suggested that self-enhancement 
as a trait may not be adaptive, but when used only as a strategic behaviour, applied when needed to 
boost self-esteem, it may lead to positive consequences. It is worthy to note the notions of 
“unmitigated agency” and “unmitigated communion”, both stemming from Bakan’s theory (1966). The 
two define extreme actions where one dimension of the dichotomy is promoted regardless the other 
and both can result in adverse inter- and intra-personal consequences (Helgeson & Fritz, 1999; 
Wiggins, 1991). It is probable, that negative long-term consequences of self-enhancement may come 
from unmitigated manifestations of agentic motives. 
All this key SDR discussions, substance vs. style and adaptive vs. maladaptive, made researchers aware 
that new methods of measuring and controlling SDR are needed. Especially the need of criterion-
related measures was voiced. Paulhus and John (1998) popularised new technique named self-
criterion residual (SCR) of comparing self- and other-reports treating the latter as a criterion of self-
reports. Moreover, new SDR scales, such as the BIMI, were proposed. 
Apart from methodological refinements, the SDR framework needs also further theoretical works 
including efforts to merge this paradigm with many other conceptually-related areas from the domain 
of social sciences. Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) initiated a series of attempts to integrate SDR research 
with related research fields of self-presentation, self-monitoring, self-enhancement, Dark Triad 
personality and self-esteem. Merging theoretical frameworks of related concepts enabled Paulhus and 
Trapnell (2008) to distinguish three trait-like characteristics related to individual differences in overly 
positive self-reports: a) attunement to self-presentational demands (attention to self-presentation), b) 
motivation to engage in self-presentation, c) amount of distortion in self-presentation (nature of image 
intended to present). The first trait would describe attending to demands of a given social situation 
and tailoring one’s behaviour to them. Self-monitoring and self-consciousness are among the traits 
that are thought to describe such social attunement. Both are often treated as skills that enable to 
gauge social demands and act according to them. Self-consciousness was often divided further into 
private, public and social anxiety (Buss, 1980). Other approach sees social attunement as a 
consequence (a facet?) of the classical personality trait- extraversion (John, Cheek & Klohnen, 1996). 
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Nonetheless, the Snyder’s approach of self-monitoring won the biggest popularity, probably also 
thanks to the research instrument conceived along with the theory (1974). 
Numerous motives were enlisted as possibly leading to self-presentational behaviours, among the 
most important frameworks were: self-promotion/self-protection (Arkin, 1981); self-enhancement, 
self-verification, self-evaluation (Swann, 1990; Leary, 2007); egoist (self-enhancement), politician 
(popularity), consistency-seeker (consistency) and scientist (truth) typologies (Robins & John, 1997). 
Finally, the nature of image presented is based on agency and community dimensions. However, there 
are difficulties with finding trait-like characteristic that would be related with the degree of distortion. 
Despite this research lacuna, it was sufficiently evidenced that the two fundamental meta-values 
organise the content of self-presentation and constitute two basic types of this behaviour (Lonnqvist, 
Verkasalo & Bezmenova, 2007; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008). 
2.2.3 Paulhus and Trapnell’s (2008) model 
Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) proposed to reorganise SDR theory along the two fundamental 
dimensions: the first one being context, the second content. The former is understood as contextual 
demands on self-presentation as exerted by measurement situation. The most important 
characteristic here is audience- if it is present then the context is deemed as public and it is related to 
higher SDR motivation. If it is not present, then the context is called private as the only “audience” is 
the self. Another important characteristic of measurement situation is stake, with high-stakes 
situations eliciting SDR more easily. Content is considered within the agency-community framework- 
different image of the self may be evoked in different social situations, also contents may inter-
individually differ in subjective importance (desirability). 
 
Figure 2. Schematic organisation of self-enhancement and SDR as in the conception of Paulhus and 





















Such organisation of distortive responding also enabled to untangle some of the long-debated 
controversies. In example, Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) contended that SDR is neither response set, 
nor response style, nor accurate report of a desirable personality, but can be either of them depending 
on the situation (cf. Paulhus, 2017). An ad hoc presentational strategy due to situational demands 
would be called a response set, whereas a stable individual tendency to yield distorted self-evaluations 
would be treated as a response style. By adopting the hierarchy of image content and audience 
presence, Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) were also able to circumvent the unfeasible problem of 
consciousness role in SDR classification. Now consciousness is not a key characteristic used to classify 
response distortions and is not needed to predict nor explain them (see also Paulhus, 2002; Pauls & 
Crost, 2004). These new organisation of concepts enables also to explain self-presentational 
behaviours in low-stakes, private and anonymous situations. These instances are now often classified 
as automatisation of self-presentation, habitual self-presentation or an effect of other social 
motivations, e.g. self-enhancement. 
Most importantly, Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) pointed to a conceptual overlap between many 
dispersed terms that have common content under “disparate labels”. Among these terms are: socially 
desirable responding, self-enhancement, self-presentation, impression management- differences 
between them are of mainly historical nature, as origin of studies on them was different. Nowadays, 
however, it is time to merge them, which is possible under the classification proposed by Paulhus 
(2002) and Paulhus and Trapnell (2008). Their most important common core from the point of view of 
social sciences methodology is the effect to which they lead- a distorted, overly positive bias in self-
descriptions. 
Hence, different overly positive biases were integrated under the two-level framework with context 
and content as organising factors. However, there is still a great need to further research phenomena 
underlying the observed effects. Apart from the bridge towards underpinning psychological processes 
there is also a great need of new research methods to measure and control the overly positive biases 
(Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Ziegler, 2011; 2015). 
2.2.4 Positivity bias emergence 
Since Paulhus’ theoretical advancements (2002) no systematic review of SDR was published (Bensch, 
2018), but some of the following results showed that further differentiation between the phenomena 
and building the nomological network of SDR, faking and related concepts is much needed (Bensch et 
al., 2017; 2019). Such endeavours were undertaken by Matthias Ziegler, and a large group of his 
collaborators, and led to substantial advancements in SDR knowledge.  
First of all, they have proposed to put numerous but ill-defined concepts into one nomological network 
and conceptualise them under one term of positivity bias (Anderson, Brion, Moore & Kennedy, 2012; 
Bensch et al., 2017). Furthermore, a merging effort was expanded also to the conceptions of spurious 
measurement error (Schmidt et al., 2003) and method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003) pointing to the 
positivity bias as a source of systematic measurement error that leads to increase in spurious variance 
in measurements. Such a conceptualisation enables to treat response biases as sources of variance 
and account for them in statistical models. Moreover, Ziegler (2015) pointed that also other response 
biases should be studied together with positivity bias, including response styles, as some initial 
research revealed unexpected cognation between MRS and SDR in qualitative research (think-aloud 
verbal protocols) which is a good incentive for future studies (Ziegler, 2011). Most importantly, Ziegler 
(2011; 2015) complemented models of cognitive survey responding (Krosnick, 1999; Tourengeau, Rips 
& Rasinski, 2000) by adding person (trait) and situation (context) characteristics that may interact with 
each other and can exert their influence on every stage of survey responding. This account also entails 
33 
 
that positivity bias is domain-specific, namely not every item is biased and not every biased item is 
distorted to the same degree. Moreover, this bias does not always occur but occurs always when given 
circumstances take place. Its occurrence is believed to be a function of interaction between person 
and situation characteristics. Among key personal characteristics Ziegler (2011) named e.g. general 
mental ability, self-reflection, honesty and narcissism, whereas supervision, warning and presence of 
administrator where listed as important situational aspects. Without a shadow of doubt the list given 
by Ziegler (2011) is not complete and it cannot be completed without further studies. In Figure 3 below 
there are some propositions of such characteristics, however, they should be treated only as such 
(propositions) and no firm conclusions should be drawn from the list presented. It is also worthy to 
remember that collaterally to Ziegler, similar model of factors influencing response biases was 
conceptualised by Leite and Cooper (2010) who formulated SDR as a result of a three-way interaction 
of person, situation and item characteristics. Similar ideas were already signalised by Furnham (1986) 
and Kalton and Schuman (1982). 
Ziegler (2011) also urged for studies on process models of response biases. These studies are still 
lacking, that not only impedes verification of theoretical models, including satisficing and cognitive 
stages of responding, but also hampers research on methods to prevent and control for response 
biases. Ziegler (2011) compared it to developing treatments of a virus without knowing its exact 
nature. The field especially abounds with “faking” studies that are aimed at preventing and controlling 
for positivity bias in high-stakes contexts and are mainly concentrated on personality scales. However, 
it is not clear how faking studies inform item answering “under normal conditions” as context and 
content can influence not only the effect (bias), but also the processes leading to it (cf. Bensch, 2018).  
 
Figure 3. Cognitive stages of survey responding with person and situation characteristics influencing 
them (on the basis of Krosnick, 1999; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski, 2000; 




























This means that there is a great need of studies in low-stakes contexts as this is the most common 
setting for basic research measurements and also the only context in large-scale assessment 
programmes in the type of PISA, PIAAC, etc. These research efforts are especially needed as theoretical 
interpretation and practical utility of the most commonly used methods to measure positivity bias, e.g. 
SDR scales, has been recently questioned (Bensch et al., 2017). These scales, e.g. the BIDR, were shown 
to have a huge overlap with personality traits, hence, a question arises what is measured by them 
(Smith, 1997)? Is it a tendency to bias or a personality trait on its own (Bensch, 2018; see also Uziel, 
2010)? 
The forthcoming chapters will discuss various conceptions that can shed light on processes leading to 
positivity bias. The review is aimed to link SDR research and investigations related to self-presentation, 
self-enhancement, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-consciousness and overclaiming. This review is 
also thought as a source of inspirations for new research questions and alternative explanations of 
positivity bias. Most of the theories reviewed have not been linked with response biases before or was 
linked only superficially. 
Such a review is much needed as insufficient integration of research results within and across 
disciplines is a major problem for the response bias research. Even inside one subdiscipline (e.g. social 
psychology) there are a lot of similar constructs that are not sufficiently defined and differentiated 
from their synonymic counterparts, the same is true for cross-discipline research. Psychology, 
sociology and psychometrics can inspire each other and work together to solve response biases matter, 
but to this end greater synthesis between them is needed. Such a synthesis would help to join loose 
ends in current theories and verify some long-accepted truths that do not seem to hold in the face of 
new arguments. Uziel’s discussion against the commonly accepted views on SDR scales is one of the 
examples (2010). Integration of approaches seems necessary to get a full grasp on mechanisms of 
response biases. Without that the efforts to find efficient methods to control response biases will be 
no more than just haphazard attempts to understand the outcomes without any insight into the “black 
box” (Ziegler, 2011). A comprehensive review of SDR control and prevention methods will be also 
presented in order to show why the overclaiming method is linked with such high hopes of response 
bias researchers. 
2.3 Chapter summary 
Self-knowledge and false judgments about the self were important philosophical topics already 
beginning from the antiquity, where they were present in Greek or Chinese philosophical writings. 
Interestingly, already these early thinkers considered self-knowledge to be the most difficult kind of 
knowledge attainable. Moreover, also the research on self-cognition biases and fallacies can be dated 
back at least to these remote times. More modern early researchers, like Charles Cooley or William 
James, complemented these thoughts by pointing to the role of social relations in forming and 
formulating self-judgments. 
Early research attempts also developed a set of methods that was used in order to construct 
knowledge about the self, which included introspection, self-inference, self-verification, looking glass 
(inferring on the self on the basis of opinions held by others on our topic), social comparisons and self-
perception, defined as culling information about the self on the basis of behaviour. Along with the 
methods’ toolbox, a set of errors, biases, fallacies and illusions was identified, using the names given 
to these phenomena later on, both self-deception and faking/impression management were identified 
early on in the research history. 
However, initial research attempts were characterised by a significant bend towards practical aspects 
(e.g. better measurement), somewhat ignoring theoretical development of the self-reports biases. The 
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concept of responding according to socially held norms was formed early on, but at first socially 
desirable responding (SDR) was seen as close to pathology, disturbance or delinquency. This 
psychopathological conception of the early SDR research was somewhat balanced by the Cronbach’s 
ideas of response sets and response styles as main response biases. The former were thought of as 
transient, context specific and non-generalisable measurement distortions, whereas the latter as 
stable, generalisable and context-independent ways of responding that were linked with trait-like 
explanations. This trait-like conceptualisation of SDR prevailed in the later period of the history of this 
research topic and resulted in creation of numerous new methods to measure SDR: self-report scales 
(inventories) aimed at measuring propensity to respond according to social norms as an inter-
individually varied personality-like trait. One of the first of such scales was proposed by Edwards, but 
shortly his questionnaire was criticised by Marlowe and Crowne who constructed (in 1960) the first 
SDR scale conceptualising this construct outside of the clinical framework. Their scale became a 
principal measurement tool to assess SDR for the next 40 years of research. 
The field was greatly agitated by the watershed integration prepared by Damarin and Messick. Their 
work indicated that SDR comes in many aspects and that there are many relevant stages between 
conscious accuracy and conscious misinterpretation (inaccuracy, lying, faking). This meant that SDR 
was firmly defined as a heterogenous construct, moreover, the two researchers pointed that “bias in 
self-regard” (self-deception) posed greater measurement threat than “bias in self-report” (impression 
management) which was a big break-through in the field. Damarin and Messick for the first time 
suggested that SDR is a validity menace also in low-stakes, non-threatening and anonymous 
measurement contexts. This line of research was continued by Sackeim and Gur who asked why people 
were even capable of self-deception. They have concluded that self-deception was fuelled by 
motivational, which does not mean intentional, forces. Later on, Paulhus turned attention into 
adaptive advantages of self-deception, which can serve as self-esteem protection and facilitator, at 
least for short term, of social relations. Paulhus also proposed new classification of SDR types with 
impression management defined as a response set, with no trait variance and being entirely context-
dependent. He also merged the framework of agency and communion (two super-motives organising 
social cognition and behaviour) with the SDR field by pointing that agency and communion organise 
content of self-presentation in a wide spectrum of social situations. Paulhus also corroborated earlier 
findings that the scope of self-deception is much wider than sexual, aggressive and in general socially 
inappropriate content. He also contended that impression management is a habitual, autotelic social 
behaviour, hence it is not necessarily defined as conscious or intentional lying and faking. Paulhus was 
also responsible for presenting a long list of SDR covariates, e.g. related to personality but also pointing 
to subjective importance of domain measured as an important predictor of SDR tendencies. 
Later conceptions, e.g. formulated by McFarland and Ryan and by Ziegler, indicated that all SDR-related 
biases should be merged under one framework of the overly-positive bias of self-perception (positivity 
bias). New models of positivity bias (and other response biases) claimed that they are driven by a three-
way interaction between person, situation and item characteristics of a given measurement occasion. 
Newer research again called for more response bias studies in low-stakes contexts. Biases in these 







Chapter 3- POSITIVITY BIAS: RELATED CONCEPTS AND 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
3.1 Impression management and self-presentation 
Impression managing and regulating is most often classified into the self-presentation framework and 
defined as tailoring one’s impression to social reality and situational context (Schlenker & Weigold, 
1992). Most often it is achieved by tactical selection of information- positive traits are overstated, 
negative ones are understated (Goffman, 1959). The problem of self-presentation attracted interest 
of social sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology) already in the beginnings of the 20th century, 
when Charles Cooley wrote that mental images of self and others are social facts that influence inter-
personal interactions (1902). Moreover, he also introduced to the James’ theory of the self the ability 
to reflect over one’s behaviour. Cooley also thought of self-image as being shaped predominantly by 
the perceptions of how others perceive an individual. In this conception, named looking-glass self, the 
self-perception was in fact shaped by social judgments based on self-presentational image that an 
individual presented to others. Thus, self-perception is to a large degree moulded in social interactions. 
At the beginning self-presentational behaviour did not have particularly high opinion and was rather 
considered as lying or a symptom of clinical or adjustment problems. However, the later research 
showed that self-presentation is in fact an adaptational behaviour that, to different degrees, is evinced 
by everyone (Leary, 1995).  
3.1.1 Erving Goffman’s views on self-presentation 
Canadian-born sociologist Erving Goffman is believed to be one of the first researchers that came out 
with ground-breaking views on self-presentation. In his seminal book The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (1959) Goffman stated that the social interactions are driven by “veneer of consensus”, 
“surface of agreement”, everything to achieve the “interactional modus vivendi” (p. 9). Goffman used 
a theatre metaphor to describe social situations when individuals (“actors”) present their images for 
observers (“audience”) by playing their “parts” in given “instants” (p. 16). In his conception each 
participant (actor) of an interaction participates in coining a “real agreement” as to “whose claims 
concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured” (p. 10), this leads to elaboration of a “working 
consensus”, which has different content in each situation or setting, but which general form remains 
similar (p. 10). Goffman emphasised the importance of initial information (“first impressions”) as they 
define the situation and their subsequent developments. Many of his interlocutors called this “getting 
off on the right foot”, as in the example of a teacher, that advised to be strict for pupils at the beginning 
of work with them in order to build authority (p. 11-12). Moreover, the “conception of oneself” is an 
important initial factor defining the social situation. Self-presentation is thus a key to build this social 
consensus for a given situation, hence, when presentation is discredited, all participants feel uneasy 
(p. 12) and such disruptions can have serious social and individual consequences. Goffman even wrote 
about “social coin with awe on one side and shame on the other” (p. 70)- when “mystification” is 
disclosed, the performed may felt shamed14.  
In order to prevent such embarrassing situations, “defensive practices” are employed to “safeguard 
the impression” (p. 13-14). These “protective practices” are often called “tact” in the natural language 
 
14 Goffman claimed that observers have an inherent advantage over actors and that they check the informant, 
e.g. observe different aspects of his/her behaviour by checking up “on the more controllable aspects of behaviour 




and prevent the definition of the situation from being abruptly changed. The Canadian sociologist also 
changed the views on self-presentation by pointing out that the clear-cut, blatant lies are rare, because 
they would be easy to disclose and would thus threaten the whole defined situation. Instead, 
omissions, intentional ambiguity, innuendo, over- and understatement are encountered much more 
often (p. 62). He also differentiated two kinds of communication in self-presentation: deceit and 
feigning. The former one is everything related to the communication sensu stricto, e.g. verbal 
utterances or gestures, the latter one is defined as performing actions that have other aim besides 
being informative, e.g. a worker can present himself as diligent to his supervisor by simply doing some 
job-related actions. Goffman called the whole process “misrepresentation”- one of the key elements 
of self-presentation in his conception. Therefore, these conceptions transformed self-presentation 
from a marginal process close to pathology into a general phenomenon, a cornerstone of social 
interactions. Goffman coined the term ”impression management” and claimed that it happens 
everywhere in every social interaction (p. 15). He even claimed that this “game” is indispensable for 
the proper society’s functioning (1959). 
Obviously, impression management is not consisted of only true elements. The “mask” (self-
presentation) presented to the “audience” is a “truer self”, “the self we would like to be” (p. 19). 
Creating this impression of “better self” is a socially desirable presentation, called “idealisation” by 
Goffman, another key element of self-presentational behaviour. Cooley saw similar processes as a 
training for being better (p.35)- one tries to live up to one’s ideals, presents orientation upward, 
celebrates norms of the society (1922). Negative idealisation is also possible, as an example Goffman 
gives a “poverty show” presented by street beggars in order to collect bigger alms (p.40). Idealisation 
can employ material or non-material values, e.g. showing off one’s new car or performing certain 
behaviours that characterise only privileged members of society, e.g. higher Indian castes (e.g. Indian 
Brahmins). Idealisation can be based on showing something or concealing something, e.g. Brahmins 
perform self-presentation by drinking and eating in a specific to their cast way but simultaneously they 
may conceal fact of drinking alcohol or eating meat as these behaviours are not allowed for the 
members of this caste. Hence, Goffman differentiated very similar types of socially desirable 
presentation as the main strand of this research, namely enhancement and denial. He also pointed to 
strategic and dark secrets as things that individuals are especially unlikely to disclose. This part of 
Goffman’s research refers to similar behaviours as the sensitive questions survey research. 
Sometimes the participants grow to the presented image to such an extent that they internalise the 
role, e.g. a recruit in the army may be at the beginning bothered by military drill but with the time he 
accepts the rules and starts to live by them as played roles influence one’s personality and become a 
second nature. Hence, images and masks are not things and faces, but they convey truth about them. 
Goffman claimed that IM can only be successful if it is “in sync” with individual’s perception of self and 
that successful self-presentation leads to an image of “a self”, this self being a product of the 
presentation, not its cause (p. 252). He also discussed the very much debated issue of conscious or 
unconscious character of IM. Goffman believed that is almost always both as an individual defines the 
situation “knowingly and unwittingly” and IM is hence a melange of controlled and automatic 
processes as “we all act better than we know how” (p. 74). Moreover, it is a “mixture of cynicism and 
belief”- self-presentation is partly true, but there is also, apart from self-presentational behaviour 
addressed to others (“the audience”), (self-)deception involved, as in the case of shamans that are 
convinced about their skills, though they also use “sleight-of-hand” tricks (p. 21). Hence, Goffman 
perceives “belief” in the presentation as another key element of successful IM. Presentation may be 
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sincere or cynical and can have agentic or communal motives15 (p. 17-18) and can be triggered by an 
individual motivation or by traditions and expectations regarding one’s group role, e.g. social status, 
group membership. He believed that individual’s personality, given social interaction and given society 
all influence the precise motives of IM. 
In case of each act of IM both “front”, defined as physical appearance, decoration and “dramatic 
realisation”, actions undertaken to give certain impression are used, but the information outflow is 
tuned to the social situation and individuals engaged, e.g. the presence of others changes the 
presentation like workers normally do not use familiar names or jokes when clients are present. 
Appearance of an ”intruders” also change the presentation, e.g. sudden appearance of a supervisor 
may spur the workers brigade to drop leisure activities and get back to work. Goffman also pointed 
out that self-presentation is often performed in teams, e.g. all workers in an office may be engaged in 
a performance before clients or supervisors. 
Goffman independently reached very similar conclusions about impression management and self-
presentation as the SDR research conducted before and after his first book publication (1959). He 
claimed that self-presentation is an important and general social phenomenon, indispensable and 
inevitable in almost every social interaction. He also noticed that the character of IM can be both 
conscious and unconscious, and that probably most often it is a mixture of carefully planned and totally 
unwitting processes. Moreover, he sees IM as an entirely motivated process, based on motives closely 
resembling the agency-communion framework. Creating and maintaining positive (self-)image (“face”) 
is realised through overstating positive characteristics (enhancement) and downplaying the negative 
ones (denial). Goffman also noticed that self-presentation can change quickly and without apparent 
reason, he ascribed it to an “everchanging character of the human nature” (p. 56) that can influence 
the content and degree of IM in a seemingly unchanged social setting. However, it has to be 
remembered that Goffman studied a related, but also very distant phenomenon from bias in 
questionnaire items. As he analysed behaviours that were performed in the immediate, physical 
presence of all participants (p. 15) he was forced to use qualitative methodology (observation), that is 
rather far from the quantitative character of the data that is in the centre of this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, having this caveat in mind, Goffman’s work is an important contribution to the main 
frame of the SDR research and can be treated as a corroboration of many research ideas. Also, last but 
not least, Goffman coined the term “impression management” that was later adapted to the SDR field 
by Delroy Paulhus. 
3.1.2 Impression management in Peter Blau’s sociology 
The concepts of social approval and impression management are also present in the research of Peter 
M. Blau, who reviewed their roles in social exchanges (1964). Blau considered social approval as one 
of the main motors of social behaviours as it was called “basic reward” in social interactions (p. 17). 
Moreover, winning social approval was seen by Blau as a key condition to find acceptance in any social 
group (p. 34). Therefore, people have to “prove attractive associates” in order to secure favourable 
position in the social network (p. 34). Despite the commonness and importance of this process of 
impressing others (impression management) Blau stated that "people create impressions continually 
and without special design", but also that a specific motive may push them to create impressions in a 
self-conscious and deliberate way (p. 39). It was also emphasised that the process of winning social 
approval is highly varied among individuals, groups and situations (p. 39). Interestingly, Blau noted that 
people often use a double strategy of being impressive and self-depreciating to win social approval (p. 
 
15 Obviously, as writing in late 1950s., Goffman did not use these terms precisely. He instead wrote about “private 
gain” and “the good of the community”.  
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57). Employing self-depreciating tactics is especially important to maintain group integration and 
hierarchy. Probably self-enhancement has to be balanced by self-depreciation as social relations are 
vulnerable to vaunt and bloat. Superiors and subordinates yield different patterns of self-enhancement 
and self-depreciation- superiors are more modest in case of unimportant characteristics but remain 
high self-ratings in traits important for their position and group’s success, whereas subordinates tend 
to self-depreciate their important characteristics in order to keep low, unthreatening profile towards 
their superiors. However, in order to compensate for this humbleness subordinates turn to self-
enhancement in case of unimportant attributes. Subordinates also tend to conform with the views 
presented by their superiors (Blau, 1964, p. 54-56; Jones, Gergen & Jones, 1963). Blau also noticed that 
it suffices for approval of abilities to be unilateral (respect), whereas approval of opinions or beliefs 
has to be reciprocal (agreement). This leads to the forming of the social consensus that also helps to 
sustain one’s view of himself. In this way social approval also shapes self-knowledge and influences 
changes in the public opinion (Blau, 1964, p. 62; Noelle-Neumann, 1974). According to Blau’s 
observations, people are more prone to express approval than disapproval (p. 68), which may play its 
role in the commonness of self-enhancement tendencies- as mainly positive feedback is received it 
may lead to formation of overly positive self-views. However, only sincere social approval has value 
and the simulated one is not only worthless, but can also draw negative social consequences on the 
individuals using ineffective ingratiation tactics (Blau, 1964, p. 82). 
3.1.3 Social approval and surveys on public opinions 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann picked up one of the most interesting threads in Blau’s research- how social 
approval shapes public opinions and leads to the views homogenisation on the group level and to the 
internalisation of the socially approved views on the individual level. Her research concentrates around 
the view that social approval leads to the forming of social consensus and is one of the basic forces 
shaping group processes (1974). People tend to conform to the most prominent or most common 
views in order to prevent from social isolation and sanction. Noelle-Neumann referred to the research 
of Asch (1951), Goffman (1959) and Milgram (1961) on conformism in order to conclude that people 
value social integration higher than their own judgements and views (1974). In order to gauge what is 
the prevailing opinion or norm they use a “quasi-statistical organ”- they observe their social 
environment and try to assess the prevalence of opinions and ideas and also evaluate the chances of 
success (chances to become uniformly accepted) of given norms or viewpoints (Noelle-Neumann, 
1974; 1991). These processes lead to the steady homogenisation of the public opinions on a certain 
topic, in the aftermath there is only one commonly accepted and socially approved viewpoint on a 
certain matter. Those that do not agree with the dominating opinion are forced to remain silent or to 
fake agreement under the threat of social sanctions (e.g. isolation). In this way, through conformism, 
socially desirable responses in surveys are given. It is worthy to note, that this conception is the closest 
to the Crowne and Marlowe’s need of social approval idea (1960), but puts much less emphasis on 
clinical and psychological needs and more on social processes. The process of forming social consensus 
was called “the spiral of silence”- as the viewpoint becomes less and less popular it is also less and less 
accepted in the society (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). People are swayed to conformity not only by social 
sanctions but also by the wish to protect self-confidence and self-esteem- people just want to be sure 
that they are “right” in important issues. Noelle-Neumann also identified correlates of opinion 
conformity- women, elderly and people of lower socio-educational status were more prone to 
conform, whereas men, younger and those of higher socio-economic status were more prone to speak 
up and oppose the common views (1974). It is striking that the same groups, especially older and less 
educated participants, are also often linked with lower quality responses in self-report research (Grau 
et al., 2019; Magdolen, von Behren, Hobusch, Chlond & Vortisch, 2019). Hence, it can be assumed that 
conformity, the spiral of silence and SDR are driven by very similar mechanisms. However, the research 
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also shows that almost always there are some groups that resist the common opinion and stick to their 
own views even when faced with social isolation or odium. It is unclear what are the correlates and 
mechanisms of forming such “hard-core” partisans of lost cases (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). Noelle-
Neumann noticed that selecting informational sources, nowadays called most often “information 
bubbles” or “filter bubbles”, are most probable reasons of this recalcitrance (1974)16.  
Interestingly, the “quasi-statistical organ” of measuring public opinion is often wrong as it is 
susceptible to biases (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). People fall prey to false-consensus bias- they tend to 
wrongly assume that their own views are more widely shared in the society than it is in reality. 
Moreover, social sanctions, e.g. isolation, are not the only negative consequences feared by 
conforming responders. They are also afraid of embarrassment and social derisiveness as potential 
consequences of yielding unacceptable or stupid opinions. Noelle-Neumann’s research also 
corroborated the view that people form opinions about their own traits also one the basis of what 
others think about them (cf. Cooley, 1902; Taylor, 1982), but noted that these assessments also often 
tend to be wrong (1991). 
Noelle-Neumann’s research on SDR and yielding conforming answers was further developed by Bishop 
and his co-workers in their research on pseudo-opinions (1986). These researchers proved that people 
can not only refrain from giving responses if they feel unsure of whether they “should” think on a given 
topic. Apparently, they are also prone to give opinions on fictitious, non-existing issues if they think 
they should do so (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber & Bennett, 1980; Bishop, Tuchfarber & Oldendick, 
1986). Bishop and his colleagues offered a survey where participants were asked to provide their 
opinions on various current political issues. Among the real items there were few non-existing issues, 
e.g. “Metallic Metals Act” (Bishop et al., 1980). To their surprise, about one-third of the sample offered 
their agreement or disagreement with the fictitious items. Moreover, in a split-ballot design some 
participants still persisted on giving an opinion on non-existing items even if offered an explicit 
occasion to say they had no opinion whatsoever (filtering question; Bishop et al., 1986). Participants 
that were men, less educated and claiming less knowledge about politics in general were more prone 
to offer opinions on fictitious issues, however, this effect disappeared in filtered condition (Bishop et 
al., 1980; 1986). The effect was interpreted in a way that less educated participants yield opinions on 
non-issues because they want to pose as more knowledgeable than there are in reality. It is possible 
that this behaviour is a self-esteem saving mechanism as by yielding pseudo-opinions participants are 
claiming “I am not uninformed. I have an opinion!”. In the filtered condition however, they may feel 
relieved from this burden, as the option to provide an “I don’t know” opinion is explicitly provided to 
them. In this condition a pressure to offer such opinions could be greater among better educated 
participants as they feel obliged to be well-oriented in politics due to their superior status. It is 
interesting however, that Bishop and his colleagues did not find any relation between propensity to 
offer non-opinions and score on the MCSDS (1980; 1986). Hence, survey participants may not only 
claim socially desirable characteristics or refrain from yielding responses putting them in an 
unfavourable light, but they may also offer opinions on non-existing, completely fictitious items if they 
only think they should do it in order to yield desirable or expected impression. Nevertheless, lack of 
correlation between propensity to yield such pseudo-opinions and the MCSDS challenges simple 
ascription of pseudo-opinions to SDR processes17. 
 
16 See also e.g. Cornelis, Van Hiel, Roets & Kossowska (2009) for personality and socio-demographic correlates of 
conservatism and Kappes, Harvey, Lohrenz, Montague & Sharot (2020) for socio-cognitive and neuronal basis of 
confirmation bias and altering opinions. This part of the Noelle-Neumann’s work is however beyond the scope 
of this dissertation so the topic will not be continued here. 
17 Or challenges the MCSDS construct validity as a measure of SDR (Smith, 1997). 
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3.1.4 Robert Hogan’s socioanalytic theory 
An interesting consequence of the integration of the SDR research with other research fields from 
sociology and social psychology is a steady departure from the inconvenient terms of conscious and 
unconscious bias in favour of automatic versus controlled self-presentation. This change goes in line 
with the Hogan’s “socioanalytic” theory (1983) according to which constant practice of public self-
presentation leads to automatization of the process and results in habitual self-presentations even in 
private contexts. According to the Hogan’s ideas, a controlled self-presentation directed towards a 
given audience equals frank self-descriptions performed in private settings. In this way the self-reports 
in “private audience” settings may still be biased due to self-deception and habitualised self-
presentation. Adapting this line of thinking enables to support claims of a domain- and context-general 
character of self-deception proposed by Paulhus (2002) who expanded the scope of this action out of 
the purely self-defensive character. Traditionally self-deception was thought of as a motivated action, 
aimed at e.g. self-esteem protection, but according to the Paulhus’ interpretation of the Hogan’s ideas, 
self-deception may also have a non-motivational, automatic character (2002).  
Hogan based his theory on social psychology, evolutionary biology and symbolic interactionism, being 
heavily influenced by Goffman’s work. However, unlike Goffman, Hogan sees social roles and self-
presentational behaviours related to them as products of inner self-concept, not outer social forces. 
In other words, according to Hogan and on the contrary to Goffman or Gergen and Gergen (1980), it is 
the self-concept that choses the roles it wants to play in social interactions, not the other way around 
(that the roles played shape the self-concept). Hogan believes that self-concept is organised around 
the core that is formed in social interactions from infancy to adulthood and that also has a significant 
biological component (Hogan, Jones & Cheek, 1985). The self-concept can change in the course of life, 
but Hogan opposes views that self-concept is constructed ad hoc, according to the social role actually 
played. Hence, Hogan’s conception entails that inter-situationally changing self-presentations are 
always based on the stable self-concept. Hogan also implies that all social actions are driven by three 
“master motives”: a) need of approval, approbation and attention (need to get along, clearly related 
to communality motives), b) need of power, status (need to get ahead, obviously related to agentic 
motives) and c) need of structure, order, predictability. According to Hogan “master motives cause and 
explain social actions” (Hogan et al., 1985). All motives are important for an effective social group 
functioning, especially the balance between getting ahead and getting along must be observed in order 
to preserve group cohesion. The socioanalytic theory states that people are highly inter-individually 
varied in case of how they pursue these three master motives. Most importantly to the central topics 
of this work people vary in case of: a) what they perceive as socially desirable, b) what behaviours they 
yield in order to appear socially desirable, c) importance they ascribe to respond in socially desirable 
way (Johnson & Hogan, 2006). The first difference determines content and context of self-
presentation, the second one defines the exact behaviours used to achieve goals and the third one 
stipulates the degree of self-presentational actions, in some cases agents may decide not to engage in 
such behaviours at all. From the point of view of this theory any testing situation, be it answering 
personality items or participating in an online survey, is just another social situation where exactly the 
same rules apply. Participants SDR is influenced by their motivation to provide socially desirable images 
and also their skill to do so (Johnson & Hogan, 2006). Most often people yield responses that are a 
resultant between their identity (“who am I”) and their reputation (“how others see me”). Hogan states 
that the responses given may be valid (not distorted in socially desirable way) even if they do not 
closely resemble the actual state of affairs in the real life. It suffices if they convey the social image of 
a participant validly (Johnson & Hogan, 2006). This statement is based on the concept that both 
identity and reputation convey certain “truth” about one’s characteristics: “reputation describes a 
person’s behaviour; identity explains it” (Hogan & Holland, 2003). 
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3.1.5 Other views on impression management 
Therefore, impression management was established as an omnipresent phenomenon concerning 
every sphere of life, including eating, entertainment or attire, being so important for certain people 
that to maintain a given presentation they are ready to risk their life or health (Leary, Tchividjian & 
Kraxberger, 1994). Further research concentrated on the functions of IM. At first, it was commonly 
accepted that the main function was gaining social acceptance18 (Schlenker, 1980), but afterwards this 
view was revised and three main functions of IM were determined as: a) interpersonal influence (e.g. 
eliciting a certain impression to achieve an aim), b) building own self-identity and self-esteem and c) 
emotion regulation (Leary, 1995). It is noteworthy, that IM can serve to achieve both social as well as 
individual goals, e.g. protecting self-esteem, maintaining identity (Gollwitzer, 1986). 
Impression management was proven to depend on three groups of factors: a) social norms, roles and 
values, b) already possessed social image and c) a precise motivation (goal to be achieved) by the dint 
of IM (Bond, 1991; Leary, 1995). Individual motivations of IM are inter-individually varied to a great 
degree and similar variability characterises competences to convey a desired impression. High 
motivation to manage social impressions is related to character of interaction (public vs. private), 
importance of the desired goal and difference between the desired image and the image perceived by 
observers (the greater the discrepancy, the greater the IM). Motivation to IM is also elevated when 
future social interactions with a given audience are likely in future. 
Self-consciousness and self-monitoring 
Tendency to IM, treated as a trait, is also individually varied and two trait-like constructs were 
proposed to describe it. The first one is public self-consciousness- high levels of this trait mean paying 
larger attention to the public, social aspects of one’s image and are also related with higher levels of 
conformity as well as large anxiety of social rejection (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975). The second 
one is self-monitoring and it is understood as an ability to control and manage own social impressions 
and to tune them to social situations basing on the guidance from social observations and feedback 
given by the audience. People high in self-monitoring can precisely identify and interpret even subtle 
signals from social interactions and consequently tune one’s IM to them (Snyder, 1974). Self-
monitoring ability is also linked with efficient self-control of emotion regulation and able 
communication through various channels (facial, vocal, etc.). Snyder proposed that self-presentation 
can be driven either by self-monitoring (social observation, self-control, attunement to social 
appropriateness) or by inner emotional states. Efficient self-monitoring involves also paying great 
attention to social comparisons which are treated as a primary source of information (guidelines) on 
how to prepare self-presentation for a given social situation. Thus, to effectively self-monitor means 
to control one’s own behaviour and emotional expression and to observe other people in the search 
for social information needed to manage the right impression for a given situation. The ability to self-
monitor is believed to be highly inter-individually varied and that "monitored expressive behaviour 
should vary more from situation to situation than non-monitored expressive behaviour". Thus, in case 
of effective self-monitors their behaviour is more adjusted to the social situation whereas in case of 
low self-monitors their actions are just driven by their emotional states and stable personality traits. 
Snyder presented empirical results that showed that professional actors have higher self-monitoring 
abilities than university students and that university students have supreme self-monitoring skills than 
psychiatric patients. Self-monitoring is considered a learnt ability, e.g. in the process of socialisation, 
that it cannot be just simply inherited (1974). Self-monitoring was also conceptually contrasted with 
SDR: the former is a skill, an ability, and the latter, in the Snyder’s view of SDR based on the approach 
 
18 Cf. Marlowe and Crown’s theory of need of social approval as a main drive of social desirability (1960). 
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of Marlowe and Crown, is a motivation to seek for social approval. In later research Arkin (1981) and 
Rauthmann (2011) proposed that self-monitoring can be divided into acquisitive (offensive) and 
protective (defensive) self-monitoring, in a similar way as Leary (1995) divided self-presentation. 
Similarly, Barnes (1976) suggested that impression management can be divided into assimilative IM 
and accommodative IM, the former being bringing other people behaviours in line with one’s own 
expectations, the latter being somewhat opposite- adjusting one’s behaviours to the views of others 
(Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Briggs and Cheek (1988) questioned self-monitoring theory, accusing it 
of being redundant to extraversion, but Gangestad and Snyder (2000) refuted this claim, by proving 
that the two concepts, although closely related, form separate traits, as extraversion does not contain 
sensitivity to others and interpersonal orientation to such a degree as self-monitoring. It is to be 
determined by further research, whether self-monitoring is just a facet of extraversion, or is it a 
standalone personality trait. 
Related concepts: Dark Triad personality and overconfidence 
 Another trait similar to self-monitoring is Machiavellianism, defined as tendency to conscious and 
strategic manipulation of interpersonal relations, including deliberate lie, deceit and distorting self-
image (Christie & Geis, 1970). Machiavellianism is also connected with emotional coldness and 
indifference to morality (Jones & Paulhus, 2009). Other “Dark Triad” personality traits: narcissism and 
subclinical psychopathology also received research interest in the context of their relation to SDR 
(Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Narcissism is a personality trait related to SDR because of the proneness 
to exaggerate, boast and conceit characteristic for subclinical narcissists (Raskin & Hall, 1981). 
Subclinical psychopathology is related to low levels of anxiety and empathy along with high degrees of 
thrill-seeking and impulsivity (Hare, 1985).  
However, as much as the above-mentioned constructs seem related to the SDR, they are nevertheless 
distinct from it, both conceptually and empirically (Paulhus, 2002). It was evidenced that self-
monitoring did not correlate with SDR scales: Paulhus (1984) correlated Snyder’s self-monitoring scale 
with popular SDR scales and did not receive significant correlations. Similar results were obtained by 
Snyder himself who did not obtain substantive correlations between his self-monitoring scale and the 
MCSDS (1974). More results on that were presented by Kowalski, Rogoza, Vernon & Schermer (2018) 
who correlated various measures of the above-mentioned constructs. In their research self-monitoring 
was not related to SDR but was moderately and positively correlated with all Dark Triads traits, noting 
the highest correlation with narcissism. SDR, on the other hand, noted weak correlations with 
narcissism (positive), Machiavellianism and psychopathy (both negative). All Dark Triad traits yielded 
moderate and positive correlations with each other (Kowalski et al., 2018). Because Kowalski and his 
colleagues did not provide any path analyses or structural models nor did they perform a possible 
suppression/mediation analyses it is impossible to tell why these constructs correlate with each other 
in the obtained fashion. Moreover, they have used a less-researched SDR measurement tool instead 
of the most commonly used the MCSDS and the BIDR. More research is clearly needed in this field. 
However, for the needs of this dissertation it suffices to conclude that SDR, as measured by SDR scales, 
is only very distantly related to self-monitoring and Dark Triad personality traits. The only clear relation 
that can be explained on the conceptual level is the positive relation between narcissism and self-
enhancement tendencies, as both contain grandeur illusions (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).   
Overconfidence is yet another topic that is often related to SDR. In some conceptions it is even placed 
in the common core of the positivity bias along with SDR and overclaiming (Ziegler, Maass, Griffith & 
Gammon, 2015). The most common definition of overconfidence is “a positive deviation between 
estimated and actual performance” (Stankov & Crawford, 1997). This concept can be further divided 
into: a) overestimation- thinking to be better than one really is, b) overplacement- thinking to be better 
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than others, c) overprecision- being more sure of one’s knowledge that it is warranted (Moore & Healy, 
2008). A recent meta-analysis shows that confidence is in general related to the correctness and speed 
of response, indicating that people are able to predict the results of their actions in mnemonic or 
perceptual cognitive tasks. Only around 6% of participants is characterised by a negative prediction 
that is similar to overconfidence (Rahnev et al., 2020). No stable correlates of overconfidence were 
identified as yet, apart from narcissism and extraversion being related to overprecision (Moore & Dev, 
2017). Despite the superficial similarity to SDR there is no evidence for a larger relatedness of the two 
phenomena (Bensch et al., 2017). Any correlations between SDR and overconfidence identified to date 
never exceeded correlations around 0.30. It is thus believed that overconfidence is a part of different 
nomological network and that it is rather a metacognitive skill than a response bias (Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2007). It is possible that future research will help to build the nomological network of 
overconfidence as some of it measures are under heavy critique (Moore & Dev, 2017). However, 
overconfidence seems to be a topic that is at best only loosely related to SDR and will not be referred 
to further in this work.    
3.2 Self-esteem and SDR in the survey research context 
Self-esteem is another construct often linked with impression management and self-presentation. It is 
related not only to the degree of self-presentation, where lower self-esteem correlates with more self-
presentational behaviours, but also to the content presented (type of impression conveyed). High self-
esteem is associated with offensive (acquisitive) self-presentation where a lot of positive 
characteristics are ascribed to an individual. Offensive self-presentation is akin to self-enhancement 
and it is performed with a high belief in success (cf. Goffman, 1959). Low or unstable self-esteem is 
related to defensive (protective) self-presentation, where main motivation is to save oneself from 
negative presentation and to conceal negative traits (Leary, 1995). Low self-esteem is also linked with 
social anxiety and need for social approval (Leary, 1990). This construct is clearly distinct conceptually 
from SDR but from the early beginning of the SDR research the two concepts were intertwined in many 
research attempts, for example self-esteem protection was fundamental for many conceptions of SDR 
mechanisms (the so-called motivational accounts, e.g. Sackeim & Gur, 1978). Paulhus and Trapnell 
(2008) included this idea in their classification of SDR types based on the agency-communion 
framework: protecting self-esteem was to be based on agentic self-presentation, whereas avoiding 
social disapproval- on a communal one. 
Another popular theory linking self-esteem and SDR contended that self-enhancement was beneficial 
for personal adjustment19. This view was formulated partially on the basis of correlations between SDR 
scales and self-esteem self-reports (Paulhus, 1998). Moreover, it is postulated that self-enhancement 
bias is actually one of the sources of self-esteem, as distorted views of oneself and one’s 
accomplishments may lead to an elevated self-regard (Kwan, Kuang & Hui, 2009). Researchers also 
pointed that self-esteem may be an outcome of various biases: either narcissistic tendencies or self-
enhancement, leading to different consequences for the level and stability of self-esteem. Narcissistic 
basis of self-esteem often results in maladjustment and negative, especially long-term, social 
consequences (Crocker & Park, 2003; Kernis, 2003; Paulhus, 1998; Tracy, Cheng, Robins & 
Trzesniewski, 2009). Self-enhancement, especially moderate in the degree of distortion does not seem 
to bring such negative consequences for self-esteem (Kwan et al., 2009). Other conceptions see self-
enhancement as one of the main self-motives20, powerful drives used to regulate and shape self-
 
19 In this account, according to the established consensus, all the terms akin to self-esteem (e.g. self-worth, self-
concept, self-regard, self-image, self-evaluation, etc. are treated as equivalent variants of the general term “self-
esteem” (cf. Huang, 2013; Kozielecki, 1984; Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2015).  
20 Other self-motives are: self-verification, self-assessment and self-improvement (Sedikides, 1993). 
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esteem (Leary, 1999; 2003). Individuals with high self-esteem tend also to self-enhance, but according 
to some conceptions this motive characterises persons with high but also unstable self-esteem and in 
a long-term it may hinder their functioning by blocking the self-improvement motive (Kernis, 2003; 
Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2015).   
Other important question concerns the relation between self-esteem stability and SDR. An unstable 
self-esteem relies on external sources of information to confirm itself (Kernis, 2003) and it is evidenced 
that individuals with high but unstable self-esteem yield socially desirable responses, whereas 
individuals with high and stable self-esteem report positive traits but without much concern for social 
desirability (Schneider & Turkat, 1975). However, in order to fully explore the relation between self-
esteem and SDR much more research is needed, especially using measures that are not self-reports. 
This should enable to investigate other facets of self-esteem than just subjective individual’s feelings 
and opinions which could provide additional information on behavioural manifestation of self-
esteem’s level and stability (Coopersmith, 1967). 
Huang (2013) analysed relations between self-esteem and SDR in a detailed way. In a performed meta-
analysis the previously suggested positive relations between self-esteem and SDR were investigated 
(e.g. Arlin, 1976; Astra & Singg, 2000; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 1995; Riketta, 2004) and the alleged 
moderating role of SDR for the criterion validity of self-esteem measures was tested (Zerbe & Paulhus, 
1987). The results of the meta-analysis pointed out that self-esteem, mainly measured by the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), and SDR, mainly measured by the MCSDS or the 
BIDR, correlated around 0.30, a correlation that can be classified as moderate at best according to the 
Cohen’s classification of effect sizes (1988). Moreover, SDR scales proved to have only a minimum 
moderating effect on the criterion-related validity of self-esteem measures. These results confirm the 
positive relation between self-esteem and SDR, although the magnitude of the relation is much smaller 
than previously thought. Interestingly, self-esteem measures correlated more with the SDE subscale 
of the BIDR (0.40) than the IM subscale (0.16) of this scale. However, this result is most probably result 
of agentic content of both the RSES and the SDE scales (Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken & Mayo, 2012). 
It is also possible that these correlations were driven by more general self-enhancement tendencies 
that are known to have larger effect on agentic traits, at least in individualistic cultures (Kurman, 2001; 
but see e.g. Church et al., 2006; Yik, Bond & Paulhus, 1998 for contradicting results). SDR also failed to 
significantly moderate the relations of self-esteem measures with other important variables, e.g. 
academic achievement or job performance, thus partialling out the SDR variance (implied as spurious 
variance) did not lead to better estimates of these relations. Huang interprets these results in the light 
of the overly positive bias of perception theory, claiming that people have an inherent inclination 
towards assessing everything related to them more positively than other things (2013; see also 
Pedregon, Farley, Davis, Wood & Clark, 2012). Participants’ age and gender failed to moderate the self-
esteem-SDR relation (Huang, 2013), probably due to low correlations between participants’ age and 
SDR (only around 0.10; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998) and small relation between gender and SDR 
(around 0.20, with males yielding greater SDR scores than women; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998).  
3.3 Self-knowledge and self-consciousness 
3.3.1 Main theories of self-knowledge and self-consciousness 
Self-esteem is strictly related to other two popular concepts: self-knowledge and self-consciousness. 
Despite their popularity, e.g. in natural language, both these constructs are still deemed a largely 
under-researched area with a lot of research lacunas (Kozielecki, 1981; Zaborowski, 1989). Self-
knowledge is defined as a set of judgements about self, including self-descriptions (e.g. “I am tall”, “I 
live in the USA”), self-evaluations (“I am good at math”), self-standards (“How should I act? Who I want 
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to be in the future?”), rules about generating self-knowledge and rules guiding self-presentation, e.g. 
what kind of self-presentation is accepted by an individual (Kozielecki, 1981). These standards are 
believed to be internalised and subjective, some of them may be even not intersubjectively 
communicable. Self-knowledge is polyfunctional, serving cognitive, motivational and regulatory 
mechanisms. Self-knowledge enables identifying oneself (“Who am I”?) and knowing others by 
simulating others’ minds (“What do they think?”), as well as controlling (self-control) and regulating 
(self-regulation) one’s own actions (“What should I do now?”, “I can’t go for a party without doing my 
homework”). Self-knowledge is believed to be created in the process of autoperception (self-
observation, Bem, 1972), social comparisons (Festinger, 1954) and internalising cultural norms 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These conceptions where first voiced in the work of William James (1890) 
who saw sense-making and integrative processes as foundational for self-knowledge. He also 
formulated conception that self can be either subject or an object of cognition, using the Sanscrit terms 
of “atman” and “jivatman” to name an active subject reflexing over the world and itself (“I”) and an 
object of this reflection (“Me”), respectively. These thoughts were further developed by G.H. Mead 
who claimed that the role-taking process that is continuously exercised in social interactions leads to 
development of self-conversations and an ability to simulate others’ internal states (1934). These 
abilities then lead to formation of self-consciousness, the result of which, according to Mead, is 
creation of personality (self-knowledge) ascending as a product of continuous self-reflection and self-
criticism. Hence, self-consciousness is a key to “know yourself” as it is an essential process that enables 
creation of self-knowledge. Interestingly, large individual differences are observed in the ability to be 
self-conscious, or rather self-aware of who and how we are (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975; 
Zaborowski, 1989). Self-consciousness can be defined both as a skill and as a state. The former is an 
ability to achieve self-insight and self-assess one’s behaviours or abilities accurately, the latter is a state 
of being aware of one’s qualities, thinking about them knowingly (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Wicklund, 
1975; Zaborowski, 1989). It is unclear what exactly can trigger autoreflection, under what conditions 
it emerges and when self-conscious “I” is activated (Zaborowski, 1989). 
Some researchers limited self-consciousness to a state of autoconcentration that served to compare 
salient elements of the self with social or personal standards and to adjust or regulate the behaviour 
accordingly. In line of these theories self-consciousness is always unpleasant as it inevitably brings 
troublesome feelings stemming from the comparisons between the current “Me” and an ideal self 
(ideal version of “Me”) or an ought self (“Me” I-should-be) (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987; 
Wicklund, 1975). These self-discrepancies were believed to be such unpleasant that they generalised 
over to any state of autoconcentration, even one’s own reflection in the mirror or hearing one’s voice 
on a tape recording (Sackeim & Gur, 1979). This approach has been heavily criticised as ignoring the 
processual character of self-consciousness and over-concentrating on negative emotions caused by 
the state of self-concentration (Zaborowski, 1989). Hull and Levy (1979) proposed an alternative theory 
of self-consciousness, accenting automatic and processual character of the concept, emphasising its 
role in coding information about the self that incomes from external sources. Scheier and Carver 
(1977), Buss (1980) as well as Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski (1982) were among the researchers who 
criticised the negativity brought by the self-conscious states and contended that these states simply 
strengthen the current emotions, positive and negative alike. Zaborowski (1989) formulated his 
conception of self-consciousness as an integrative account of the earlier theories by Wicklund (1975), 
Hull and Levy (1979) and Rogers (1961). First of all, Zaborowski’s theory postulated a multifaceted, 
complex account of self-consciousness (S-C). In his opinion S-C can be characterised by different 
saliency levels, with the lowest called latent, difficult to concentrate on. S-C can be also differentiated 
regarding content, with both public (social) and private (personal) contents possible to be in the focus 
of attention, and form, with both objective and subjective processing attainable to concentrate on, 
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depending on the centrality of a given domain (cf. Buss, 1980; Hull & Levy, 1979). In its processual face 
S-C was responsible for coding, processing and integrating information about the self. Zaborowski also 
contended existence of different levels of scope of S-C, with the defensive level being the most limited, 
defined as concentrating on self-defence against threatening stimuli. This type of self-consciousness 
was attributed to the research of e.g. Wicklund (1975) that postulated that autoconcentration was 
aversive. Greenwald (1985) discerned three potentially threatening situations that engage the self 
(“ego” in his papers) and may lead to biased self-consciousness (self-insight): a) situation of being 
assessed by others, b) being assessed by the self (self/auto-evaluation, also known as self-assessment) 
and c) processing especially important or sensitive matters to the self. 
Zaborowski, however, argued that self-consciousness was unpleasant only when dealing with 
threatening stimuli, in people with low self-esteem and in case of negative affective states experienced 
by an individual. He postulated that other, more developed and wider in scope, forms of S-C were: a) 
personal, embracing objects related to physical and psychic phenomena related to the self, b) external, 
consciousness of the self in social interactions, and, the widest in scope and the most developed form 
of S-C, c) meta self-consciousness alias reflexive self-consciousness. This last form of S-C was 
responsible for reflexing upon different aspects of self and steering one’s behaviour and cognition, as 
well as correcting and developing them21. Thus, in the account of Zaborowski, self-consciousness 
serves to construct self-judgements, change self-esteem, apply self-control, alter social relations or 
manage motives, igniting ones and dampening others. Zaborowski postulated a modular conception 
of self-consciousness, seeing S-C mostly as a polyfunctional and multifaceted process leading to the 
formation of self-knowledge and having a decisive role in steering everyday behaviour and cognition 
(1989).  
However, Zaborowski was also aware that self-consciousness only sometimes meant objective coding 
of incoming information about the self. More often, the process of acquiring self-knowledge is 
threatened by many biases. Greenwald (1980) went even that far as to claim that the self (“ego”) is 
like a totalitarian regime that actively distorts and even fabricates self-knowledge by information-
control processes. Other researchers, however, were more optimistic about the possibility of forming 
more veridical self-knowledge. George Kelly built his theory of personal constructs around the notion 
that people are like naïve scientists when constructing their knowledge about the self22 (1955). 
Scientists, as they are motivated to have an accurate view of the reality and because they use scientific-
like reasoning to build and organise their knowledge. Naïve, because the systems of constructs they 
create are often distorted by their “idiosyncratic experiences” and in result deviate from reality (Kelly, 
1955). The research led by Rubinstein (1960) corroborated Kelly’s views and showed that not in every 
case the contents of self-consciousness reflected the reality- in case of low educated participants the 
S-C was very limited, reduced, superficial and seemed to be created ad hoc, without much coherence, 
as if their self-insight was only interim. These remarks were then confirmed by Loevinger, Wessler and 
Redmore (1970) and by classical research of Alexandre Luria who in the mid-1920s interviewed 
Uzbekistani peasants to discover that they were unable to yield any coherent self-judgements nor to 
describe their “character” (1974; Kozielecki, 1981). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Kofta (1979) 
contended that people on average are self-conscious of the contents of their self-knowledge, but not 
of the processes and mechanisms leading to its creation, arguing that the rules of self-knowledge 
formation are difficult and obscured from the simple self-insight of most of the people. 
 
21 It is worthy to add that Łukaszewski (1974) also distinguished similar, meta-level, regulative functions of self-
consciousness. This notion in the theory of Zaborowski is also partly inspired by the Rogers’ (1961) conception of 
self-actualisation (getting better, developing one’s potential, closing to one’s ideal self). 
22 And the world in general. 
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Other research pointed out that self-knowledge in certain domains tends to be richer and more 
organised than in other domains (Gordon, 1968; Jones, Sensenig & Haley, 1974; Markus, 1977). In 
these central and important domains self-knowledge is arranged in coherent, hierarchical structures 
linked with faster, more precise processing of information and low tolerance for ambiguity or 
discrepancy. Hazel Markus (1977) called such organised chunks of self-knowledge self-schemata (self-
schemas) and contended that they help individuals to predict and control their own actions, aid to 
process domain-related information, facilitate retrieving relevant evidence and enable maintaining 
coherent self-image in a given dimension. In other, less important domains, self-knowledge is believed 
to be less organised, consisted of isolated, atomised judgements, of low accessibility and verbalisation 
(Alschuler, Weinstein, Evans, Tamashiro & Smith, 1977; Kozielecki, 1981). Recent research showed that 
another important differentiation should be among context-dependent and context-independent self-
schemata (Klein & Lax, 2010). They are functionally independent and have different neuro-correlates 
with context-dependent selves related to memory processes and context-independent to more 
abstract reasoning (Martial, Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2018). Thus, it looks like self-knowledge 
consists of general self-representation (“Who am I?”) and a set of context- or domain-specific “selves” 
that differ in the degree of development, e.g. a professional tennis player would be most probably 
characterised of a very well developed self-schemata in the domains of her tennis abilities and much 
less elaborated self-knowledge in less relevant domains, e.g. math skills. 
The above-presented results show that self-consciousness is an indispensable process in order to 
inspect and communicate self-knowledge (achieve self-insight). The existence of metacognitive 
processes regulating acquiring and organising self-knowledge is also postulated. However, little is 
known how these regulative processes operate. Especially interesting, from the survey methodology 
point of view, would be to investigate the mechanisms of verifying and correcting self-insight veridity 
(“Am I really good at math?”) before communicating self-relevant information, e.g. in a survey study. 
On this level of research advancement it is impossible to assess how similar or dissimilar are these 
processes in comparison to the metacognitive functions regulating more basic, perception-level 
cognitive processes. Judging about the perception processes, e.g. awareness and confidence of 
perceiving an object (Siedlecka et al., 2019a; Siedlecka et al., 2019b), is quite well studied as is error 
monitoring and adjustment in performing very basic actions (e.g. Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004; 
Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Veen & Carter, 
2006). How and if this research can be merged with the research on self-knowledge and self-
consciousness of much more complex information-processing is yet to be determined.  
3.3.2 Generating self-knowledge and self-judgements (self-descriptions)   
However, these and similar results did not bring answers why a stable, consistent and easy-to-
communicate self-knowledge seems to be a rare thing (Gordon & Gergen, 1968). In most of the cases, 
even in the case of central, important dimensions, self-knowledge is distorted by biases that lead to a 
creation of a self-knowledge system discrepant from reality. Some researchers (Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
Sackeim & Gur, 1978, 1979; Wicklund, 1975), ascribed this effect to a lack of motivation for a realistic 
and valid self-insight due to the alleged unpleasantness of self-concentration. Turner (1975) 
considered two alternative explanations: a) lack of motivation or b) lack of abilities to perform a valid 
self-insight. Simply put, adequate self-knowledge may not be of primary importance to some 
individuals and reaching exact self-knowledge is always related to a substantial cognitive effort. 
Probably, most of the people are just satisfied with only an approximate self-knowledge in most of the 
situations (Kozielecki, 1981). Nevertheless, subsequent research showed that processes of self-
knowledge creation and communication are mainly based on three methods (strategies) of 
constructing judgements and that they are driven by four basic self-motives (Kozielecki, 1981; 
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Sedikides, 1993). Kozielecki distinguished linear strategy of constructing self-judgements that was 
based on processing every available piece of information on a given topic before forming a judgement. 
Another strategy was called “conjunctive”- an individual is comparing information and forms a 
negative self-judgement if he finds even one negative instance. A seemingly opposite strategy was 
called “alternative” where even finding one positive chunk of information suffices to form a positive 
self-judgement (1981; cf. Lewicka, 1978). Thus, if an individual would be asked to assess his math 
abilities, then using the linear method he would compare every available instance of a situation when 
his math abilities were tested and then weigh them to see how much evidence is for good and how 
much for bad math skills. On the other hand, using the conjunctive method would lead to browsing 
through instances informative about his math abilities and forming a negative judgement (“My math 
skills aren’t very good”) when even one chunk of negative evidence could be found (e.g. exam failure). 
In this sense the conjunctive method is a kind of “all or nothing” strategy. Finally, when using the 
alternative method an individual also reviews the evidence on math skills but if only a one bit 
suggesting positive evidence is found (e.g. exam success), a positive judgement about one’s math skills 
is formulated. Thus, the alternative method is a “one suffices” strategy that can lead to overly 
optimistic judgements (overclaims), whereas the conjunctive strategy can contribute to overly 
pessimistic self-perceptions (underclaims).  
Generating self-judgements is thought to be driven by four self-motives (auto-motives), differed in 
their function and strength (Bargh, 1990; Leary, 2003; Sedikides, 1993). The most powerful self-motive 
is the urge to feel good, have high opinion about oneself and to maintain high level of self-esteem. This 
motive is most often named self-enhancement (Krueger, 1998). Other motives are self-verification, 
which should be rather called “self-confirmation”23 (Wojciszke, 2002), as this motive consists of leading 
to seek confirmation of a given self-image and an urge towards keeping a congruent view of oneself. 
Self-verification is in fact quest for the confirmation of our views (both positive and negative) about 
oneself (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). These two motives are though responsible for keeping self-esteem 
high and buffering threatening stimuli and feedback from the environment. The other two motives, 
self-assessment and self-improvement, are geared towards performing a true diagnose of the self and 
towards improvement of modifiable traits in order to be better (Trope, 1986). Thus, these motives lead 
to better self-knowledge and improving in the areas that need so (Sedikides, 1993). In other words the 
motive behind self-enhancement is to perceive “I” as positive, behind self-verification to make “I” 
congruent, behind self-assessment to make “I” true to reality and behind self-improvement to make 
“I” better, more beneficial (Kossowska, 2009; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Of course, the motives can 
compete with each other as they lead to different cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes 
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Thus, the two most powerful self-motives are not leading to a veracious 
self-image (self-description) but to an overly positive image that serves to reduce negative impact of 
everyday slings and arrows and to give an individual energy to perform usual life actions. Small wonder 
then, that a biased process of self-consciousness leads to formation of a biased structure of self-
knowledge (Zaborowski, 1989).  
Nonetheless, people are capable of truthful self-evaluation, but it requires mobilisation of cognitive 
resources. Many researchers claimed exactly so and pointed out that an accurate, diagnosing self-
insight is oftentimes not only threatening for an individual but it is also effortful, e.g. Rogers (1961) 
claimed that obtaining more accurate self-knowledge requires first to overcome anxiety and to switch 
off defensive mechanisms. Similar viewpoint was presented by Birney, Burdick and Teevan (1969) who 
stated that anxiety reduces self-diagnose and that the “fear of failure” is a stronger affect than the 
 
23 This “truer” name, better reflecting the sense of this construct is reflected in the Polish term for this motive 
proposed by Wojciszke (2002): “samopotwierdzanie”. 
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drive to have an accurate view of oneself. Obviously, the above-mentioned differentiation on central 
and peripheral domains of the self has certain importance also in case of self-enhancement as forming 
elevated self-assessment and ignoring negative feedback is much more probable for important than 
unimportant dimensions (Sedikides & Green, 2000). From the point of view of a survey methodology 
these are not great news- participants tend to yield superficial and ad hoc created assessments or 
opinions (even pseudo-opinions, Bishop et al., 1986) in peripheral domains, whereas in case of central 
dimensions they tend to present an elevated, overly positive image as spurred to do so by self-
enhancement motive. This evidence points out, that apart from intended behaviours of inaccurate self-
presentation (e.g. faking; Ziegler et al., 2012), there are habitual distortions of self-descriptions, that 
are not “special cases”24 but they are rather a default, ordinary way in which self-knowledge is 
perceived and communicated. For sure, the communication rules characteristic for a given individual 
also play role in how answers are given in a survey (cf. Snyder, 1974 on self-monitoring) but it seems 
that self-enhancement (S-E) is a major force underpinning any self-description in any research context. 
Thus, it is warranted to analyse this self-motive more closely in order to gauge its possible implications 
for survey methodology in general and for response biases in particular. To this end, mechanisms of S-
E need to be reviewed, its correlates examined and possible effects for self-response measurement 
scrutinised. 
3.4 Self-enhancement: mechanisms, correlates and consequences 
3.4.1 Definitions and terms 
Due to large number of overlapping terms in the field it is warranted to clarify basic definitions and 
conceptions regarding self-enhancement in the first place. Sedikides and Gregg (2008) proposed that 
self-enhancement can be understood as: a) an observable effect (e.g. elevated scores in a measure, 
inflated self-ratings), b) an ongoing process (e.g. ascribing self-serving attributions), c) a personality 
trait (“repetitive inclination to demonstrate the motive”) and d) an underlying motive (authors define 
it as a conscious motive to see oneself superior and strategically tailor social comparisons to prove 
one’s superiority, e.g. by comparing oneself to weaker opponents; note, that this motive can also be 
non-deliberate). These biases are omnipresent and are part of the “false uniqueness” bias, a tendency 
to overclaim socially desirable traits to express the belief of being unique (“my children are the 
smartest, I am mostly touched by the tragedy, my problems are the most serious, I am the smartest 
worker”, etc.; Chambers, 2008). This larger effect is nicely illustrated by an “emotion intensity bias” 
which describes a phenomenon to ascribe more intensive emotions to oneself and even to the 
members of one’s own social group in comparison to others and people from other social groups 
(Chambers & Suls, 2007). 
The effect is known under many different names such as rose-coloured glasses, self-enhancement, 
positive illusions, (overly) positive bias, self-serving bias, self-flattering, self-positivity, overconfidence, 
exaggerated positivity, automatic optimism, wishful thinking, unrealistic optimism, self-valorisation, 
self-ingratiation, self-insight failure, self-deception and above-average effects25 (Beer, 2014; Beer & 
Harris, 2019; Kim, Chiu & Zou, 2010; Robins & Beer, 2001). Only a cursory glance at the above, much 
incomplete list26 suffices to agree with Beer and Harris (2019) that the framework is plagued by 
“definitional issues”. Moreover, the terms are not only plenty but they are also little defined (Alicke, 
 
24 As in SDR conceptions of self-enhancement or self-deceptive biases (Paulhus, 2002). 
25 The reversed effect, although much less common and much less researched alike, is also known. It is most 
often called self-effacement, self-derogation or self-diminishment (Kim, Chiu & Zou, 2010). 
26 For a similar lists of terms in Polish see e.g. Kossowska (2009) and Szpitalak (2012). 
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Sedikides & Zhang, 2019) contributing to the "bewildering array of phenomena that contain "self” as 
a predicate” (Leary & Tangney, 2003; see also Leary, 2004). 
It is important to note that not all of the above terms are synonymous, like e.g. overconfidence has 
little to do with self-enhancement (Bensch et al., 2017) and e.g. above-average effect describes only 
one particular result (or a strategy) of the self-enhancement motive (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Other 
propositions entail creating one umbrella term to name all the similar or even identical effects. Bensch 
and colleagues proposed “positivity bias”, whereas Cahill (2015) came up with “convenient bias”. 
Another often used term is “motivated biases” (of self-perception; e.g. Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). 
The best term to describe these phenomena should denote their result, which is a self-image biased 
towards desirability and positivity, but also should refrain from implying exact processes lying 
underneath such over favourably self-descriptions (c.f. Cahill, 2015). In my opinion among the three 
above-mentioned terms the (overly) positive bias (of self-perception) is the least confounding and 
describes the construct best. Of course it is an overarching term and many of the above-listed terms 
can also be used to denote specific processes or effects, while others are only synonymic terms at best, 
or entirely confounding at worst. 
3.4.2 Mechanisms 
In many conceptions of human cognition accurate perception of the self and the surrounding 
environment is one of the most basic functions of cognitive system (Kelly, 1955). How it is then possible 
that such a common and omnipresent distortion of reality as the positivity bias could be present? What 
are the precise mechanisms driving it and what, if any, functions it serves ((Heine, Lehman, Markus & 
Kitayama, 1999)? These questions are also important from a more applied perspective, as no serious 
method to control overly positive self-reports can be conceived without the proper understanding of 
its mechanisms and the exact functions it plays in human cognition (Cahill, 2015). 
The mechanisms suggested to stand behind the positivity bias are grouped into two main categories: 
motivational and non-motivational biases. The first group combines mechanisms that are driven by a 
motive, in other words, that certain self-relevant, evolutionary goal, achieving which is beneficial for 
an individual stands behind them (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). In most of the cases the four basic self-
motives (Bargh, 1990; Leary, 2003; Sedikides, 1993) are seen as processes underlying positivity bias in 
the motivational account. The second group entails mechanisms that are by-products of other 
processes and do not serve for any particular self-relevant goal (Beer, 2014; Cahill, 2015; Chambers, 
2008). According to the motivational explanation, positivity bias serves for self-esteem protection from 
anxiety and threats of everyday life, some even proposed that self-enhancement offers defence 
against mortality (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Arndt & Schimel, 2004). Other popular conceptions 
contended that positivity bias served as an energising principle (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000), 
boosting individual’s self-esteem and self-efficacy, thus contributing to one’s goal realisation and effort 
expenditure (cf. Coopersmith, 1967). Yet another idea for a motivated positivity bias is that it helps to 
maintain self-esteem on a sufficiently high level to ensure positive social relations. This idea is based 
on the conception of self-esteem as an index of social value (sociometer) that helps to win partners 
and to associate with valuable social groups (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). It is worthy to note that 
motivational conceptions of self-enhancement point to its close relation to self-esteem and suggest 
that self-relevant goals are achieved through maintaining positive self-esteem. In that account 
positivity bias exists to protect and enhance self-regard when needed (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Arkin 
(1981) conveyed this notion by proposing two mechanisms of self-advancing and self-protecting: the 
former to boost the positivity of self-regard and the latter to diminish the negativities. This 
differentiation is in fact confirmed by research results as different strategies of self-enhancing are used 
by people with low versus high self-esteem (Kunda, 1999). Those with low or unstable self-esteem use 
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more self-protective strategies, while those of high self-esteem perform more self-advancing 
techniques. Kim, Chiu and Zou (2010) also pointed to these strategical differences: self-effacers used 
self-handicapping or effort withdrawal techniques that were less popular among self-enhancers. It is 
interesting to note that accurate self-assessors used other strategies, e.g. preparatory effort or 
remedial actions. 
Arkin’s (1981) differentiation on two types of techniques used to boost self-positivity, namely 
enhancing positive qualities and suppressing knowledge of negative ones, brings about another 
important notion in the science of overly positive bias: self-deception. Self-deception is by some seen 
as a type of self-enhancement but by others as a superordinate term to S-E; in this work it is treated 
as one of many manifestations of the overarching positivity bias (Hepper, Gramzow & Sedikides, 2010). 
Chance and Norton (2015) gathered three most frequent self-deception definitions: a) motivated false 
belief (Mele, 1997), b) motivated false belief in spite of disconfirming evidence (Greenwald, 1997; 
Sharot, Korn & Dolan, 2011), c) motivated and conscious false belief held simultaneously with a 
conflicting, unconscious and true belief (Sackeim & Gur, 1978; 1979). These definitions can be 
complemented by propositions brought by Snyder (1984) who defined self-deception as “motivation 
to tolerate discrepant self-image” and by Zaborowski (1989) who concentrated more on a processual 
side of the construct and proposed that self-deception is “selective avoidance of threatening 
information”. Nevertheless, classical accounts on self-deception were criticised on the grounds that 
they “require that self-deceivers must hold two contradictory beliefs, while remaining unaware that 
one of them is held. This capacity has been deemed paradoxical, or even impossible, on logical, 
philosophical, and psychological grounds” (Peterson et al., 2003). Mele argued further that 
intentionality and consciousness is not needed to speak about a “motivational bias” (1997). Also 
Greenwald (1980, 1997), Mele (1997) and Peterson (1999) do not agree with the traditional definitions 
(e.g. Sackeim and Gur’s) and point out that self-deception is not based on objective, but rather 
subjective, affectively-marked premises, as person may ignore conflicting evidence unwillingly, e.g. 
due to lack of resources to process it properly, due to lack of knowledge, intelligence, experience, etc. 
This line of thinking was picked up by von Hippel and Trivers (2011) who proposed a new opening for 
the self-deception research. Their definition resembles this of Zaborowski (1989) and contends that 
self-deception is simply a process of biasing the information-gathering process in a way favourable to 
an individual. What is currently favourable for a given individual is decided by his own goals and 
motives. The debate on the functions of self-deception is still ongoing, with most of the researchers 
agreeing that it serves adaptive purposes like: a) deceiving others, b) gaining social rewards and c) 
reaping psychological benefits (Cahill, 2015; Chance & Norton, 2015). Some voices also point that self-
deception may be also maladaptive (e.g. Peterson et al., 2003)27. 
Thus, the traditional “motivationalists” saw positivity biases as serving to protect self-esteem, offer 
comfort and provide self-satisfaction (Taylor and Brown, 1988). The ideas of von Hippel and Trivers 
(2011) changed the focus from internal effects of self-deception (self-esteem protection) to external 
functions, namely enhancing social status. Keeping self-regard positive may also serve to motivate 
oneself and mobilise resources to sustain effort and achieve one’s goals (Coopersmith, 1967; Sedikides 
& Skowronski, 2000). The recent evidence presented by Gesiarz, Cahill and Shalot (2019) and Kappes 
and Sharot (2019) suggests that positivity bias is in fact motivated, but that it is also more automatic 
and working on earlier stages of information processing than it was previously thought. In the study 
by Gesiarz and collaborators (2019) the participants were playing a game in which certain responses 
were more desirable than others as leading to higher monetary gains. However, the game was 
promoting only accuracy and participants could not gain money from responding desirably but 
 
27 Please see the discussion in part 3.5.3 for a more detailed elaboration on adjustment of positivity bias. 
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incorrectly. Despite that the participants already from the early beginning of the task presented a bias 
towards choosing desirable responses. Moreover, this bias increased further during the game. The 
authors point to the bias in responding but also in the processing of the incoming information in the 
way that desirable responding was faster and came after analysing smaller amount of information than 
undesirable one. Hence, the desirable conclusions are made on the basis of smaller evidence and with 
little effort to verify their accuracy. These results show that the positivity bias is motivated by 
participants’ expectations but it is also automatic (non-deliberate), and active already on the very early 
stages of cognition. Moreover, the results obtained by Kappes and Sharot (2019) showed that cognitive 
resources are not needed to yield cognitive bias, thus corroborating the automatic character of 
positivity bias formation. It is not known however, whether the inclination towards bias is learnt (e.g. 
in the process of socialisation), innate or “a combination of both”. 
On the other hand, the nonmotivational accounts of self-enhancement simply see limited cognitive 
resources (information processing limitations) as the main mechanism of this bias (Beer, 2014; 
Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Beer, Rigney and Koski (2018) suggested that self-enhancement can be 
motivated and orchestrated by focusing on positive aspects of oneself, selecting only positive feedback 
and selecting only social comparisons favourable to self, e.g. by choosing inferior referents or selecting 
only these dimensions in which an individual was good at. Similarly, Cahill (2015) sees the basis of 
enhanced self-descriptions in biased belief updating, e.g. in discarding negative feedback or biased 
selectivity of relevant/irrelevant feedback. Cahill (2015) also contends that non-motivated, automatic 
processes are sufficient for positivity bias, moreover, he thinks that controlled processes seem to serve 
for bias correction and not its evocation. There is also a question whether the negative feedback is 
simply not encoded or is it suppressed at recognition (bias at encoding or at recognition phase)? Study 
2 in Rigney’s research (2019) shows that even if the incentives to claim negative feedback occur before 
encoding they do not alleviate the positivity bias which was attenuated only in the self-irrelevant-high 
incentive condition. However, Study 3 in the same research that used event-related potentials (ERP) 
measures seems to show that the negative feedback is not “forgotten” nor concealed, it is simply not 
encoded in the first place (Rigney, 2019). This finding is somewhat corroborated by another ERP study 
that shows that goal-irrelevant feedback has reduced processing in comparison to the goal-relevant 
one (Severo, Paul, Walentowska, Moors & Pourtois, 2020). These results pushed Rigney (2019) to 
postulate two mechanisms of positivity bias: a) different standards for positive and negative feedback- 
the negative one is simply not encoded, b) depth of processing when searching through memory- the 
search is deeper when positively-evaluated object is to be evaluated positively- e.g. if we like a 
politician and we have to decide whether she is intelligent, then the memory search for any evidence 
to confirm her intelligence will be much more thorough in comparison to assessing intelligence of 
someone we do not like. Both these mechanisms point to positivity bias as very basic and automatic 
process28.  
The account of self-enhancement as an automatic process also suggests that self-evaluations’ aim is 
to claim one’s positivity, hence reduced processing of negative feedback due to its goal-irrelevance- as 
the goal is to show oneself in a positive light, everything that impairs this process is discarded on early 
stages of cognitive processing. Moreover, it also suggests that positive self-esteem, characteristic for 
a vast majority of people (e.g. Różycka & Wojciszke, 2010), has its consequences for self-evaluations- 
as the self-esteem is mostly high it means that in general people like themselves, which entails looking 
hard for any piece of evidence confirming good characteristics. In the line of this reasoning, Swann and 
Read (1981a, 1981b) showed that people actively seek to confirm self-schemata and that feedback 
 
28 Epley and Whitchurch (2008) showed an example where self-enhancement is even surprisingly automatic: in 
their research one’s face was recognised faster when it was made more attractive (enhanced) than when it is 
made less attractive. 
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that confirms them is valued as more valid than feedback that negates them. In the terms of 
mechanisms suggested by Kozielecki (1981) most of the people seem to use the more lenient 
alternative method when assessing themselves, resulting in overly favourable self-images. These 
findings are confirmed also by other research, e.g. Peterson and colleagues (2003) showed that people 
with high SDR tendencies (as measured by the BIDR or the Eysenck Lie Scale) ignore negative outcomes 
of gambling games and proceed in such tasks in a perseverative way. In other study, Peterson, Driver-
Linn and DeYoung (2002) showed that high self-deceivers were slower in identifying anomalous visual 
stimuli. In line of this proposition, Chance, Norton, Gino and Ariely (2011) showed that self-deceptive 
participants failed to recognise what led them to achieving good results in a task (researcher’s help). 
They have, hence, committed an attributional error and ascribed their success to their own abilities. 
Moreover, it pushed them also to predict similarly favourable outcomes in the future, even if they 
were financially motivated to predict accurately. All these pieces of evidence point to lower error 
utilisation and larger rigidness of behaviour in self-deceiving individuals29.  
Other possible non-motivated mechanisms of positivity bias were proposed by Chambers and 
Windschitl (2004) who differentiated between upper tier (general, broad mechanisms) and lower tier 
(specific) processes. The upper ties processes are proposed to operate at all three stages of responding 
(information recruitment, evaluation, judgement formation) whereas the lower tier mechanisms are 
to operate only on one of them. The first group entails egocentrism, focalism and generalised-group 
account, whereas the second counts in differential accessibility, differential attention, case vs. rate 
assessment, idiosyncratic standards, differential standards, regression-to-the-mean (small role), 
differential confidence (small role), anchoring and insufficient adjustment. Chambers and Windschitl 
(2004) proposed these mechanisms as main non-motivational processes standing behind the observed 
positivity bias, mainly in tasks requiring comparative judgements, e.g. “What are math abilities in 
comparison to an average person from your class/school?” It is unclear how these mechanisms would 
perform in case of items without any direct comparisons required, e.g. “What are your math abilities?”  
Thus, the “non-motivationalists” also have succeeded in gathering evidence to support their view on 
the mechanisms of positivity bias. However, it seems that none of the proposed mechanisms can 
account for all of the findings, as in example the results showing that threat to self-esteem increases 
bias, whereas affirmation reduces it (Paulhus et al., 2003; Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Kumashiro & 
Sedikides, 2005; Trope & Neter, 1994) go against the non-motivational approach. The results collected 
by Chance and collaborators (2011) in a study when social recognition (participants were praised for 
good results in a sham test) exacerbated self-deceptive tendencies can serve as a confirmation for that.  
Most probably there is an interplay between motivated and non-motivated processes and both 
accounts can be true in certain conditions or for certain participants (Chambers, 2008; Moore, 2005). 
This is suggested by results that affirmation does not reduce positivity bias when it is caused by 
cognitive mechanisms, e.g. memory bias, and works only when bias is motivational (Gramzow & 
Willard, 2006). On the other hand evidence that positivity bias is increased under cognitive load 
(cognitive load forces more automatic processing due to lack of cognitive resources to manage all of 
the actions) points to the non-motivational account (Paulhus, Graf & van Selst, 1989).  
In line with the above findings it was also showed that cognitive load increased self-flattering (“above 
average”) ratings. Moreover, the response times were three times faster under the cognitive load 
condition, indicating that under cognitive load stimuli processing is automatized, resulting in fast but 
also self-enhancing responses. This suggests that the above-average overly positive self-judgments are 
 
29 These effects are probably also somewhat related to need for cognitive closure that can also be described in 
the self-motives framework. 
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due to heuristic processing of information, e.g. due to decreased adjustment processes or lower 
accessibility of relevant self-knowledge (Paulhus et al., 1989; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). It also shows that 
an accurate self-rating is a controlled process that needs cognitive resources30 (Kruger, 1999). 
3.4.3 Neurocognitive and physiological evidence on positivity bias 
This double explanation is corroborated by the research evidence from neurocognitive studies pointing 
that the neural mechanisms of exaggerated positivity differ depending on whether self-esteem is 
versus is not threatened (Beer, 2014; Beer & Harris, 2019; Hughes & Beer, 2012). In general, medial 
OCF (orbitofrontal cortex) and dorsal ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) activation is related to self-rating 
accuracy (overcoming positivity bias) and to reduced self-flattering judgements, whereas MPFC 
(medial prefrontal cortex) activation is related to egoistic positive bias (Beer & Hughes, 2011). This 
structure (MPFC) also plays important role in constant self-evaluation (Beer, 2007). Additionally, 
ventral ACC (vACC) is related to detection of valence (positive versus negative) and it may also encode 
social desirability of traits, coding what is desirable or potentially rewarding (ventral ACC also play role 
in expecting/maximising reward in gambling). These results suggest that high quality data (non-biased) 
can be expected from participants that yielded high OFC and dorsal ACC activation during a task. 
However, the research presented by Beer and Hughes (2011) and Flagan and Beer (2013) suggested 
that the neuronal correlates of self-positivity triggered by self-esteem threat versus those caused by 
cognitive load are different. The former are related to an increased activation of medial OFC, ventral 
ACC and MPFC with a concurrent activation of a wider neural network involving also basal ganglia 
structures (see Table 1 in Flagan and Beer (2013) for a precise list of areas), whereas the latter are 
linked with a decreased activation in medial OFC and other structures in the frontal lobe. It is also 
worthy to note that when self-esteem threat is present it does not matter whether the cognitive 
resources are at disposal or not- self-enhancement takes place nonetheless (Beer & Hughes, 2011). 
Another evidence for automaticity of self-enhancement was brought from an EEG research by 
Krusemark, Campbell and Clementz (2008) where ERP source and voltage analysis was used to show 
that unbiased attributions were preceded by increased dorsomedial frontal cortex activation, meaning 
that greater cognitive control was needed to prepare them in contrast to biased attributions. Similar 
results from an fMRI study were provided by Hughes and Beer (2012), where accountability condition 
in a self-descriptory task led to increased activation of dorsal ACC, OFC and MPFC resulting in less self-
serving bias in comparison to non-accountability condition31. Additional information was brought by 
Kwan and colleagues (2007) who conducted a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study: when 
TMS was delivered to MPFC and precuneus it resulted with less self-enhancement in comparison to 
conditions where sham TMS was used or when TMS was delivered to other brain structures, not 
related to cognitive control, e.g. supplementary motor area (SMA). The authors pointed out that their 
results corroborated the role of MPFC in self- and other-deception. Almost exactly the same results 
from a similar study design were obtained by Amati, Oh, Kwan, Jordan & Keenan (2010), whereas yet 
another TMS study conducted by Barrios and others (2008) showed that MPFC is important for agentic 
self-enhancement but not for moralistic one. Why and Huang (2011) showed that self-enhancing 
opinions about one’s performance in demanding cognitive tasks reduced cardiovascular responses, 
namely, self-enhancing participants had reduced heart rate as well as systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure. Moreover, some of the self-enhancement effect was mediated by perceived control over the 
task that was gained during the first phase of the task. The authors contended that self-enhancement 
 
30 As all effortful processes are impaired under cognitive load. 
31 Hughes & Beer (2012) used a customized version of the OCT. Higher c parameter was taken by them as an 
indicator of less self-serving responding. 
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may be related to short-term stress coping reaction that may be beneficial for health. Why and Huang’s 
results and conclusions were also confirmed by Hernandez and co-workers (2015).  
Hence, neurocognitive and psychophysiological studies have brought very interesting results giving a 
unique insight into mechanisms of self-enhancement. Of course, many of these investigations suffer 
from common limitations of neuro studies, like small number of participants and simplified 
experimental stimuli. A good example comes from the study by Kwan and colleagues (2007) where 
only twelve participants took part and the self-enhancement measure used was very crude (“Does this 
adjective describes you? Yes or No?”). 
3.5 Positivity bias: state- or trait-driven? 
One of the classical debates in social sciences is about the temporal nature of concepts (whether they 
are rather stable or are they rather transient) as well as their inter-individual variability (whether they 
change or not across people). Such state versus trait debate is also present in the self-enhancement 
framework. Taylor and Armor (1996) as well as Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin and Dardis (2002) emphasised 
the sensitivity of self-presentation strategies to “situational demands and social settings”, hence siding 
with the “state” account. The opposite view was presented by Vecchione, Alessandri, Barbaranelli and 
Caprara (2013) who contended that self-enhancement is a trait-like characteristic that is stable in time 
(“trait” account). Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) also sided with the trait “team”, showing that self-
enhancing is related to the trait-like attunement to self-presentation demands and to the nature of 
the image intended to be presented (agentic or communal). The researchers considered that in case 
of certain individuals the tendency to self-enhance is always present, but the exact content of their 
self-presentation is context-dependent. For example when there is a need (motive) to avoid social 
disapproval a moralistic (communal) self-presentation may be deployed, whereas when there is a need 
(motive) to protect self-esteem an agentic (egoistic) self-presentation will be used. Fitting self-
presentation to the specific audience and situation would point to Ziegler’s (2015) conception that 
positivity bias is also the result of an interaction between trait and situational factors. These account 
was also confirmed by some research results, e.g. by Robins and Beer (2001) or by Paulhus and Harms 
(2004) who showed that results of the overclaiming questionnaire (OCQ) respond to both state and 
trait engendered self-enhancement.  
However, as self-enhancement is different in people with low versus high self-esteem it is believed 
that some differences exist between egoistic and moralistic positivity biases. Vecchione and Alessandri 
(2013b) suggested that egoistic are more stable, whereas moralistic more transient, but also concluded 
that both egoistic and moralistic self-enhancement have more trait than state variance, though both 
have less stability than Big Five personality traits. Similar results were provided by Schmitt and Steyer 
(1993) who in a multi-trait, multi-technique (method) study (MSMT) presented that egoistic bias 
correlated more with the trait variance of emotional stability and conscientiousness, whereas 
moralistic bias with the state variance of these variables. Interestingly, Vecchione and Alessandri 
(2013a) showed that moralistic and agentic self-enhancement were not correlated with each other 
(the correlation disappeared when controlled for method variance). This result is in accordance with 
the original Wiggin’s (1964) theory of two orthogonal SDR factors: alpha and gamma. It is also in line 
with the theory of two unrelated community and agency motives (Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). The 
separateness of these constructs is also suggested by their different neuronal basis (Barrios, Kwan, 
Ganis, Gorman, Romanowski & Keenan, 2008; Farrow, Burgess, Wilkinson & Hunter, 2015). These 
results led Vecchione and Alessandri (2013a) to define self-enhancement more in the framework of a 
personality characteristic, than response bias. This line of reasoning seems justified as John and Robins 
(1994) pointed to sizeable individual differences in the validity of self-assessment: from great self-
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enhancement to sizeable self-effacement. If and how it is related to the rules of generating self-
judgements described by Kozielecki (1981) is yet to be determined. 
Researchers attempted to find explanations for individual differences in positivity bias in line with the 
trait account and proposed that a) cognitive biases (Klar & Giladi, 1997; 1999), b) lack of metacognitive 
ability (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) or c) lack of motivation to self-enhance (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) can 
play deciding role in explaining inter-individual variance in tendencies to self-enhance. Kim, Chiu and 
Zou (2010) suggested that this may depend on the domain assessed as new domains may be more 
based on the metacognitive processes, whereas well-known domains may rely more on motivated 
processes. However, no controlled comparisons of this statement were ever presented. Chance, Gino, 
Norton and Ariely (2015) provided another evidence supporting trait account in the state vs. trait 
discussion. They have pointed out that the slow decay and quick revival of self-deception suggested 
trait-like explanation of the phenomenon. They have shown that self-deceptive judgments are very 
stubborn to go away, even in the face of direct evidence against them. Self-deceivers, even confronted 
with reality, fail to learn not to self-deceive- they are susceptible to succumb to self-deception on 
another occasion which, according to Chance and colleagues, implies that personal characteristics are 
more important. On the other hand, there is also evidence supporting rather state account, e.g. that 
bias can be attenuated by practice (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) or by monetary incentives to report 
accurately (Kim et al., 2010; but see Gesiarz et al., 2019).  
However, the research by Luo, Sedikides and Cai (2019) brought evidence about substantive 
heritability of self-enhancement manifestations, such as narcissism levels, self-favouring judgments 
and overclaiming knowledge, thus scoring one point for the “trait” team again. It is not known as yet, 
whether this heritability is related to self-esteem heritability established by Saphire-Bernstein and 
collaborators (2011). Due to the known links between narcissism, self-enhancement and self-esteem 
(Hepper, Gramzow & Sedikides, 2010) such analysis would truly show what traits and tendencies are 
heritable32. 
3.5.1 Context- and individual-related correlates of positivity bias 
Accountability 
Measurement context and individual correlates of positivity bias were also researched in order to 
deepen the knowledge about this phenomenon. One of the characteristics of the measurement 
situation manipulated was accountability which seems to lower self-enhancement (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin & Hardin, 2002). Beer and collaborators (2013) suggested that social 
accountability may be especially effective in curtailing the exaggerated positivity because it involves 
losing social face (huge threat to self-esteem) in case of self-enhancement, other accountability types 
(e.g. losing financial remuneration) may not be self-esteem threatening and, thus, not that effective in 
reducing self-enhancement. On the other hand, Niessen, Meijer and Tendeiro (2017) showed that self-
reports from “applicant” contexts have lower predictive validity than self-reports from “research” 
contexts (the hypothesis is that self-enhancement in applicant conditions lowers the validity), 
moreover, the self-reports burdened by self-enhancement did not offer incremental validity over other 
measures, whereas those not distorted did offer an R2 increase when added to cognitive tests and 
graded-point average (GPA) in a regression equation. 
 
 
32 See also research of Brummelman et al. (2015) linking narcissism with internalization of parents’ inflated views 
of their children in the way of social learning. 
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Item and domain characteristics 
Certain role may be also played by the type of items used. It is worth to note that direct questions 
(inducing comparison, e.g. “How good at math are you in comparison to an average pupil?”) yield larger 
enhancement effects, e.g. above-average effect than indirect questions (“How good at math are 
you?”), which Chambers and Windschitl (2004) attributed to a number of non-motivated cognitive 
biases33. They also claimed that many of the nonmotivated biases do not apply to indirect questions. 
Hence, the most popular format of self-report items in the social sciences, the rating scales, e.g. of the 
Likert type, are “safe” from these distortions as they are indirect questions that do not request any 
comparisons. 
Interesting results were brought by analyses of domain characteristics that confirmed that people self-
enhance mainly on things that are important, central to them, according to the general rule: “self-
centrality breeds self-enhancement” (Gebauer et al., 2012; Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides & Neberich, 
2013). An attempt to systematise the findings showed that: a) trait (domain) social desirability, b) 
domain familiarity, c) certainty and d) trait importance (Crocker, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2003; Hughes 
& Beer, 2012) all predicted magnitude of self-enhancement bias. It is thus evidenced that if the trait is 
desirable for a given participant she will self-enhance more in items related to it (Phillips & Clancy, 
1972). Other evidence on this topic was brought by Gramzow and Willard (2006) and Paulhus and 
colleagues (2003) who also claimed that more socially desirable and rewarding traits are more 
exaggerated. On the other hand, when the domain is not familiar, people yield more accurate ratings 
(Beer, Lombardo & Bhanji, 2010). Sedikides and Strube (1997) ascribed this latter effect to larger 
tendencies to self-assess than to self-verify or self-enhance in situations of low certainty which may 
relate to the fact that people self-enhance more in domains that are hard to verify. Objective 
verification seems to reduce self-enhancement, so people mostly enhance in domains hard to verify, 
e.g. less public, less specific and less objective. Beer and Hughes (2010) differentiated between “broad” 
and “narrow” traits with self-enhancement more related to the “broad” ones, namely traits which are 
simply less verifiable than others as their definitions are more inter-individually varied, e.g. creative 
versus tidy; “tidy” is easy to define, whereas “creative” is more difficult and have more varied 
definitions among people. Van Lange and Sedikides (1998) claimed that self-enhancement is 
augmented when subjective and abstract traits are rated, in comparison to traits that are objective 
and verifiable. Also Felson (1981) showed similar effect with college American football players who 
over-rated more on “ambiguous” versus “unambiguous” traits. Allison, Messick and Goethals (1989) 
called this a “Muhammad Ali effect”, who said “I only said I’m the greatest, not the smartest”. 
Obviously one’s intelligence is much easier to gauge than one’s greatness. Not surprisingly, people 
tend to value more the domains they are good at, which complicates the issue even further. Hill, Smith 
and Lewicki (1989) showed that students high on certain school skills valued them as more important 
and more desirable than lower achieving students did. What is more, the perception can and often 
does change, as e.g. failure in a given domain leads to perceiving it as less important than before the 
failure (Hill et al., 1989). This view was also expressed by Tesser (1988) in the self-evaluation 
maintenance theory, where three factors were deemed critical: a) performance in a domain, b) 
relevance of that domain and c) its relationship to target; all related positively with self-enhancement 
tendencies. Moreover, also task difficulty can influence self-enhancement processes. As evidenced by 
Kruger (1999) people tend to overstate when assessing easy tasks and tend to understate when 
assessing difficult tasks. Moore and Cain (2004) even concluded that this effect can account for greater 
 
33 Egocentrism, focalism, anchoring, case account, regression-to-the-mean account, hybrid referent group, 
generalised group effect, etc. 
59 
 
rates of entrepreneurial entries into industries that are perceived as “easy”34, e.g. gastronomy, in 
comparison to businesses deemed difficult, e.g. bridge construction. Thus in a survey on academic or 
professional skills participants should have a general tendency to understate (efface) their abilities in 
the domains deemed difficult, e.g. math, and overstate (enhance) them in the domains seen as easy, 
e.g. foreign languages (see Baczko-Dombi, 2017 on students’ opinions on school subjects). 
To sum up, the research evidence shows that different traits can be differently biased, due to their 
importance, desirability, verifiability and controllability, as perceived by participants (Alicke, 1985; 
Dunning et al., 2004; Gebauer et al., 2012; McLarres & Oyelere, 1999; VanYperen, 1992). This is 
corroborated by Leary’s summary on conditions when overly positive self-presentations- such take 
place only when: a) the situation is important for a person, b) it is unlikely to be caught on an inaccurate 
self-presentation and c) untrue self-presentation will not harm anyone (Leary, 1999). 
Personality 
Self-enhancement tendencies also correlate with a number of individual differences. First of all, they 
are linked with types of personality that are known for such propensities: narcissism and self-
monitoring. Narcissism is thought to be a basis for self-enhancement tendencies that “cannot be 
bridled” by measurement context, stakes, accountability or instructions (Robins & John, 1997), 
whereas self-monitors self-enhance when it is opportunistic and can bring gain for them. Hence, 
narcissists are believed to self-enhance always, on the other hand, cautious impression management 
of self-monitors is strictly related to the measurement context and stakes (Paulhus, 2003). Further 
research revealed a connection between self-enhancement and narcissistic tendencies, ego-
involvement in the task, self-serving attributions of performance e.g. self-enhancers see the root of 
their success, but not the failure in their abilities, failure is always attributed to external phenomena. 
Moreover, self-enhancers tend to attribute success to their underlying ability, not their motivation 
(Quattrone & Tversky, 1984; Fernbach, Hagmayer & Sloman, 2014). This bias is called “affect regulation 
in response to the threat of failure” and it is believed to protect fragile and unstable self-esteem 
(Robins & Beer, 2001). The results provided by Trope and Neter (1994) confirmed this pattern as 
participants in negative mood or after a negative feedback yielded more self-enhancing responses than 
when in good mood or after a positive feedback. This finding confirms conclusions that self-
enhancement is increased in (ego-)threatening situations. In another study Robins and John (1997) 
showed a group of narcissists a video recording with their performance. The presentation led to 
increased instead of decreased self-enhancement, which again point to the existence of processes that 
actively distort the feedback (cf. Rigney, 2019).  
More basic personality traits were also correlated with self-enhancement. In an analysis of the Polish 
post-PIAAC study Rynko and Palczyńska (2018) achieved positive correlations between the Grit scale 
and overstating one’s ICT skills, although no correlations were obtained between the self-assessment 
of these skills and the Big5 personality traits. In fact, self-enhancement should correlate with 
neuroticism and conscientiousness as those two personality traits correlate with self-handicapping- 
one of the most important behavioural strategies used to protect self-esteem (Ross, Canada & Rausch, 
2002). Vecchione and Alessandri (2013b) indeed found evidence for such correlations. However, these 
relations are at best very modest in magnitude, as shown by Tonković, Galić and Jerneić (2011) who 
found a very small negative correlation between OCT bias and neuroticism- -0.11. Personality traits 
also show a rather stable pattern of relations with positivity bias as measured by SDR scales. Positive 
correlations between SDR scores and extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to 
 
34 This effect probably also extends to other spheres of human activity, e.g. on electing college careers; this effect 
could be especially prominent in countries where higher education is free of charge, e.g. Poland. 
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experience were reported, whereas negative relation was established with emotional stability 
(neuroticism; Paulhus & John, 1998; Pauls & Stemmler, 2003). Obviously these correlations can be 
interpreted in two ways: that an individual yielding socially desirable responses is in fact a person with 
this (very desirable) pattern of personality or that both measures, SDR scale and personality scale, 
were distorted in the same direction by self-enhancing tendencies (McCrae & Costa, 1983). So far, this 
research on disentangling the substance versus style dispute seems far from delivering final answers 
(Ziegler, 2015). 
Intelligence, educational level and cognitive abilities    
More research evidence is available on the relation between self-enhancement and participants’ 
intelligence and education. Both these variables can influence not only the results (enhanced self-
reports), but also the process leading to distorted results as claimed by Christiansen, Burns and 
Montgomery (2005)- more intelligent (high IQ) participants can fake self-reports in more subtle ways, 
more difficult to identify. There is also evidence showing that the elderly and respondents of lower 
educational level are more prone to yield socially desirable responses (Fraboni & Cooper, 1989). Similar 
relations are observed also in the case of socio-economic status (SES), where responders of lower 
status are characterised with more SDR (Hrgović & Hromatko, 2019; Ross & Mirowsky, 1984), 
moreover this pattern is also typical for the countries of lower GDP per capita (Buckley, 2009; van de 
Vijver & He, 2014). These results may point to very interesting but unfortunately rarely explored 
evidence that SDR is related to automatic processing and low levels of cognitive abilities as suggested 
by research of Paulhus and colleagues (1989) where attentional load increased the proportion and 
speed of socially desirable responses. 
Probably the best known account on the relation between cognitive abilities and adequacy of self-
reports is the Kruger-Dunning effect (1999) which entails that participants with lower cognitive abilities 
yield less adequate (overly positive) self-assessments of one’s traits that is warranted by more 
objective criteria. Kruger and Dunning (1999) explain this effect by linking lower cognitive abilities (e.g. 
lower IQ) with insufficient metacognitive abilities to appraise oneself validly which results in more self-
enhancement. 
Overall, there is large evidence that participants of lower education and/or lower cognitive skills yield 
responses of lower quality, be it biased in a socially desirable (overly positive) way, distorted by 
response styles or careless responding or simply sensitive to questionnaire alterations or item wording 
(e.g. Converse & Presser, 1986; Grau et al., 2019; Gummer, Roßmann & Silber, 2018; Jelonek, Worek, 
Turek & Muszyński, 2019; Krosnick, 1991; Meisenberg & Williams, 2008; Naemi, Beal & Payne, 2009; 
Paulhus & John, 1998; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Roßmann et al., 2017; Van Vaerenbergh & Thomas, 
2013). However, it is yet to be established what is the exact mechanism standing behind this effect. 
Malhotra (2008) pointed that it is not the main effect of lower cognitive skills (as proxied by lower 
educational level completed) but an interaction between educational level reached and response time: 
among the participants with lower education only those with fast response times yielded lower quality 
data. Other researchers, e.g. Krosnick (1991; 1999) and Tett and Simonet (2011), also inclined towards 
interactional explanation, namely that an interaction between ability and motivation, or even between 
opportunity, ability and motivation, can explain the quality of participant’s responses. Roßmann and 
co-workers (2017) provided empirical evidence that also survey design affects participants’ abilities 
and motivation to yield accurate responses: burdening designs may result in lower answers quality and 
higher measurement errors (Groves & Lyberg, 2010).  
It is worthy to point out that these results and suggestions correspond very well with the Turner’s 
(1975) and Kozielecki’s (1981) ideas that creation of adequate self-knowledge requires significant 
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cognitive effort and skill. However, it is still not sufficiently known what is the exact mechanism that 
causes this pattern of results. Jackson and Messick (1958) attributed one of the response biases 
(acquiescence response style; ARS) to “low level of cognitive energy across situations”, while initial 
research with the use of anchoring vignettes seemed to suggest that biased or inconclusive results 
stemmed from lower comprehension of items among lower educated participants, especially those 
below 12 years of formal education attainment (Bago d’Uva, van Doorslaer, Lindeboom & O’Donnell, 
2008; Murray, Ozaltin, Tandon, Salomon, Sadana & Chatterji, 2003)35. 
On the other hand, Rynko and Palczyńska (2018) showed that higher educated participants self-
enhanced more in the Polish post-PIAAC study. The same was true for people from big cities, in 
comparison to people from smaller locations. As the domain assessed were ICT skills it is probable that 
it is not the effect of education/IQ on self-enhancement but probably a matter of the domain- clearly 
ICT skills are more important for better educated and living in bigger cities where such skills are more 
valued on the labour market and where most IT companies have their offices. ICT skills overstating 
decreased with participants’ age in this study, which seems to corroborate the “domain desirability” 
hypothesis (Alicke, 1985) over the “cognitive skills” theory (Kruger & Dunning, 1999)- ICT skills are 
obviously more important for younger Poles and there is a huge generational gap in ICT skills level in 
Poland (younger are more skilled; Burski et al., 2013).  
Hence, the debate on the relation between cognitive abilities (as proxied by IQ or educational level) 
and self-enhancement techniques is still far from conclusions as even of the most central effects for 
this account, e.g. the Kruger-Dunning effect, was recently subjected to a heavy critique, mainly on 
methodological grounds (Gignac & Zajenkowski, 2020; He & Cote, 2019; Humberg et al., 2019). The 
caveats mainly regarded using difference or residual scores as main dependent variables in the original 
study which measures were proved to conceal, distort and mismatch information provided in the 
original measures (He & Cote, 2019; Humberg et al., 2019; Nuhfer et al., 2016; 2017; see also Zumbo, 
1999). Other mathematical approaches to calculate such effects were advocated, e.g. polynomial 
regression and research surface analysis (Edwards, 1994; Edwards & Parry, 1993). The analyses 
performed by McIntosh, Fowler, Lyu and Della Sala (2019) also showed that metacognitive processes 
are “neither necessary nor sufficient” to cause the Kruger-Dunning effect. Krajc and Ortmann (2008) 
also criticised previous studies on the grounds of recruiting samples with skewed abilities (mainly 
students from very selective universities) that contributed to the alleged effect (see also polemic with 
these claims in Schlosser, Johnson, Dunning and Kruger, 2013). 
Gender differences 
Another important debate is around gender differences. In general, the relation of gender and 
positivity bias is not a very pronounced one, however, there are some systematic patterns observed. 
The research generally points that self-enhancement is used more often by men than women 
(Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007) and that also cultural norms in general see self-enhancement as a more 
masculine thing (Rudman, 1998). What is more, self-enhancing women are often perceived as less 
attractive (Sedikides et al., 2015). This is corroborated by the evidence that men enhance their 
competences and assertiveness (agentic traits) and women rather promote their social skills 
(communal traits) (Leary, 1995). This would suggest that men should be more prone to agentic 
(egoistic) bias than women and women should yield larger communal bias than men (Paulhus & John, 
1998). However, in the analysis of Rynko and Palczyńska (2018) women indeed overstate slightly less 
than male, but this relation held only in math-related tasks (an agentic trait) and there were no 
 
35 However, this result needs further research, especially in the light of evidence criticising the methodology of 
anchoring vignettes (Stankov, Lee & von Davier, 2017). 
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differences in other, also agentic tasks. Hence, it can be concluded that group and cultural norms are 
important for across gender self-enhancing tendencies. These results also bring yet another 
confirmation on the key role of domain and items importance and desirability. 
Agency and communion 
The individual differences in self-enhancement were also analysed in the agency-communion 
framework. Paulhus and Trapnell (2008) integrated these dimensions with the SDR research, proposing 
two “self-presentational styles”: one agentic in nature, based on claiming “superhero” abilities and 
related to self-enhancement, other communal in nature, consisted of ascribing “saint-like” qualities 
and related to impression management. Djikic, Peterson and Zelazo (2005) also related self-
enhancement to egoistic bias (see also Paulhus, 1991 and Paulhus & John, 1998 for similar 
conclusions). In their research egoistic self-enhancers (people scoring high in the SDE subscale of the 
BIDR) showed a memory bias- they did not recognise negative feedback and in consequence noted 
more negative misses and less negative false alarms with rising SDE score (cf. Rigney, 2019). 
Participants with moralistic bias (high scores in the IM and the SDD subscales of the BIDR) spent more 
time viewing feedback, regardless its positivity. Djikic and collaborators (2005) ascribed this effect to 
early memory bias, that hinders processing of negative feedback. However, the correlations between 
the BIDR subscales and behavioural measures (e.g. response times) used by Djikic and colleagues only 
amounted to around 0.20. Moreover, Rigney (2019) criticised memory indices used in this research, 
questioning their validity as measures of memory bias. Using a modified procedure and a Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT) measure of positivity bias Rigney (2019) showed that positive traits are always 
more liberally recognised than negative ones, yielding higher accuracy for negative traits (d’ index from 
SDT). Financial incentives and self-relevance of the traits did not change this pattern, indicating 
automaticity of positivity bias stemming from different “standards” for positive and negative feedback 
with the positive one more liberally accepted, regardless the conditions. Similar results, this time 
showing no positive effects of accountability and financial incentives on the accuracy of self-reports 
was shown by Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning and Kruger (2008). The results reported by 
Schlosser and collaborators (2013) showed that learning process also did not have any effect on the 
accuracy of self-reports, as surveyed students failed to increase their accuracy in the course of their 
education. 
Another discrepant result was brought by Musch (2003) who showed results where memory 
(hindsight) bias was not correlated with egoistic bias, but with moralistic bias instead, as indicated by 
the German version of the BIDR. In another study Djikic, Chan and Peterson (2007) confirmed that 
moralistic self-enhancers did not yield this early memory bias, while egoistic self-enhancers did. 
However, they have shown that the bias was reduced in the latter group in the “social facilitation” 
condition (participants were recorded on a video camera when processing the feedback). The exact 
mechanism of this reduction is disputable though. The likely candidates are: a) accountability 
(someone may check the discrepancy between answers and recording, hence exaggerated self-
enhancement may be identified), b) other self-presentation behaviour was sparked by the camera 
(camera as “the audience”), c) greater self-awareness was caused by camera recording, thus reducing 
the “habitual”, biased way of processing. Note, that all of these explanations fit with the list of 
conditions that bridle self-presentational tendencies (Leary, 1999).  
An important notion was raised by Abele and Wojciszke (2007) and Wojciszke, Baryła, Parzuchowski, 
Szymków and Abele (2011) that agentic values are more important to self-esteem than community 
values. However, there is a possibility that it is true only for Western, individualistic cultures. Kwan and 
colleagues (2009) obtained evidence for that as they showed that smaller percent of variance was 
accounted for by benevolence, merit and bias in self-esteem measure in Chinese sample (~30%) than 
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in American one (~70%), pointing to different factors constituting self-esteem in individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures. The cultural differences are beyond the scope of this work but it is worthy to 
note that there is large evidence supporting that agentic traits should be self-enhanced more than 
communal ones due to larger role of agentic traits for self-esteem maintenance, at least in 
individualistic cultures. 
Conclusion 
The evidence of individual differences in self-enhancement tendencies is mixed. There is evidence that 
these tendencies correlate with a wide array of traits, but on the other hand the correlations obtained 
are often very small and the evidence is inconclusive. On this level of research it seems that there is 
more evidence in favour of contextual than trait explanations of self-enhancement. One of the 
important factors affecting overly positive self-ratings is the domain being assessed, with domains 
important for participant, more subjective and less verifiable being more prone to bias. There is also 
evidence that accountability and inducing self-aware states is related to decreased positivity bias. 
There is also an ongoing debate on whether positivity bias is domain-general versus domain-specific. 
No definite solutions of this debate are possible now due to still insufficient evidence. It is worthy to 
note that it goes on from an early research period as already Brandt (1958) noticed that across-domain 
adequacy of self-reports was very similar pointing to a trait explanation of positivity bias (or at least 
domain-general character of the bias). However, the evidence provided by Grzegorczyk (1978) or 
Rynko and Palczyńska (2018) disagrees with this statement and favours domain- and context-related 
explanations. The domain-specific account is also supported by the results obtained by Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, Spataro & Chapman (2006) and a comprehensive review by Beer and Harris (2019). 
Most probably, the interactionist account of Ziegler (2015) claiming that both context and traits play 
role would eventually prevail here36 as, as it was claimed by Paulhus and Trapnell (2008), the tendency 
to self-enhance is always present (though there is possibility that its magnitude varies across-
individuals), but it is triggered by situational factors and the exact content of the self-presentation is 
context-dependent. 
3.5.2 Positivity bias in educational context 
Empirical analyses of this work are based on the PISA 2012 database, hence it is warranted to bring 
more focus on positivity bias in the educational/school-related context before presenting the main 
results of the study. The most typical paradigms in the school context positivity bias are comparing 
students self-reports to a) teacher ratings or b) objective test scores (Brown, Andrade & Chen, 2015). 
Positive illusions in school context were associated with poorer social skills, more problem behaviours 
and lower academic achievement (Gresham, Lane, MacMillan, Bocian & Ward, 2000). Other 
researchers linked self-enhancement bias with narcissism, poorer social skills and lower academic 
achievement as measured by lower grade point average (GPA) (Kwan, John, Robins & Kuang, 2008). 
Kim and colleagues (2010) related self-enhancement to lower life satisfaction and GPA among 
inaccurate self-assessment group (Study 4 & 5). Forsterling and Morgenstern (2002) obtained lower 
scores of motivation to achieve among inaccurate self-assessors. Gramzow and co-workers also 
corroborated the negative relation between self-enhancement and academic achievements, e.g. GPA 
(Gramzow, Elliot, Asher & McGregor, 2003). However, there are also results pointing to positive 
consequences of overoptimistic self-reports, e.g. lower drop out from school and higher teacher 
ratings of performance (Bonneville-Roussy, Bouffard & Vezeau, 2017). 
 
36 As it is very often in social sciences, cf. “nature or nurture”, “state vs. trait” or “conscious vs. unconscious” 
debates from various research contexts. 
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In general, it is suggested that students of lower academic skills have also lower abilities to self-assess 
themselves adequately and that boys tend to have more self-enhanced views than girls. Moreover, the 
self-reports validity in case of most students tend to improve in the course of education (Brown et al., 
2015), probably as a function of feedback provided by teachers and parents (Chung, Schriber & Robins, 
2016). The proportion of overly positive self-reports is assessed to be around 30%, with around 15% 
of students showing self-effacement (Bonneville-Roussy et al., 2017). Interestingly, Minkov (2008) 
showed that on the country-level self-enhancement tendencies may lead to lower academic 
achievement as indexed by results from PISA and TIMSS studies. He also suggested few possible 
explanations for such result: a) negative relation between self-enhancement and self-improvement 
motives, resulting in self-complacency and lack of motivation to improve one’s skills (see also Heine, 
2003), b) ignoring negative information more in more self-enhancing countries, c) setting lower 
objective achievement standards that lead to inflated self-reports in the cross-country perspective and 
d) counter-productive school practices promoting superficial criteria of achievement, e.g. norm-
referenced superiority (being the best in class) and inducing mostly external motivation, e.g. learning 
to achieve good grades or to be “the best in my class” (Minkov, 2008; see also Watkins, McInerney, 
Akande & Lee, 2003). So far the causal order of this postulated relation is not known. 
3.5.3 Adjustment of positivity bias 
An important debate in the field concerns outcomes and (alleged) adjustment benefits of self-
enhancement. In general, it is believed that self-enhancement brings positive social consequences, at 
least at short distance. Adaptive benefits of self-enhancement were advocated by Taylor and Brown 
(1988) on the basis of negative correlations between SDR scales and health problems, anxiety, negative 
affect and other similar measures. Other evidence is not so favourable for this hypothesis as e.g. Colvin 
and Block (1994), Colvin, Block and Funder (1995), Martocchio and Judge (1997), Paulhus (1998), 
Peterson and colleagues (2003) suggested that self-deception and self-enhancement were 
maladaptive. Dale and Weinberg (1990) contended that self-enhancement could lead to unrealistic 
ambitions and consequential failure, frustration and burnout. Similarly, self-enhancement may lead to 
disengagement, as the pain of failed high (but unrealistic) expectations is too big (Robins & Beer, 2001). 
Gorlin and Otto (2017) even saw self-deception as a major threat to psychological integrity and saw it 
as one of the major challenges before psychopathological research, proposing even organising 
therapies dedicated for self-deceivers.  
An interesting innovation was proposed by von Hippel and Trivers (2011), and later confirmed 
empirically by Smith, Trivers and von Hippel (2017), who claimed that self-deception (positivity bias) 
do not serve for intrapersonal benefits but it is mainly oriented toward interpersonal gains, such as 
winning social respect. The research by Anderson and colleagues (2012) showed that individuals who 
display confidence, even if it is unwarranted by their knowledge and abilities, gain higher social status 
and are perceived as more competent than they really are37. Mijović-Prelec and Prelec (2010) also 
noticed the relation between positivity bias and confidence boost. Also the research of Smith and 
collaborators (2017) showed that self-deception’s benefit entails in being more persuasive, as self-
deceived individual is more convincing and sways people more easily. In this way self-deception also 
masks manipulation and lowers the chances that an individual will be revealed as incompetent or 
manipulating. The negative consequences of unsuccessful self-presentations are well-known in the 
literature and have been described e.g. by Beer and colleagues (2013). The research up to date also 
 
37 Anderson and collaborators use the term “overconfidence” to describe state of unwarranted confidence in 
one’s abilities. This sense of this term is a bit different from its use in survey methodology field where it is used 
to denote metacognitive bias in assessing confidence of one’s predictions (Stankov & Crawford, 1997). However, 
both uses are related to each other as both of them denote a gap between perceived and actual abilities. 
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points that self-enhancers are more liked by others, but it is not universally confirmed by all research 
results. An important thing is to differentiate between actual and perceived self-enhancement, as the 
latter is most often not acceptable, namely when others realise that an individual is self-enhancing 
(thus, deceiving them) they tend to frown upon at such insincere self-presentation (Dufner et al., 2019; 
Sedikides, Hoorens & Dufner, 2015). This is probably why recent meta-analyses suggested that self-
enhancement can have positive social consequences only in short-term, with negative consequences 
in long-term- simply in the long run there is greater probability that self-enhancing, overconfident 
individuals be uncloaked and frown upon for their self-enhancing attempts (Chance et al., 2011; Dufner 
et al., 2019). Both meta-analyses suggested that long-term benefits of positivity bias may be sustained, 
if the bias is yielded only in the private context. However, results brought by Beer and Harris (2001) 
showed negative long-term consequences of self-enhancement also in the intrapersonal domain, 
leaving the evidence gathered to date without firm conclusions (Beer & Harris, 2019). Also in the case 
of self-enhancement in the school context there are no firm conclusions about the adjustment of 
overly optimistic self-reports of abilities as the evidence is mixed and some studies point to positive 
outcomes like increased educational attainment or school retention, whereas other point to negative 
consequences (Brown et al., 2015). 
In the line of other-deception research an especially interesting account was presented by Lamba and 
Nityananda (2014) as they reviewed possible consequences of self-deception for financial and 
educational institutions. The researchers claim that gains from other-deception are potentially 
disastrous for societies as false air of competence surrounding self-enhancers may lead to their 
unwarranted promotion for key positions in important institutions like banks or armies leaving them 
in the risk of being run by incompetent but overconfident, others-manipulating individuals. Lamba and 
Nityananda advocated for taking this into consideration, e.g. in hiring decisions or grading in 
educational institutions (2014). They also call for taking this matter under consideration in scientific 
research and present initial results that ranking rather than grading might prove to be less prone to 
overly positive self-perceptions. 
It is worthy to note that in many research attempts measures used as indications of self-enhancement 
consequences might be themselves distorted by self-enhancement (self-reports of health or self-
esteem) or its social consequences (peer-ratings, social position) (Humberg et al., 2019). Also the 
magnitude of bias may be a key factor in judging its adjustment benefits. Mijović-Prelec and Prelec 
(2010) as well as Papps and O’Carroll (1998) were among the researchers who turned attention to the 
magnitude of positivity bias and claimed that moderate levels of self-deception may be beneficial or 
at least harmless. Other important factor may be the precise strategy used to achieve an enhancing 
effect. Hepper, Gramzow and Sedikides (2010) distinguished almost 60 different, both cognitive and 
behavioural, strategies, grouped empirically in four main factors. As showed by their research it is 
warranted that different strategies yield different, positive or negative, adjustment outcomes. 
Additionally, more and more newly appearing research attempts point that the relation between 
abilities and adjustment is often mixed or curvilinear. Firstly, it may be domain-dependent, as, for 
example, in the case of emotion recognition that may be beneficial for job performance, as it is handy 
in negotiation processes, but may be detrimental for relationship maintenance due to increase stress 
in negatively valenced situations (Simpson et al., 2011). Similarly cognitive abilities may facilitate work 
performance but may hinder gaining leadership in group, as often groups refrain from having overly 
smart leaders (Antonakis, House & Simonton, 2017). Thus, self-enhancing consequences may be 
different depending on the exact context, domain and shape of relationship (He & Cote, 2019). As 
posited by Thompson (1999): in one context self-enhancement may be beneficial, e.g. by reducing 
stress reaction (cf. Why & Huang, 2011) or by motivating individual to increase effort (self-efficacy 
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explanation, Bandura, 1997), while in the other it may be maladaptive, e.g. due to threat 
underestimation and subsequent risky behaviours or due to causing helplessness (cf. Donovan, Leavitt 
& Walsh, 1990). 
3.6 Chapter summary 
The first part of  the above chapter concentrates on presenting evidence on positivity bias and related 
topics stemming from different research fields and methodologies than the “mainstream” of socially 
desirable responding research presented in Chapter 2. The integrated evidence from e.g. observational 
research of Erving Goffman and survey research of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann largely corroborated 
findings from the main body of research. 
Some interesting results were brought by Peter Blau who turned attention to higher frequency of 
positive in comparison to negative feedback in social relations which may be one of the reasons of the 
prevalence of positivity bias. The findings presented by Noelle-Neumann (1974) linked SDR to 
conformity and evidenced that people are constantly gauging what is socially desirable and socially 
approved in their particular groups. Therefore, what is perceived as socially desirable can change from 
group to group, e.g. from school to school. Very thought-provoking results were obtained by Bishop 
(1986) who showed that people can claim opinions and knowledge on non-existing, entirely fictitious 
issues. This urges the question about the boundaries of self-presentation and self-deception but also 
provokes queries about the mechanisms that lead to such effects. 
Interesting information on the nature of positivity bias was brought by psychological research on self-
consciousness, self-knowledge and self-motives. Most importantly, it was showed that achieving 
accurate self-knowledge, indispensable for forming realistic self-judgments, is an effortful and difficult 
process that requires sufficient control and cognitive resources to be brought off successfully. 
Moreover, at least for some participants, gathering accurate self-knowledge can be even aversive and 
unpleasant. Forming veridical self-judgments also requires overcoming automatic reactions, that 
promote (overly) positive self-view and tune attention to positive feedback and desirable outcomes 
(see e.g. Gesiarz et al., 2019). 
The above chapter also presents a thorough review of self-enhancement and both motivational and 
non-motivational accounts of this phenomenon. The former concentrates on the roles of self-
enhancement as a boost to self-esteem, protection from threatening stimuli or thoughts, energising 
factor, overcoming fear and anxiety and enhancement social status. The latter sees self-enhancement 
as a by-product of cognitive processes, e.g. as a result of limited cognitive resources or memory 
fallacies. Interestingly, evidence from neurocognitive research shows that self-enhancement as a 
reaction to self-esteem threat and as a result of cognitive load are based on different neuronal basis. 
Furthermore, this branch of research claims that self-enhancement is one of the key motives that guide 
everyday behaviour and cognition. Hence, positivity bias can be expected in almost every 
measurement occasion. 
Investigation for correlates of positivity bias leads to a mixed picture, pointing also that pairwise 
correlations are unlikely to shed much light on the relations between positivity bias and psychological 
and socio-demographic characteristics. As evidenced by research (e.g. by Rynko & Palczyńska, 2018) 
such relations should be modelled by interactional designs as suggested by theoretical models of 
Ziegler (2011) and Krosnick (1991; 1999). Nevertheless, positivity bias was related to a wide array of 
socio-psychological traits, e.g. self-monitoring, dark personality, overconfidence, low educational 
attainment, but also to measurement occasion characteristics: domain desirability, verifiability and 
individual importance (centrality) among others. In the educational context specifically, lower 
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educational achievements, lower school motivation, more behavioural and social problems were 
correlated with more bias. Moreover, boys typically yield more enhanced responses than girls.  
As it seems from the research amounted to date there is a tremendous need to focus more on 
measures used to index positivity bias and establish its correlates (Beer & Harris, 2019; He & Cote, 
2019). Moreover, the characteristics of measurement context (e.g. accountability, private vs. public, 
cognitive load) and items (desirability, verifiability, etc.) should be experimentally manipulated and 
linked with other self-report measures and also other, not self-descriptory tasks in order to advance 
knowledge on positivity bias. Specifically, an approach to overcome the shared method variance 
concern are needed as often trait and method variance are confounded as measures of positivity bias 
and measures of outcome come from the same source (most often the participant himself). 
Additionally, more longitudinal studies with diverse indicators of adjustment, preferably using 
objective measures, including psychophysiological or neurocognitive data, is needed. In their 
comprehensive review article Beer and Harris (2019) sum up that these steps are needed “to 
understand the nuances of when, where, and for whom self-insight failures are adaptive”. It can be 
added: “when, where and for whom self-insight failures happens and what effects they have on self-
report validity”. 
Some clarifying evidence was recently provided by Garrett, González-Garzón, Foulkes, Levita and 
Sharot (2018) who claimed that positivity bias disappears in threatening conditions. Hence, the whole 
evidence accumulated in laboratories and surveys, all collected in non-threatening, non-stressful 
conditions may be only one facet of the self-enhancement relation to adjustment. The other facet may 
be reversing the preference for positive stimuli under a perceived threat, leading to disappearance of 
positivity bias. Such change in preferences may be executed by a shift in attention and was 
corroborated in the EEG research of Carretié and collaborators (2004) who showed that processing 
negative stimuli is quenched on early stages of processing if they are not identified as a real threat, 
precisely as suggested by the research of Garrett and colleagues (2018), Kappes and collaborators 
(2020) or Rigney (2019)38. However, this pattern can be reversed when a situation would be identified 
as truly threatening, as suggested by new evidence (Garrett et al., 2018). Interesting results in this 
context were brought by Cai, Wu, Shi, Gu and Sedikides (2016) who showed that higher processing of 
negative stimuli, and consequential decrease of self-enhancing responses, is possible. Such processing 
was marked by larger N170 event-related potential (ERP) as a response to negative information in less 
self-enhancing participants. 
Hence, it can be concluded that positivity bias can be triggered at least in two ways: either by a self-
relevant motive (Sedikides, 1993) or by impaired cognitive processing due to e.g. cognitive load or time 
pressure (Kappes & Sharot, 2019). The two processes are distinguished on the neuronal level but it is 
not known whether they also yield different behavioural effects (Beer & Harris, 2019; Flagan & Beer, 
2013). More is known about the motivated positivity bias which is an automatic, non-deliberate and 
adaptive phenomenon of human cognition that serves for both intra- as well as interpersonal benefits, 
e.g. stress reduction (Hernandez et al., 2015), motivation and self-efficacy boost (Bandura, 1997), as 
well as winning social support and status (Anderson et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2017). However, 
unmitigated or uncorrected positivity bias can lead to negative consequences, both intrapersonal (e.g. 
lowered self-esteem; Robins & Beer, 2001) and interpersonal (e.g. lowered social liking; Paulhus, 
1998). This view of positivity bias accounts perfectly for the mixed evidence on its adjustment and 
consequences- simply put, the bias brings positive outcomes when it offers net benefits and when the 
net balance is no longer favourable it should be, and most often is, corrected (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). 
 




Therefore, positivity bias brings positive consequences for most of the people in most of the situations. 
However, survey methodologists are not among the fortunate and positivity bias always brings them 
(potentially) negative outcomes. What are the consequences of self-enhanced responses in self-report 





























Chapter 4-SELF-REPORT METHODOLOGY AND POSITIVITY 
BIAS: IDEAS, PROBLEMS, REMEDIES 
 
4.1 The idea of self-report of abilities 
The idea of self-report is beautiful and simple- why bother with complicated measures if one can just 
ask participants about virtually anything that warrants scientific assessment? Moreover, what better 
way to measure so many hard to observe phenomena? Lastly, who could possibly know their 
personality, attitudes or math abilities better than the respondents themselves? Unfortunately, this 
rose-coloured situation is only half true- self-reports offer tremendous benefits but are also prone to 
many threats to validity, response biases among them. 
Self-report scales are constructed on the basis of assumption that participants are able to validly report 
on certain existing characteristics (traits) with the use of a measurement instrument provided, most 
often in the form of a rating scale. However, Mills and Hogan (1978) called this basic assumption a 
“Platonist interpretation of item responses” claiming that already the assumption of the traits 
existence is an optimistic idea39, not to speak about the possibilities that participants can veraciously 
describe themselves. Mills and Hogan (1978) also pointed out that measurement occasion is a social 
situation for respondents, meaning that they will employ role-taking (role-playing) behaviours just as 
they would do on any other occasion. This implies that self-report measurement is under threat of all 
the conscious and unconscious tendencies predicted by theories of Goffman, Blau, Hogan, Paulhus or 
Sedikides, as presented in the above chapters. Shortly, respondents strive to maximise their positive 
experiences and minimise their negative ones during any measurement occasion and will yield an 
overly-positive image of their characteristics due to inherent response biases, e.g. impression 
management, self-enhancement motivation or simply putting low effort in the responses provided. 
Problems with self-report measurement typically present themselves regardless the domain 
measured, be it reporting about frequency of physical exercises, dietary habits, one’s personality or 
reading abilities (Brenner & DeLamater, 2016; McIntyre, Noels & Clement, 1997). However, despite 
many potential pitfalls the self-reports manage to yield quite high validity when compared with more 
“objective” measures. The subsequent chapter will also briefly present results of validity studies in the 
context of self-reports and will also provide a short overview of the methods conceived to control for 
positivity bias. In both cases the presentation is focused on self-administered self-reports as this is the 
focal point of the subsequent analyses. 
4.2 The validity of self-report 
In a recent study Naguib and co-workers (2019) conducted a large-sample web survey among medical 
doctors. On average, the respondents achieved only 57% of items answered correctly on a 9-item test, 
whereas the mean predicted score amounted to 84%, yielding that 92% of the surveyed doctors were 
overoptimistic about their skills. This effect could be blamed on the “ignorant, but overconfident 
experts” (Bradley, 1981) but other, more lay samples also provided some discouraging examples. For 
instance, Ennis (1965) surveyed participants about their reading activities and, probably to his great 
dismay, obtained results that even people that reported reading zero books in the last year assessed 
 
39 The researchers here referred to the notion of “traitedness”, namely, how similar a person is across situations 
or what is the part of the behavioural or attitudinal variance explained by situational versus trait factors (Fleeson 
& Wilt, 2010; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne & Ilardi, 1997). The “traitedness” is also thought to vary cross-culturally 
(e.g. Minkov, 2008). See also Block (1961) on ego identity and role variability. 
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themselves as “moderate” or “heavy” readers (18% of the “zero” group). Another 38% of the group 
that reported reading 1-4 books per year rated themselves as “moderate” or “heavy” readers40. 
Probably a parade of such results pushed DeNisi and Shaw (1977) to conclude that self-reports of 
abilities are impractical as they did not correlate with ability tests. Although the data they gathered 
did not support such a harsh claim as self-reports correlated with tests, though not every scale that 
should did and some correlations were low in magnitude. Thornton (1980) ascribed these lack of 
predictive validity to an “inflation bias” and admitted that the evidence of self-report predictive and 
discriminative validity is mixed. However, it is worth to note, that DeNisi and Shaw (1977) based their 
study on a sample of students in a low-stakes assessment, whereas other studies that recruited real 
job applicants or real job employees (high-stakes context) have shown that self-reports of ability, 
knowledge and skills are a valid predictor in personnel recruitment (e.g. Levine, Flory & Ash, 1977), 
yielding high correlation between self-reports and objective ability tests and other measures, e.g. 
supervisors- or peer-ratings. Thus, context and instrumentality, as well as stakes, could have crucial 
impact on the usefulness of self-report measures. Furnham (1986, 1990) also claimed that 
measurement tools differ in their susceptibility to faking due to their design. He believed that scales 
with high face validity and these measuring constructs well-known or well-understood by the general 
public being in more risk of being faked. This claim has a naturally logical appeal and has been also 
tested empirically (Furnham, 1990; Furnham & Henderson, 1982; Velicer & Weiner, 1975), however it 
is unknown how these scale characteristics would interact with positivity biases other than faking. 
Such discrepant results urged researchers to perform integrative studies and meta-analyses in order 
to assess self-reports’ utility as well as to investigate potential moderators of their validity. The meta-
analyses in general have confirmed that self-reports of abilities are valid measures of constructs of 
interest, as most of the meta-studies have yielded that self-descriptions correlate with more objective 
measures, mainly cognitive tests (e.g. IQ tests, math proficiency tests, etc.). Mabe and West (1982) 
reported a self-report-objective measurement correlation to be low to moderate (r=0.29 on average) 
with high variability (SD=0.25). Some scales yielded higher correlation with their criterion (even up to 
r=.70) and some failed to present any criterion-related validity at all (correlations around 0). Very 
similar results were presented by Hansford and Hattie (1982) who obtained average correlation of 0.21 
and again high variability of correlation coefficients of (SD=0.23)41. Similar results were also obtained 
by Kruger and Dunning (1999) who claimed that in most research endeavours self-reports yielded only 
moderate correlations with actual performance (rs from 0.05 to 0.50). Research on correlation 
between SAT scores (objective measurement) and self-rated ability yielded only a 0.33 correlation, 
GPA (grade point average) and self-rated ability- only 0.22 (Robins & Beer, 2001). Kim et al. (2010) 
reported higher correlations between these measures (r~0.60-0.80), but with a much shorter test, 
although also based on SAT items. Joseph and Newman (2010) presented a meta-analysis of relations 
between self-report and various objective measures of emotional intelligence and yielded a correlation 
of only 0.20. Also research on the utility of the single item IQ measures yielded their low utility as 
 
40 These results were also wittily depicted in the pop culture, e.g. in the Woody Allen’s movie “Annie Hall”:  
Alvy's Psychiatrist: [Alvy and Annie are seeing their therapists at the same time on a split screen] How often do 
you sleep together? 
Annie's Psychiatrist: Do you have sex often? 
Alvy Singer: [lamenting] Hardly ever. Maybe three times a week. 
Annie Hall: [annoyed] Constantly. I'd say three times a week. 
[excerpt from the screenplay of the movie as in https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/annie_hall/quotes/] 
See more on this kind of effects of unclear terms (“vague quantifiers”) but also inter-group comparisons in the 
works of Nora Schaeffer, e.g. Schaeffer & Charng (1991). 
41 Educational settings’ data was analysed in that study. 
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intelligence proxies as the correlations between the scores were low (r~0.20-0.25), despite the strains 
to improve the validity by manipulating item design (Paulhus, Lysy & Yik, 1998). However, specifically 
in the domain of math self-assessment the correlations between self-report scales and objective tests 
can amount up to 0.50 (Ackerman, Beier & Bowen, 2002), being a high value in the light of a recent 
meta-synthesis42 (Zell & Krizan, 2014). 
Other researchers claimed that it is also important to accept that every self-assessment measure would 
be always imperfect, in the sense it would be always discrepant with other, more objective measures 
(John & Robins, 1994; Kim et al., 2010). However, when self-assessment and objective test are on the 
same scale (e.g. number of points) the correlation can be quite high (r~0.60-0.80) and around 80% of 
the sample will yield correct estimates of one’s score (Kim, et al., 2010). The evidence gathered shows 
that respondents have a limited insight into their own abilities but that there is also a significant 
importance of factors that moderate the criterion-related validity of self-reports (Zell & Krizan, 2014). 
4.2.1 Moderators of self-reports validity 
Mabe and West (1982) differentiated moderators into: a) person-level characteristics and b) 
measurement conditions, the former entailing individual differences, such as age, gender, intelligence 
or personality, whereas the latter regarding item design, domain characteristics or measurement 
context. 
Person characteristics 
The first and obvious candidates for a moderator of self-reports criterion-related validity are response 
biases with a special focus on the positivity bias. In fact, there is evidence that successful control of the 
spurious error variance leads to validity improvements (e.g. Anderson et al., 1984; Leite & Cooper, 
2010). However, pinpointing such variance is not an easy thing and oftentimes even (theoretically) 
very elaborated tools fail to account for it and do not moderate the criterion-related validity (DeNisi & 
Shaw, 1977; Li & Bagger, 2006; Huang, 2013; McCrae & Costa, 1983). 
Another often researched moderator is age. In general, there is evidence that even young children 
(ages 8-12) yield overly positive self-descriptions (Thomaes, Brummelman & Sedikides, 2017) but the 
older the sample the higher the validity of self-reports (Paulhus et al., 1998). This pattern is confirmed 
by many research projects and has a solid grounding in the psychological theory of cognitive 
development (Harter, 2012). 
Gender also was scrutinised as a potential moderator, but the research suggests that it can be a validity 
moderator only in certain domains, related to gender stereotypes and social norms in a given society 
(Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019; Marsh & Yeung, 1998). 
Surprisingly, there are not many evidence-based personality moderators of self-report validity. One of 
them is internal locus of control (Mabe & West, 1982), which is attributed to superior utilisation of 
personally-relevant information and also to greater motivation to actively seek such information in 
comparison to respondents with external locus of control (Phares, Ritchie & Davies, 1968; Seeman, 
1963). In general, the research on personality moderators is scarce (Ackerman et al., 2002; Mabe & 
West, 1982). 
Personal cognitive abilities are also an important moderator of self-report validity: more intelligent 
and more educated participants yield responses of higher criterion-related validity (Mabe & West, 
1982; Schlosser et al., 2013). Role of metacognitive ability as well as experience in self-assessment and 
 
42 Meta-analysis of meta-analyses. 
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survey participation was also researched. It was suggested that there is no gain from experience as 
participants failed to yield higher self-report validity in a post-test in comparison to first measurements 
(Ferraro, 2010; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, and Rakow, 2000; Schlosser et al., 2013) but the research 
presented by Miller and Geraci (2011) and Ryvkin, Krajc & Ortmann (2012) provided evidence that 
corrective feedback and metacognitive training can result in larger validity of self-reports. Experience 
in survey participation was positively related to data quality (Gadzella, Cochran, Parham & Fournet, 
1976; Gummer et al., 2018; Heilenman, 1990). These results indicate that accurate self-assessment can 
be taught, at least to some extent (Butler & Winne, 1995; Miller & Geraci, 2011). 
Interest and motivation were linked with higher data quality (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). These 
characteristics can be both specific (“I am interested/motivated in this particular topic”) and general 
(“I am interested/motivated to take part in surveys/acquire knowledge of myself/help science in 
general”) as suggested by Paulhus et al. (1998). 
Measurement characteristics 
Specific versus broad items give estimates of higher validity (Ackerman et al., 2002; Mabe & West, 
1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014), e.g. item “I am good at math” is predicted to yield ratings of lower validity 
than item “I can calculate the area of a triangle”. This relation is probably driven by how the self-
efficacy is created which is inherently a task-specific trait (rather than task-general or domain-general) 
as it is related to task-specific exposure and experiences (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019).  
Difficulty of the task also may play a role, with hard tasks being more often over-rated and easy tasks- 
under-rated (Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 2000). The results of the meta-synthesis provided by Zell and 
Krizan (2014) suggested that self-reports on simpler, less complex tasks yield higher validity than 
reporting on more complex tasks. 
Task/domain familiarity is another measurement characteristic positively related to criterion-related 
validity (Mabe & West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014). It is postulated that familiarity enables learning 
process to take place, which eliminates at least part of spurious variance (Butler & Winne, 1995). 
Intuitively more objective, verifiable domains are self-reported with more accuracy than subjective, 
unverifiable ones (Mabe & West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014). Thus, it can be expected that math ability 
will be more accurately reported than e.g. emotional intelligence (Paulhus et al., 1998). 
Trait desirability is related negatively to the validity of self-reports- surveying about subjectively 
important or socially desirable traits is a typical situation where self-enhancement motivation can lead 
to biased scores (Paulhus et al., 1998) 
Stakes of the assessment are also related to the validity of research. Mills and Hogan (1978) predicted 
that in low-stakes situations validity should be higher as incentives to faking or self-enhancement are 
low in these situations (see also Niessen et al., 2017). On the other hand, it is postulated that high-
stakes assessments may be less biased as they induce additional motivation (e.g. Eklöf, 2010; Eklöf & 
Nyroos, 2013). 
Both anonymity and accountability are related in general to the validity of the self-reports (Mabe & 
West, 1982) as it was already commented in subchapter 3.5.1 on the role of accountability in self-
enhancement reduction. 
Certainly this subfield suffers from lack of research, especially scarce are experimental studies (Mabe 
& West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014). It seems that better knowledge on moderators of the validity has 
been acquired in case of cognitive tests than self-reports (see e.g. Borgonovi & Biecek, 2016). 
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4.3 Problem with “objective” criterion 
Obviously, criterion-related validity studies have their own, specific problems. The first group of them 
is of purely psychometric nature. Put simply- psychometric qualities of the tasks used both as self-
reports and objective measures are another important moderator of criterion-related validity 
(Reynolds & Suzuki, 2013). If unreliable or lacking in construct validity measures are used in research 
then the correlation coefficients are probably limited or even distorted (Ackerman, 1996; Paulhus et 
al., 1998). Another issue of similar nature is the problem of method versus trait variance: many self-
reports are correlated higher with other self-assessments than with other, e.g. behavioural, measures 
of akin constructs indicating a large role of response biases43 (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Joseph & 
Newman, 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
The second group of problems is of more philosophical nature. The criterion-related validity studies 
entail using the best possible criterion in order to obtain values close to the “true score”. However, 
not in every measurement it is clear what this “true score” or “true value” should be. According to 
many researchers the distinction is clear-cut in case of socio-demographic variables (e.g. gender, age, 
profession) or questions about objectively verifiable facts (e.g. number of medical visits in the past 
year, income from all sources in the past month, etc.)- there is a certain value or score that is true and 
any distortion from it would be considered an error. However, in case of many measures it is hard to 
establish what the “true score” should (and could) be. This problem is especially prominent in 
measuring constructs like opinions, attitudes and judgements (Groves, 1989; Jabkowski, 2015; 
Sztabiński, 2011). After all, it is possible that there is no “true” value outside of the measurement 
situation as in many cases the attitude in question is constructed simultaneously with the 
measurement process (Jabkowski, 2015). 
This situation is best reflected in the difference between the “true score” notion in psychometric versus 
in statistical sense (Jabkowski, 2015). In statistical definition the true score is simply the value of an 
index in the population, whereas in psychometric sense the true score is latent or even non-existent 
(Groves, 1989). Hence, under the psychometric definition any value without error could serve as a 
measure of true score, whereas in the statistical definition the true score is simply the value of an index 
in population. Despite the examples provided by the researchers it is still unclear to which category 
measurement of certain constructs should be classified. In example, are cognitive abilities closer to the 
elusive nature of political attitudes or are they rather affined to the firm factuality of socio-
demographic variables?  
Setting this notion aside it is warranted to conclude that in many cases theoretical validity can be only 
estimated not determined. However, it is crucial for any validity study to provide “best, most 
informative, least ambiguous evidence that resources allow” (Landy, 1986). In a criterion-related 
validity study the main focus is dedicated to finding the best possible criterion, otherwise the notion 
of validity as a correlation between indices is seriously limited. The PISA math ability test fulfils these 
high requirements for a “representative and pre-eminent” (Landy, 1986) or an “exemplificatory” index 
(Groves, 1989; Jabkowski, 2015) of math ability due to its high psychometric characteristics and careful 
preparation of the tests’ content (OECD, 2014a; 2014b). Moreover, it offers measurement conducted 
on a representative, large sample in standardised, controlled conditions and with strict rules of data 
processing after measurement. All these facts attest that the PISA math test scores are as good a 
criterion of math abilities as it is feasibly thinkable in case of social sciences research44.  
 
43 And other measurement errors related to the form, but not to the substance. 
44 Of course, the PISA test has also many drawbacks, among which being a low-stakes test is one of the most 
important ones (Borgonovi & Biecek, 2016; Eklof, 2010; Rutkowski & Wild, 2015). Another possible source of 
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Hence, the correlation between the test score and the math familiarity (self-report) score will be used 
as the main indicator of criterion-related validity of the math familiarity scale in order to assess the 
effect of OCT on this relation. This is an example of a concurrent validity study as both measures were 
taken at the same time point. This is also a validation of “X as a sign of Y” type (prediction validity), but 
also “X requires the same attribute as Y” (construct validity) (Landy, 1986) and OCT score is used to 
assess the magnitude of response bias in the self-report. 
4.4 Commonness of overly positive self-reports 
There is evidence that inflated ratings are very common indeed (Shi, Sedikides, Cai, Liu & Yang, 2017). 
Brandt (1958) concluded that only 50% of self-estimates were adequate, others were mostly too high. 
Very similar evidence was provided by John and Robins (1994) who found that only 50% of participants 
were accurate in self-evaluation, 35% overestimated their performance, whereas 15% self-effaced 
(underestimated their performance). Preliminary research by Koniewski et al. (2019) revealed slightly 
lower numbers with only 4% of self-effacers and 16% of self-enhancers on both tasks they have used 
but with greater numbers for one-task self-effacement/enhancement (21% and 39% respectively). 
Similar numbers in the school-context studies were reported by Robins and Beer (2001) where 31% of 
the sample overestimated their performance and only 9% underestimated and Bonneville-Roussy and 
colleagues (2017) were almost 30% of the sample yielded inflated self-reports but also around 15% 
yielded overly pessimistic ratings. Almost exactly the same proportion of 30% of overclaimers was 
obtained by Randall and Fernandes (1991). Similar proportions of participants distorting their self-
ratings were yielded by faking studies where the percentage of fakers oscillates usually between 15 
and 30% (Holden & Book, 2012). However, the average size of the positivity bias is usually not large 
(Robins & Paulhus, 2001), most of the people yield only mild to moderate bias (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; 
Dufner et al., 2019; Robins & Beer, 2001) and only a fraction yields large bias (Taylor & Armor, 1996). 
In the meta-analysis performed by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) the average effect sizes pointed out 
that most of the fakers had scores elevated by a half or one standard deviation, depending on the 
scale. Hence, it is important to differentiate between a “bias” and a derailment of cognition as the two 
are definitely not the same, the latter indicative more of clinical problems than self-enhancement. 
Most of the faking research undertaken so far shows that faking can lead to distortion of personality 
assessment rising up to one standard deviation (Birkeland et al., 2006; Dwight & Donovan, 2003; 
Hooper, 2007; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Moreover, various research endeavours suggest that 
proportion of participants engaging in faking may vary from around 15% to as high as 50% (Ziegler et 
al., 2011). Although the influence of faking on self-descriptory data in other research areas is not that 
meticulously researched, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that they are not free from its 
detrimental influence. For example, in the study of Taylor and Brown (1988) none of the surveyed 
students expected to score below the mean on the final exams, whereas in a study of Krueger (1998) 
almost half of participants said they would be capable of solving a complex mathematical problem that 
only 20% of population would solve. Similarly, 88% of the surveyed American sample claimed better 
than average driving skills (Svenson, 1981) and 94% of surveyed academic teachers claimed above-
average teaching skills (Cross, 1977)45. 
 
error in the PISA databases is related to cheating, faking and other errors, including those committed probably 
in the data processing phase (see Blasius & Thiessen, 2012; 2015), however, this factor is possibly present in 
many other datasets as well. 
45 Those research results are classical examples of the so-called above-average or better-than-average effect and 
are most probably effects of self-cognition biases (self-enhancement), leading to ascribing oneself more positive 
traits and skills than it is in reality (Thornton, 1980; Wojciszke, 2011). 
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Participants not only assess themselves more favourably but also claim to have traits or to perform 
actions that in reality they do not perform, nor have. In a population-representative study conducted 
in Poland around 75% of the English teachers surveyed claimed that they use information-
communication technologies (ICT, e.g. computers) during their lessons, whereas observations of their 
classes yielded that only 25% of the teachers surveyed actually used them (Muszyński, Campfield & 
Szpotowicz, 2015). Moreover, in the Polish edition of the PIAAC study around 20% of participants 
declaring frequent use of computers in a self-descriptory survey then failed a very simple computer 
proficiency test (Burski et al., 2013). In the PISA 2012 study (OECD, 2014a) even 15% of pupils claimed 
that they are very familiar and understand well non-existent mathematical terms (e.g. “indicative 
fraction”) and more than 30% of them claim that they have heard about those faked terms. What is 
important, is that the results of those self-descriptory data on mathematical abilities have rather low 
predictive validity on mathematical test results. Only accounting for scores on non-existent items led 
to rise of the validity of the self-descriptory data (Pokropek, 2014). Those results show that virtually 
any use of self-descriptory scales is in a threat of faking and that basing research conclusions on 
uncorrected data is in a risk of drawing wrong conclusions. 
4.5 Review of SDR control methods 
4.5.1 Problems and limitations of the actual SDR methods research 
Many SDR “reduction” methods have been developed, although despite a large amount of studies as 
yet none of the proposed palliatives gained universal recognition as a commonly-accepted standard to 
deal with positivity biases (faking, SDR, etc.) (Krumpal, 2013; Ziegler et al., 2012). Moreover, there is 
still a significant gap in efficiency comparative studies where various methods are pitted against each 
other. Validity studies are also scarce, especially criterion-related validity research. Another problem 
is that the majority of the studies devoted to this topic where conducted in only one specific setting: 
faking of personality assessments, mainly in practical contexts. Other topic highly covered in the 
literature is controlling for SDR in sensitive and intrusive questions. The remaining topics are 
underrepresented in the literature which results in a significant tilt of suitability of the existing methods 
to the two most commonly researched situations. However, as has been shown in subchapter 4.3, 
positivity biases are not limited to these contexts. The concentration on practical utility in a narrow 
number of contexts resulted in a relative lack of theoretical advancement in the field which impedes 
further research (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad & Thornton, 2006; Ziegler, 2011). Nonetheless, these 
problems have been identified and new research endeavours aim at “putting the horse back in front 
of the cart” (Heggestad, 2012), namely trying to link practical method utility with substantial 
understanding of the basis of their effectivity.  
The subsequent review will try to present most important methods devised to control positivity bias, 
along with an attempt to gauge their adequacy for large-scale assessments and self-reports of abilities 
situations. The review concentrates on the methods possible to use in the self-administrative mode. 
Methods specific for situations where interviewers are involved are beyond the scope of this work. 
Exemplary information on this research can be found elsewhere (e.g. Bredl, Storfinger & Menold, 2011; 
Bredl, Winker & Kotschau, 2012; Kemper & Menold, 2014; Krumpal, 2013; Menold & Kemper, 2014; 
Nederhof, 1985).  
4.5.2 Classifications of SDR control methods 
Many classifications of positivity bias control methods have been proposed and almost every one of 
them entails division on methods intending to prevent the bias and methods aimed to reduce 
consequences of the bias that already took place. The preventive methods need to be applied before 
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the data is collected so they are often referred to as ex-ante or proactive methods, whereas the other 
group is applied after the data is collected, hence they are also known as post-hoc, reactive or remedy 
methods (Adair, 2014; Hipsz, 2014; Zheng, 2015; cf. Nederhof, 1985; Paulhus, 1991). 
Other divisions proposed also take account of the level on which the method operates (person, item, 
scale, etc.; Dilchert & Ones, 2012; Kuncel, Borneman & Kiger, 2012) and the degree to which methods 
constitute part or by-product of the measurement of interest (so-called internal methods) or require 
using additional indicators (bias markers) with little or none substantial meaning (external methods) 
(Reeder & Ryan, 2012). 
Adair (2014) proposed a classification based not only on practical aspects of the methods but also on 
the mechanisms they are aimed at. This classification integrated applied research with some earlier 
conceptions of faking conceived by McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006). Adair divided preventive 
methods to these aimed at curbing participants’ intentions to respond desirably (cf. demand reduction 
techniques in Paulhus, 1991) and these restricting their ability to do so (2014). The works of Adair 
(2014) and McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) were both dedicated for faking, but their extension to 
other positivity biases is proposed here. Obviously, these models are only in the initial phases of 
empirical testing (even regarding the faking framework only). 
The model proposed by McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) derives from the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 1991) and predicts that both situational and personal characteristics decide 
about the participants’ intention to fake (respond desirably, self-enhance) that can result in actual 
faking (self-enhancing) behaviour if a given respondent possesses abilities to do so and the 





Figure 4. Model of positivity bias based on the model of faking proposed by McFarland and Ryan (2000). 
Methods and the stage on which they intervene according to Adair (2014). 
McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) put a large emphasis on beliefs and intentions that precede faking 
behaviour in their theory. In their opinion such characteristics as values, morals or personality traits 



























having intentions to fake does not necessarily result in faking behaviour as it is assumed that 
participant may refrain from faking, e.g. as a result of adverse conditions (e.g. fear of detection) or 
insufficient abilities (e.g. lack of knowledge what self-image should be presented). Such a focus on 
beliefs and intentions is warranted in case of faking which is a conscious and purposive behaviour. 
However, it is also conceivable that similar processes and stages also take place when unconscious 
positivity biases take place. In example, participants’ beliefs towards participating in surveys (e.g. 
survey/test anxiety) or even attitudes towards science in general can influence their measurement 
behaviour, even unknowingly to themselves. Similarly, in case of unintentional positive biases, 
“intentions of faking” could be changed to tendencies towards responding in an overly positive way. 
Research on self-enhancement confirms that such tendencies are ubiquitous but participants greatly 
differ in their realisation (e.g. Crocker & Park, 2004), hence warranting dependency of biased 
behaviour on preceding processes (intentions in case of faking and many other response sets, 
tendencies in case of response styles). Other parts of the model are also easily accommodated to the 
framework of general positivity biases (cf. Ziegler, 2011). 
Returning to the classification proposed by Adair (2014): preventive methods need to suppress 
participants intention to fake or unable it through opportunity cancellation or ability reduction. On the 
other hand, remedial (identification) measures can be used only after the data is collected thus being 
able only to correct for bias effects, but not to preclude them. A detailed classification of positivity 
biases methods is presented in Table 1 below. Classification categories proposed by Adair (2014), 
Reeder and Ryan (2012) and Dilchert and Ones (2012) were merged and organised in order to 
formulate a comprehensive taxonomy.  
It is noteworthy that this classification is only a proposition, though an important one. Identifying 
method’s place in the classification enables inference about the mechanisms it is meant to affect. Of 
course, classification should be subjected to discussion and verification due to further empirical and 
theoretical developments. It seems that there is little place for controversy in the prevention versus 
remedy division, as well as in the intention versus ability or external or internal character of remedies. 
However, there is large overlap between the person-level and item-level SDR control methods. This 
overlap is rendered by introducing the “mixed-level” category which reflects that this classification is 
subjected to the highly contextualised use of these methods. In some studies randomised response 
technique may be treated as a person-level analysis as the questions submitted to randomisation 
procedure may constitute the whole or vast majority of measurement, whereas in other research 
attempts only a subset of items may be subjected to randomisation, meaning that this method was 
used as an item-level one (see e.g. Hipsz, 2014). Similar reservation involves also keying/weighting 
methods and differential item functioning (DIF)- they may be use as person-level indicators of desirable 
responding or they may remain only item-level indicators which are to inform about SDR in a given 
item or scale only. These remarks regard also other methods (e.g. administration mode in the case of 
mixed-mode surveys, where certain items may be administered in different mode than others) 
showing that the person- versus item-level division is much less rigid than other categories in the SDR 
methods taxonomy. This division depends on measurement context and researchers’ intentions 
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Table 1. Classification of SDR control methods. Based on Adair (2014), Dilchert & Ones (2012), Kuncel 
et al. (2012), Reeder & Ryan (2012) and author’s ideas. 
Literature review suggests that methods differ widely in their efficiency, flexibility and details of use. 
The subsequent paragraphs will briefly comment on their main characteristics, paying special attention 
towards their utility in accounting for non-deliberate SDR in low-stakes large-scale contexts. The 
review is not meant to exhaust the literature but rather to give food-for-thought by pointing to 
research lacunas and also to sketch the methodological context in which the overclaiming technique 
(OCT) was conceived and developed. It is also meant to show why many researchers perceived OCT as 
a good candidate for the golden standard method of SDR control (Paulhus et al., 2003; Randall & 
Fernandes, 1991). 
4.5.3 Preventive methods: intent 
Appeals/warnings are one of the methods counted as influencing participants’ motivation to fake and 
most probably are the only preventive measure that is easy to apply in every research context and that 




Manipulating task instructions is one of the proactive methods influencing participants’ intent 
(motivation) to respond desirably (be it deliberate faking or non-deliberate self-enhancement) that 
seems effective and relatively easy to apply in practice. In this method special persuasive statements 
(oral or written) are embedded in task’s instruction in order to blunt participants’ motivation to 
respond desirably. Those statements can be positive, trying to persuade participants to respond 
honestly, by referring to moral principles (e.g. “results of scientific inquiry are important”, “lying is not 
socially valued”, etc.) or they can be negative, trying to influence participants through warnings (e.g. 
“fakers can be detected”) often in the form of some consequences that may be held for those not 
giving “true” answers. Such consequences can entail loosing remuneration for research participation, 
exclusion from further studies or, in case of applied contexts, e.g. exclusion from further stages of job 
recruitment.  
Pace and Borman (2006) proposed a taxonomy of manipulated instructions where negative warnings 
can inform about: a) detection methods (“fakers can be identified”) or b) consequences (“fakers can 
be punished”, “we will remove you from the remuneration list if you will provide dishonest answers”), 
on the other hand, positive warnings appeal to c) universal moral principles (“dishonesty is immoral”), 
participants’ d) reason (e.g. “do not fake, as you will give wrong image of yourself, which may have 
adverse consequences, in example, you will obtain a job you are not really suited to”) or they e) share 
information about the objectives of the study, trying to evoke participants’ reciprocity in the form of 
candid responses. Additionally, this kind of instruction points to the value of scientific inquiry and 
hence often it is called “educational (appeal)”. Another kind of positive appeal was introduced by Turcu 
(2011) who proposed appealing to the subjective norms of a given society (e.g. “students of our 
university do not lie”). Thus, there are two main kinds of negative instructions, warnings of detection 
and warnings of consequences, and few, relatively recently proposed and poorly researched, positive 
instructions often referred to as honesty instructions or appeals (Adair, 2014). Another method, 
engaging participants more but based on similar ideas as instruction manipulations, is the so-called 
solemn oath method. In this procedure, before doing anything else, participants are asked to sign an 
agreement that they will provide only true and honest answers. A vast majority of participants sign it 
without problems (Weaver & Prelec, 2013). As warranted by research evidence this method is 
moderately efficient but leads to more coherent answers, probably by reducing careless and 
inattentive responding (de-Magistris & Pascucci, 2014; Jacquement, Joule, Luchini & Shogren, 2013; 
Weaver & Prelec, 2013).  
Literature review points out that relatively few research studies were devoted to the efficiency of 
warnings and appeals in response biases reduction. In a meta-analysis, Dwight and Donovan (2003) 
identified only 15 of such studies, whereas Adair (2014) found them only slightly above 20. Despite the 
low number of studies the results of the above cited meta-analyses are promising- Dwight and 
Donovan (2003) pointed out that manipulated instructions reduce faking by on average 0.23 of 
standard deviation. Even more promising results were presented by Adair (2014) and Zheng (2015), 
showing that this result may be underestimated and range even to 0.91 of standard deviation, 
depending on study design and trait measured. Nonetheless, the evidence on which type of instruction 
manipulation is the most effective is mixed. Some research suggests that negative instructions are the 
most effective, especially those accusing participants of dishonest responding or threatening them of 
consequences (Burns, Filipowski, Morris & Shoda, 2015), while other studies point out that appeals 
lead to more valid estimates of measured traits (Adair, 2014). Some results indicate that educational 
and subjective norm appeals may be the most efficient kinds among the positive instructions family 
(Adair, 2014; Zheng, 2015). 
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The above-cited results on instruction manipulation efficiency mostly come from personality 
assessment studies conducted in practical contexts of job-applicant selection or from studies 
simulating such contexts (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). Moreover, in most of those studies participants 
come from very specific subsamples, often highly-motivated to perform well in assessment (e.g. 
candidates for work promotion, military trainees, candidates for police officers; Dwight & Donovan, 
2003; Eysenck, Eysenck & Shaw, 1974). These factors reduce external validity of manipulated 
instruction studies, as it is difficult to indicate how appeals/warnings would work in low-stakes 
contexts with participants not motivated to „fake good” but also not motivated to answer honestly, 
neither to pay specific attention towards instructions and questions as research situation would not 
bring any practical consequences to them. There is also a research gap that hinders to predict how this 
method of faking prevention would act if used not on personality scales, but on e.g. self-assessment 
of skills (e.g. educational skills, as it is done in ESS, PISA, PIAAC, etc.). 
Hence, the applicability of these methods in low-stakes contexts is hard to evaluate due to lack of 
evidence. However, there are also other limitations to accepting instruction manipulations as a 
panacea to SDR in every research context. Warning participants of consequences is not possible in 
most low-stakes research situations as respondents in these contexts have literally nothing to lose and 
no practical repercussions can be held against dishonest participants (even if they can be identified 
somehow). This is especially true as warnings seem to bring some side effects (e.g. test anxiety, 
lowered motivation; Burns et al., 2015). In situations where participants are obliged or externally 
motivated to take part in a study (e.g. job selection, in-job assessment) it is probable that warnings’ 
assets outweigh the drawbacks (lower motivation, test anxiety) but it is the other way around in most 
of the research situations where participants’ motivation is of crucial importance to obtain high quality 
data (Meade & Craig, 2012). Thus, it seems that application of less-researched appeals is more 
promising than using warnings in low-stakes contexts. Apart from the limited utility in certain 
measurement situations another limitation of instruction manipulations is their restricted efficiency. 
First of all, participants may not pay attention to instructions and may even do not read them at all 
which is especially probable in self-administered modes. Available evidence points out that such 
omissions indeed happen, which cancels out all potential benefits of manipulated instructions46 
(Paulhus, Bruce & Trapnell, 1995). Thus, participants’ non-compliance remains one of the most serious 
limitations of this method. Probably this drawback can be mitigated by method’s developments such 
as solemn oath procedure. Additionally, this method may not be equally efficient towards various 
forms of positivity bias. It is evidenced that instruction manipulation is reasonably effective in high-
stakes research occasions but will the method be comparably useful in other contexts? Nonetheless, 
there is evidence that appealing for honesty and diligence reduces incoherent survey behaviours thus 
enhancing data quality (e.g. Jacquement et al., 2013). It is not known, however, how instruction 
manipulations will affect non-deliberate positivity biases, e.g. self-enhancement. Nevertheless, 
relations between self-enhancement and inattentive responding (e.g. Paulhus et al., 1987) are all too 
obvious to ignore possibility to reduce them by instruction manipulations. Taking into account 
method’s limitations it is worthy to remember that its advantages are also remarkable: it is an easy-
to-use, cheap and flexible procedure that is already evidenced to be effective in response biases 
reduction. 
Bogus pipeline 
Method similar to appeals/warnings in that it also motivates participants to give true(er) answers is 
the bogus pipeline (BPL; Jones & Sigall, 1971). This method bases on convincing participants that their 
 




answers will be verified by an external device simulating a lie detector. In some cases the device is 
substituted by a sham biochemical analysis (e.g. collecting saliva samples) where participants are 
informed that it will be used to detect liars. Meta-analyses point to mixed results of BPL application 
(Krumpal, 2013; Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). The BPL has also some evident flaws such as serious ethical 
considerations (how far can we go in participants’ deception?), large organisational effort 
(constructing a bogus lie detector), is impossible to apply in certain research contexts (telephone or 
web-based studies) and is very difficult to use in field studies. Due to organisational and ethical 
considerations this method is also completely unfeasible in large-scales studies and will not be 
commented further on. However, its logic, based on convincing participants that unwanted behaviours 
could be identified, is possible to use without constructing bogus lie detectors, e.g. through instruction 
manipulation, online warning application (cf. Burns et al., 2015) and even manipulating participants’ 
honesty by priming (Rasinski, Visser, Zagatsky & Rickett, 2005)47. 
Measurement design 
This category is in fact not a separate group of methods but rather a bunch of rules that should be 
observed in every measurement with human participants and that may have special importance in 
curbing SDR. Among such rules is avoiding or minimising of speeded responses, stress, tension, 
emotional arousal (if it is not part of experimental manipulation or a necessary element of 
measurement) and cognitive load- all these factors are known to increase SDR (Paulhus, 1991). 
Another rule, especially important for positivity biases control, is assuring participants of their 
anonymity (Nederhof, 1985). In measurements where respondents are physically separated from each 
other, where they leave no identifying marks on their answer sheets and they do not pass over any 
identifying information about themselves (e.g. e-mail addresses), SDR is lower (Paulhus, 1991). 
These methods alone do not guarantee sufficient SDR reduction but are necessary prerequisites in 
every measurement occasion if SDR control is to be possible.   
Mode of administration 
Mode of administration is a special part of measurement design often linked with substantial influence 
on research results and participants’ behaviour (see e.g., Groves et al., 2009 for review). Early on it was 
noticed that participants are more prone to SDR when measurement was mediated through 
interviewer, be it in a classical face-to-face interview or in telephone interview, which both yielded 
more SDR than self-administered modes (Hochstim, 1967). This observation was later on confirmed by 
many studies, bringing firm conclusion that SDR tendencies are lowest in self-administered mode 
(Kreuter, Presser & Tourangeau, 2008; Krumpal, 2013; Nederhof, 1985; Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). 
However, the advent of computerised surveys brought new questions to the field: whether self-
administered measurement on paper-and-pencil versions yield similar results as their computerised 
versions (including Web interviews)? 
The evidence on this issue is mixed, as some studies point to higher SDR in computerised 
measurements than in paper-and-pencil ones (e.g. Lautenschlager & Flaherty, 1990; more examples in 
Paulhus, 1991), while others indicate no differences between the modes or even detect a reversed 
effect- lower SDR in computer-based measurements (review: Tourangeu & Yan, 2007). Dwight and 
Feigelson (2000) as well as Richman, Kiesler, Weisband and Drasgow (1999) noticed that differences 
between paper and computer versions diminished in later studies in comparison to earlier ones. This 
 
47 In this particular case respondents, prior to answering proper items, responded to a word-matching task that 
implicitly promoted being honest. Rasinski et al. (2005) reported that this method yielded less SDR in comparison 
to a control group. 
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result suggests that with the growing popularity and commonness of computers, as well as with 
improving computer abilities in subsequent generations (Burski et al., 2013), any differences between 
paper- and computer-based self-administered surveys disappear. This result is supported by the meta-
analysis performed by Vispoel, Morris and Clough (2018) who voiced for full interchangeability 
between computerised and paper-based versions of the BIDR. Similar results, supporting no 
differences between modes in case of SDR scales and sensitive questions were also brought by Dodou 
and de Winter (2014) and Gnambs and Kaspar (2017). Interesting results were, however, presented by 
Koivula, Rasanen and Sarpila (2019) where differences between mail and web survey versions were 
found with mail version yielding more SDR. The authors indicate that such mode-differences are 
moderated by preferences towards certain mode by different participant groups, e.g. less educated 
and older respondents choosing mail over web and by ICT skills of respondents. 
To sum up, it is evidenced that large-scale assessments relying on self-administered mode (e.g. PISA) 
are in less danger of SDR than these based on other modes (e.g. CAPI in PIAAC). Whenever conducting 
web-based surveys it is warranted to control participants ICT skills and Internet connection quality. 
Intrusiveness reduction methods 
Next group of methods are techniques that aim at increasing participants’ comfort and convincing 
them that their responses are fully confidential. This goal is achieved through deploying special survey 
modifications in order to conceal responses from interviewers or to doubly assure participants that 
their responses cannot be tracked to them in self-administered modes. These methods are meant to 
reduce the subjective intrusiveness of measurement situation hence their other name of indirect 
methods. Most prominent among those techniques are randomised response technique (RRT; Warner, 
1965) and item count technique (ICT) alias unmatched count (UCT; Raghavarao & Federer, 1979). 
The former bases on giving participants two questions, one sensitive and one not, and a device 
generating random values (a die, a coin, etc.). Participants are instructed to use the device before 
answering every pair of such questions and informed that certain result (e.g. heads) obliges them to 
give a true answer on a sensitive question whereas any other result gives them freedom to answer 
truthfully the not sensitive question. As the interviewer do not know what is the result yielded by the 
random values device, the respondent can be assured that his/her privacy is not breached. There are 
many research results pointing that this method leads to more valid estimates (review: Lensvelt-
Mulders, Hox, Heijden & van der Maas, 2005; cf. Hipsz, 2014), but there is also a large evidence that 
this method results in greatly overestimated values and hard to control measurement errors stemming 
from the method’s complicacy (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010a). Other studies also point that participants 
grow suspicious, often refuse to use the device and even purposefully do not obey the instructions in 
order to “hack” the whole system (review: Krumpal, 2013; see also Hipsz, 2014 for a detailed analysis 
of audio recordings of RRT measures). As evidenced by Coutts and Jann (2011) the method results in 
many “false no” results as respondents chose to use this safe option regardless to which item was 
pointed by the random device. Moreover, the method is difficult for many interviewers who struggle 
to perform it correctly and that respondents in self-administered modes also grapple with its correct 
use. Elevated measurement errors due to additional cognitive load in RRT on participants and pollsters 
was reported by Biemer, Jordan, Hubbard and Wright (2005). Furthermore, RRT is not successful in 
reducing respondents’ suspicions regarding full confidentiality of their answers (Coutts & Jann, 2011) 
and may additionally increase participants level of test anxiety (Boeije & Lensvelt-Mulders, 2002). 
Further drawback of RRT is its very limited application in certain contexts, e.g. telephone or web-based 
studies (but see Coutts & Jann, 2011 and Höglinger, Jann & Diekmann, 2016 for recent developments 
in that matter). 
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The ICT/UCT technique consists of dividing participants into two groups. One of them answers to a set 
of questions, whereas the second one answers to the same set, but enlarged by one position 
containing an additional sensitive question. At the end participants from both groups do not yield their 
exact answers, but only a number of certain answers, e.g. how many times they answered “yes” to the 
questions on the list. By calculating mean differences between two groups a distribution of answers to 
the additional question can be estimated. Some research suggest that this method leads to more valid 
estimates than direct questions (e.g. Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010b). A big drawback of this method is a 
necessity to divide sample into two groups as it complicates research design and rises costs- to obtain 
same measurement precision as direct questioning a double number of participants is needed. Coutts 
and Jann (2011) compared ICT/UCT with RRT and direct questioning and obtained results pointing 
towards more valid estimates with the use of ICT/UCT. 
A large problem of both these methods is that due to their specificity they do not provide information 
on individual respondent but only yield fraction of respondents that answered questions in a given 
way (e.g. indicated that they indeed cheated on a math test). RRT also has serious caveats regarding 
its efficiency and usability in most of the research contexts. A limitation typical to ICT/UCT is that it 
require larger samples to obtain similar measurement precision as direct questions (Cruyff, 
Boeckenholt & van der Heijden, 2016). Both methods were developed specifically to counter for 
deliberate forms of positivity bias, faking and blatant lying, and also answering intrusive, sensitive 
questions. It seems that their use is best restricted to these contexts and they cannot help much in 
countering non-deliberate biases. Nevertheless, ICT/UCT seems a viable option even for large-scales 
assessments where it can be used to measure sensitive topics, e.g. educational cheating, school 
aggression or bullying and inappropriate teacher behaviours48. RRT is not recommended to use due to 
large problems with procedure from both interviewers (if present) and respondents, as well as large 
fractions of false negative and false positive responses it generates (Höglinger & Diekmann, 2017). 
Third-party ratings 
This method, also called proxy-, informant-, other- or peer-reports, resides on collecting data about 
participant from other people, e.g. their partners, siblings or colleagues. Proxy reports have been 
mainly tested for personality reports and there is evidence for their good validity, less bias and 
measurement invariance with self-reports (Mottus, Allik & Realo, 2020; Oh, Wang & Mount, 2011). 
However, meta-analysis performed by Connolly, Kavanagh & Viswesvaran (2007) demonstrated that 
self- and peer-reports, though converging to a large extend (rs ~0.50-0.60), have predominant, 
substantive unique variance. These results indicate that this method can be treated only as an 
interesting research option and supplementary measurement49. Moreover, from the point of view of 
social psychology, the method entails important problems with self- versus other-perception, e.g. 
actor-observer differences50 (Abele & Brack, 2013; Abele, Bruckmuller, Wojciszke, 2014; Abele & 
Wojciszke, 2007, 2014; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001). These discrepancies can be additionally 
moderated by observer type (superior, peer, subordinate) and degree of acquaintanceship (family, 
 
48 Moreover, such use seems especially warranted as main drawback of ICT/UCT, using different item sets in 
different groups, does not constitute much of a problem in assessments using missing-by-design organization 
anyway (e.g. PISA). Further, the requirement of large sample sizes is also not a problem in ILSAs/NLSAs. 
49 McCrae (2018) showed that other-reports contained different content-irrelevant (method) variance than self-
reports. It shows that informant reports contain both spurious and substantial variance that is unique in 
comparison to self-reports. Regarding the spurious variance it means that peer-reports are also biased but by 
different mechanisms than self-reports.  
50 For use of proxy reports in factual questions surveys see Dashen (2000), Schwarz & Wellens (1997) and Schwarz 
& Oyserman (2001). This research also confirmed that proxies use different response mechanisms and inferential 
strategies to answer survey items than would be used in self-reports. 
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relative, friend, etc.) (Connolly et al., 2007) and may introduce additional biases as demonstrated in a 
study by Cisłak (2013) whose title “All your boss can see is agency” tells the whole story about the 
nature of such biases. Moreover, other-reports are also susceptible to the regular biases present in 
self-reports (RS, C/IER, halo effects, etc.; Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann & Angleitner, 2000). 
Apart from the above-mentioned, obvious caveats there are also two further issues with this method: 
a) so far it has been mainly tested on personality scales and its utility outside of these measures is 
largely unknown, b) if used to identify desirably responding participants in a large-scale assessment 
the method would yield enormous costs, at least doubling the project expenditure. The costs could be 
even higher if organisational effort of finding reporters matching in important characteristics, e.g. 
length and type of acquaintanceship, for each participant would be factored in. Hence, this method is 
not assumed to be a viable option for large-scale assessments due to its expensiveness and lack of 
verification in many research contexts apart from factual questions and personality reports. 
Indirect questions 
Indirect questions (IDQ)51 are in a sense a mirror reflection of the third-party ratings- this time it is the 
respondent himself that is asked to report about other people. In this group of preventive methods 
participants are asked to report how “an average person” would answer to a given item (e.g. “what is 
the opinion of an average student in your school on cheating on exams”) or what are the characteristics 
of this “average person” (e.g. “what is the level of mathematical abilities of an average student in your 
school”) (Fisher, 1993). The logic of the method is based on reducing subjective intrusiveness of items 
if other people and not the respondent himself/herself are to being assessed. It is also assumed, basing 
on the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene & House, 1977), that respondent will project her own 
opinions and attitudes on others, hence yielding answers that would give an indirect window onto her 
own “answers”. 
Indirect questions underwent some verification that brought mixed results. Epley and Dunning (2000) 
demonstrated that reports on others were far less favourable than opinions on the self and that the 
self-reports were unrealistically favourable, whereas the indirect report were closer to reality 
(donations made in the donation paradigm: 2.44$ [self-report], 1.83$ [indirect question], 1.53$ 
actually donated). Similar conclusions were presented by Lusk and Norwood (2010) but Miller and 
Ratner (1998) provided evidence contradicting the results favouring indirect over direct questions 
(DQ). However, validity studies verifying IDQ over DQ are scarce. In one of the few examples Fisher 
and Tellis (1998) showed that IDQ did not correlate with the MCSDS, but DQ did, which the authors 
considered as a validity evidence in favour of IDQ. Notwithstanding, these results may be simply an 
effect of method variance as proposed by Jo (2000). The matter was thoroughly and innovatively 
settled by Jang (2017) who provided firm evidence that indirect questions do not lead to more valid 
estimates than direct questions when used as indicators of individual actual behaviour (in his study- 
charity donation). Moreover, he determined that the interaction between IDQ and DQ is important in 
predicting actual individual behaviour, bringing important evidence that IDQ and DQ may bring 
complement information. Jang (2017) also concluded that DQs always have higher predictive validity 
than IDQs and that DQs not always lead to enhanced self-reports. Furthermore, he suggested that 
projections theory does not seem to hold as respondents based their IDQs on other inferential 
processes. Interestingly, he demonstrated that using a “plea to exaggerate less” (type of honesty 
instruction manipulation) resulted in higher correlations between DQs and actual behaviour. 
 
51 Oftentimes RRT and ICT/UCT are referred to as “indirect methods”. Hence, to differentiate between them and 
methods proposed by Fisher (1993) the Fisher’s method is always referred to as “indirect questioning”. Other 
term, though less used, is peer-prediction method (Miller, Resnick & Zeckhausen, 2005). 
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In another variation of IDQ respondents are instructed to report on a given person they know, which 
is known under the term “nominative technique” (NT), first proposed by Sirken in 1970s (e.g. 1970) 
and refined by Judith Droitcour (Miller) (1985). The method typically consists of two steps. In the first 
one respondents give number of their friends that did a certain thing, typically an illegal, threatening 
or unwanted behaviour (e.g. cheated on a math test). Second step takes place only if participant 
indicated at least one such person. In this stage respondents are asked to assess number of other 
friends that also know that the person named in the first step cheated on a math test. The second step 
is repeated for every person named in the first step. This procedure serves to correct for multiple 
reports of that one particular person (cheater) from many respondents (Krumpal, 2013). Typically, 
respondents are asked to answer also in-depth questions about one or every person nominated in the 
first step of NT. These in-depth questions may entail demographic inventory or items expanding 
knowledge about sensitive behaviour asked in step one (e.g. “when did he cheated”, “how did he do 
it”, etc.). NT is supposed to reduce the intrusiveness of questions by shifting the focus of interest from 
respondent to his/her friends or relatives. Moreover, it does not breach the anonymity of the 
nominated people as respondent is never asked to provide any identifying details (Lee, 1993). 
However, NT is not free from serious methodological challenges. The method may seem simple and 
efficient, but in fact it may be cumbersome and frustrating for people that know numerous people that 
e.g. cheated on a test and are repeatedly asked about details regarding every one of this group 
(Droitcour, 1985). Participants’ refusal to answer diligently in the second step, naming others that also 
“know”, jeopardises the whole procedure and typically result in overestimates of cheaters due to use 
of inappropriate weights52. Obviously, participants mostly do not possess full knowledge about the 
others they describe, which is a common problem in proxy reports of which NT is not free either 
(Droitcour, 1985). Empirical verifications of NT are scarce, in one of the few studies, conducted by John, 
Edwards-Jones, Gibbons and Jones (2010), the method did not yield any results as participants simply 
admitted that they did not know about the inquired behaviours in anyone they knew.  
Hence, scarce empirical validation of NT and many reservations towards its feasibility precludes from 
treating it as a viable option for an SDR control method in any larger assessment. On the other hand, 
IDQ is better tested but its validation results are not overly favourable. However, this method may be 
used, even in large-scale assessments, as a basis to some more sophisticated methods, namely 
Bayesian truth serum (BTS) commented on in one of the subsequent sections.   
Summary of preventive methods (intend) 
To sum up, the preventive methods group consists of a very diverse array of techniques, from simple 
and easy to implement (e.g. instruction manipulation) to awkward and cumbersome (e.g. BPL, RRT). 
Some of them may have their merits in research on sensitive matters but seem too complicated to use 
in general-purpose research like assessment of educational skills or personality (Krumpal, 2013). 
Regarding use in ILSAs/NLSAs it appears that instruction manipulation, ICT/UCT and, to some extent, 
IDQ are viable options for an SDR control method in large-scale assessments, with a caveat that utility 
of ICT/UCT may be limited only to sensitive questions. It is also noteworthy that instruction 
manipulations are most theoretically-grounded among the proactive methods. 
 
52 In order to estimate the number of cheaters in the population, the number of cheaters named in the first step 
is divided by 1 + the number of others that know. Satisficing in step two, a common problem of NT, results in 




4.5.4 Preventive methods: ability 
Other proactive methods influence not participants’ intent to fake but their ability to do so. This is 
achieved mainly by manipulating items format (e.g. forced choice responses) or items transparency 
(“subtle” items, contextualised items, neutral items; Adair, 2014; Dilchert & Ones, 2012; Huber, 2017). 
Third possibility is to limit participants’ time to answer the items, as it is theorised that faked responses 
take more time than honest ones (Dilchert & Ones, 2012).  
Time limits 
Imposing time limits in order to control for SDR is hardly researched at all, as the most recent meta-
analysis identified only a handful of studies that used this technique (Adair, 2014). The results are 
mixed at best as most of the studies found no differences between measurements with time limit 
imposed (speeded condition) and without it (un-speeded condition) (Holden, Wood & Tomashewski, 
2001; Robie, Komar & Brown, 2010; Robie, Taggar & Brown, 2009). Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006) 
showed that time limit had no main effect on self-report scores, but that it interacted with response 
format. However, the pattern of this interaction was different in different scales used and no clear 
patterns were identified. In a study conducted by Komar, Komar, Brown and Taggar (2010) time limit 
also did not significantly influence self-report scores but interacted with participants cognitive abilities, 
reducing SDR in participants with low cognitive abilities.  
In this state-of-the-art the time limit method is not suitable for any practical application as it seems 
that further research in this path must be preceded by a careful theoretical explanation why time limits 
are to influence honest responding. Moreover, important practical issues are to be solved, e.g. what 
time limit serves best to unable SDR, how to incorporate inter-individual differences in reading speed 
and how to obtain baseline reaction times in order to set the most efficient time limit (Dilchert & Ones, 
2012; Khorramdel & Kubinger, 2006). These steps are important as imposing time limits is perceived 
negatively by participants who reported higher tension and fatigue in speeded conditions (Roma et al., 
2018; but see Komar et al., 2010 for neutral perception of time limits), which may induce satisficing 
and lower data quality in speeded conditions. Most importantly, however, the evidence from different 
paradigms indicates that, if anything, time limits seem to promote self-enhancement (e.g. Shalvi, Eldar 
& Bereby-Meyer, 2013; see also Paulhus, 1991), thus using this method to control for any type of SDR 
would be probably counterproductive. 
Recently a new development of an old time limit idea was presented by Meade, Pappalardo, Braddy 
and Fleenor (2018) who presented a method called rapid response measurement (RRM). RRM resides 
on computer-based assessment where items are presented one at a time with short inter-item 
latencies. Respondents are asked to answer as quickly as possible. According to the authors the 
method retains psychometric properties in comparison to a traditionally-measured scale but 
participants were impossible to fake it when instructed to do so. RRM seems a moderately promising 
option for future research. 
Item formulation manipulation 
Another idea to undermine participants’ ability to SDR is based on neutralising items, in order to strip 
them from any evaluative, desirable or threatening content. This is achieved by rewriting items to a 
new form, often called “subtle” or “neutral/neutralised”, e.g. an item “Am the life of the party” was 
reformulated to “Prefer to be the central figure at a party”. The new version is less evaluative and is 
predicted to yield lower scores and not induce SDR (Bäckström & Björklund, 2013; Bäckström, 
Björklund & Larsson, 2012). Another important aim of item reformulation is to make them less 
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transparent for participants in order to reduce possibility of inferring their purpose and tailoring 
reports to make a favourable impression (Adair, 2014). 
Evidence on efficiency in SDR reduction in case of subtle items is favourable, as they lead to less 
favourably self-presentations simultaneously retaining good psychometric qualities of measurement 
scales (Adair, 2014), as evidenced by analysis of their effects on reliability, factorial structure, construct 
validity and criterion-related validity (Bäckström et al., 2009; 2012; 2014). Use of neutralised items 
even resulted in lower proportion of construct-irrelevant variance in self-report scales53 (Bäckström et 
al., 2014).  
Subtle items are hence hard to fake and evoke lower SDR tendencies but also convey certain 
drawbacks. First of all they need a considerable effort in piloting in order to develop items of truly 
neutralised content and retained psychometric properties. Moreover, sometimes subtle items present 
measurement problems, e.g. lower reliability, which means that a larger number of subtle items in 
comparison to transparent items needs to be used to obtain comparable measurement precision. 
Furthermore, neutralised items may be hard to use in cross-cultural research as they may pose 
exceptional difficulties in translation. The first drawback is not of a problem from the perspective of a 
large-scale assessment as they are normally supported by significant analytical background. The other 
two drawbacks present more serious obstacles as place is always short in packed LSAs’ questionnaires 
and translational and cross-cultural issues are often in the very heart of organisational effort of every 
ILSA. Despite its advantages, usage of reformulated items may be also severely limited due to 
difficulties in employing them outside of personality assessment54. Of course this method cannot be 
completely efficient in certain research contexts, e.g. sensitive questions, factual items, etc. Hence, 
more research is needed on subtle items translatability and applicability outside of the personality 
measurement. 
Item response format/categories manipulation 
As the previous method entailed altering item content (wording) this method concentrates on the 
format in which response categories are presented. Most typically, self-report scales use Likert-type 
items in which respondent answers to every item separately. This kind of responding is easy to process 
for a respondent but also enables creating super-positive self-images by rejecting negative and 
embracing positive questions. One of the solutions invented to overcome this problem was changing 
response format into (multiple) forced choice (MFC). In this format respondent is to choose only one 
of the two items presented, e.g. “Chose adjective that describes you best: 1) practical, 2) imaginative” 
(Adair, 2014). The two (or more) options are to be equalised regarding their social desirability. In this 
way respondents are forced to choose among equally desirable (or undesirable) options which, in 
theory, results in yielding responses not distorted by SDR. 
However, from the very beginning this method was burdened by measurement problems (Dilchert & 
Ones, 2012; Nederhof, 1985). The MFC design yields ipsative data that has peculiar and unwanted 
measurement problems in comparison to normative data: hard inter-individual comparisons (all 
respondents have similar scores), imposed score restriction (impossible to achieve an all high or an all 
low score) and inter-scales (inter-item) covariance structure, distorted criterion-related validity, 
inflated reliability coefficients and biased factorial structure (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2013). These 
problems practically ruled out any serious application of these methods, however, the measurement 
 
53 Such variance is attributed to response biases: SDR or RS (Bäckström et al., 2014; Khorramdel & von Davier, 
2014). 
54 Sometimes other techniques, e.g. presenting items in a randomised order, are described jointly with item 
neutralisation, however, they will not be commented here, as they fail to reduce SDR (Adair, 2014). 
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problems seem to be largely solved now with the use of IRT techniques to model MFC data (Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2011; 2013; Joubert et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, even with measurement problems solved, the MFC use to prevent SDR remains dubious. 
The evidence gathered to date suggests that MFC items are typically still biased by SDR in comparison 
to Likert-type scales and they are definitely fakable if respondents are told to do so (Adair, 2014; 
Dilchert & Ones, 2012; Pavlov, Maydeu-Olivares & Fairchild, 2019). Moreover, there is an indication 
than in case of the MFC data cognitive ability moderates data quality, with participants characterised 
by low cognitive abilities showing less SDR than individuals higher in cognitive functioning (Burns, 
Christiansen & Montgomery, 2005; Vasilopoulos et al., 2006). These differences are not normally found 
in rating scales.    
Thus, it seems that forced choice responses utility is limited as they lead only to small or none SDR 
reduction in most of the contexts (Adair, 2014). There is also evidence that they may be useful in a 
strict contexts with very high stakes when deliberate faking threat is very real or when participants 
have especially strong SDR tendencies (Pavlov et al., 2019). It seems that such situation may occur in 
educational contexts where teachers are a group especially prone to SDR (Larson & Bradshaw, 2017; 
Wilhelm, Dewhurst-Savellis, & Parker, 2000; Żylicz & Malinowska, 2012). Other advantage of using 
MFC is that it can easily generate large numbers of unique items which would be especially welcome 
for large-scale assessments using computerised adaptive testing (CAT). However, MFC design is also 
notorious for being very time-consuming in piloting stages as every pair of items needs to be balanced 
on item desirability and other criteria (Dilchert & Ones, 2012). This property may be further 
discouraging from basing ILSAs on MFC measurement as the organisational effort in such programmes 
is usually exceptionally large. 
Other manipulations of item response categories entail mainly changing number of rating categories 
in order to find option that works best in SDR reduction. Such comparisons are not often in the 
literature but some that were executed point to better properties of longer rating scales, e.g. 6-point, 
in comparison to dichotomous scales. Probably longer rating scales are less transparent and also 
enable to better differentiate between the hues of attitudes, opinions and traits. However, the 
difference is not large and is not present for very transparent scales (Khorramdel & Kubinger, 2006; 
Khorramdel, 2014). In general, continuously scored rating scales yield more valid results than 
dichotomously scored ones and SDR scales are no exception here (Cervellione,Lee & Bonanno, 2009; 
Kam, 2013; Stöber, Dette & Musch, 2002). 
Summary of preventive methods (ability) 
Preventive methods focusing on limiting participants’ ability to fake yielded mixed evidence on their 
efficiency. The most promising option is taking item desirability under consideration when writing 
survey questions. MFC as SDR control method does not seem to rise to expectations but may be useful 
in cases when SDR tendencies (both deliberate and non-deliberate) are especially high.   
4.5.5 Remedial methods: external 
Survey paradata usage 
Paradata is typically defined as administrative information on how survey was conducted, it can also 
contain information on response processes yielded by respondents (Couper, 2005). One of paradata 
examples that is researched as a potential SDR control method is response time (RT) analysis. In the 
above paragraph imposing time limits was commented on as not very promising method for SDR 
reduction (Adair, 2014). Here RT will be treated differently: as an additional source of information that 
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potentially enables SDR identification (see e.g. Kreuter, 2013 for more research on paradata and survey 
data quality). 
First of all, there at least two competing conceptions of how SDR should be related with RT. The first 
of them, the Self-Schema model (Markus, 1977), proposes that processing information contingent with 
self-schema (a view of the self) should be faster than processing discordant information. Hence, 
according to this view SDR should yield longer RTs than “honest” responding as socially desirable image 
presented by SDR is not a true self-schema of respondents. The second theory, called Semantic 
Exercise model (Hsu, Santelli & Hsu, 1989), suggests exactly a reversed pattern, with SDR yielding 
shorter RTs than non-biased responding. This judgement is based on a believe that SDR is driven by 
cognitive processes that are much less complex than honest responding. This theory views SDR as a de 
facto satisficing55, where rating decisions are taken basing on easy accessible and easy processable 
characteristics of items, e.g. their semantical features, whereas honest responding entails cognitively 
complex processes such as retrieving information from episodic memory. Another theory, proposed 
by Holden and colleagues (1992) and known as the Adopted Schema model, advocates that 
participants responding in a desirable way adopt an ad hoc constructed schema of an ideal self-image 
to which they compare their answers. As this self-image is a necessarily less complex one than real 
self-schema processing items in a desirable way is faster than “honest” responding. Another side 
theory proposes that deliberate SDR, e.g. faking, takes longer than honest responding as faking 
consumes additional time in response editing in which respondents tailor their answers in order to 
yield the wanted impression (Holtgraves, 2004). 
Analysing the available evidence for RTs use as an SDR control method discloses that it is only in the 
beginning stages of organisation. Most importantly, there is still no consensus regarding which theory 
of chronometric properties of SDR should be accepted as a leading paradigm (Dilchert & Ones, 2012; 
Maricutoiu & Sarbescu, 2019; Xu et al., 2015). Moreover, neither of the RT-SDR theories is fully 
integrated with the available models of SDR/faking (e.g. McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Ziegler, 2011). 
Some convincing results in support of the Self-Schema model were presented by Akrami, Hedlund and 
Ekehammar (2007), however alternative explanations of their results exist and were not tested to date 
(e.g. Shalvi et al., 2013). In example, the pattern of results obtained by Akrami et al. (2007) resembles 
the relation between trait level and its desirability which is also an inverted-U shaped for most of the 
traits (Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009), hence their results could be driven not by self-schema comparisons 
mechanisms but by a simple heuristic of reacting to trait desirability. Moreover, there is quite a firm 
evidence that cognitive load elicits fast and socially desirable (e.g. self-enhancing) responses (e.g. 
Stodel, 2015; Xu et al., 2015), suggesting that the SDR-RTs relation may be much more complex and 
context-dependent than painted by Akrami et al. (2007) (see e.g. Maricutoiu & Sarbescu, 2019). 
Regarding research practice there are still not enough data gathered to verify RTs utility as an SDR 
control method (Dilchert & Ones, 2012). Some evidence that RTs can be helpful in identifying 
participants responding in a desirable way was presented recently by Mazza et al. (2019). However, 
before RTs can be of any serious practical use a lot of methodological work is ahead of survey 
researchers as RTs are notorious for their measurement problems, e.g. low signal-to-noise ratio, high 
inter-individual variability, low test-retest properties, quantitative challenges due to their inherent 
characteristics (e.g. typical log-normal distributions), existence of specific effects (e.g. speed-accuracy 
trade-off) and moderating influences from many variables, including cognitive abilities, study design 
and item characteristics (Maricutoiu & Sarbescu, 2019; Paulhus & Holden, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2009; 
Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). It is also worthy to note that efficient RTs use will require very precise 
 
55 Though they do not call it like that. 
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latency measurement as differences between cognitive mechanisms reside in milliseconds, hence this 
level of precision is needed also in survey research to make full use of RTs where latencies are now 
measured in seconds or even in minutes (Paulhus & Holden, 2009). Furthermore, any comprehensive 
RT analysis would require many item-level latencies in order to account for low methods’ reliability 
(Paulhus & Holden, 2009).  
Mouse-tracking analysis is another example of paradata use (e.g. Mazza et al. 2020), however, same 
reservations as in case of RT analysis apply to any kind of paradata, be it log-files, mouse-tracking and 
other forms of data. It seems that these methods are on a relatively initial phase of research and cannot 
be treated as sure methods of SDR control. However, as many large-scale assessments go online (e.g. 
PISA became fully computerised in 2015), paradata is going to be collected anyway. Thus, it is advisable 
to investigate best methods to use this potentially valuable source of information in response 
processes and response biases research. Inevitably, any advance in this field would also require 
theoretical integration of the now mutually incompatible models. 
SDR scales 
Next group of reactive methods to control for SDR variance is consisted of the so-called SDR scales or 
questionnaires. Other, often used names contain e.g. honesty, control, validity and lie scales, whereas 
unlikely virtues and infrequency scales are very similar concepts, which are treated jointly with the 
“classical” SDR scales here. The logic behind this approach is that individuals noting high scores on 
these scales will also yield untrue, distorted, socially desirable responses in self-report scales of 
substantial interest (e.g. math ability, math anxiety, etc.). The score of the scale can be used in 
quantitative data analysis, e.g. as a moderator, mediator or, most often, suppressor of a given 
empirical relation, e.g. relation between math ability as measured by self-report and an objective 
(cognitive) math test (Ganster et al., 1983; Piedmont et al., 2000). Such scales were also used in 
accounting for differences between interpersonal abilities measured by self-report and observers’ 
ratings (Borkenau & Zaltkauskas, 2009) or intercorrelations of personality traits (spurious, inter-
factorial variance; Holden, 2007).  
The history of SDR scales dates back at least to 1930s. when Hartshorne and May (1930) initiated the 
long history of the „lie scales”. Next major step was taken by Hathaway and McKinley (1951) who 
elaborated new lie scales with an aim to identify faking individuals in clinical research. Their works later 
on became known as the MMPI lie scales. These scales were used by Edwards (1957) who constructed 
the first widely recognised tool intended specifically to measure proneness to SDR. However, both the 
Edwards’ scale and the MMPI lie scales were proven to have very limited scope of use and a narrow 
theoretical basis- both treated high SDR scores as a psychopathological symptom, moreover, many 
items had clear clinical connotations that lowered scale validity when used in non-clinical samples 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). This situation was changed by new conceptions that appeared in 1960s. 
These new ideas called to cease treating SDR only as blatant lying or a psychopathological symptom. A 
prime example of these new approaches is the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS) that 
became the main reference point for the next years of the SDR research. This scale treated SDR as a 
consequence of conformity and need of social approval, resulting in overly positive images yielded in 
self-reports, especially including denying common but undesirable behaviours, e.g. bad manners or 
undesirable thoughts (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The MCSDS won a huge popularity and was used 
worldwide, in many variants that included also adaptations to other languages (Cosentino & Solano, 
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2008; Holden & Passey, 2010; Sarbescu, Costea & Rusu, 2012; Siuta, 198956; Verardi et al., 2010) and 
shortened versions (Clancy & Gove, 1974; Stocké, 2014; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972).  
Despite its popularity the MCSDS did not escape serious critique. The meta-analysis conducted by 
Beretvas, Meyer and Leite (2002) disclosed problems with reliability, especially in some age groups (cf. 
Neal & Carey, 2005). Other research questioned its adaptability to cross-cultural contexts (Verardi et 
al., 2010). The most serious charge was presented by Paulhus (1984) and Barger (2002) who pointed 
to the problem that the scale’s factor structure did not correspond to its theoretical foundation. The 
MCSDS was designed as a one-dimensional inventory, whereas the empirical evidence pointed to a 
two-dimensional structure with correlated factors (Leite & Beretvas, 2005; Tao, Guoying & Brody, 
2009). Apart from being in a serious contradiction to the Crowne and Marlowe’s interpretation of need 
for social approval being the only construct underlying the MCSDS scores, this pattern of factor 
structure is not beneficial for any measurement tool as cross-loadings often impede clear theoretical 
interpretation of the results (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & Strahan, 1999). 
Moreover, the MCSDS was soon considered to be based on an obsolete theory that only comprised a 
small fragment of SDR. The view of SDR changed to a multifaceted construct driven by several, often 
separate processes in which both individual’s stable traits but also transient conditions of the 
measurement context play role (Hartshorne & May, 1930; Holden & Passey, 2010; Johnson & Van de 
Vijver, 2003; Kurzt, Tarquini & Iobst, 2008; Paulhus, 2002; Ziegler, 2015). The most commonly used 
contemporary SDR model postulates that the MCSDS measured not need for social approval, but it 
was a mixture of items measuring self-deceptive and impression management tendencies (Paulhus, 
1984). Most of the MCSDS items are now classified as measuring agency management, type of the 
impression management (IM) construct (Paulhus, 2002). 
The new two-dimensional model of SDR gained huge attention and empirical support, no wonder thus 
that also the new SDR scale constructed of the basis of it- the BIDR- was used widely (Paulhus, 1984; 
 
56 This is the most commonly known Polish translation of the MCSDS. However, other translations were also in 
use. To the best knowledge of the author of this dissertation no full adaptation of this scale to the Polish was 
ever done. Initial research on the scale adaptation was only presented by Siuta in 1989. In spite of that, the 
MCSDS is commonly used in research projects in Poland (e.g. Chachaj et al., 2006; Polczyk, 2005; Suszek, 
Fronczyk, Kopera & Maliszewski, 2018; Zinczuk-Zielazna & Słysz, 2018). Other translation was presented earlier 
than Siuta by Korzeniowski (1980), as stated by Izdebski (2007, 2013). Another translation was presented by Hipsz 
(2014). However, to my best knowledge, no psychometric characteristics of those two versions were ever 
presented. Another translation existed from early 1980s and was used by Zuber (1981) and by Wojciszke (1984). 
This time, some initial psychometric data was presented. A scale originally conceived in Poland but related closely 
to the MCSDS was prepared by Drwal and Wilczyńska (1980). This questionnaire, named Questionnaire of Social 
Approval (abbreviated KAS from the Polish name Kwestionariusz Aprobaty Społecznej), underwent full 
adaptation and a strict psychometric inquiry that confirmed its good psychometric qualities. The KAS correlates 
highly with the MCSDS (r~0.70; Drwal & Wilczyńska, 1980). Another SDR scale available for research on Polish 
samples is an adaptation of the SDS-17 scale (Stoeber, 2001) prepared by Fronczyk, Skrzyński & Cieciuch (2012). 
However, the report from this adaptation is not publicly available, which hinders its verification and further 
research on the Polish version of the SDS-17. Another scale, named Social Approval Scale (SAS, Skala Aprobaty 
Społecznej) was constructed by Żylicz and Malinowska (2012). This scale is based on items driven from the KAS, 
the MCSDS, the BIDR and a scale on morality and social values conceived by Żylicz. The SAS was used in one large-
scale research project on a representative sample of the Polish teachers, but the scale results and items were 
not made available for the public. This makes the KAS the only Polish-language SDR scale that is available in the 
public domain and has proven psychometric and substantive properties. Paradoxically, despite at least four 
commonly known BIDR translations into Polish, one of them presented by Hipsz (2014), the other used by Zinczuk 
and Draheim (2009), this scale did not enjoy great research interest in Poland (see Izdebski et al., 2013 for an 
isolated example of its practical use). The first formal adaptation of both the BIDR and the MCSDS based on new, 
revised translations is still underway in the research project led by the author of this dissertation. 
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Paulhus & Notareschi, 1993). Out of the two SDR dimensions it was the IM, purposeful and conscious 
distortion of self-reports, that was perceived as a bigger threat to the validity of research results. The 
other bias, self-deception, was assumed to be a minor threat (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). However, 
further research brought weighty allegations against the accepted classification and role of SDR scales 
in self-report research. Uziel (2010) showed that IM, as measured by the BIDR, did not correlate with 
systematic cheating and being insincere (cf. Li & Bagger, 2006; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998). Uziel’s 
research points that high IM scores (either from the MCSDS or from the IM subscale in the BIDR) do 
not predict distortion of self-reports. Instead, such high scores can simply indicate a well-adjusted 
individual, agreeable, non-impulsive and with good self-control. Thus, Uziel challenged the validity of 
SDR scales (the IM-BIDR and the MCSDS) to measure distortive tendencies in self-reports, moreover, 
he also presented evidence that individuals with high scores on the IM scales may in fact yield more 
valid, corresponding to reality self-reports as confirmed by higher correlations with peer-reports in 
case of high IM-scoring group in comparison to low IM-scoring group (Uziel, 2014). Uziel’s research not 
only questions the validity of SDR scales as such but also shifts the attention from IM to self-
enhancement as a main SDR-related threat to the validity of self-reports (at least in low-stakes 
contexts). 
These results point to the crucial objection against using SDR scales to measure distortive tendencies 
in self-report at all57. Many studies showing that SDR scales scores failed to act as a moderator, 
mediator or suppressor of response biases of many kinds, e.g. empirical relations between self-report 
and verifying criteria, e.g. IQ test or proxy-report (Franzen & Mader, 2019; Leising, Scherbaum, Locke 
& Zimmermann, 2015; Piedmont et al., 2000; Smith, 1997; Uziel, 2010; meta-analysis: Ones et al., 
1996). Li and Bagger (2006) determined inability of validity scales to detect spurious variance, while 
Huang (2013) showed that SDR scales explained only minor spurious effects on substantive relations 
between self-esteem and academic performance. Similarly, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo and Bezmenova 
(2007) claimed that SDR scales offered no help in identifying fakers under neutral instructions. They 
also failed to find any moderating effects of SDR scales. Moreover, in some cases employing scores 
adjusted on SDR scales resulted in reduced validity in personality scales (Piedmont et al., 2000). It is 
also worthy to compare the results by Zettler, Hilbig, Moshagen and de Vries (2015) where low, instead 
of high, scores from the IM of the BIDR were related to cheating in an online game. These results point 
not only to zero, but also adverse, counterproductive results of using SDR scales. 
Two possible explanations of this failure were proposed: first, that SDR scales do not measure 
tendencies to present oneself in socially desirable, overly positive light and second, that the scores of 
the scales are distorted itself, e.g. by other response biases, e.g. response styles or careless responding. 
The former probability is known under the substance versus bias debate (McCrae & Costa, 1983). In 
this line of thinking SDR scales are believed to measure substantial, trait-like variance, “overlooked 
aspects of content variable” , as put by Sackeim and Gur (1978). Many interpretations of this 
overlooked aspects were proposed. In example, Uziel (2010, 2014) stated that SDR scales measure 
motivation to include socially desirable norms in one’s life and behaviour which he called 
interpersonally oriented self-control. De Vries, Zettler and Hilbig (2014) found correlations between 
the HEXACO personality inventory and the BIDR: the SDE subscale correlated positively with 
Extraversion and negatively with Emotionality and Conscientiousness, whereas the IM was related to 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Honesty-Humility traits. Moreover, Guo, Liu, Wang, Li and Gao 
(2019) determined that high scores on SDR scales were predictive for good job-related performance, 
 
57 In example: "In fact, these problems are important enough to indicate that SD scales are inappropriate both 
for applied purposes and for the purposes of researching the mechanisms and processes underlying faking 
behavior." (MacCann, Ziegler & Roberts, 2012) 
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good mental health, including boredom enduring, adjustment after graduation, buffered social stress 
and increased stress-coping resources. Van der Linden, Dunkel and Petrides (2016) also related the IM 
scores to job-related performance, attainment of social goals and social effectiveness. It seems that 
high SDR scales, especially obtained from the IM subscale of the BIDR, are related to honest behaviours 
and good social adjustment. It seems that such scores are indicative of a good, desirable personality, 
not of response bias (see also Ones et al., 1996; Piedmont et al., 2000). 
The latter explanation, SDR scales being distorted by other response biases themselves, was voiced 
e.g. by Becker (1976). Many studies pointed out that the SDR scales can, and often are, faked 
themselves (Furnham & Henderson, 1982; Marselle, 2014; Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992; Viswesvaran 
& Ones, 1999). Such scales may be specifically susceptible to being faked (or distorted by other 
response biases) due to their high transparency which enhances participants abilities to distort self-
report results (Dilchert & Ones, 2012). An interesting example of such problems was provided by 
Paulhus (2002) who admitted that participants often have problems with the self-deception denial 
(SDD) subscale of the BIDR as they consider its items as intrusive or even offensive. Moreover, it is 
possible, due to the specific construction of the SDR scales, that their items have higher desirability 
that any other items used in the studies, which would mean that the SDR scales are more prone to 
distortion than any other research instruments in the surveys. What is more, the SDR scales are 
deemed easily coached, meaning that participants can learn how to cheat them in order to obtain 
desirable scores, which greatly limits use of this method in practical settings (Alliger, Liliendfeld & 
Mitchell, 1996; Hurtz & Alliger, 2002; Miller & Barrett, 2001; Robie, Cartina et al., 2000). Other 
problems related to SDR scales were pointed by DeMaio (1984) who noticed that the process in which 
many of the scales were build is questionable as respondents had serious problems in assessing the 
desirability of items on the initial stages of building SDR scales. Furthermore, SDR scales often contain 
culturally-specific desirable behaviours and are thus difficult for cross-cultural research which 
additionally hinders their theoretical use in large-scale assessments (Lönnqvist et al., 2007). 
 However, despite the amassing evidence of problematic SDR scales use, they still remain the easiest 
and most convenient way of measuring (alleged) SDR tendencies. Oftentimes, due to ethical, 
organisational or methodological issues other methods are not possible to use, thus leaving the validity 
scales as the sole remedial method of controlling SDR in many research endeavours (Krumpal, 2013; 
Nederhof, 1985). Moreover, the substance versus bias controversy continues, as some studies point 
to successful implementation of validity scales for SDR control (e.g. Berry, Page & Sackett, 2007; see 
also Steger, Schroeders & Wilhelm (2020) for more examples). Hence, the SDR scales utility calls for a 
thorough, meta-analytic study which would comprehensively describe lie scales properties as an SDR 
control method depending on sample, design, criteria and scales used. Insufficiency of the presently 
used scales does not preclude efficient use of other scales, e.g. dark personality, self-orientation or 
competitive worldviews inventories (Roulin & Krings, 2016; Van der Linden et al., 2016).   
Overclaiming technique (OCT) 
The overclaiming technique was linked with very high hopes of being an efficient and easy-to-use 
method of both deliberate and non-deliberate SDR control (Paulhus et al., 2003; Philips & Clancy, 1972; 
Randall & Fernandes, 1991). It is comprehensively reviewed in the subsequent chapter. 
Psychophysiological measurements 
These techniques join information from human’s physiology and cognition by measuring biological 
substrates of psychological (socio-emotional and cognitive) processes. Among prominent methods 
used in this field are: a) brain activity measures- imaging, e.g. functional magnetic resonance imaging 
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(fMRI) and electroencefalography (EEG), b) eye activity measures, e.g. pupillometry and eye-tracking, 
c) cardiovascular activity, d) muscle activity (myography) or e) electrodermal activity. 
So far these techniques found significant use in the SDR research despite their large cost and 
organizational requirements (see subchapter 3.4.3 of this work). In this subchapter eye-tracking 
studies will be further commented on due to their notable role in accumulating evidence on survey 
responding in the recent years (e.g. Galesic et al., 2008), and even establishing the method as one of 
the essential pretesting tools (Lenzner, Kaczmirek & Galesic, 2011). Nevertheless, eye-tracking 
research concentrated specifically on SDR is still rare. Three examples come from faking studies in 
which eye-tracking helped to identify strategies used by participants in fake good conditions. It was 
evidenced that faking respondents concentrate their gaze mainly on extreme response options, but 
also read items in a less organized way with lower number of fixations (Muller, Schiepe-Tiska & 
Strohmaier, 2017; van Hooft & Born, 2012; Xu et al., 2015). In a preliminary study also using an eye-
tracker Kaminska and Foulsham (2013) suggest that SDR may be a by-product of satisficing in which 
respondents read questions quickly and concentrate on extreme options directly after reading them. 
Eye-tracking seems a promising option for future studies on response biases, especially that it is readily 
combinable with paradata measurement in computer-based studies.  
Another evidence specifically concentrating on SDR was brought by event-related potential (ERP) 
studies where the so-called P300 component (P3b variant) was found to have lower amplitude in 
participants scoring high on SDR scales (De Pascalis, 1993; Robinson, 2001). This pattern of results 
could suggest that high scores on such scales are driven by inattentive responses or responses driven 
by high cognitive load (P300 amplitude is lower in high cognitive load conditions, large distraction or 
force multitasking pressure; see Kok, 2001 and Linden, 2005 for reviews). Such pattern of results 
should be confirmed by further studies. 
Psychophysiological methods will probably never be a core SDR control method, at least not for ILSAs, 
mainly due to their costs and organizational requirements (carefully prepared laboratory settings). 
However, these methods already proved very useful in explaining response biases mechanisms and 
their further use in this area along with an integration with other methods present in the field (e.g. 
paradata use) are much awaited and even necessary steps. 
Keying and weighting techniques 
This group of methods comprises of two related techniques. The first one is keying, which is an 
empirical scoring of items regarding their properties attained in measurement, e.g. predictive power 
or criterion-related validity (Mitchell & Klimoski, 1982). The second one is weighting, which is based 
on ascribing additional values (weights) to items in order to create additional indicators of response 
bias. Normally these weights are, like keys, also empirically-driven. One of few accessible in the 
literature weighting examples was presented by Krueger (1998) who used participants’ item 
desirability ratings as an indicator of their self-enhancement tendencies. In this method participants 
completed a type of personality questionnaire in the form of list of adjectives (“Does the adjective 
describe you?”) and then rated desirability of the items used in the measurement (e.g. easy-going). 
The obtained measure is then correlated with participants ratings on personality questionnaire. In the 
final step this correlation between personality and item personal desirability rating is adjusted on item 
social desirability ratings, based on averaged ratings of descriptiveness and desirability of the whole 
group. The resulting partial correlation is treated as an SDR index. The method possesses certain 
appeal (face validity?), however remains largely untested, similarly as other keying and weighting 
methods (Kuncel et al., 2012). Paulhus and Holden (2009) pointed to two drawbacks of the method: a) 
it takes precious time and space in questionnaire as respondents have to rate each item twice, b) the 
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order of ratings seem to influence the results. Problems related to assessing items’ desirability 
reported by DeMaio (1984) rise additional doubts whether this method truly is capable of bringing any 
useful information. Before these methods would be used in large-scale assessments they need to 
undergo a thorough investigation of their true characteristics. However, it seems unlikely that any 
method based on doubling the number of items would become popular in the era of short scales 
domination.   
Implicit methods 
Bayesian truth serum (BTS) introduced by Prelec (2004) is one of the examples of implicit or indirect 
measures of SDR. In this task participants are asked to do two things: a) respond to a question and b) 
assess how other people will answer it (e.g. what fraction of the whole population will chose this 
option). The method resides on the false consensus effect and is based on using both answers in 
calculating individual scores where respondents are rewarded for correct predictions on how others 
will respond and for providing answers as close as possible to the answers predicted by the whole 
group. The method received some empirical testing and provided promising results as groups warned 
of the BTS calculation yielded less desirable and more honest answers (Frank et al., 2017; Weaver & 
Prelec, 2013). However, there are serious caveats regarding the methods’ utility as just the same 
results could have been achieved if respondents simply reacted to warning of a “lie detector”, similarly 
as if it was a BPL or instruction manipulation (Kuncel et al., 2012). The method needs further testing 
before anything decisive about its efficiency could be said. It is worthy to note, that this method is 
based on similar predictions as IDQ commented above and similar caveats towards its validity apply 
(Jang, 2017).   
Gregg (2007) proposed using Implicit Association Test (IAT), a cognitive task widely used in 
experimental social sciences (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) that resides on measuring 
implicit preferences towards certain objects. Gregg and Klymowsky (2013) noted method’s pluses and 
minuses, however its utility for SDR research is still not known. Although the method is often used to 
measure racial prejudices and other undesirable attitudes and opinions it was never, to the best 
knowledge of the author, compared with measures and tools used in survey research. However, IAT 
seems a promising option for research investigations on SDR. Nevertheless, its use in large-scale 
assessments would be probably very problematic due to large time requirements of the method.   
Construct-irrelevant bias indicators 
One of the main disadvantages of SDR scales is that they capture trait variance, apart from bias 
variance, hence the idea to construct similar scales but this time measuring only response bias. The 
scales were named trait-free indicators, representative indicators of response styles (RIRS; Weijters, 
Schillewaert & Geuens, 2008) or response inconsistency scales (Piedmont et al., 2000). The author of 
this thesis named them “construct-irrelevant bias indicators” (CIBI) in order to underlie that such 
indicators need to be unrelated to the measured construct to be effective (cf. Ferrando, 2005). This 
name also alludes to the construct-irrelevant variance (CIV) term which the CIBIs are precisely meant 
to measure. 
This category entails a large and internally diversified group of techniques. Instructed response items 
(IRIs; e.g. “If you read this mark “9” in this item”), bogus items (e.g. “I was born on Mars”) and 
instructed manipulation checks (these items typically consist of a short instruction and an activity 
respondent have to do, e.g. provide an open ended response) (Curran, 2016). These items serve for 
C/IER identification and do not offer much help as SDR indicators. 
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However, two other forms of such items could be helpful. The first of the two is called “response 
inconsistency scales” and is formed of pairs of related items, e.g. “Normally I seek quiet places” and “I 
like being part of a large crowd”. Paired items are related to each other in order to enable measuring 
inconsistent responses (Dilchert & Ones, 2012). In the example above agreeing to both items would 
be a potential signal of inconsistent responding. This method is normally used to screen for C/IER and 
RSs but theoretically may be set up to indicate SDR (see Piedmont et al., 2000). In order to achieve that 
item pairs would have to be equalised on desirability and paired in such a way that desirable responses 
to both of them would be logically contradictory. Such a scale would not necessarily be trait-free 
(Weijters et al., 2008) but would have to be of a significant length in order to guarantee needed 
precision of measurement (Dilchert & Ones, 2012). Existing examples of similar scales consist of more 
than 40 items, hence their utility is constricted mainly to high-stakes settings. 
The second CIBI method of some potential to measure SDR is called self-reported honesty (Meade & 
Craig, 2012), diligence scale (Curran, 2016) or seriousness check (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich & Musch, 
2013). This is a very simple technique based on asking respondents direct questions regarding their 
honesty and attentiveness during survey. Such questions can be e.g. “Should your data be used in 
analysis? Yes/No” or “Did you answer honestly?”. Despite its simplicity the method seems to work 
reasonably well in identifying low quality data (Curran, 2016; Meade & Craig, 2012). However, two 
caveats apply should this method be of any value to indicate SDR: a) check should entail more than 
just one item to achieve acceptable reliability and avoid false positives, b) its content should be more 
directed to honesty and desirability and less to motivation or diligence.  
Both response inconsistency scales and diligence scales need preparatory work before they could be 
attested as SDR indicators, however these methods offer some possibility to become useful if only 
their length could be held at moderate item numbers. 
Summary of external remedy methods 
Remedial methods in this category are based on collecting additional measures, that are not related 
to the construct measured and their sole aim is to indicate SDR. These additional measures differ in 
their efficiency, ease of use and flexibility to be applied in different modes and contexts. SDR scales 
was a perfect candidate for gold-standard SDR control method, however, recent evidence amounted 
to a firm and consistent knowledge that these measures should not be used in this role. Hence, OCT is 
a second best hope to be an easy-to-apply but valid indicator of SDR. 
Moreover, most of these methods is only in the initial phase of testing and all of them seem to lack 
verified theoretical underpinnings. Such a link between theory and practice is much needed in this 
context, in order to avoid misinterpretation of the collected indicators.  
4.5.6 Remedial methods: internal 
Mixture models 
This method resides on identifying latent subgroups among the participants that took part in the 
measurement. The technique accounts for shared patterns in the data and can discern between groups 
of participants of different properties even if no grouping variables were explicitly stated which seems 
to be a blessing for SDR research where generally it is not known who yielded biased responses and to 
what extent.  
Mixture models are widely used in social and life sciences but are only in initial phases of testing in 
response biases identification (Zickar & Sliter, 2012). However, some very promising evidence exists as 
Leite and Cooper (2010) have successfully used this method to differentiate between participants 
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responding desirably and honest responders. Other applications involve study of Meade and Craig 
(2012) who used mixture models to identify C/IER and analyses conducted by Khorramdel, von Davier 
and Pokropek (2019) who used this technique to discern different RS groups. 
It seems that method offers a promising avenue to identify subset of respondents responding 
desirably, moreover, it allows to differentiate between different forms and patterns of SDR if such can 
be found. Mixture models is an option especially suited for large-scale assessments as they do not 
need any additional indicators and can offer an interesting insight into SDR on their own. What is more, 
the abundance of data normally collected in LSAs can be readily used to interpret groups emerging 
from mixture models. Method’s large requirements regarding sample size are easily met in case of 
large-scale assessments.    
Person fit measures 
While mixture models are meant to identify latent groups in the data, person fit measures (perfits; 
PFMs) are devised to select outlying individuals. Normally, perfits are used to find aberrant patterns in 
the data, e.g. respondents who do not follow the instructions, and have been applied with promising 
results in detecting C/IER (Conijn, Emons & Sijtsma, 2014; Curran, 2016; Meade & Craig, 2012). The 
logic of analysis is similar to conducting regression diagnostics and detecting outliers. However, in this 
case person fit measures indicate discrepancy from an underlying IRT model for a given dataset, e.g. 
self-report scale. 
Despite some successes in the C/IER research perfits were so far less successful in the SDR field (Zickar 
& Sliter, 2012). A set of simulational and empirical studies conducted by Conijn and colleagues showed 
that perfit measures performed best for random responding, but had less success in accounting for 
ERS or SDR in the data. Moreover, eliminating participants flagged as outliers brought only little gain 
in model fit and criterion-related validity. The method seems to be efficient in eliminating only certain 
types of outliers but does not help to identify truly influential cases, elimination of which could give 
substantial improvements in data quality. Nevertheless, the PFMs were able to outperform other SDR 
control methods, e.g. inconsistency scales, in a preliminary research (Conijn, Emons, De Jong & Sijstma, 
2015). 
PFMs also have certain drawbacks. First of all, they are based on an underlying IRT model, most often 
graded response model (GRM), so any departures from models requirements (e.g. local dependency 
of items, multidimensionality) may result in deteriorated perfits efficiency. Although this is 
theoretically a crucial concern, empirical data seem to suggest that PFMs are quite robust to model 
violations (Conijn et al., 2014). Secondly, the method needs quite lengthy scales, of 20 items or more, 
to work properly. Moreover, items should vary in their fakability and desirability as method seem to 
be less efficient in identifying stylistic responses. Thirdly and finally, there is a large need for a theory 
that would enhance making sense of the PFMs results, as for now many aberrant patterns are hard to 
interpret. 
Nevertheless, the method is an easy to use and cost-efficient technique that can be merged with other 
remedies, e.g. mixture models and DIF in order to account for various types of response biases present 
in the dataset (Conijn, Sijtsma & Emons, 2016). 
Differential item functioning (DIF) 
This technique allows to compare item properties between two groups of participants that differ only 
in one trait, but stand the same on underlying latent ability. In theory it is an ideal method for SDR 
research as it should enable detailed comparisons between honest and responding desirably groups. 
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However, the criterion that is used to form two comparison groups has to be known prior to analysis 
and collected during measurement. Nevertheless, DIF seems as a good method to expand knowledge 
on SDR by providing detailed item-level data. Its main drawback, necessity of a valid dichotomous 
criterion, is mitigated in LSAs as in these assessments numerous measures are collected anyway, so 
there is plenty of candidates for a criterion and performing DIF analysis may seem a viable option. It is 
worthy to note, that more research is needed to determine what measures possible to collect in LSAs 
could be used as a valid DIF criterion for an SDR identification (Zickar & Sliter, 2012). The DIF’s 
equivalent for a scale-level analysis is differential test functioning (DTF). Measurement invariance 
analyses can also be used to determine similarity in model estimates between the pre-defined 
groupings. 
Factor deletion/rotation 
Paulhus (1981), basing on an observation of Messick and Jackson (1972) that the largest (principal) 
factor emerging from factor-analysis of the MMPI data was very highly correlated with item desirability 
ratings, conceived that deleting this factor from further analyses would eliminate SDR variance from 
the data matrix. 
The method proposed by Paulhus (1981) was heavily critiqued by Borkenau and Amelang (1985) who 
provided empirical evidence that deleting such factor diminishes content saturation in resulting factor 
scores. Moreover, the adjusted scale scores were characterised by lower construct and structural 
validity in comparison to the unadjusted scores. The researchers firmly discouraged from using factor 
deletion technique. In fact, this method was quickly abandoned.   
Apart from lack of efficiency the method also had one inherent drawback- it needed a valid SDR 
criterion to be collected with the target scale in order to serve as marker variable. Otherwise, there 
was no possibility to confirm that the emerging principal factor was indeed representative for SDR 
variance. As suggested by Borkenau and Amelang (1985), the SDR factor was not always the largest 
factor and even was not always present in the data. Moreover, its character seemed to depend from 
the scales’ content, which limited method’s use due to low inter-sample generalisability (see Paulhus, 
1984). It appeared that this method confused item desirability (item characteristic) with SDR (actual 
survey behaviour). 
Higher order factors 
Higher-order factor method entails modelling variance common to subscales or even separate scales 
used in one measurement occasion. Oftentimes such common variance emerges as a so-called method 
variance (McCrae, 2018; Podsakoff et al., 2003) but can also represent response biases, e.g. RS 
(Khorramdel & von DAvier, 2014) or SDR (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Such common variance may provoke 
spurious correlations between theoretically unrelated (sub)scales or suppress true relations, thus 
lowering scales’ construct validity. Another effect of common variance presence is spurious scale 
multidimensionality which causes both psychometric and substantial problems (Rauch, Schweizer & 
Moosbrugger, 2007). 
Schmit and Ryan (1993) presented a study where typical factor structure of a Big5 questionnaire did 
not emerge in a sample motivated to yield favourable impressions (applicants for a job post). In the 
applicant subsample, in comparison to the non-applicant one, inter-factor correlations were observed, 
that were accounted for by a higher-order factor (HOF, also general factor, GF) in order to establish an 
adequate model fit. The authors interpreted these unexpected cross-factor correlations to SDR. 
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Many subsequent studies also found such a structure, but the interpretation of the general factor 
emerging is mixed (Pelt, Van der Linden, Dunkel & Born, 2019), as some researchers attribute it to 
response biases (method variance), whereas some perceive it as an emanation of substantial variance.  
Dunkel, Van der Linden, Brown and Mathes (2016) contend that the emerging higher-order factor can 
be attributed to three separate sources of variance: social effectiveness, positive self-evaluation and 
SDR, the first two being sources of valid trait variance. On the other hand, Anglim, Morse, de Vries, 
MaCCann and Marty (2017) found that higher-order factor explained two-thirds of the difference 
between applicants and non-applicants, thus pointing to the bias (SDR, faking) interpretation of the 
higher-order factor. However, Pelt et al. (2019) and Dunkel et al. (2016) are more inclined to 
substantial versus bias explanation of HOF. Overall, the nature of such patterns is still elusive and 
validity studies are much needed, especially as some previous studies lacked ecological validity by 
concentrating on instructed faking studies where the role of fakers was played by college students 
(Pelt et al., 2019). 
Bäckström (2007) provided some validation on this topic by obtaining correlations between HOF and 
the IPIP equivalent of the BIDR, which would suggest a bias nature of the higher-order variance. 
However, this validation still does not respond the substance versus bias question as the SDR scales 
are known to contain large substance variance themselves. 
Reise, Kim, Mansolf and Widaman (2016) provided a detailed analysis on why higher-order models 
seem to offer better fit than unidimensional models in the presence of biased responses. The authors 
used a newly-introduced method- iterated reweighted least squares (IRLS) that allows to combine 
individual fit measures with many structural models, including various higher-order factor models (e.g. 
bifactor model). The method was used on a large database and showed that only a handful of 
participants (3% of the sample) was modelled better with a HOF model than a unidimensional (more 
parsimonious) model. Interestingly, a substantial part of the sample (11%) yielded such inconsistent 
responses that they did not fit to any model. As evidenced by a detailed data exploration the bifactor 
model helps to model stylistic responses, e.g. acquiescence (ARS). However, neither bifactor nor 
unidimensional model helped to model blatantly aberrant response patterns, e.g. straightlining or very 
low response variability (using the same two or three response categories throughout the whole scale). 
Moreover, there were still many aberrant patterns in the data for which an explanation was difficult 
to find. 
Nevertheless, modelling higher-order variance and subsequent partitioning it to specific variance 
sources is a promising, yet under-researched SDR control method (McCrae, 2018; Pelt et al., 2019). A 
serious limitation of the research to date was that almost all of the results were drawn from personality 
or self-esteem scales, thus narrowing the research contexts in which this method was used. 
Summary of internal remedy methods 
Internal remedy methods are on the first glance very attractive as they can be used after the data was 
collected (e.g. on a secondary dataset) and typically do not require preparatory efforts. Moreover, they 
can be used as both confirmatory and exploratory techniques which gives a valuable flexibility (Conijn 
et al., 2016). What is more they are time- and cost-efficient as they necessitate only additional 
analytical exertion which is easier to provide than additional respondents’ effort. Another advantage 
of these methods is that they easily combine with themselves (e.g. Conijn et al., 2015, 2016) mutually 
aiding interpretation as they can serve as criteria for each other. In example, perfit measures can be 
combined with mixture models and either perfit values or latent class membership could be used as a 
criterion to establish groups for a DIF comparison. This possibility was exploited by Reise and 
colleagues (2016) who combined logics of higher-order, person fit and mixture models in a newly 
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developed method of analysis. Certainly, more of such developments proposing innovative methods 
that allow to combine strengths of the existing models are most welcome. 
Nonetheless, these methods are still under-researched which means that they still may need collection 
of additional measures that would serve as criterion in order to aid their interpretation. Moreover, 
theoretical advancements would greatly ease usage of these methods, as so far possibilities to 
generate models and measures seem infinite but incisive interpretations are in short supply. 
4.5.7 SDR control methods: summary 
The above review was meant only to reframe rather than exhaust the literature on response biases 
control methods so inevitably it is very selective. The main point of the review is that none of the 
methods used so far achieved the “golden standard” status and still there are no easy answers for 
difficult questions on how to account for the spurious measure caused by response biases, including 
the overly positive bias of self-perception. It is warranted to conclude that the research on methods 
was engulfed by pragmatic aspects and, consequently, achieved few theoretical advancements on the 
nature of the biases. Moreover, the research to date often entangled SDR, response styles, careless 
responding and other biases; the examples of studies that aimed to investigate relations between 
them are scarce (e.g. Grau et al., 2019; Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Pokropek, 2014). 
Most importantly, however, the research to date was very focused on the response biases in the “old”, 
“classic” sense: as effects of social desirability or conscious, deliberate manipulation of self-reports, 
e.g. to achieve some gains (faking research) or to evade answering to intrusive questions. This research 
corresponds to, e.g. Goffman’s or Blau’s theories on impression management but it does not offer 
much in case of the new framework of positivity bias, both in case of theory as in case of methodology. 
There is a great need to develop new methods that would account for response biases also in other 
measurement contexts, namely in low-stakes, non-intrusive, non-threatening measurement 
occasions, which are common situations where response biases in the “new” sense emerge: results of 
unconscious, non-deliberate, motivated processes. 
It is also advisable to think about the requirements that efficient SDR methods should fulfil. Kuncel and 
colleagues (2012) named a few of such specifications: high sensitivity, low rate of false positives, 
capturing only trait-irrelevant variance, resistant to coaching and instruction. This list is slightly tilted 
towards the needs of applied research (e.g. job selection) and can be supplemented by stating the 
most fundamental prerequisites of SDR control methods for any kind of research with a special focus 
on large-scale assessments. Such techniques should be time-efficient, especially on the side of the 
respondent (client). This is especially important in large-scale assessments as their questionnaires are 
normally packed with scales and there is small possibility of adding lengthy, time-consuming tools. 
Moreover, such method should be of course efficient, namely it should be evidenced to enhance self-
report validity by accounting for construct-irrelevant variance. Furthermore, such method should be 
also easy to use, cost-effective and flexible, ready to use in various research contexts, designs and 
modes. It is also important to remember that the “golden-standard quest” is now more of a rhetorical 
figure than a true search for the best method. The evidence amassed so far points that SDR is not a 
zero-one phenomenon and it seems that combining strengths of different methods is the most 
promising way to account for the multi-faceted nature of the bias.  
The methods should also catch up with the changes in measurement trends, e.g. the advent of 
computerised testing in ILSAs (e.g. PISA is completely computerised since the 2015 edition) makes RT 
and log file analyses (backtracking, editing, mouse moves) much more accessible and hence much 
more promising for future studies in the response bias field. Moreover, also the appearance of more 
advanced psychometric techniques should be seen as a chance to refine self-report measures. 
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Especially the methods based on the IRT family contributed greatly to response bias research, 
however, the accomplishments are so far greater in the cognitive tests field (e.g. Stager et al., 2020). 
Both paradata and internal remedy methods are especially promising in the context of ILSAs/NLSAs as 
their use does not pose any effort on the side of respondent which is a requirement of paramount 
importance in this context. Moreover, these methods seem to be less burdened by cultural factors 
which is crucially important for international projects58. The specificity of large-scale assessments also 
readily balance these methods’ drawbacks, e.g. need of large samples, large response vectors and 
sufficient analytical background. Efficient use of SDR control methods requires also enhancing data 
patterns interpretations which need to be based on advances in comprehension of the SDR 
nomological network. Psychophysiological methods can be a great help in future studies on SDR 
mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the many above-presented methods the overclaiming technique seems a 
promising tool to account for response biases in self-report research. However, the method still needs 
extensive validation studies in order to establish its practical values as well as to identify processes 
leading to certain OCT scores, which is indispensable to verify its validity. The rest of the dissertation 
is dedicated to such a validation study of this method on the example of the PISA 2012 data. 
4.6 Chapter summary 
Self-report is an easy-to-use and very cost-efficient research method. Both of these advantages explain 
its immense popularity in a wide array of research disciplines and measurement contexts. However, 
apart from great virtues the method is also subjected to a heavy critique regarding its validity. Some 
of the researchers even claim that self-reports collect “Platonic ideal” type of data, as they are often 
used to gauge unobservable phenomena as opinions, attitudes or judgments of, allegedly, dubious 
validity. 
Despite certain caveats self-report validity has been supported by recent meta-analyses and meta-
syntheses. Of course, the method is not free from methodological problems, of which systematic 
measurement errors are among the most important. One of the prominent sources of such errors are 
response biases commented in more detail in this work, but apart from them the method has certain 
moderators of response validity. Most important of them are gender, age, cognitive abilities and 
participants’ interest and motivation to participate in a survey responding. Also item and scale 
properties play key role in responses validity as more specific and objective items yield more valid 
scores. 
Self-reports are also widely used in the assessment of skills, including academic or school-related 
abilities. Validity of such scales is well evidenced by a firm body of criterion-validity studies. However, 
this subfield is not free from its specific problems as subjects often tend to misestimate the level of 
their skills at question (e.g. math abilities). Interestingly, hard tasks tend to be over-rated, while easy 
tasks are more often under-rated. Overall, there is a certain tilt toward overly positive self-reports, 
some studies evidence that only 50% of self-reports is accurate with around 30-35% of self-
assessments that are overclaimed. Interestingly, the group of underclaimers is also frequently 
identified in the field which to date was not adequately addressed by theoretical explanations. 
Most importantly, still no consensus has been forged on how to account for this positivity bias in self-
report of skills. Many methods were devised and tested but none of them reached status of a “golden”, 
commonly accepted standard. The subchapter 4.5 reviews these methods and contains proposition of 
 
58 Especially that nowadays such projects entail not only ILSAs but also multi-lab projects, including multi-lab 
replication research.  
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a refined classification of methods, divided into preventive and remedial procedures. The conducted 
review evidenced that there is indeed no method that is adequately verified to be a valid and flexible 
curative for positivity bias. It is advised to combine and converge many procedures in order to account 
for response biases of which self-assessment of skills is definitely not free. Due to its easiness and 
efficiency of use, as well as sound theoretical justification, overclaiming technique is seen as a good 
candidate for an “all-rounder”-like method available to validly account for positivity bias and other 
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Chapter 5- OVERCLAIMING TECHNIQUE AS A MEASURE OF 
POSITIVITY BIAS- HYPOTHESES DRAWING 
 
5.1 Definitions and similar terms 
The above-presented review of the methods conceived to prevent positivity biases or to control the 
spurious variance they cause in self-reports showed that none of the methods available is a perfect 
solution for the problem. The ideal method should be easy to use, cost- and time-effective as well as 
flexible in order to be usable in every research context and every mode of data collection. Specifically, 
such method should be feasible not only in small research projects, but also in large-scale 
measurements like ILSAs (e.g. PISA, TIMSS, PIAAC) or major international surveys (e.g. WVS, ESS, etc.).  
The overclaiming technique (OCT) could be seen as such a response to methodological problems 
caused by positivity bias and alike processes. The method was first used by Phillips and Clancy (1972) 
and was based on experiences from linguistic word recognition tasks (see Zimmerman, Broder, 
Shaugnessy & Underwood, 1977 for description). OCT is based on presenting to respondents truly 
existent items (“reals”) mixed with items that do not exist (“foils”). The respondents’ task is to assess 
their familiarity or knowledge with the items presented. Claiming knowledge or familiarity with non-
existent items is believed to be an index of positivity bias and can be further used in statistical analyses. 
Hence, overclaiming was defined as asserting knowledge of a concept that does not exist (Phillips & 
Clancy, 1972) or claiming knowledge about non-existent items (Paulhus et al., 2003). 
On the basis of responses to reals and foils different scores (indices) could be calculated. Paulhus and 
co-workers advocated (2003) use of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) framework in order to do so, 
however, other methods were also widely used (e.g. Bing et al., 2011; Muller, 2019; Vonkova et al., 
2018). Most importantly, there are two main indices that can be constructed from any OCT: a) accuracy 
index and b) bias index. Any accuracy index, no matter the method used to calculate it, entails 
information about how well a given participant discriminates between reals and foils59. Hence, this 
index encodes not only how highly a responder claims her familiarity with reals but also how well does 
she refrain from claiming familiarity with foils. The most recommended accuracy index based on SDT 
calculations is d’ (Paulhus & Petrusic, 2010). Bias indices convey information on how eager a 
respondent is to claim familiarity with any type of stimuli. This kind of indices are often named “yes-
rate” indexes or “location criterion”. The most often encountered bias index based on SDT is c (Paulhus 
& Petrusic, 2010). Detailed information on the use of indices will be provided in the methods section 
below.  
Some researchers also use the term “overclaiming” interchangeably with other notions like e.g. 
“overconfidence”, “overestimation” or “bullshitting” (e.g. Jerrim et al., 2019). Frankfurt (2005) defined 
“bullshitting” as claim knowledge or expertise in an area where they actually have little experience or 
skill, thus situating it close to the definitions of overclaiming proposed by Phillips and Clancy (1972) 
and Paulhus and co-workers (2003). However, these terms should not be confused with overclaiming 
as there are measured by different paradigms and have their own definitions as overconfidence is the 
difference between confidence of correctness and real accuracy (see Pallier et al., 2002) and 
bullshitting is defined more precisely as deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying (Black, 1983) or 
pseudoprofound communication, that attempts to impress rather than inform, to be engaging, rather 
than instructive (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2015). Thus, main difference between 
 
59 These indices are also often named “sensitivity” or “discriminability” indices. 
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bullshitting and overclaiming is in the complexity and intentionality being much greater in the former 
than in the latter. Overconfidence has been verified as being only weakly related to overclaiming, 
defined as it is done here, by Bensch and collaborators (2017). Still it is unknown, how exactly 
overclaiming is related to tendencies to bullshit or fake news gullibility but some evidence exists that 
they are somewhat related (Pennycook & Rand, 2020). Conceptually, overclaiming is related to yet 
another similar term, namely yielding pseudo-opinions as defined by Bishop and co-workers (1986; see 
also Herr, Sherman & Fazio, 1983). The definitions presented above situate overclaiming, at least in 
the context of survey methodology, as a term very close to positivity bias (Bensch et al., 2017). 
Overclaiming technique (OCT) is, therefore, a measure of the fact and degree of overclaiming in self-
report data. The small differences between the existing OCT versions (Ackerman & Ellingsen, 2014; 
Goecke et al., 2020; Hargittai, 2005; Ziegler et al., 2013) are ignored and not commented here, as not 
relevant to the main topic of the dissertation. 
Having this terminological clarifications in mind it has to be said that OCT meets the requirements of 
research efficiency posed before a method targeted at gauging the positivity bias in self-report data. 
OCT is easy to use, not very time consuming, context- and mode-flexible and have an appealing clear 
operationalisation of scores. After all, what can be more diagnostic of creating too positive, too 
desirable characteristic of oneself than claiming familiarity with non-existent items or fictitious skills? 
However, this first-glance appeal of OCT has to be verified empirically. To date the results of its 
usefulness are mixed as many research results point to the lack of convergence validity between the 
OCT scores and other typical measures of positivity bias (e.g. Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Muller, 2019). 
Moreover, there is evidence that OCT scores fail to act as a suppressor or moderator in the relation of 
the self-report scale scores and a given criterion (e.g. Yuan et al., 2015). However, other research 
results point to the usefulness of OCT, in example to control for spurious variance in cross-country 
research (Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; Vonkova et al., 2018) or to act as suppressor or moderator in 
criterion-related validity studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 1984; Pokropek, 2014; Yang et al., 2019). 
Nevertheless, there is a large call in the field for more validity studies of the method, especially 
criterion-related validity research (Bing et al., 2011; Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Paulhus, 2011) and 
construct validity investigation, in order to continue the attempts to get to know the mechanisms 
leading to OCT scores and to draw the full nomological network of the method (Bensch et al., 2017; 
Tonković et al., 2011). The debate on overclaiming mechanisms is still open and inconclusive (e.g. 
Muller, 2019) thus this research aims to contribute to it by conducting a comprehensive review of the 
evidence gathered to date and also by providing new analyses based on a rich secondary dataset (PISA 
2012 for Poland).  
The subsequent parts of this chapter will provide an additional review of research results concerning 
OCT along with a methodological commentary regarding OCT scoring and applying in analysis. 
Moreover, research questions will be presented and their justification in the light of the literature will 
be offered. 
5.2 Research review and research questions derivation 
5.2.1 Overclaiming scores as a suppressor of spurious variance 
First of all an attempt will be made to bring further evidence of a potential suppressor effect of the 
OCT scores on the relation between self-report scale and related criterion. In this research the math 
familiarity scale from the PISA 2012 dataset will be used as a self-report scale and PISA test math score 
will be used as an objective criterion. The assumption is that self-report should correlate positively 
with the criterion at least in the range of 0.30-0.40 of the standardised correlation coefficient (zero-
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order correlation case) as evidenced by reviews of self-report validities (e.g. Ackerman et al., 2002; 
Mabe & West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014). This research question also aims to verify one of the key 
effects of positivity bias- suppression (Ganster et al., 1983) and verify mixed evidence present to date 
in the literature where there is a large evidence base for suppressor effect of OCT scores on criterion-
related validity of self-report scales (He & van de Vijver, 2016; Pokropek, 2014; Vonkova et al., 2018; 
Yang et al., 2019) but there are also some contradictory results that need verification (Bing et al., 2011; 
Yuan et al., 2015). Moreover, some of the positive evidence was very preliminary and cannot be 
treated as a full proof. Hence, in light of the theory it is assumed here that OCT scores will act as a 
classical suppressor (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski & Tracy, 2004; Tzelgov & Henik, 1991) for the 
relation between math familiarity self-report scores and cognitive (math) test scores, resulting in 
elevated relation between the self-report and the math test and negative relation between the OCT 
score and the math test after OCT scores will be introduced to the regression equation. As warranted 
e.g. by Anderson’s and colleagues research (1984) adding OCT scores to the equation should bring 
exactly these results: negative correlation between inflated score and objective test and boost of R2 as 
an indicator of increment in validity of the self-report. Thus:   
Hypothesis 1: Overclaiming scores will act as a classical suppressor in the relation between math 
familiarity self-report scale and objective criterion- cognitive math test. 
Positive verification of these hypothesis will provide evidence that OCT can be used to enhance the 
validity of self-report measures in low-stakes assessments. 
Moreover, the research proposed in the subsequent parts of this work is aimed to enlarge our 
understanding of the mechanisms of OCT. Initial propositions were very optimistic indicating that OCT 
can measure positivity bias (e.g. Paulhus et al., 2003) but further research brought a lot of contradicting 
results to this (overoptimistic?) statement (Hulur, Wilhelm & Schipolowski, 2011). For example, Dunlop 
and colleagues (2017) summarised the research and proposed that overclaiming can result from four 
different mechanisms: a) self-enhanced self-presentation, b) faking/impression management/lying, c) 
memory bias, d) careless responding. This summary is a roadmap for testing various hypothesis 
regarding overclaiming mechanisms. 
5.2.2. Overclaiming as a result of memory bias 
Huber (2017) specified that the alleged “memory bias” can be due to two different processes: a) false 
recognition or b) false recollection60, whereas Calsyn, Kelemen, Jones and Winter (2001) hypothesised 
that OCT scores may be related to general or specific knowledge of a respondent. This idea was further 
supported by other researchers who investigated the relation between general and domain 
knowledge, as well as IQ and openness to experience personality trait61 and OCT (e.g. Dunlop et al., 
2017). All these hypothesis (memory bias, knowledge, openness to experience) have a common core 
as in the case of the relation between respondent’s knowledge (openness to experience) and 
overclaiming it is assumed that the larger the knowledge, the bigger the tendency to overclaim due to 
 
60 Recognition and recall are two distinct types of memory retrieval. Recognition is simpler and easier as it entails 
only recognising which of the presented (incoming) stimuli is known (memorised) and which is unknown (new, 
not memorised). Recall is also a process of memory retrieval but it is defined as a self-standing process based on 
retrieving information from memory without any additional cues nor stimuli (Yonelinas, 2002). Recognition can 
be further divided into “feeling of knowing” (recollection) and “feeling of familiarity” (familiarity) (Mandler, 
1980). 
61 Openness to experience is one of the main personality traits (one of the five in the Big5 model) and is often 
related to IQ and knowledge but also to creativity and non-traditional, unorthodox thinking (e.g. Moutafi, 
Furnham & Crump, 2006). 
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larger probability of false recognition of foils due to interference between foils and notions present in 
the memory system.  
Another feasible explanation within the larger “memory bias” framework is that more creative, open 
to experience people have simply more associations with foils, e.g. due to having richer and/or more 
disinhibited semantical networks. Hence, creativity and originality in thinking can propel those 
participants to make sense of foils and claim their familiarity (Muller, 2019). It is worthy to remember 
that one of the three facets of openness62, unconventionality, can predict non-traditional thoughts and 
life decisions (Schwaba, Robins, Grijalva & Bleidorn, 2019). High openness to experience also predicts 
high verbal fluency, so participants high on unconventionality trait can have more atypical associations 
with a given foil than other respondents and, consequently, larger chance of claiming familiarity with 
it which would result in achieving a higher bias score in OCT. 
In general, OCT does not display consistent relations with personality (Dunlop et al., 2019). Kam and 
colleagues (2015) showed little overlap between OCT and personality traits, similarly Barber, Barnes 
and Carlson (2013) found no correlation between OCT bias index and neuroticism (HEXACO-measured) 
and survey enjoyment. Much alike results were also achieved by other researchers (e.g. Dunlop et al., 
2017; Lee, 2016). Williams, Paulhus and Nathanson (2002) reported no relation between OCQ and self-
report measures of perfectionism, clarity of self-concept and optimism. Dunlop and collaborators 
(2019) reported small to moderate correlations between OCT indices and the HEXACO-model 
personality traits: bias correlated with extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness 
(rs in the range of 0.15-0.25), whereas accuracy correlated only with extraversion and 
conscientiousness (r~0.15). Both OCT indices correlated negatively with emotionality (r~ -0.15). 
However, one of the main personality traits, openness to experience (and similar measures), is 
regularly linked to have relations with overclaiming. In example, Ziegler and co-workers (2013) found 
a positive correlation between bias index and openness (r=0.30) and risk-taking traits. Similar 
correlations between bias index and openness were also found by Tonković and colleagues (2011; r 
~0.25). On the other hand, Dunlop and co-workers (2017), Ludeke and Makransky (2016) and Swami, 
Papanicolau & Furnham (2011) found a relation between openness and accuracy index (r=0.26), but 
no relation between openness and OCT bias63. 
Interesting results were presented by Ludeke and Makransky (2016) where bias was also a significant 
predictor of openness exaggeration, but only in high prestigious domains of OCT (e.g. jazz music, but 
not rap music, philosophers, but not cloth retailers, etc.). Hence, the content of the scales can influence 
OCT scores and validity. Items’ desirability and instrumentality to make a certain impression is a 
probable moderator of the OCT-openness relation, along with measurement context (Dunlop et al., 
2019). Correlation between openness to experience and accuracy index is probably related to 
accumulated general knowledge, however, both direct and indirect, knowledge-mediated, paths 
relating openness to OCT exist. It is important to note, however, that not only greater knowledge could 
be responsible for the openness-overclaiming correlation, it may be also due to self-enhancement 
tendency inflating scores in both measures (Dunlop et al., 2017). 
For example, Atir, Rosenzweig and Dunning (2015) presented results where overclaiming foils was 
positively related to self-reported knowledge in a given domain. This result could point to the possible 
relation between overclaiming and knowledge in line of the memory bias hypothesis. However, Atir 
 
62 According to one of the models these are: intellectual interests, aesthetic interests and unconventionality, cf. 
Christensen, Cotter & Silvia (2019). 




and colleagues attributed OCT bias to lack of metacognitive skills as in the case of Kruger-Dunning 
effect (1999), especially that in another set of studies conducted by these researchers participants 
competent in a certain knowledge domain overclaimed familiarity with foils less than incompetent 
participants did (Atir, Rosenzweig & Dunning, in preparation). These results would point that the 
positive relation between OCT bias score and self-rated knowledge is a spurious one, as objectively 
measured knowledge is related negatively to bias. 
Other research evaluated relations between OCT indices and various knowledge and intelligence 
measures. Swami and colleagues (2011) obtained positive relation between both OCT accuracy and 
bias index and self-rated intelligence and psychiatric knowledge (r ~ 0.30). Pesta and Poznanski (2009) 
showed that OCT accuracy correlated with an IQ test (r=0.64), exam scores (r~0.40-0.50) and GPA 
grades (r=0.30). Overclaiming also offered some small incremental validity in predicting MBA exam 
scores. In the study conducted by Bertsch and Pesta (2009) both OCT indices were related to IQ- 
accuracy (d’) correlated around 0.40, whereas bias (c-measured) was non-significant or negative, 
however, different bias index, mean foils index, was related negatively to IQ (r=-0.16). Positive relation 
between OCT accuracy and intelligence were also presented by Bensch and co-workers (2017) (r=0.38) 
for crystallised intelligence and also Ziegler and colleagues (2013) who did not obtain relation between 
VOC-T bias and fluid intelligence, but found a small correlation between accuracy and intelligence tests 
(r~ 0.15). Moreover, Deffler, Leary and Hoyle (2016) found a small positive relation between 
educational level and accuracy (d’), but no relation between educational level and bias (c-measured). 
Musch and collaborators (2012) found that OCT accuracy (d’) correlated with vocabulary test (r=0.40), 
whereas Calsyn and others (2001) found that the number of real agencies named in a free recall 
correlated with agencies overclaiming (r=0.12) and true agency recognition test correlated 0.60 with 
OCT accuracy. These findings are to a large extent similar to the finding of Stanovich and Cunningham 
(1992) and West and Stanovich (1991) who obtained significant correlations between their version of 
OCT and various vocabulary, knowledge and intelligence tests (PPTV64, Nelson-Denny vocabulary 
knowledge test and Raven matrices) as well as SAT65 (r=0.50) and GPA (r=0.35) scores. Very interesting 
results were showed on the basis of the PISA 2012 dataset by Kyllonen and Bertling (2013) who 
reported positive relation between OCT accuracy and math test scores, both on individual- and 
country-level. However, it is worthy to note, that only after the correction for overclaiming66 this latter 
correlation achieved significance (from 0.17 to 0.58) and that the correction did not affect the 
individual-level correlation (0.45 unadjusted, 0.44 adjusted). 
In other studies both accuracy and bias indices were related to IQ measures (accuracy- r~0.50, bias- 
r~0.20; Paulhus et al., 2003; Paulhus & Harms, 2004). Paulhus and Harms (2004) interpreted that more 
intelligent participants had higher accuracy due to their greater knowledge and cognitive ability and 
that they had higher bias because of “overgeneralised cognitive confidence”. This line of 
argumentation was supported by Kuncel and co-authors (2012) who proposed that OCT was related 
to associative memory hence more knowledgeable people should yield higher accuracy and higher bias 
indices due to overgeneralisation of the associations from their long-term memory67. The results 
presented by Bensch and co-workers (2017) where IQ (crystallised) correlated not only with OCT but 
 
64 Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test- a popular test for assessing richness of vocabulary. 
65 Scholastic Assessment Test- a popular standardized test for college admissions in the USA. 
66 To this end a following measure was calculated: mean rating for reals minus mean rating for foils (cf. Atir et 
al., 2015). 
67 “(…) “memory is associative and people with more knowledge are more likely to have many associations. One 
likely consequence is that knowledgeable people are more likely to have legitimate but inaccurate recognition 
for foil items” (p. 107).” (Kuncel et al., 2012) 
109 
 
also with a overconfidence measure (r=0.46) may point to such metacognitive explanations of OCT 
scores. 
However, this “associative” theory was questioned by other evidence, e.g. Muller (2019) points that 
the evidence for OCT-intelligence relation is limited, whereas in the work by Hulur et alii (2011) 
overclaiming was not related to IQ (both fluid and crystallised) which pushed the authors to a 
conclusion that indeed foils functioned “as intended” as they are not measure of e.g. similar sounding 
overgeneralisation, resulting in a memory bias of false recognition but a measure of positivity bias. 
Similarly, Franzen and Mader (2019) obtained a negative relation between IQ test and overclaiming 
tendency. This result corresponds to the result obtained by Bishop and colleagues (1986) where the 
more a person knew about a subject, the less likely she was to give an opinion about a fictitious political 
issue. Likewise, Paulhus and Dubois (2014) found that OCT accuracy is positively related to final school 
grades (r=0.37), whereas OCT bias is negatively related to them (r=-0.18)68, namely that again 
participants with higher knowledge overclaimed less. 
On the other hand, null results also appeared in the field where no relation between OCT bias and 
objective or self-report measures of intelligence, ability, etc. was found: Bing et al. (2011) reported no 
relation between GPA, ACT69 and OCT bias, Musch et al. (2012) found that bias did not correlate with 
discrepancy between self-report and objective ability test, as indicated by the residuals between self-
ratings and Abitur70 results, in other words OCT bias failed to moderate this relation. 
Interestingly, there is also certain knowledge lacuna regarding whether self-perceived and objective 
knowledge have similar or different relation to OCT indices. Atir and colleagues (2015) found that both 
types of measures (self-reported and objectively measured) predict a positive relation between 
knowledge and bias (more knowledge, more bias). Moreover, both types of measures do it to a similar 
degree in case of effect size, there is also a preliminary evidence than their influence is at least in part 
independent from each other as both regression coefficients were significant when entered into a 
regression equation. However, Van Prooijen and Krouwel (2019) obtained relation between OCQ bias 
to self-perceived (0.11), but not actual (test-measured) political knowledge. As only a handful of 
studies included both types of measures it is impossible to inform this discussion further. However, 
the PISA dataset gives opportunity to compare relation between both self-reported and objective 
assessments of within-domain knowledge with OCT indices.  
The above review leaves us with two divergent predictions: one that OCT scores are mainly driven by 
overgeneralisations of existent knowledge leading to false recognitions (memory bias hypothesis), 
other that these scores depend on metacognitive abilities to monitor and control one’s knowledge 
(metacognitive hypothesis). The former predicts that participants scoring higher on knowledge, ability 
or intelligence measures would have higher scores on both accuracy and bias OCT indices in 
comparison to participants scoring lower on these measures (e.g. Atir et al., 2015; Kuncel et al., 2012; 
Paulhus & Harms, 2004). According to e.g. Dunlop and colleagues (2017) and Paulhus (2011) it can be 
assumed that more knowledgeable participants accumulated more knowledge, hence they have more 
illusions of alluring familiarity that propels them to claim familiarity with foils. Simply put, they know 
more so they have more associations and hence more occasions to commit an error of false familiarity. 
According to many researchers this account explains the relation between years of education, 
openness and overclaiming tendencies (Dunlop et al., 2017; Muller, 2019).  
 
68 Paulhus suggested interpretation in the line of self-enhancement theory as a result of “narcissistic self-
destructiveness”. 
69 American College Testing- a popular standardized test used for college admissions in the USA. 
70 High-school final exam in Germany. The equivalent of Polish or Austrian Matura. 
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On the other hand, Atir and co-workers (2015) theorised that this pattern of results may also emerge 
as a result of motivated “confirmation-biased” memory search or as an outcome of activated 
expectations about one’s knowledge. Inflating one’s perception of knowledge, e.g. due to 
experimental manipulation, leads to inflated rate of false alarms (Atir et al., 2015). The exact 
mechanism is not known, but it may be explained in the light of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; 
Ajzen, 1985; 1991). According to this theory perceiving a given situation as easy leads to development 
of domain-specific self-efficacy that may contribute to overclaiming in a way of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: “I know a lot, so I should also know that”. This account is additionally corroborated by the 
fact that indeed relation between knowledge and overclaiming is domain-specific (Atir et al., in 
preparation)71. 
The “metacognitive abilities” account predicts that more knowledgeable responders should have 
higher OCT accuracy, but lower OCT bias in comparison to other participants, exactly as in the study of 
Dunlop and others (2019) where bias (c-measured) was related to providing opinions on bogus and 
obscure statements in a test of political knowledge while accuracy was related negatively to provide 
such opinions. This account is based on the findings showing that OCT accuracy index is a valid measure 
of one’s genuine knowledge/ability and that bias is low in highly competent participants due to their 
supreme abilities to search one’s memory or to inhibit the alluring foils (Atir et al., in preparation; 
Stanovich & Cunningham, 1992; Stanovich & West, 1989).  
In line of this account would be also findings relating OCT bias with fake news gullibility and 
susceptibility to populist political claims (Pennycook & Rand, 2020; Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). 
This could mean that overclaimers may just have a very low threshold to accept “anything” as a signal 
(valid news, existing notion, etc.). However, this claim is doubtful in the light of the alleged domain-
specificity of OCT (Atir et al., 2015), especially accounting for low cross-domain correlations for OCT 
indices, e.g. Calsyn and others (2001) found that overclaiming estate agencies names and political 
issues was only modestly correlated (r=0.27), but overclaiming agencies names and scientific terms 
was practically not correlated (r=0.08) and Franzen and Mader (2019) reported low correlation 
between two versions of their OCT task (r=0.20). These findings seem to indicate that there is no 
“overclaiming trait” that would predict yielding large OCT bias in every domain. 
Additionally to the mentioned studies presenting different relations between measures of competence 
and OCT indices there is also a large body of studies showing null results- no relation between OCT 
indices and knowledge/intelligence/ability of participants was achieved e.g. by Bing et al., 2011, Hulur 
et al., 2011, Jerrim et al., 2019 or Musch et al., 2012.  
Disentangling between contradictory evidence is not possible without a set of dedicated experimental 
studies, however, in case of the PISA 2012 database it is possible to test some of the hypotheses that 
would indirectly provide some initial evidence on the viability of one of the above hypotheses. Namely, 
a correlation between math ability, certain self-report characteristics and OCT indices (bias and 
accuracy) will be calculated in order to assess whether (and if, how) general knowledge (as indicated 
by math test score and self-reports) is related to OCT indices. To this end three self-report scales, self-
efficacy, openness to problem-solving and perseverance, were chosen basing on the relation between 
these traits and knowledge/cognitive ability, as suggested by the literature (Furnham & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2006; Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf & Buhner, 2012; Zhang & Ziegler, 2015). In this way, 
these self-reports serve as additional measures of math ability, widening the scope of analysis. This 
enables to test following hypotheses: 
 
71 As it is between self-efficacy and objective knowledge (e.g. Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019). 
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Hypothesis 2: Math ability, as measured by the PISA test, will be positively related to OCT accuracy 
index and negatively to OCT bias index. 
Hypothesis 3: Traits related to math ability, self-efficacy, openness and perseverance, will be 
positively related to OCT accuracy index and negatively to OCT bias index. 
Confirming both hypotheses would support the “metacognitive monitoring and control” proposal (e.g. 
Dunlop et al., 2019) in contrast to the “overgeneralised associations”/”confirmatory bias/memory 
bias” prediction (e.g. Kuncel et al., 2012; Paulhus, 2011). It would also put in doubt the self-
perception/self-efficacy explanations (Atir et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the ample PISA 2012 dataset gives an opportunity to compare relation between self-
reported and objectively measured knowledge on one side and OCT scores on the other. Under the 
memory bias account there should be no difference between such relations, however, according to 
the motivated bias account self-assessments should be distorted by the same processes as OCT, but 
objective tests should be absent from them. Hence, if the memory bias account is generally correct it 
could be expected that: 
Hypothesis 4: Self-report math ability assessments will be related to OCT indices similarly and to a 
similar magnitude as objective measures of math ability. 
Answering the hypotheses presented above will help to shed light on the theories attributing 
overclaiming to memory-based mechanisms. 
5.2.3 Overclaiming as result of deliberate response manipulating (faking, impression 
management, lying, etc.) 
Overclaiming can be also result of deliberate response manipulation, be it faking, impression 
management or simple lying. However, research results pointing to such relation are mixed at best.  
Bensch and colleagues (2019) provided evidence that OCT is not related to experimentally-induced 
faking (conscious distortion) and were also surprised that OCT bias correlated negatively with faking 
good (r= -0.15, this was also significant in a regression equation with beta= -0.16). However, 
elimination of just three participants with a maximal overclaiming score resulted in non-significance of 
this parameter. Similar results were presented by Feeney and Goffin (2015) who showed that OCT did 
not correlate with self-reported faking tendencies and only weakly correlated with the measure of self-
report distortion called Residualised Individual Change Score (RICS)72.  
On the other hand, Dunlop and colleagues (2019) showed that bias index from OCT was correlated 
with positive self-presentation behaviours during job interview (r=0.23) but accuracy index was not 
related to them. Moreover, they have also found a relation with other measures of faking- RICS and 
within-person correlation (WPC)73. The results provided by Ludeke and Makransky (2016) and Muller 
and Moshagen (2019a) pointed to no relation between OCT and faking, but the results presented by 
Bing and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that OCT might be used as an indicator of faking tendencies. 
On the other hand, Joseph, Berry and Deshpande (2009) found a negative relation between self-
reported frequency of unethical conduct at work and OCT bias (r= -0.21; more ethical conduct 
correlated with more overclaiming), meaning that overclaiming participants had tendencies to inflate 
 
72 RICS are the residuals obtained by regressing self-report scores from applicant condition (high motivation to 
fake good) on the same participant’s scores from honest condition (low motivation to fake good) (Feeney & 
Goffin, 2015). The measure is a widely accepted indicator of faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). 
73 WPC is simply a correlation coefficient between two assessment conditions, e.g. fake good and honest 
responding. Low WPC is interpreted as an indicator of high faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). 
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their reported ethical behaviour. Probably the pattern of results is context-dependent and only job-
relevant OCQs can serve to measure faking tendencies that should manifest in higher bias indices in 
faking conditions (Dunlop et al., 2019; Feeney & Goffin, 2015). This line of argumentation was also 
supported by Paulhus (2011) who suggested that OCT is more sensitive to context and content than 
previously thought. 
Other evidence on the relation between OCT and deliberate response manipulation is also mixed. 
Paulhus and Harms (2004) found a correlation between bias and peer-ratings of bragging and egotism 
(r ~ 0.30), whereas Franzen and Mader (2019) found no relation between OCT scores and intrusive 
questions, regarding e.g. shoplifting, excessive alcohol consumption, etc (similar results in Randall & 
Fernandes, 1991). Ludeke and Makransky (2016) also showed absent convergent validity evidence for 
the OCT and faking as it did not correlate with the self- versus peer-ratings discrepancies. Finally, no 
correlation was found between cheating in an experimental paradigm (coin tossing, dictator’s game) 
and OCT indices (Muller, 2019, Study 2; Muller and Moshagen, 2019) nor between OCT scores and 
cheating in a knowledge test (Steger et al., 2020). This lack of relation to seemingly valid indicators of 
faking seriously undermines OCT utility and questions its validity to measure impression management. 
Experimental evidence against linking overclaiming and impression management was provided by Atir 
and colleagues (2015) who manipulated participants’ knowledge about the presence of foils in 
overclaiming task. Warnings reduced the overall bias and had no effect on accuracy (as in Paulhus et 
al., 2003) but did not have any influence on the relation between participants’ declared knowledge 
and OCT bias, thus undermining the probability that overclaiming is due to conscious response 
manipulation. 
Due to lack of needed data in the PISA 2012 database the hypothesis of OCT as a result of conscious 
response manipulation (faking, cheating) cannot be verified here. Nevertheless, in the light of the 
research review presented in the above chapters it is unlikely that a large proportion of respondents 
(if anyone at all) would engage in this behaviour in a low-stakes educational assessment as PISA. Thus, 
this mechanism will not be commented further in this work. 
5.2.4 Overclaiming as result of non-deliberate, motivated response biases (e.g. self-
enhancement tendencies)  
Having commented on memory biases and impression management as two potential mechanisms of 
overclaiming it is time to proceed to the two remaining ones: overclaiming as a result of self-enhancing 
tendencies, namely overclaiming as a result of motivated processes leading to overly positive 
presentation in self-report, and overclaiming as a result of non-motivated processes, related to 
response styles (RS) and careless/insufficient effort responding (C/IER). 
Let at first deal with the most popular theory that OCT scores are mainly driven by motivated biases in 
the type of self-enhancement bias and other biases of self-perception resulting in an overly positive 
image yielded in self-report (positivity bias). The vast majority of studies investigating this relation used 
measures of Dark Triad personality traits (especially narcissism), self-esteem inventories and SDR 
scales to indicate their covariance. 
Narcissistic participants are predicted to yield overly positive images in a non-deliberate way even in 
low-stakes measurement contexts (Gabriel, Critelli & Ee, 1994; Gebauer et al., 2012; John & Robins, 
1994; Luo et al., 2019; Maaß & Ziegler, 2017; Raskin, 1991), however, the research evidence on 
relations between this personality trait and OCT is mixed (review: Grosz, Loesch & Back, 2017). Most 
of the studies found only small correlations (in the range of r~0.10-0.30) between self-report 
narcissism measures and OCT. In example, Paulhus and Williams (2002) presented results where bias 
113 
 
(c-measured) correlated 0.17 with narcissism (NPI-measured74) and did not correlate with 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy. OCT accuracy index did not correlate with the Dark Triad traits at 
all. Similarly, Paulhus et al. (2003) found an NPI-OCT bias correlation of 0.35 (very similar results in 
Paulhus & Harms (2004)). It is interesting that the narcissism measure (NPI) did not correlate with OCT 
bias in music domain, whereas it did correlate in academic domain (r=0.18). It may point to a 
conclusion that only the domains that are relevant or instrumental for constructing positive self-image 
are biased by overclaiming, whereas domains perceived as unimportant and/or irrelevant for self-
image may not be susceptible to self-favouring distortion (see also Dunlop et al., 2019). Gebauer and 
others (2012) confirmed this domain-specificity by showing that agentic narcissists overclaimed in 
agentic domains (e.g. academic knowledge), whereas communal narcissists overclaimed in communal 
domains (e.g. humanitarian aid, childcare). Other evidence for the relation between OCT and self-
enhancement were brought by Luo and others (2019) who obtained correlations in the range of 0.20-
0.30 between OCT bias and various narcissism measures (NPI, CNI75, NGS76) and also a 0.35 correlation 
with better-than-average task. On the other hand, Bensch et al. (2019) reported that OCT bias and 
narcissism correlated only 0.13, and no correlation was obtained between OCT and Machiavellianism 
nor psychopathy (all measured with the Short Dark Triad (SD3) self-report scale). Altogether, the 
evidence for a relation between OCT and narcissism is mixed (Muller, 2019)- some studies found it 
(Gebauer et al., 2012; Grosz et al., 2017; Paulhus et al., 2003; Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002), whereas others did not (Bensch et al., 2017; Dunlop et al., 2017; Ludeke & Makransky, 
2016). 
Interesting account was presented by Grosz and others (2017) who reported that the bias index from 
OCT was related to social-dominance assertive narcissism and to intellectual-ability assertive 
narcissism, but not to other types of narcissism. What is more, the relation established was very small 
(r=0.12). This finding relates to the results of Anderson et al. (2012) that claimed that overclaiming 
serves to win or maintain a social position, but not to bolster self-esteem. Mind also that the same 
aims are commonly related to grandiose narcissism, which is positively related to self-perceived but 
negatively to actual knowledge (Zajenkowski, Czarna, Szymaniak & Dufner, 2019). This is probably this 
part of variance that links narcissism, overconfidence, bullshitting and overclaiming. Furthermore, alike 
OCT and response biases in general, also narcissism was linked to low “cognitive complexity” (Paulhus 
& John, 1998; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995), providing yet another common link between the various 
effects of response biases. 
Similarly mixed evidence exists for the relation between self-esteem and OCT. Paulhus reported a 0.30 
zero-order correlation between the RSES scores and OCQ bias, which resulted in a 0.22 coefficient in a 
regression equation with narcissism (NPI-measured) also included (Paulhus et al., 2003). On the other 
hand, Mesmer-Magnus, Viswesvaran, Deshpande and Joseph (2006) and Kam and others (2015) found 
a negative correlation between OCT bias index and self-esteem (r around -0.16). On the other hand 
Tracy and others (2009) reported that OCT bias correlated (r=0.14) with self-aggrandisement 
narcissism (NPI-measured) but not with self-esteem (RSES-measured). Hence, evidence for relations 
between OCT bias and self-esteem are scarce and inconclusive, but pointing to rather small relation, if 
any at all. 
Also no relations were found between OCT bias and other personality traits often linked with SDR. For 
example, Paulhus and others (2003) reported insignificant correlation between Snyder’s self-
 
74 NPI= Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988). One of the most commonly 
used self-report measures of narcissism as a personality trait. 
75 Communal Narcissism Inventory (Gebauer et al., 2012) 
76 Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale (Rosenthal, Hooley & Steshenko, 2007) 
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monitoring scale and OCQ bias, whereas Sassenrath (2019) found no relation between OCQ bias and 
the Interpersonal Relations Inventory (questionnaire measuring empathic responses, interpersonal 
relations, etc.). In the same vein, neither Schoderbek and Deshpande (1996) nor Randall and Fernandes 
(1991) reported relation between OCT bias and the Ruch and Newstrom’s scale measuring ethical 
conduct. Additionally, Lee (2016), Muller and Moshagen (2019) and Steger et al. (2020) did not glean 
evidence for any relation between OCT indices and Honesty-Humility dimension from the HEXACO 
personality inventory. 
Despite the hard critique received by SDR scales they were the most often used indicator of relation 
between OCT scores and overly positive response bias. However, most of the studies found very scarce 
evidence for the relation between the two measures. For example, Bishop et al (1986) found no 
relation between answering to fictitious issues and a summed MCSDS score. Ludeke and Makransky 
(2016) reported no correlations with the SDE subscale from the BIDR. Franzen and Mader (2019) 
revealed no relation between short versions of the MCSDS and OCT scores, alike Sassenrath (2019) 
who failed to find any relation between OCQ bias and the BIDR subscales (SDE and IM). Again no 
correlation between the MCSDS (short version) and OCT was reported by Calsyn et al. (2001). Barber 
and others (2013) correlated both the MCSDS and the BIDR with OCT and found them unrelated. 
Other studies mainly reported low or very low correlations between OCT and various SDR scales: below 
0.20 with the IM subscale from the BIDR (Schoderbek & Deshpande, 1996), 0.15 with communal 
management from the BIDR (Tonković et al., 2011), 0.11-0.18 with the MCSDS and the BIDR (the SDE 
subscale; Randall & Fernandes, 1991), a very small (r=0.18) relation of the MCSDS and the BIDR (the 
SDE subscale only) to bias (c-measured) was found by Dunlop and co-workers (2017). Another scale 
used in this study, SDS-17 (Stoeber, 2001) correlated with bias (c-measured) (r=0.24), but not with 
accuracy (d’). Mesmer-Magnus et al. (2006) even obtained negative correlation (r= -0.14) between OCT 
bias and the SDE from the BIDR pointing to a counter-theoretical relation of more overclaiming with 
less self-deceptive enhancement. Similarly, Muller and Moshagen (2019) also obtained negative 
relation between OCT and the IM from the BIDR (r= -0.17), which they interpreted as an indication that 
this subscale measures honesty, rather than proclivity to bias responses (cf. Uziel, 2010; Zettler et al., 
2015). 
Slightly higher correlations were also noted, e.g. Paulhus et al. (2003) reported no correlation between 
OCT indices (neither accuracy, nor bias) and the IM & SDD subscales, but found a moderate correlation 
(r=0.30) between the SDE subscale of the BIDR and OCT bias. Very similar result was obtained by Musch 
et al. (2012), where the German version of the BIDR was used, and Paulhus and Harms (2004)- in both 
studies OCT bias (c-measured) correlated only with the SDE, not the IM (r~0.30). Surprisingly, the 
reversed pattern was discovered by Bensch and co-workers (2017) where OCT bias index correlated 
with IM (r=0.35), but not SDE (r~0). The authors related this unusual pattern to high correlation 
between the scales in this particular study, however, did not offer any predictions why this inter-
dimensional relation was so high. 
The above results show little relation between OCT and typical measures of motivated response biases: 
Dark Triad personality self-reports, SDR scales, etc. However, it is possible that OCT is driven by self-
enhancement tendencies but that the measures used to capture these tendencies simply fail to do 
that and cannot be treated as valid indicators of positivity bias. Tonković and colleagues (2011) argued 
that it is the content that drives the relation between the BIDR subscales and OCT, because of the 
egoistic, agentic content of these subscales, e.g. bragging knowledge or skills. In this vein of 
interpretation any relation between SDR scales and OCT is only secondary, driven by content- and 
context-dependent characteristics of the OCT version and the whole study. This interpretation would 
thus suggest that any relation between OCT scores and SDR scales is only spurious. 
115 
 
It is worthy to gauge if better77 assessment of self-enhancement tendencies can be achieved by 
measuring importance and desirability of a given domain for participants. There is evidence that skills 
that are more valued are more overclaimed (Paulhus et al., 2003; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008). 
Furthermore, the research by John and Robins (1993) and Vazire (2010) suggests that accuracy of self-
assessment should be higher in unimportant domains rather than important, because in case of 
important domains it is clouded by motivational factors (cf. Zell & Krizan, 2014). A certain confirmation 
of this views was provided by Gebauer, Sedikides and Schrade (2017) who conducted a study in which 
Christians overclaimed more on topics related to their faith (e.g. Bible, saints), less on communal 
topics, and did not overclaim on agentic topics.  
A handy and valid measure of item/domain desirability is self-reported perceived trait desirability 
(Philips & Clancy, 1972). It is a stronger predictor of overclaiming than other domain characteristics, as 
presented by Dunlop and others (2019). A broader theoretical and methodological framework related 
to the trait desirability hypothesis, called ideographically desirable responding (IDR), was proposed 
and corroborated by Ludeke, Weisberg and DeYoung (2013; see also Sinha & Krueger, 1998). It was 
showed that IDR was positively related to SDR (BIDR-measured) and self-esteem (RSES-measured), 
thus confirming the convergent validity of the method. IDR is thought related to the centrality and 
importance of a given trait for a certain participant, thus more desirable domains/topics should be 
more overclaimed in OCT (Dunlop et al., 2019). Similarly, less desirable traits should be overclaimed 
less, in example, MacIntyre, Noels and Clement (1997) showed that respondents with high anxiety 
towards a school subject tended to underestimate their skills, whereas the opposite was true for those 
with low anxiety towards this subject. 
In the PISA 2012 database there are no commonly used measures of SDR/self-enhancement 
tendencies, like e.g. SDR scales, Dark Triad inventories or classical self-esteem questionnaires. 
Similarly, no direct measures of item/domain desirability were used. However, proxy measures could 
be provided through the use of other scales that should code importance of a given domain for 
participants. Such scales present in the mentioned dataset are e.g. intrinsic motivation for 
mathematics, instrumental motivation for mathematics, subjective norms about learning 
mathematics, intentions about future math education, math anxiety (reversed relation), and various 
scales related to math and math-related behaviours. If OCT bias scores are in fact driven by self-
enhancement tendencies then these scales should correlate positively with them. Moreover, math 
anxiety and other scales coding negative attitudes towards mathematics should be related negatively 
to OCT bias. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5: Scales related to the perceived importance, effort and joy of learning mathematics will 
be related positively to OCT bias. 
Hypothesis 6: Scales related negatively to the perceived importance, effort and joy, e.g. math anxiety, 
will be related negatively to OCT bias. 
Thus, if the self-enhancement tendencies are responsible for OCT bias scores pupils for whom math is 
important and central should overclaim more on the PISA 2012 OCT. 
There is also evidence that pupils motivated to learn mathematics, but struggling to achieve good 
results, may be especially prone to develop self-enhancement tendencies. Such students may feel 
threatened by the discrepancy between their expected and achieved outcomes and resort to self-
enhancement in order to save their favourable self-image. This students may also develop attributional 
theories that would e.g. put the blame of their failures on external criteria or lack of will to succeed  
 
77 In comparison to, allegedly unsuitable for this task, SDR or narcissism scales. 
116 
 
(the “I could if I wanted to” attitude). Such attitudes should correlate positively with OCT bias and do 
not correlate or even correlate negatively with OCT accuracy (see Griffith et al., 2006). Thus: 
Hypothesis 7: Scales measuring perceptions of success control will be related negatively to OCT bias 
(less control, more bias) and positively to OCT accuracy (less control, less accuracy). 
Moreover, self-enhancement is related not only to “pumping up” virtues but also to diminishing vices. 
Hence, on the basis of this account, it can be predicted that self-reports of negative phenomena, such 
as truancy from school, disciplinary problems or negative school attitudes, should be correlated 
negatively with OCT bias: 
Hypothesis 8: Reporting negative school-related phenomena will be related negatively to OCT bias 
(more negative phenomena reported, less bias). 
The above relation was not found by Jerrim and others (2019) for the same PISA data from the Anglo-
Saxon countries, here it will be tried to confirm their findings on a different sample and with a slightly 
different analytical approach.  
PISA dataset gives a rather unique opportunity to contrast and compare data on similar phenomena 
stemming from separate sources of information: school students and school principals. Of course the 
overlap of the two questionnaires is not great but the answers from both sources can be compared in 
case of school disciplinary climate. It is predicted that: 
Hypothesis 9: The degree of divergence between students’ and principals’ opinions on school 
disciplinary climate will be positively related to OCT bias (more divergence, more bias). 
Finally, also holding respondents accountable for their answers is related to lower positivity bias in 
responses (e.g. Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin & Hardin, 2002). However, in the PISA 
study the participating students cannot be held accountable as it is a low-stakes and anonymous 
assessment. Nevertheless, information on the school policy in using achievement data in 
accountability procedures could be used as a proxy for school’s attitude towards assessments, PISA 
included, in general (Vonkova et al., 2018). Is it treated seriously? Or is it treated lightly, or even as an 
unnecessary nuisance, a whim of country authorities? It is predicted that: 
Hypothesis 10: Using assessment data in accountable procedures will correlate negatively with OCT 
bias. 
Hence, the above hypotheses are aimed to test the assumption that OCT scores are driven by 
motivated tendencies to present oneself in an overly positive light, e.g. as a consequence of self-
enhancement or SDR. 
5.2.5 Overclaiming as result of response styles and careless/insufficient effort responding   
The last mechanism that was suggested to play role in OCT scores emergence is careless/insufficient 
responding (C/IER). This prediction was voiced by many researchers (e.g. Bing et al., 2011; Bensch et 
al., 2019; Muller & Moshagen, 2019a) but few took the effort to find an empirical support for such 
claims. 
However, there are several studies that managed to gather some interesting evidence. Barber and 
others (2013) showed a substantial correlation between OCT bias (measured as averaged foils scores) 
and bogus and IRIs items (r=0.45 and r=0.51) pointing to a relation between OCT bias and C/IER. The 
researchers also obtained small correlation (r~0.15) between OCT bias and acute insomnia, sleepiness 
and self-control depletion (all measured by self-reports). No relation to chronic insomnia was found, 
though. Here sleepiness (sleep deprivation) was treated as a factor driving C/IER and, consequentially, 
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related to higher overclaiming due to lowered self-control and cognitive resources78 (Barber et al., 
2013). 
Similarly, Ludeke and Makransky (2016) found that OCT bias is related to Mahalanobis distance 
(r=0.15) and person fit (perfit) measures79 (r=0.45) and it is unrelated to contra-logical survey errors80. 
The researchers interpreted this rather high correlation between perfit measures and bias as an 
indicator that overclaiming may be due to C/IER. All C/IER measures (Mahalanobis, perfit, survey 
errors) were negatively correlated with accuracy (d’-measured) further corroborating the hypothesis 
of importance of C/IER on OCT scores. Calsyn and Winter (1999) used a similar measure of counter-
logical survey errors and also did not find any relation between it and OCT bias, but found a small and 
negative correlation between survey errors and OCT accuracy (r= -.16). 
Jerrim et al. (2019) did not calculate any C/IER indices but tried to show an indirect evidence that 
overclaiming is not related to C/IER, by showing zero correlation between truancy and self-reported 
test effort with the overclaiming index. As C/IER often causes unrelated measures to correlate with 
each other (Carden, Camper & Holtzman, 2018) Jerrim took this analysis as an indirect evidence of 
C/IER relation to OCT scores. Failure to find such correlations enabled Jerrim and co-workers to claim 
that OCT was not related to C/IER. 
Another response bias that may be a potential mechanism of OCT scores are response styles (RS; Jerrim 
et al., 2019). The evidence on relation between OCT and RS is even scarcer than in case of C/IER. To 
the best knowledge of the author there is only one study analysing this relation- Dunlop et al. (2019) 
found that a crude extreme response style (ERS) measure (count of extreme responses) correlated 
with OCT accuracy (r=0.15) and bias (r=0.23). This would show that OCT scores and RS share some 
variance but not enough to claim that both are effects of the same mechanism. Another study that 
used OCT and RS together is Pokropek (2014) but no relations between the two measures were tested 
there81. The study by Pokropek, Khorramdel and von Davier (in preparation) also applied both of these 
measures together and found a positive relation between RS and OCT bias, which seemed more 
pronounced in case of ERS than MRS. However, the relation between OCT and RS was not directly 
measured and was not the focal point of the analyses performed.  
Some indirect evidence linking OCT and C/IER and RS stems from twin studies: both RS (Melchers, 
Plieger, Montag, Reuter, Spinath & Hahn, 2018) and OCT (Luo et al., 2019) were proved to have around 
40% of variance due to genetics, few % to shared environment and more than 50% due to non-shared 
environment (see also similar results on acquiescence response style; Kam, Schermer, Harris & Vernon, 
2013). More research is needed to confirm and interpret these similar patterns. 
Nevertheless, the existing evidence on the relations between C/IER, RS and OCT is very scarce. From 
the ample research on C/IER and RS there are many indices and methods that could be used to bring 
the OCT-C/IER/RS alleged relation to a more thorough test than it has been done to date. In this study 
 
78 Curiously, these results pointed also to lowered scores on the SDR scales used, showing a lower cognitive 
control-lower SDR relation, whereas other studies pointed to a reversed relation where low cognitive control 
was related to higher SDR/self-favouring responding (e.g. Paulhus et al., 1987; Robins & Beer, 2019). 
79 Both Mahalanobis distance and the family of person fit indices are used to detect outliers or to identify 
aberrant data patterns, namely to identify participants whose data should be treated with extra care due to 
possible distortion or error (e.g. Conijn, Emons & Sijtsma, 2014). Both group of indices is widely used in the C/IER 
research (Meade & Craig, 2012; Niessen, Meijer & Tendeiro, 2016). 
80 Indicating that one does not use computer at all and then indicating that one uses Internet for 2 hours a day is 
an example of this kind of survey error. 
81 Save that the VIF statistic for the regression model analysed in the paper was given, suggesting that there were 
no problems with collinearity between the predictors (RS and OCT measures). This evidence suggest that 
correlations between them were not very high (Pokropek, 2014). 
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a wide and diversified range of C/IER indices will be used to establish their relation with OCT scores. 
Hence: 
Hypothesis 11: Careless/insufficient effort responding indices will be correlated positively to OCT bias 
and negatively to OCT accuracy indexes. 
An additional analysis of the relation between fatigue, C/IER and OCT will capitalise on PISA’s missing-
by-design structure, where scales are embedded inside of forms and forms are rotated across 
participants. In different forms specific scales are put in different order, hence some scales are 
responded to at the beginning of the questionnaire session in one form and on the end of the session 
in other forms. This design allows to compare OCT and C/IER indices in two conditions differed by the 
level of fatigue: low, when overclaiming scale was used at the beginning of a form and high, when it 
was placed near the end of a form. Thus: 
Hypothesis 11a: OCT bias will be larger and OCT accuracy smaller in high fatigue condition than in low 
fatigue condition. 
Confirming hypothesis 11 and 11a will provide evidence in favour of the theory of overclaiming as a 
result of C/IER. Other pattern will yield evidence disconfirming this theory. 
In order to examine the relation between RS and OCT the newly developed RS models will be used 
(Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014; Khorramdel et al., 2019; Pokropek et al., in preparation). Extreme 
response style (ERS) is predicted to be related positively to both OCT indices (bias and accuracy) (as 
hinted by Pokropek et al., in preparation). Thus: 
Hypothesis 12: Extreme response styles (ERS) will be positively related to OCT accuracy and OCT bias. 
The above analyses will inform about the nature of relations between C/IER, RS and OCT using a wide 
variety of indices and also some newly developed models basing on multidimensional IRT models that 
offer promise to accurately model the RS variance in self-reports. 
5.2.6 Structural validity as an indicator of OCT mechanisms 
Another potential source of evidence on OCT’s nature is its structural validity. The key indicator is its 
dimensionality, namely whether the scale is uni-, bi- or multidimensional which could be an indicator 
of number and kind of processes laying in the foundation of OCT scores. For example, if OCT is driven 
mainly by self-enhancement or C/IER/RS all items should be correlated with each other and, even if 
two factors emerge (one for reals, one for foils), they should share a large proportion of their variance 
(Hulur et al., 2011). However, if OCT is driven by memory biases two relatively unrelated factors should 
emerge: one for foils, one for reals, basing on the different cognitive mechanisms predicted to be 
engaged in responding to reals and foils. It may be surprising, but among all the previous studies on 
OCT only Pokropek (2014) analysed OCT scale’s psychometric structure. The results obtained yielded 
that reals and foils formed separate factors. However, no further analyses were performed as the study 
had different focus and it was only a preliminary conference paper. 
Hence, there is no firm indication regarding OCT scales factorial structure. Some indirect evidence does 
exist, though it is based on the correlation between OCT bias and accuracy indices. In the study of 
Dunlop et al. (2019) c and d’ correlated 0.27, but in Ziegler et al. (2013) they were correlated -0.26 
(populational sample) and -0.74 (student sample). It is important to note that the sign of the 
correlation is sometimes reversed. This is due to multiplying the c parameter by -1 in order to have 
higher values indicating more bias (e.g. Dunlop et al., 2019; Muller & Moshagen, 2018). This 
information has to be taken into consideration when analysing correlations between OCT scores, 
however it obviously influences only the sign, not the magnitude of coefficients. Other studies also 
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yielded substantial correlations between the two indices, e.g. in the study by Bertsch and Pesta (2009) 
the correlation between d’ and c amounted to -0.49, in Muller and Moshagen (2018) d’ and c 
correlated -0.46 and in Muller and Moshagen (2019a) this correlation was only -0.20 (c timed by -1). 
In Mackinnon and Wang (2020) this relation amounted to -0.44 and in Hughes and Beer (2012) it was 
0.43 (SDT indexes d’ and c were used but no info is present whether they also have changed the sign 
of c). 
However, analysing such a correlation conveys certain problems. First of all, there is no firm evidence 
how c and d' correlation should be interpreted and whether it is interpretable at all. As the indices are 
created using the same variables (hit and false alarm rate), a correlation is expected. However, there 
is no specific correlation size expected nor specified as a coefficient in practically any size can be 
(theoretically) expected (Dunlop et al., 2017). Moreover, the cross-study and cross-sample stability of 
this correlation is problematic, e.g. Ziegler et al. (2013) found huge differences in its value from one 
study to another. As there are no systematic analyses of this topic it is impossible to say what 
differences between the studies caused this difference in case of the Ziegler et al. (2013) research and 
in general what measurement characteristics are related to certain values of this coefficient (Ludeke 
& Makransky, 2016). Additionally, the indices based on small number of items (e.g. only on reals or 
foils) are inherently in peril of low reliability (Dunlop et al., 2017). 
Moreover, there is also a small amount of information regarding correlations between foils and reals 
themselves. In one of the few studies that shared these values the inter-item correlations were not 
very high (r in the range of 0.28 to 0.50; Franzen & Mader, 2019). On the other hand, Joseph et al. 
(2009) reported a quite high Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 for an OCQ consisted only of foils on different 
lay topics. In a similar OCQ version, but this time consisting of foils in 40%, Randall and Fernandes 
(1991) reported a Cronbach’s alpha calculated from both reals and foils amounting to 0.70.   
To sum up- it is difficult to pose any specific hypothesis regarding OCT psychometric structure due to 
scarcity of evidence. However, following Pokropek (2014) who performed initial analyses on the same 
dataset it is assumed that: 
Hypothesis 13: OCT items will form two correlated factors: one for reals and one for foils. 
This analysis is largely an exploratory one as lack of informative results prevents forming more specific 
confirmatory hypotheses. However, the exploration of this topic may bring interesting information on 
overclaiming mechanisms.  
5.2.7 Social norms and overclaiming: school-level analysis 
Response biases are also strongly related to the perceived social norms and even to culture in a given 
society (Kemmelmeier, 2016). Relations between culture, different country-level variables and OCT 
scores were presented in dedicated publications (e.g. Fell & Koenig, 2016; 2020; Fell et al., 2019; 
Vonkova et al., 2018). However, relations between smaller groups norms and OCT are largely 
uncharted. To the best knowledge of the author such relations were analysed only by Jerrim et al. 
(2019) who observed that only a few percent of OCT variance occurred between schools, indicating 
that overclaimers are rather “evenly spread across schools”. No other school-level variables were 
analysed in their study. Proportion of OCT indices’ variance on individual- and school-level will be also 
examined in this study.  
In this work an effort will be given to explore the possible school-level covariates of overclaiming. There 
are attempts to explain response biases in the frame of the TPB (Ajzen, 1991) where social norms and 
subjective beliefs about them are important predictors of behaviour. For a 15-year-old adolescent 
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school is certainly an important source of social comparisons with teachers’ or peers’ norms and beliefs 
constituting an influential point of reference.  
A set of variables that could be used in such a school-level analysis was suggested by Vonkova and 
colleagues (2018) and, among others, included: average level of math ability level at school, average 
level of math anxiety at school, average level of self-reported math knowledge at school (e.g. math 
self-efficacy scale, math familiarity scale, etc.), male-female ratio, school type (private versus public). 
To this list a pressure on achievements can be added as a potential threatening factor arousing self-
enhancement tendencies (Fell & Koenig, 2016; 2020). It is known that pressure to succeed rises 
students’ academic cheating and faking82 (Bong, 2008). In the PISA 2012 the pressure variable was 
measured in the school principals’ questionnaire. 
Another variable that can be joined to the above list is social status, in PISA measured by a set of self-
report items in the student’s questionnaire and presented under the form of educational, social and 
cultural status index (ESCS). This variable was also rarely related to response biases, but recently Jerrim 
and others (2019) presented an analysis where ESCS covaried with OCT bias, in such a way that higher 
status predicted higher bias. Nonetheless, no explanation for this pattern was offered in that paper. It 
is possible, however, that ESCS serves as yet another “pressure” factor- students from high status 
families may be more prone to parental pressure, upward social comparisons and other factors 
compelling self-enhancement tendencies. On the basis of this evidence it can be predicted that: 
Hypothesis 14: School-level variables indicating high math abilities or high pressure to math-related 
attainments will correlate positively with OCT bias. 
Such pattern of results is suggested on the basis of SDR/self-enhancement theories that predict larger 
self-enhancement when self-esteem is threatened. In case of highly competent (and competitive) 
backgrounds, e.g. in schools with high level of math ability and/or high pressure on educational 
achievements this can be a fact due to high social expectations and social norm to know math very 
well. Moreover, in such competitive social groups success is greatly admired which may compel certain 
individuals to find a shortcut to achieve it by overclaiming (Anderman, Griesinger & Westerfield, 1998; 
Fell & Koenig, 2016; Tett & Simonet, 2011). 
Another group of school-level variables that is potentially related to OCT are scales coding possible 
rule violation and anti-social behaviours, e.g. truancy, grade repetition, disciplinary climate, sense of 
belonging to school, school-level of overclaiming, etc. Country-level rule violation was identified as a 
predictor of OCT bias in analyses performed on the PISA 2012 dataset by Fell and colleagues (2019). 
However, no school-level data was analysed by them. In this work an attempt will be made to confirm 
these findings also on the school-level using the above-listed variables as proxies for rule violations 
((e.g. low school discipline, low sense of belonging, high truancy, high grade repetition, etc.). Hence: 
Hypothesis 15: School-level rule violation will be related positively to OCT bias and negatively to OCT 
accuracy. 
Such pattern of results is predicted on the basis of the assumed higher tolerance for questionable 
moral behaviours in such social groups or lower (insufficient, ineffective) control in them that promote 
dishonest behaviours such as overclaiming (mild form of academic cheating; Fell & Koenig, 2016; see 
also Griffith & McDaniel, 2006 on “everybody fakes” attitudes). 
 
82 See also https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/february23/cheat-022305.html 
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The above analyses will offer a comprehensive, though not conclusive, review of different theories on 
mechanisms of overclaiming. The analyses will comprise both individual- and school-related variables. 
Some of the analyses planned are largely exploratory, due to scarcity of previous evidence. 
5.2.8 Correlates of overclaiming- building nomological network 
Apart from testing hypothesis informing on mechanisms of overclaiming another analysis is planned: 
building nomological network of OCT by analysing its correlates. This enables to inform future 
theoretical and empirical research on OCT and also offers predictions for future experimental studies. 
Socio-demographic variables 
First of all, relations between sociodemographic variables and OCT will be examined. One of such 
variables is gender. The evidence gathered to date offers a very mixed picture. 
Gender 
Large portion of studies reported no gender differences. Such pattern of results was found in example 
by: Calsyn & Winter (1999); Feeney & Goffin (2015); Franzen & Mader (2019); Joseph et al. (2009); 
Mesmer-Magnus et al. (2006); Paulhus & Dubois (2014); Paulhus et al. (2003); Paulhus & Petrusic 
(2010); Schoderbek & Deshpande (1996); Swami et al. (2011). Dunlop and others (2017) found gender 
differences only in one out of three studies conducted. 
However, in a number of studies using self-enhancement designs some gender differences did appear. 
In example, Furnham, Zheng and Chamorro-Premuzic (2005) identified that male participants were 
more prone to better-than-average bias regarding IQ self-assessment than female ones, whereas 
Bornholt, Goodnow and Cooney (1994) reported that men were more overconfident than women. Also 
Nuhfer and others (2017) reported that women were better at self-assessment than men, who tended 
to overestimate their abilities. Moreover, Bishop and co-workers (1986) disclosed that men claimed 
opinions on fictitious issues more often than women. Similarly, Zhang, Paulhus and Ziegler (2018) 
found that male students were more prone to scholastic cheating than female students. 
In research using OCT specifically such differences also occurred, especially in studies exploring the 
PISA 2012 dataset. More overclaiming in males was found by Jerrim et al. (2019), Fell et al. (2019) and 
Yang et al. (2019). Also in other OCT studies this pattern was encountered (e.g. Atir et al., 2015; Dunlop 
et al., 2017; Ziegler et al., 2013). However, reversed pattern, with women overclaiming more, was also 
identified (e.g. Calsyn et al., 2001; Philips & Clancy, 1972). 
This seemingly discrepant pattern of results can be expected if specific content used to construct OCT 
items will be taken under consideration. As it was made evident in the SDR research the proposed 
“types” of this behaviour were driven predominantly by agentic or communal content of SDR scales 
(Paulhus, 2002). Paulhus and John (1998) stated that women should be more susceptible to communal 
bias, whereas men should be more prone to agentic bias. There are many other research sources that 
confirm this relation (e.g. Bem, 1972; Gilligan, 1982; Helgeson, 1994; McGuire, 1968 even contended 
that women are more susceptible to what is “right” in the society, hence are more prone to communal 
bias; see also larger concerns for privacy and social approval of women survey respondents as 
evidenced by Rasinski, Willis, Baldwin & Jobe, 1994). Other factor that should be taken into account 
before analysing gender differences in OCT is gender-related desirability of a trait/domain measured 
by a given version of OCT. Paunonen (2015) offers evidence that genders indeed differ in perceived 
trait-desirability (but see Alicke, 1985, where gender differences in traits desirability and controllability 
were not found). 
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Philips and Clancy (1972) followed this line of thinking in interpreting the result obtained in their study 
were female overclaimed more, although the magnitude of the relation was rather small (Yule’s 
Q=0.15). The authors concluded that their OCT items were related to being “up on new things”- trait 
that is rated as more desirable by women than men. 
The content used in the PISA 2012 OCT involves academic skills and knowledge which is definitely a 
type of agentic content (Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008). Hence, it should predict higher overclaiming in 
male participants. However, to additionally inform the predictions it is warranted to quickly analyse 
the social image of math in Poland with a special focus on any gender-related differences. Baczko-
Dombi (2017) in her analyses pointed out that math is perceived as an important but also difficult 
school subject. Moreover, many school pupils and students do not believe that they can succeed in it. 
As evidenced by ILSAs’ results, Poland is one of the countries with a very equal inter-gender level of 
math proficiency, e.g. only in PISA 2015 boys scored better than girls by a significant margin of eleven 
PISA points. In other PISA editions there were no significant differences between the genders in Poland 
(Sitek, 2019). The gender difference is also very small in case of Polish standardised school exams but 
gets large and in favour of male students in case of the basic-level Matura exam (final high school 
exam) (Grudniewska & Kondratek, 2012; Zawistowska, 2013; 2017). Female students also experience 
higher math anxiety than their male counterparts83 (Cipora, Willems, Szwarc & Nuerk, 2018; Henschel 
& Roick, 2017). Female students are also less likely to take extended-level Matura exams in math, even 
holding constant their cognitive skills (Zawistowska & Sadowski, 2019). These results incline to 
formulate a conclusion that in Poland, at least from a certain stage of education, math is identified as 
a “boy thing”, hence social norms predict that boys will be characterised by higher math abilities in 
comparison to girls. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 16: Boys will overclaim more than girls in PISA 2012 OCT. 
Socio-economic status 
Other socio-demographic variables were studied in the context of OCT even rarer than gender. Some 
evidence is available in case of socio-economic status: Jerrim and others (2019) found that students of 
higher status (as measured by the PISA ESCS index) overclaimed more than their peers. However, most 
of the difference driven by ESCS was caused by one item (“proper number”), inducing hypotheses that 
some of the foils may provoke larger overclaiming in certain groups of students. Obviously, no 
systematic analyses are possible in this matter on the PISA 2012 OCT with only three foils available. 
However, the status differences were not confirmed by Calsyn et al. (2001) who found that self-
reported income was not related to overclaiming and only small and negative relation between 
educational level and overclaiming was obtained.  
Jerrim et al. (2019) found also more overclaiming in immigrant groups in Anglo-Saxon countries (except 
the USA). However, similarly as in the case of differences in OCT bias regarding the ESCS, the are no 
readily available explanations for these results. However, due to the relation between ESCS and 
abilities (Marks & Pokropek, 2019; OECD, 2014a) it can be hypothesised that these differences have 
similar roots as differences observed between high- and low-skilled participants, if interpreted in the 
vein of the motivated bias framework (memory bias hypothesis would predict the reversed pattern of 
relation). In this work both hypotheses will be tested, moreover, an analysis will be performed to check 
whether ESCS and gender differences are independent from ability level: 
Hypothesis 17: Economical, social and cultural status (ESCS) will correlate positively with OCT 
accuracy and negatively with OCT bias (higher status, lower bias). 
 
83 This effect holds even when controlled for math proficiency (Henschel & Roick, 2017). 
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Hypothesis 18: Gender and ESCS relation with OCT indices will be independent from math ability. 
Jerrim and others (2019) proposed also interesting analysis of OCT items, namely testing differential 
item functioning84 (DIF) (Holland & Thayer, 1986; Swaminathan & Rogers, 1990), regarding ESCS. In 
this work these analyses will be replicated in the Polish sample and also expanded on other variables, 
e.g. gender. 
 Age 
Ludeke and Makransky (2016) found no relation between overclaiming and age (group was restricted 
to 15-30-years-olds only). Similar age groups were also used by e.g. Clariana and others (2016) or 
Mesmer-Magnus and co-workers (2006), also to yield no age-related differences in OCT bias and only 
small differences in OCT accuracy in the former study. These differences could be plausibly associated 
to the knowledge of participants that differed according to the educational level (see also Paulhus, 
2011). It is important to notice that most of the studies in the field is based on college or high school 
student samples so age range in the sample is mostly very limited. Probably the only study that 
included a wide range of age groups (30-70+) in the sample was Calsyn and Winter (1999) who reported 
a small negative correlation between age and OCT bias (r= -0.11). Thus, there is only a very limited 
evidence of age-related differences in OCT. However, this topic is potentially interesting, as age is 
known to covary with OCT correlates, e.g. narcissism, that is known to change with age (Foster, 
Campbell & Twenge, 2003). Hence, future research is to verify role of age as a possible covariate and 
moderator of OCT. In case of PISA 2012 no age differences are predicted as the sample is drawn from 
a cohort of 15-years-olds and only a small fraction of students in the sample is of marginally different 
age. 
5.2.9 Individual differentiation of overclaiming 
Analysing differences between conditions or social groups is very informing on the nature of processes, 
overclaiming not being an exception. However, also a slightly different point of view is possible, namely 
exploring latent patterns and groups that are not coded by any observable variables but can be 
discerned in statistical analyses of latent classes and profiles. 
The reasonableness of this approach to analyse OCT is corroborated by results showing that there are 
important inter-individual differences in response biases that are not captured by standard grouping 
variables. Bishop and others (1980) and Schuman and Presser (1981) identified that only about 30% of 
participants give opinion on non-existent issue, the rest does not embrace them at all and hence does 
not contribute to the spurious variance. Similar percentage of 30% of overclaimers was identified in 
the research by Randall and Fernandes (1991), though other studies yielded lower values, e.g. 25% in 
Paulhus and others (2003) and only 6% in Ludeke and Makransky (2016). The proportion of 
overclaimers seems to depend on foils’ desirability and instrumentality85 and probably other factors 
which are, as yet, unverified (Dunlop et al., 2019). 
Such latent differences between participants pose an additional difficulty the analysis of OCT scores: 
some respondents can overclaim a lot, while others may not overclaim at all or even underclaim. The 
effects of under- and overclaimers may cancel out and be skipped in standard OCT analyses, suggesting 
a null effect, whereas in fact a lot of patterns could be observed if other data analysis techniques had 
been used. Interesting light on this topic can be shed by using mixture models technique which unable 
 
84 DIF is identified when in case of respondents on the same level of abilities, but belonging to two different 
groups (e.g. regarding gender, type of school, etc.), the test responses have different distribution (e.g. Kondratek, 
Skórska & Świst, 2015). 
85 Instrumentality, utility towards creating a given picture (Ziegler & Kemper, 2013). 
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to discern latent groups of respondents (different patterns of OCT responses). These techniques 
revealed differently responding groups in RS research (Khorramdel et al., 2019; Ziegler & Kemper, 
2013), in SDR analyses (Leite & Cooper, 2010; Levin & Zickar, 2002), similar techniques were also used 
in case of C/IER (Meade & Craig, 2012). 
In this work a latent class model analysis is planned in order to identify different overclaiming groups 
among participants and to further examine the characteristics of these groups, e.g. through analyses 
of their correlations with other variables relevant for overclaiming. Moreover, an analysis of covariates 
predicting each group membership probability is planned. 
As this is a largely exploratory analysis only a rather non-specific hypothesis can be formed, as there is 
only one study informing on potential latent groups in OCT (Yang et al., 2019). However, the analysis 
in this work will be performed in order to compare and contrast the results with the study by Yang et 
al. (2019) who obtained three latent classes using the data from the US sample of the PISA 2012. They 
interpreted the obtained classes as: a) accurate self-report and high math abilities, b) accurate self-
report and low math abilities and c) overly positive self-report and average math abilities. The classes 
accounted for about 60%, 20% and 20% of the whole sample respectively. Hence, it is supposed that:  
Hypothesis 19: Latent class analysis (LCA) models will reveal different subgroups of responders, 
including a non-overclaiming group, an overclaiming group and an underclaiming group. 
Differences of means of relevant variables will be calculated between the emerged latent groups will 
in order to understand their characteristics better. 
The analyses planned in this part will be presented in two subsequent chapters where details of the 
methods used and all the results will be described. Next chapter, Chapter 6, covers basic 
methodological information that is common for every analysis presented, e.g. database characteristics. 
Precise technical details related to a given model or hypothesis are given along with the results 
presentation in Chapter 7. Such organisation was chosen in order to ease processing of information. 
5.3 Chapter summary 
The thorough review of the overclaiming research to date led to the formulation of 19 hypotheses that 















Hypothesis 1: suppression model 
establish whether measurement of OCT bias can lead 
to increase in self-report predictive validity 
Hypothesis 2: objective domain 
ability and overclaiming 
test memory bias hypothesis as a probable mechanism 
leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 3 & 4: subjective 
domain ability and overclaiming 
test memory bias hypothesis as a probable mechanism 
leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 5 & 6: domain 
desirability and overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 7: locus of control 
and overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 8 & 9: withholding 
negative information and 
overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 10: school pressure 
on domain achievement and 
overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming; gauge 
school-level covariates of overclaiming 
Hypothesis 11: careless 
responding, respondents' fatigue 
and overclaiming 
test response style/careless responding hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 12: response styles 
and overclaiming 
test response style/careless responding hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming 
Hypothesis 13: latent structure 
of overclaiming scale 
assess latent structure of the PISA 2012 OCT 
Hypothesis 14: school-level 
social pressure on domain 
achievements and overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming; gauge 
school-level covariates of overclaiming 
Hypothesis 15: school-level rule 
violation and overclaiming 
test motivated (positivity) bias hypothesis as a 
probable mechanism leading to overclaiming; gauge 
school-level covariates of overclaiming 
Hypothesis 16, 17 & 18: socio-
demographic correlates of 
overclaiming 
expand knowledge on socio-demographic correlates of 
overclaiming (gender, socio-economic status, type of 
school, location size) 
Hypothesis 19: latent class 
identification 
explore individual differentiation of overclaiming and 
analyse covariates of overclaiming subtypes 





Chapter 6- DATABASE AND DATA PREPARATIONS 
 
6.1 Basic information about PISA 
6.1.1 What is PISA? 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an international, large-scale, triennial 
assessment conducted both in the OECD and partner countries and regions. Last editions of PISA (2018 
and the edition planned for 2021) covered data from around 90 entities, whereas the first study 
conducted in 2000 covered only 32 participating entities. The assessment is conducted on a group of 
15-years-olds.  
PISA is now widely used to examine national and cross-country disparities in learning outcomes, as 
well as factors related to learning and teaching practices across countries. The main assessment’s goal 
is to monitor educational systems worldwide and provide methodologically-sound international 
comparisons. PISA items are designed to measure students’ ability to use knowledge acquired in school 
to solve problems they might encounter in everyday life. An important purpose of PISA is also to 
provide evidence for temporal comparisons. Last but not least, PISA is also aimed at creating new 
scientific knowledge and informing educational policies worldwide with a special focus on assessment 
policies. Although some methodological aspects of this assessment have been criticized, PISA remains 
one of the most important scientific sources of information about education worldwide as in recent 
rounds of the PISA cycles around half a million students in more than 60 countries were tested. This 
makes PISA the largest educational research currently conducted. 
Collected measures 
Two main types of data collected in PISA are: a) cognitive tests, b) non-cognitive self-reports. The 
former entails three main domains: mathematics, reading (literacy in the main language of instruction 
in a given country) and science. Every edition is dedicated to one of the three domains which becomes 
main domain of the cycle on which special focus is given. Non-cognitive measures are also harmonised 
in content with the main theme of each edition. In example, in the 2012 cycle the background 
questionnaire was mainly composed of questions measuring mathematical abilities, attitudes and 
learning processes, whereas in the 2018 edition, when science was the point of focus, non-cognitive 
scales also predominantly measured school science-related topics. Apart from domain-related scales 
the PISA’s non-cognitive part also comprises scales measuring school relations, attitudes and a set of 
socio-demographic factors, like parental education, socio-economic family status or immigrant 
background. Apart from students, the background information is also collected from school principals 
who fill in a web-based questionnaire (the so-called school background questionnaire). Teachers and 
parents can also fill in dedicated questionnaires but it is only available as an additional option (in the 
2012 cycle Poland did not participate in neither of them). 
Procedure and design    
During the measurement sessions students participating in PISA are asked to first sit a cognitive test 
aimed at assessing their proficiency in reading, mathematics, and science. This part has a time limit of 
two hours. Then participants are to respond to questionnaire items in which they report on their 
attitudes, learning experience, motivation, family characteristics, etc. This part lasts for a maximum of 
one hour (normally 35-45 minutes). In each cycle countries can elect to participate in optional parts 
that vary from edition to edition. Optional assessments in the most recent cycles comprised e.g. 
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financial literacy measurement or collaborative problem-solving test. Countries can also chose to 
conduct measurement in additional, national add-ons assessments. 
Both cognitive and non-cognitive measurements are organised in a rotated design (planned missing-
data design), meaning that each respondent answers only to a subset of the whole set of items. Such 
subsets are called test forms. Students are randomly assigned to the test forms. This enables to balance 
content coverage, measurement precision and respondents’ effort. More information on missing-data 
designs can be found in Pokropek (2011) and on PISA design specifically in Borgonovi and Biecek 
(2016). 
PISA employs various kinds of item format in cognitive tests, apart from multiple-choice items also 
open-ended questions are used and this format typically comprises around one-third of the total 
number of items. Regarding non-cognitive scales predominantly Likert-type rating scales are used. 
Mode of administration 
PISA started as a paper-and-pencil assessment but since 2006 (in Poland- 2009) it gradually moved to 
computerised-based mode in order to become fully computerised from 201586. However, also in 
previous cycles subsamples were selected to participate in computer-based assessments (Federowicz, 
2013). The assessment is self-administered, grouped and proctored. Normally, it takes place within 
school’s facilities. 
Scaling and scoring 
Probabilistic models from the IRT family are used to scale both cognitive and non-cognitive data in 
PISA. 
Cognitive measures are scaled using the multidimensional (generalised) dichotomous Rasch model. 
Participants’ scores are represented on the so-called PISA scale with a mean of 500 points and a 
standard deviation of 100 points. However, the scale is anchored in the PISA 2000 cycle and 500 points 
(the so-called PISA points) represents the average of the OECD countries in 2000 and 100 points is 
equal to one standard deviation in the same PISA 2000. This is done in order to guarantee longitudinal 
comparability of the PISA scores. It is noteworthy that the scale is calibrated for each general domain 
separately, so PISA 2012 mathematical scores are scaled to PISA 2003 mathematical scores as these 
are two PISA cycles in which math was the general domain (next time mathematics will be general 
domain in 2021). This methodological approach results in PISA scores being an interval-level measure, 
hence any ratios are not meaningful for this scale (more in Federowicz, 2013; OECD, 2014a; 2014b).   
The main PISA goal is to provide inter-group comparisons and all its methodology is directed to achieve 
this objective. Therefore, individual-level scores are represented using the plausible values (PVs) 
methodology. In this method individual scores are drawn from a posterior distribution of probable 
scores which is calculated on the basis of test answers vector and a set of conditional variables. In PISA 
2012 five PVs were generated per domain for each student. More on PVs use and characteristics can 
be found in the PISA 2012 technical report (OECD, 2014b) and in specialised publications (e.g. Von 
Davier, Gonzalez & Mislevy, 2009). PISA cognitive test scores were used in the form prepared by the 
OECD and no alterations were made to their scaling. 
 
86 In the 2015 cycle countries could opted for a paper-and-pencil assessment. Around one-fifth of the 




Non-cognitive measures in PISA 2012 can be divided into scales were items were just scored and no 
scale-level scoring was performed (e.g. gender) and scales were item scores were scaled in order to 
obtain indices. The latter group of item scores were scaled by the partial-credit model (PCM) which is 
a polytomous extension of the Rasch IRT model. The scaled scores are represented on the scale with 
an OECD average of zero and a standard deviation of one. These scales were rescaled and rescored in 
this work using the graded response model (GRM), a polytomous extension of the two-parameter 
logistic model (2-PLM). The new indices have a mean set at zero and a standard deviation of one within 
the Polish sample in order to ease interpretation of regression results. 
Both students and school data are weighted in order to account for any inconsistencies between the 
sampling frame and factually assessed entities. Detailed comments about the PISA weighting system 
are well beyond the scope of this work but can be consulted in the PISA technical report for each cycle 
(e.g. OECD, 2014b). According to the recommendations formulated by Rutkowski, Gonzalez, Joncas 
and von Davier (2010) both school and student final weights are used in all analyses. 
Organisation and data access policy 
The measurement is organised and coordinated by the OECD, however it is paid from the national dues 
of the participating countries, typically these contributions come from the budget of a given Ministry 
of Education (MoE). The tests are conceived and prepared by a multinational consortium led by the 
OECD PISA team. Local data collection is organised by national teams and is supervised by the OECD. 
Long before establishing the Open Access rules PISA followed similar requirements and since 2000 all 
data, measurement instruments and reports are freely downloadable from the OECD dedicated 
webpage. This excludes some of the cognitive items which serve as anchors linking to the previous 
PISA cycles and as such are used in every PISA cycle and cannot be revealed to the public.  
6.1.2 Poland in PISA 
Poland, member of the OECD since 1996, participated in every PISA edition, beginning from the first 
one conducted in 2000. Poland also eagerly participates in optional assessments, e.g. the country took 
part in all three editions of the financial literacy measurement. Optional ICT familiarity and educational 
career questionnaires are also frequently conducted among the Polish students. 
The country initiated its PISA participation noting below OECD-average results in 2000, to soar to the 
group of top-performing countries, achieving scores well above the OECD-average in all three cognitive 
domains in the 2018 cycle (OECD, 2019). Despite the rising scores in cognitive test results Poland is 
notorious for reaching low scores in school climate and school belonging self-reports. Another 
interesting Polish characteristic is that it is among the countries that has one of the lowest gender gaps 
in cognitive PISA scores among the OECD countries. Socio-economic status is in Poland a slightly more 
important predictor of students’ educational attainment than it is on average in the OECD countries. 
However, the inter-school equity is higher in Poland than in the OECD in general, with high- and low-
performing students clustered in schools less than in many other countries87. 
Each country has an option to collect additional samples in order to perform inter-regional analyses 
(1500 students per region), however as so far Poland never elected to do so.    
 
87 Detailed information on the Polish participation in the PISA 2000-2015 cycles can be found in country reports 
prepared by the Polish MoE and the Polish PISA team led by Prof. Michał Federowicz. Other publications covering 
this topic is e.g. Jakubowski, Konarzewski, Muszyński, Smulczyk & Walicki (2017) report. 
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6.2 Database characteristics 
6.2.1 Sample 
Sampling process and response rate 
PISA uses two-stage stratified samples of students enrolled in lower-secondary or upper-secondary 
institutions and aged between 15 years and 3 months and 16 years and 2 months in the year of the 
testing in order to represent the full population of this cohort in every participating country. 
In the first stage of sampling a school-level sampling frame is constructed and validated. The sampling 
frame is stratified in order to cover important school characteristics (e.g. type, number of students 
enrolled, location size). Then, a random sample of a minimum of 150 schools is drawn to form an 
original school sample. For each school from this list two substitute (replacement) schools are drawn 
in order to guarantee replacements if a school from the original list refuses to participate. Response 
rate of 65% from the original list is required before schools from the replacement list can be recruited. 
In case of the PISA 2012 cycle in Poland only 12% of the schools measured were drawn from the 
replacement list (RR=88%; Federowicz, 2013). Totally, 184 schools took part in the Polish PISA 2012 
core assessment88. The core school sample included 176 junior high-schools (gimnazjum) and seven 
other: two vocational schools and five high-schools. 
The second stage of sampling comprises simple random sampling of students within each school. In 
order to participate in the standard PISA and in the optional financial literacy assessment (as did Poland 
in 2012) a minimum sample of 6300 students was required. No replacement samples were drawn as 
students cannot be replaced in PISA. Response rate of at least 80% was necessary for a given country 
data to be accepted by the OECD and reported in official publications. In 2012 Poland drew a total 
number of 6811 students for both PISA assessments (core and financial literacy) of which 5662 
eventually completed PISA measurement tools yielding a response rate of 82%89 (Federowicz, 2013). 
For the core PISA assessment 5545 students were drawn of which 4607 participated in measurements 
(RR=83%). Private school students were oversampled for the Polish assessment to a total number of 
357 who actually took part in the core assessment. 
As evidenced by the in-depth analyses conducted by the Polish PISA Team students’ missingness was 
moderated by their ability level as low-achievers were more likely to skip the measurement for which 
they were drawn. It was estimated that this fact downbiased the PISA cognitive scores by a mere 3 
PISA points (around 0,04 of a standard deviation; Federowicz, 2013). Due to the lack of data it is 
impossible to gauge how this missingness not-at-random influenced non-cognitive assessments’ 
scores. However, low biases in case of cognitive assessments suggest that any bias in non-cognitive 
scales is most likely also extremely limited, in a range of a hundredth parts of standard deviation. 
Rotation design  
PISA background questionnaire was implemented in a rotation design (see section 6.2.2 below for 
more details), hence only a subsample completed math familiarity scale with overclaiming items 
embedded. Math familiarity scale was presented to 3071 students who were randomly drawn to Forms 
A and C of the questionnaire. Form B did not contain math familiarity scale on the basis of the PISA 
missing-by-design structure. 
 
88 One additional school participated in the financial literacy test only. 
89 Precise response rates (RR) often marginally differ between the documents as slightly different RR counting 
procedures are used by different reporting entities. 
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However, the number of participants possible to include in analyses is slightly lower due to item non-
response. The table below summarises missing data by its cause: 
  
Item 









st62q01 1536 45 33,34% 1,47% 
st62q02 1536 40 33,34% 1,30% 
st62q03 1536 41 33,34% 1,34% 
st62q04 1536 42 33,34% 1,37% 
st62q06 1536 42 33,34% 1,37% 
st62q07 1536 31 33,34% 1,01% 
st62q08 1536 47 33,34% 1,53% 
st62q09 1536 33 33,34% 1,07% 
st62q10 1536 43 33,34% 1,40% 
st62q11 1536 50 33,34% 1,63% 
st62q12 1536 32 33,34% 1,04% 
st62q13 1536 39 33,34% 1,27% 
st62q15 1536 37 33,34% 1,20% 
st62q16 1536 34 33,34% 1,11% 
st62q17 1536 33 33,34% 1,07% 
st62q19 1536 27 33,34% 0,88% 
 
Table 3. Missing data in each math familiarity item by type of missing. Missing-by-design % was 
calculated from the whole eligible sample (4607), while missing by item non-response was calculated 














Moreover, number of missing values yielded in a given math familiarity scale factor was calculated. 










0 2881 93,81% 
1 123 4,01% 
2 33 1,07% 
3 1 0,03% 
4 3 0,10% 
5 2 0,07% 
6 1 0,03% 
7 2 0,07% 
10 2 0,07% 
11 1 0,03% 
15 1 0,03% 
Total 3071 100% 
Table 4. Frequency of number of missing values in the math familiarity scale vector. 
The analysis showed that most of the subsample did not yield any missing values. Most of the 
participants with data missing did not respond only to one or two items. However, there was also a 
participant who answered only one item out of the 16 in the math familiarity scale. 
Missing data   
Because different participants noted a minor proportion of missing data on different scales the precise 
sample size differs in some analyses. In general either 3071 or 2881 unique response vectors was used 
in each analysis. The lower number of respondents was used when missing data was not allowed by 
software requirements (e.g. see subchapter 7.5). 
It was decided not to impute the missing data basing on: a) low percent of missing data, close to the 
1% threshold termed as “excellent” (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019), b) low certainty of what variables 
should be included in the multiple imputation equations due to exploratory character of many analyses 
and insufficient coherence of the previous evidence on math familiarity and OCT correlates, c) 
probable low influence of imputation on models results, due to c’) missing-by-design data treated as 
missing completely as random (MCAR) and c’’) low fraction of data missing due to item non-response, 
d) a vast majority of the missing data is classified as MCAR, hence any estimates using this data are 
unbiased due to data missingness, e) including imputed data, especially from the missing-by-design 
part (Form B) would probably not change estimates’ results (e.g. coefficients’ values) but would only 
downsize standard errors due to increased statistical power. Such increase would reduce probabilities 
of inferential errors, however, in this work most of the results will be treated conservatively anyway 
due to initial character of many analyses. What is more, the remaining sample size is large anyway and 
secures sufficient statistical power for the analyses presented here. Similar decisions were made by 




Basic sample characteristics  
Among the students that were presented the math familiarity questionnaire 99.4% was a junior high 
school student, almost all of them in the 3rd (final) grade of this educational level. Female students 
consisted slightly more than half of participants (51.7%). Foreign-born students consisted only 0.4% of 
the subsample. Other sample characteristics will be given when relevant to the substantial analysis as 
presented in the subsequent chapter. 
6.2.2 Materials 
Rotation design (missing-by-design) of the PISA 2012 background questionnaire 
In the 2012 PISA cycle only the core socioeconomic and demographic background questions were 
administered to all students. The content of this part is briefly presented in the table below: 
 
Item Description 
st01 Grade attending 
st02 Country 
st03 Age of student 
st04 Sex of student 
st05 Attending preschool 
st06 Attending kindergarten 
st07 Grade repeating 
st08, st09, st115 Truancy 
st11 Family structure 
st12-st19 
Parents' educational and 
occupational status 
st20, st21, st25 Immigrant background 
st26-st28 Household possessions 
 
Table 5. Schematic presentation of the content of the PISA 2012 student questionnaire common (core) 
part. All students sitting PISA were presented these questions. 
The rest of the background (student) questionnaire followed a rotation design such that only two thirds 
of the overall sample of students received, at random, any one question (OECD, 2014b). The rotation 
design was adopted to increase the overall amount of topics that could be explored without increasing 








Form A Form B Form C 
Item Description Item Description Item Description 
































Table 6. Schematic representation of the rotated design of the PISA 2012 student background 
questionnaire. 
Full information on items and scales forming given parts can be found in the PISA 2012 technical report 
(OECD, 2014b, p. 61). 
Math familiarity scale 
Key analyses that follows in the subsequent chapter concentrate on math familiarity scale (st6290) and 
the embedded overclaiming items. As evidenced by Table 5 above this scale was included in part B of 
the student background questionnaire and hence was not presented to students that were randomly 
drawn to complete Form B of the background questionnaire which contained only parts A and C. This 
reduces the overall sample size for all analyses using st62 scale by approximately one-third. 
The scale comprises 16 items altogether, including 13 reals and three foils. Participants responded on 
a five-categorical, Likert-type response scale, labelled with both numbers and descriptions, from 
“Never heard of it” (1) to “Know it well, understand the concept” (5). Respondents were asked to tick 
only one answer (box) in each row. Precise wording of the scale’s stem, items and response categories 






90 Each background question is coded by an international number. This helps to orientate between the items that 
are presented in different questionnaire forms and in different language versions. Letters “st” stand for an item 
from the student background questionnaire, whereas “sch” code items presented in the school principals 
inventory. If items in a scale are not in mathematical order, e.g. some item numbers are missing, it means that 
these items were deleted after the field trial pilot study. If items are coded with a high number, e.g. above 110, 
it usually means that the items were profoundly revised after the trial (OECD, 2014b). Such identification 
numbers will be always used in this work in order to avoid confusion regarding which scale is being analysed. 
91 Items in the Polish version are taken from the Polish version of the PISA 2012 background questionnaire. In 
the paper-and-pencil questionnaire the scale’s items were presented in a fixed order that is imaged in Table 3. 
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Thinking about mathematical concepts: how familiar are you with the following terms? 



















st62q01 exponential function funkcja wykładnicza 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q02 divisor dzielnik 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q03 quadratic function funkcja kwadratowa 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q04 proper number liczba właściwa 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q06 linear equation równanie liniowe 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q07 vectors wektory 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q08 complex number liczby zespolone 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q09 rational number liczba wymierna 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q10 radicals pierwiastek 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q11 subjunctive scaling skalowanie łączące 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q12 polygon wielokąt 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q13 declarative fraction ułamek oznajmujący 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q15 congruent figure figura przystająca 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q16 cosine cosinus 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q17 arithmetic mean średnia arytmetyczna 1 2 3 4 5 
st62q19 probability prawdopodobieństwo 1 2 3 4 5 
Table 7. Math familiarity scale (st62) in Polish and English version with international item numbers in 
the first column. Foils are in italics. 
According to the PISA 2012 technical report foils were created by combining a real grammar term (e.g. 
“proper” or “declarative”) with a real mathematical term as to form a foil item that in its entirety does 
not mean anything. This method of foil creation would be classified as yielding foils of high risk of 
confusion with existing mathematical concepts (cf. Franzen & Mader, 2019; Hargittai, 2005; Paulhus 
et al., 2003). 
Reals employed in the scale mainly stem from algebra and geometry. However, efforts to form algebra 
familiarity and geometry familiarity indices were not finalised92 (OECD, 2014b). 
Other scales and materials used 
The additional scales and indices will be commented in the relevant sections of Chapter 7. 
 
92 It is also advisable to consult discrepancies in item numeration between the technical report and field 
questionnaire version on page 57 of the report (OECD, 2014b). 
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6.2.3 Data preparation 
Data used 
In the analyses that follow data from three sources were used: a) PISA cognitive items, namely 
mathematical test, b) indices from the PISA background questionnaire, with a special focus on the 
math familiarity scale, c) data from the school questionnaire, where answers were submitted by school 
principals. School-level data was merged with the student-level dataset for that purpose. 
Math familiarity scaling and scoring 
Before scaling and scoring basic psychometric properties of the scale were examined. The analysis 
presented here intended only to verify scale’s internal consistency, calculated by Cronbach’s alpha and 
a handful of basic psychometric measures. The analysis did not reveal any serious problems with scale 
coding, internal consistency, outlying items or suggestions of dimensionality problems. The topic of 
internal structure of math familiarity scale will be revisited in more detail in the subsequent chapter. 
The analyses conducted here are summed up in the table below: 
 









st62q01 3026 + 0,57 0,49 0,39 0,851 
st62q02 3031 + 0,62 0,54 0,39 0,848 
st62q03 3030 + 0,63 0,54 0,37 0,848 
st62q04 3029 + 0,64 0,56 0,38 0,847 
st62q06 3029 + 0,63 0,55 0,38 0,848 
st62q07 3040 + 0,58 0,48 0,38 0,851 
st62q08 3024 + 0,59 0,51 0,39 0,850 
st62q09 3038 + 0,63 0,57 0,39 0,848 
st62q10 3028 + 0,53 0,48 0,41 0,853 
st62q11 3021 + 0,45 0,36 0,40 0,857 
st62q12 3039 + 0,55 0,49 0,41 0,852 
st62q13 3032 + 0,49 0,39 0,39 0,857 
st62q15 3034 + 0,61 0,53 0,38 0,849 
st62q16 3037 + 0,49 0,39 0,40 0,856 
st62q17 3038 + 0,58 0,52 0,40 0,850 
st62q19 3044 + 0,57 0,50 0,39 0,850 
Scale - - - - 0,39 0,859 









Another very basic analysis conducted here regarded raw data descriptive statistics, namely 



















st62q01 exponential function 10,60% 18,70% 29,70% 26,50% 14,40% 
st62q02 divisor 3,40% 7,70% 12,60% 21,60% 54,80% 
st62q03 quadratic function 15,90% 18,40% 20,50% 19,90% 25,40% 
st62q04 proper number 9,50% 16,00% 24,00% 27,50% 22,90% 
st62q06 linear equation 20,00% 20,20% 23,20% 20,90% 15,80% 
st62q07 vectors 16,30% 18,40% 21,30% 22,50% 21,60% 
st62q08 complex number 40,90% 25,30% 18,10% 11,00% 4,80% 
st62q09 rational number 2,50% 7,00% 15,80% 30,50% 44,30% 
st62q10 radicals 1,40% 2,60% 5,40% 17,50% 73,10% 
st62q11 subjunctive scaling 54,60% 19,10% 13,50% 7,70% 5,10% 
st62q12 polygon 1,40% 2,90% 6,70% 16,80% 72,10% 
st62q13 declarative fraction 30,10% 20,60% 19,80% 15,50% 14,10% 
st62q15 congruent figure 6,60% 8,70% 15,60% 22,90% 46,20% 
st62q16 cosine 39,50% 24,50% 17,70% 11,50% 6,80% 
st62q17 arithmetic mean 1,80% 4,10% 9,90% 18,50% 65,70% 
st62q19 probability 3,20% 7,60% 13,30% 23,10% 52,70% 
Mean reals 12,58% 12,78% 16,14% 20,25% 38,28% 
Mean foils 31,40% 18,57% 19,10% 16,90% 14,03% 
Mean total 16,11% 13,86% 16,69% 19,62% 33,74% 
Table 9. Math familiarity scale- frequencies of response categories. 
The above table reveals that scale’s items differed greatly in their familiarity claimed by students. The 
most recognised items were “polygon” and “radicals”, closely followed by “arithmetic mean”. 
“Exponential function” and “linear equation” can be counted among items that were moderately 
claimed, whereas “cosine” or “complex number” were hardly familiar at all. Among the foils “proper 
number” was definitely the most alluring as more than 20% of students (over) claimed being very 





The averaged differences between reals and foils are imaged in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 5. Difference between reals and foils claimed familiarity 
The above figure shows that on average responses to reals where tilted towards claiming familiarity 
with mathematical concepts, whereas on average foils where claimed much less than reals. It is 
noteworthy that main difference between two kinds of items involves extreme response categories (1 
and 5) as mean frequencies of using mid responses (2, 3, 4) do not differ much between reals and foils. 
According to the analysis performed by Vonkova and co-workers (2018) Poland was classified as a 
country where students claimed lower than average familiarity with math concepts and overclaimed 
above the average of the countries participating in the PISA 2012 cycle. 
Math familiarity scale with the embedded overclaiming items was rescaled and rescored in order to 
yield indices more comparable with the rest of the OCT literature (e.g. Paulhus et al., 2003). Signal 
detection theory (SDT) indices were calculated on the basis of the math familiarity scores according to 
the procedure described by Paulhus and Petrusic (2010) and Vonkova and colleagues (2018). 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) scoring 
Signal detection theory was born during the troubled years of the Second World War during which it 
was developed as a theoretical underpinning for radar usage. The theory first used by physicists and 
mathematicians very soon found its application in social sciences, chiefly psychology. In this field SDT 
was employed to describe various cognitive operations, mainly perceptual, mnemonic and decision-
making processes. 
The theory resides on a matrix of two possible states of signal (target, stimulus) that can be present 
and absent and two decisions that can be made regarding this signal- respond that it is present 
(response “yes”) or respond that it is absent (decision “no”). The below table sums up possible 





































M E A N  R E A L S M E A N  F O I L S
1 2 3 4 5
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Decision Signal present Signal absent 
"YES" hit (H) false alarm (FA) 
"NO" miss (M) correct rejection (CR) 
 
Table 10. Matrix of SDT decisions and four possible results. Results’ abbreviations in brackets (). 
Among the four basic results of SDT are hit (H), when stimulus was indeed present and it was correctly 
identified by responder, false alarm (FA) when stimulus was absent but respondent made an incorrect 
decision of answering that it was present. In the realities of OCT an answer would be classified as a hit 
when high response categories (e.g. 4 or 5) would be used to an existing mathematical concept (e.g. 
“polygon”), whereas a false alarm would occur when such response categories would be used when 
responding to a non-existing concept (e.g. “subjunctive scaling”).  
On the other hand, an error of omission or miss (M) is committed when signal is present but 
respondent fails to distinguish it from the noise. In the world of survey responses such situation can 
occur when respondent would claim not to know an existing mathematical concept (e.g. “cosine”). 
Lastly, the correct rejection’s (CR) name speaks for itself- it takes place whenever respondent correctly 
identifies lack of signal as such (noise). In the OCT framework it occurs whenever respondent uses 
response categories coding lack of knowledge when assessing a non-existing concept (e.g. “declarative 
fraction”). Paulhus and co-authors advocated use of SDT in scoring OCT results as SDT enables to jointly 
model maximum of the relevant information from the task, including modelling decisions’ sensitivity 
and specificity (2003). This is an advancement in comparison to other scoring rules, e.g. using simple 
sum of responses to foils as an index of overclaiming (see e.g. Hulur et al., 2011; Steger et al., 2020). 
Moreover, SDT measures are based on information from all the items, hence they are more reliable 
than indices based on just reals or foils (such as sum of scores on foils) as they are based on more 
information stemming from a larger number of items (Paulhus et al., 2003). 
Therefore, in the frames of SDT a rich variety of indices can be calculated on the basis of decision matrix 
presented in Table 7. Potential number of such indices is vast but here they will be limited to presenting 
two indices used in this work: d’ and c. These indices were selected due to recommendations of 
Paulhus and Petrusic (2010) who compared validity of several indices in the OCT context. Moreover, 
the above-mentioned indices are also often used in the OCT research, hence their implementation 
enables greater results’ comparability across studies. 
The first of the two indices, d’, is a sensitivity index coding how well a given respondent distinguishes 
between reals and foils (signal and noise). The higher its value the better the discrimination. It is a 
dimensionless statistic based on assumption that signal and noise variances are equal and that both 
are normally distributed. There are various ways to calculate it, the easiest one is defined in the 
equation below: 
 
d’= Z(PH) – Z(PFA) (Equation 1) 
 
 where „Z” is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian distribution (Φ-1), “PH” 
is hit rate (proportion of hits to sum of hits and omissions) and “PFA” is false alarm rate (proportion of 
false alarms to sum of false alarms and correct rejections). In case of items with polytomous scores, 
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e.g. rating scales, the situation is a bit more complicated as the simple dichotomous logic of SDT cannot 
be readily applied to Likert-type ratings. To extend SDT to such scores PH and PFA are thus calculated 
on a given threshold (cut-off point) or averaged across all thresholds. For example, in a rating scale like 
the one used in the PISA 2012 math familiarity scale there are five response categories, hence there 
are four cut-off points (thresholds) (1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5) on which PH or PFA can be calculated (see details 
in Vonkova et al., 2018). 
The second of the indices, c, also named criterion location or decision criterion (often shortened to 
criterion), is a measure of predilection toward responding rather affirmatively to the items or rather 
negatively. The index can be calculated as follows: 
 
c = - 
𝒁(𝑷𝑯)+𝒁(𝑷𝑭𝑨)
𝟐
 (Equation 2) 
 
The measure shows what is considered by a given respondent as signal and what as noise. In the social 
sciences, e.g. in the OCT framework, it is used as a measure of bias. Negative values of criterion means 
liberal criterion, in the framework of OCT propensity to claim familiarity with foils and reals alike 
(answering “yes”). Values close to zero code neutral criterion (no bias)93, whereas high values mean 
conservative criterion, propensity to answer “no”. However, the minus sing in Equation 2 is often 
omitted so that high scores indicate bias towards affirmative responding and low scores bias towards 
negative responding (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). This version of this statistic, the so-called c-reversed 
will be used in this work. 
Unlike many others indices d’ and c are dimensionless (independent of measuring scale) and are 
calculated independently from each other, though they are predominantly correlated across 
individuals (Paulhus et al., 2003). 
More information on SDT indices can be found e.g. in the articles written by Abdi (2007) and Stanislaw 
and Todorov (1999) and in comprehensive, book-length positions (e.g. Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991/2005; McNicol, 1972/2005). 
Oftentimes, the so-called “common sense” indices are employed which mainly reside on simplifying 
the equations for SDT indices by not calculating z-scores. A pair of such indices was introduced by 
Paulhus et al. (2003) and Vonkova et al. (2018): d’ is replaced by “index of accuracy” (IA) calculated as: 
 
IA = PH – PFA (Equation 3), 
 
whereas criterion is supplanted by “index of exaggeration” (IE) calculated as (minus sign is also often 
omitted as in case of c): 
IE = -(PH + PFA)/2 (Equation 4). 
 
93 c = 0 indicates an “ideal observer”, a completely unbiased respondent (Abdi, 2007). The c is also often 
interpreted as a distance between actual strategy (threshold, criterion) and an ideal strategy. 
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IA and IE averaged across all the cut-off points are called averaged index of accuracy/exaggeration 
(IAa/IEa) but for the sake of simplicity IA and IE will be used in the sense of averaged indices in this 
work. IA values are in the interval [-1, 1] with the maximum of 1 indicates that all reals were responded 
to by category “5” (maximum familiarity) and all foils by “1” (no familiarity), whereas the minimum of 
-1 indicates that all reals got “1” and all foils “5”. If IA=0 than reals and foils were given the same ratings 
of familiarity. IE values are in the interval [0, 1], value 1 indicates that all items are rated on a maximum 
category (“5”), value 0- that all items are rated on a minimum category (“1”) and value of IE of 0.5 
means that all items were rated using the midpoint of the scale (“3”). 
In order to maintain accord between the three measures of OCT bias used in the subsequent analyses 
c and IE were reversed. In this line the interpretation of c, IE and an index of overclaiming calculated 
from foils directly have the same interpretation: the higher the score, the higher the propensity to 
answer “yes”, namely, use “4” and “5” response categories in the math familiarity scale.   
IRT scaling 
Math familiarity scale scores were scaled using IRT partial credit model (PCM) by the OECD PISA team, 
however on the basis of few premises it was decided to rescale the math familiarity scores using IRT 
graded response model (GRM) due to: a) PCM index used metric where OECD mean equalled zero and 
OECD standard deviation was equal to one (OECD, 2014b, p. 312), which was considered useless and 
even unconstructive for a one-country analysis, b) almost certain better model fit of a GRM model over 
a PCM model (Maydeu-Olivares, 2005, 2015)94, c) want to generate math familiarity scores using PVs 
in order to c’) have matching for math ability scores represented by five PVs and also c’’) to obtain 
more precise estimates in comparison to point estimates used originally in the PISA data95 (Rutkowski 
et al., 2010) and d) want to generate separate scores for reals and for foils as the OECD-generated 
indices did not include an index representing foils information only. 
To calculate GRM Stata module (package) -uirt- (Kondratek, 2016/2020) was used96. The basic IRT item 








st62q01     st62q06     
A 1,08 0,05 a 1,01 0,04 
b1 -2,37 0,10 b1 -1,66 0,08 
b2 -1,08 0,06 b2 -0,58 0,05 
b3 0,30 0,04 b3 0,52 0,05 
b4 1,90 0,08 b4 1,87 0,09 
st62q02     st62q07     
A 2,22 0,08 a 1,12 0,05 
b1 -2,29 0,08 b1 -1,82 0,08 
b2 -1,55 0,05 b2 -0,80 0,05 
b3 -0,94 0,04 b3 0,14 0,04 
b4 -0,23 0,03 b4 1,30 0,06 
 
94 Performed comparison of AIC and BIC values pointed to the indeed superior fit of the GRM solution. 
95 Weighted Likelihood Estimation was employed to obtain individual scores (OECD, 2014b, p. 312). 
96 The estimates were compared with Stata -irt- module and both estimates were essentially the same. 
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st62q03     st62q08     
A 1,12 0,05 a 0,78 0,04 
b1 -1,86 0,08 b1 -0,56 0,06 
b2 -0,81 0,05 b2 0,92 0,07 
b3 0,12 0,04 b3 2,35 0,13 
b4 1,10 0,06 b4 4,25 0,23 
st62q04     st62q09     
A 1,23 0,05 a 2,18 0,08 
b1 -2,25 0,09 b1 -2,53 0,09 
b2 -1,16 0,05 b2 -1,67 0,05 
b3 -0,12 0,04 b3 -0,88 0,03 
b4 1,17 0,06 b4 0,11 0,03 
st62q10     st62q15     
A 3,18 0,14 a 1,87 0,07 
b1 -2,44 0,08 b1 -2,04 0,07 
b2 -1,91 0,06 b2 -1,42 0,05 
b3 -1,43 0,04 b3 -0,75 0,03 
b4 -0,71 0,03 b4 0,04 0,03 
st62q11     st62q16     
A 0,44 0,04 a 0,71 0,04 
b1 0,43 0,09 b1 -0,71 0,07 
b2 2,37 0,22 b2 0,86 0,07 
b3 4,41 0,40 b3 2,27 0,13 
b4 6,78 0,61 b4 4,05 0,23 
st62q12     st62q17     
A 3,25 0,15 a 2,88 0,12 
b1 -2,42 0,08 b1 -2,41 0,08 
b2 -1,89 0,06 b2 -1,79 0,05 
b3 -1,33 0,04 b3 -1,15 0,04 
b4 -0,68 0,03 b4 -0,51 0,03 
st62q13     st62q19     
A 0,57 0,04 a 1,82 0,07 
b1 -1,62 0,12 b1 -2,60 0,10 
b2 -0,03 0,07 b2 -1,72 0,06 
b3 1,54 0,12 b3 -0,99 0,04 
b4 3,31 0,23 b4 -0,15 0,03 
Table 11. Math familiarity scale item characteristics under GRM model. Note: S.E.- standard error. 
Estimated item characteristics confirm overall acceptable fit of the model as a) all discrimination 
parameters are above 0, though not all of them are above 1, suggesting poor item qualities or certain 
item-fit problems and b) all slopes are ordered in the predicted direction. It is also evident that items 
differ widely regarding their difficulty. Visual inspection of item characteristic curves (category 
characteristic curves, CCC) indeed shows that expected model does not fit well to the observed data 
in case of some items. The main cause of such misfit was salient already in the frequency table- some 
items were answered using almost exclusively two response categories: 1 or 5. The topic will be 




In addition to the previously calculated scores of the math familiarity scale (PH, PFA, IA, IE, d’, c) IRT 
scoring was also performed. Separate scores were calculated for reals and foils using uirt Stata module 
with the use of the GRM. Five PVs were generated for each of the item types. The PVs were conditioned 
on participants’ gender, socio-economic status (PISA escs index was used here, see OECD, 2014b), 
math abilities and school clustering in order to enhance precision of point estimates performed with 
the use of PVs97 (Rutkowski et al., 2010; Wu, 2005). 
Whenever PVs were used in any analysis the magnitude of coefficients was averaged across 
imputations for PVs and standard errors were adjusted to the sampling design and to imputation 
variability by using proper weighting and Rubin’s rules (Jerrim, Lopez-Agudo, Marcenaro-Gutierrez & 
Shure, 2017; OECD, 2014b; Rubin, 1996). 
Other scales 
All other self-report data where computing statistical indices was applicable was rescaled using uirt 
Stata module. The questionnaires were scaled by the GRM and scored using the Expected a Posteriori 
method to estimate individual scores and their standard errors. Such estimates should typically yield 
correct point estimates, but their standard errors would be underestimated in comparison to 
generating PVs (Rutkowski et al., 2010; Wu, 2005).  
The scaling procedure was preceded by reliability, inter-item polychoric correlations and 
dimensionality analysis in order to browse the scales for any trouble-making items and problems with 
dimensionality. The detailed results of these analyses are presented in Online Appendix B. Whenever 
directly relevant to the matters at hand this issue will be also commented in the next chapter. 
Software 
Various statistical packages where used throughout the analyses performed in this work. Information 
on precise package employed is presented in the relevant sections of the subsequent chapter. In 
general, R (version 4.0.0), Stata (version 14.2 SE) and MPlus (version 8.2) were used. 
Results presentation 
Whenever statistical significance is presented in a table the following coding system is adopted: p< 
0.001- no sign98, p< 0.01 **, p< 0.05 *, ns- non-significant. 
The subsequent chapter presents and comments the verifications of the hypotheses formulated in the 
chapter 5. The presentation of results is organised as follows: at first short methods section is 
presented, commenting on specific sample, material or statistical features of a given analysis, then 
results are displayed and finally short discussion concludes each hypothesis part.  
 
 
97 Unconditioned PVs tend to yield estimates biased towards zero, namely regression coefficients smaller than 
they should be (Wu, 2005). 
98 Conventionally, three stars (***) are produced when p< 0.001 but in this work the stars are omitted in this 
particular case as due to the large sample size most of the coefficients are either non-significant or significant at 
the p level of 0.001. 
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Chapter 7- RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESES TESTING 
7.1 Overclaiming scores as a suppressor of spurious variance- Hypothesis 1 
7.1.1 Method 
In this analysis the suppression hypothesis will be tested. It assumes that OCT bias score will act as a 
classical suppressor for the relation between math self-report and math ability test (criterion). To this 
end a multilevel regression was performed with math ability test results as dependent variables and 
various measures of self-report as independent variable. Moreover, measures of overclaiming bias 
were introduced into the equation to observe whether any suppression relation takes place (Conger, 
1974). 
To account for the PISA complex data structure a multilevel regression with correction for multiply 
imputed measures of student skills was performed in order to estimate unbiased measurement errors. 
To this end user-written Stata modules “pv” (MacDonald, 2014) and “repest” (Avvisati & Keslair, 2017) 
with Stata command -mixed- and -mi estimate- were used. Sampling was applied to both levels of 
analysis: PISA final student weights were used on the student-level while scale-adjusted total student 
weights (sum of final student weights in each school)99 were used on the school-level (OECD, 2014b). 
The PISA math ability test scores represented by five PVs were used as dependent variable (criterion). 
In the role of independent variable different measures of math familiarity (OCT accuracy) were used: 
PVs calculated on the basis of reals, d’ and index of accuracy. These measures were used as self-
reported math ability. A positive and relatively high relation between this measure and math ability 
was expected. As suppressor variable different measures of overclaiming bias were used: PVs 
calculated on the basis of foils, c and index of exaggeration (both reversed, see 6.3.2). Each pair of the 
indices was used in a separate regression. 
In the first step zero-order correlations between key variables were calculated. Afterwards, a series of 
regression equations was performed, when in the first step an independent variable was introduced, 
in the second step a suppressor was introduced and in the third and final step both variables were 
introduced together in order to examine whether suppression effect takes place. Interaction in the 
fourth step was added in order to check for any moderation effects. Change in the magnitude of the 
regression coefficient between dependent and independent variable would be the key indicator of 







99 The discussion about weighting designs suitable for multilevel analyses of the PISA data is ongoing (e.g. 
Asparouhov, 2006; Avvisati, 2020). In most of the cases using any of the correct weighting designs yields very 
similar results (Jerrim et al., 2017). In case of the suppression analysis presented in this work three systems were 














d’ c reversed i_accuracy 
i_exaggeration 
_reversed 
math ability 1             
math familiarity (reals) 0,57 1           
bias (foils) -0,11 0,13 1         
d prime 0,34 0,27 -0,60 1       
c reversed 0,16 0,54 0,65 -0,54 1     
i_accuracy 0,41 0,39 -0,61 0,90 -0,37 1   
i_exaggeration 
_reversed 
0,21 0,61 0,65 -0,39 0,95 -0,32 1 
Table 12. Zero-order correlations for math ability, OCT accuracy and OCT bias measures. Note: All ps < 
0.001.  
The analysis of Table 11 shows that all OCT accuracy indices correlate positively and quite highly with 
math ability. The largest pairwise correlation coefficient was yielded by IRT-scaled and PV-scored index 
of math familiarity, followed by SDT-derived measures of d’ and index of accuracy. The correlation 
between math ability and self-reported familiarity with math concepts (proxy of math ability) of r=0.57 
is quite high, especially in the light of notoriously low correlations between self-reports and their 
objective criteria (see subchapter 4.2). 
Among the measures of bias IRT-scaled and PV-scored index of bias correlated negatively with math 
ability, whereas SDT indices, c and index of exaggeration correlated positively, indicating that the more 
liberal the respondents were (more predilection toward answering “yes” in OCT) the higher their math 
ability. These results will be revisited in the section 7.2.2 below. 
Let’s now move to the regression equations. For the ease of interpretation and comparison between 
the tables the SDT (d’, c) and common sense indices (IA, IE) were standardised for a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one to match the scaling of IRT indices. The R2 were generated using -mlt- Stata 











Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




46,34 *** - - 49,63 *** 49,96 *** 
bias (foils) - - -4,91 * -14,92 *** -14,64 *** 
interaction: 
reals*foils 
- - - - - - -2,80 ns 
R2 Level1   0,28   0,01   0,31   0,31 
R2 Level2   0,49   0,03   0,57   0,57 
Table 13. Suppression analysis for PV-scored math familiarity scale. Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ** * p<0.001. B- regression weights, PISA scale where 1SD=100. 
 
Parameter 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B p>z B p>z B p>z B p>z 
d’ 23,73 *** - - 46,42 *** 54,77 *** 
c reversed - - 13,01 *** 38,65 *** 37,96 *** 
interaction:  
d’*c reversed 
- - - - - - 8,41 *** 
R2 Level1   0,07   0,02   0,21   0,23 
R2 Level2   0,25   0,02   0,45   0,48 
Table 14. Suppression analysis for SDT-scored math familiarity score. Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ** * p<0.001. B- regression weights, PISA scale where 1SD=100. 
Parameter 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B p>z B p>z B p>z B p>z 
i_accuracy 28,66 *** - - 42,45 *** 42,73 *** 




- - - - - - 1,60 ns 
R2 Level1   0,11   0,04   0,24   0,24 
R2 Level2   0,29   0,04   0,45   0,45 
Table 15. Suppression analysis for common sense-scored math familiarity scale. Note: ns p> 0.05, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ** * p<0.001. B- regression weights, PISA scale where 1SD=100. 
The suppression analysis results for all three systems of coding OCT are presented in the table below. 
Parameter change (B or R2) is defined as difference between the value from Model 3 and from Model 
1 for predictor change and Model 2 for suppressor change. Interaction term is taken from Model 4. 
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Instead of p values for the significance of parameter change the percentage change was given as all 
the parameters differences were significant at least at the 0.05 level100. 














parameter 3,29 10,91 -2,80 0,03 0,08 
% 7,10 203,87 ns 10,71 16,33 
SDT 
indices 
parameter 22,69 25,64 8,41 0,14 0,20 




parameter 13,79 16,65 1,60 0,13 0,16 
% 48,12 98,11 ns 118,18 55,17 
Table 16. Change of B and R2 parameters between Model 3 and Model 1. B- regression weight, PISA 
scale where 1SD=100. 
7.1.3 Discussion 
Conducted analyses pointed that indeed the suppression relation takes place in case of all three OCT 
scoring systems. It is to say, including a measure of overclaiming leads to enhancement of the 
predictive validity of self-report scale measuring academic skill. This enhancement is displayed by the 
increased regression weights and the rising value of R2. 
Among the three scoring systems SDT indices and common sense indices led to a much stronger 
suppression effect than IRT indices. This is predictable from a much higher correlation between d’ and 
c (or IA and IE) than between IRT scores for reals and for foils, as correlation between predictor and 
suppressor is a necessary precondition for suppression effect to take place (Conger, 1974; Lancaster, 
1999; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski & Tracy, 2004). Moreover, the recommendations formulated by 
Paulhus and colleagues (2003), that whenever SDT indices are used in a regression equation both 
indices (accuracy and bias/discrimination and criterion) has to be included lest the results be severely 
distorted, where corroborated in the above analysis. In case of IRT-derived indices the consequences 
of excluding a suppressor from the analysis are not as pronounced but most certainly including it 
boosts the predictive validity of both independent variables and enhances model fit on both levels of 
analysis.  
Three general types of suppression were discerned in the literature: classical, negative and reciprocal 
(mutual) (Conger, 1974). It seems that the above case is a good example of a reciprocal suppression 
when both parameters increase their value when suppressor is added. Hence, OCT indices do not yield 
classical suppression effect as was predicted, but reciprocal suppression effect. This is mainly due to a 
non-zero relation between measure of bias (suppressor) and math ability (criterion). 
 
100 Significance of regression weights change was calculated from the z distribution, while significance for R2 was 








Interpretation of Model 3 results is quite straightforward: in case of all three OCT scoring systems the 
measures of accuracy correlate positively with math ability, namely, the higher the self-reported 
familiarity with math terms the higher the objective mathematical abilities. In case of the IRT indices 
the measures of bias are interpreted as follows: the higher the claimed familiarity with foils the lower 
the objective math ability (Table 12). In case of the SDT indices the higher the predilection towards 
answering “yes” in math familiarity scale the higher the math ability as measured by the PISA test. It is 
noteworthy that foils claiming was related with low, not high math ability.    
Only in case of the SDT-derived indices the Model 4 analysis confirms moderation effect, namely 
significant interaction between OCT accuracy and bias. It means that the effect of d’ on math ability 
depends on c value. The below figure presents that the predictive validity of d’ on math ability is highest 
when c is high. It is to say that relation between claiming familiarity with reals, but not foils, is more 
strongly related to math ability among participants that have a general tendency to use affirmative 
response categories in math familiarity scale. It is difficult to interpret this effect further on as to the 
best knowledge of the author interaction effects between SDT indices where not tested in the OCT 
literature, though their emergence is not shocking regarding the correlation between accuracy and 
bias measures. It is difficult to tell why the interaction term is not significant in case of IRT and common 




Figure 6. Margins plot for the interaction between d’ and c and math ability predictions. 
It is also very interesting that both IRT score for reals and for foils are more related to c, instead of 
measures of accuracy and bias being related to each other. It is warranted to suggest that the 
interpretation of c parameter as a measure of bias has to be rethought, especially in OCT versions 
where number of reals and foils is unbalanced. With the data at hand it can inferred from Table 11 that 
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this particular example the “liberal” strategy (claim familiarity/answer “yes”, use “4” and “5”) proved 
to be “efficient” strategy as it inevitably led to high scores on math familiarity scales. This was mainly 
driven by the unbalanced character of the OCT version used in PISA. With only three foils and 13 reals 
the use of this “liberal” strategy is bound to result with high math familiarity scores as the probability 
of answering to a real is more than four times higher than answering to a foil. It would be very 
interesting to verify how different scoring systems would behave in OCTs with different reals to foils 
proportions.  
It is noteworthy, that d’ correlated negatively and quite highly with IRT score for foils- it is a 
corroboration that both indices work as predicted. Moreover, IRT scores, in this form used for the first 
time to score an OCT, proved their worth yielding results clear to interpretation and consistent with 
predictions. They also noted the highest R2 values and the regression weight for IRT accuracy index 
was the highest in magnitude, save for only the weight for d’ from Model 4 where the added 
interaction term further enhanced this coefficient.  
To sum up: OCT measures of bias indeed acted like a suppressor for the relation between math 
familiarity scale scores and math ability. However, reciprocal suppression pattern was yielded instead 
of the predicted classical suppression model. Nevertheless, this change does not have large 
interpretational consequences as all three suppression models are treated like continuum of sorts 
(Conger, 1974; Paulhus et al., 2004). 
 
7.2 Overclaiming and memory bias- Hypotheses 2, 3 & 4 
7.2.1 Method 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 consider related matters, hence they will be presented and discussed together. 
In order to test these hypotheses pairwise correlation matrix as well as multilevel regression equations 
were analysed. The same statistical software and methodology was used as in case of Hypothesis 1 
testing. 
In order to test hypotheses 3 and 4 the following scales were employed: 
• mathematical self-efficacy (st37) 
• openness (st94) 
• perseverance-giving up (st93) 
• perseverance (st93) 
• experience with pure (academical) math problems (st61) 
• experience with applied math problems (st61) 
The openness and perseverance scales used 5-point rating scales, whereas self-efficacy and experience 
scales used four response categories. All scales employed (in a sense) reversed scoring, where high 
scores (answering “4” or “5”) were related to low traits level, while low scores (embracing categories 
“1” and “2”) corresponded to high trait levels. To avoid confusion all scales were reversed so that high 
scores indicate high self-reported efficacy, openness, perseverance and experience and high 
propensity to give up easily (low perseverance). The last trait was expected to yield negative 




The relation between OCT indices and math ability was in detail commented above and will not be 
presented here to avoid redundancy. However, they will be commented in the below 7.2.3 section, 
this time in the light of memory-related theories of overclaiming. 
Moreover, the results for IA and IE are not shown as they are essentially redundant to the SDT indices 
(d’ and c). What is more, the full correlation matrices are not presented either as a lot of information 
is negligible for the present hypothesis testing. All this information is available in Online Appendix C 
though. 






d’ c reversed 
self-efficacy 0,65 0,54 ns 0,24 0,24 
openness 0,29 0,30 ns 0,10 0,15 
experience: applied 
tasks 
0,16 0,21 0,08** ns 0,17 
experience: pure tasks 0,26 0,32 ns 0,16 0,13 
perseverance 0,25 0,29 ns 0,09 0,16 
giving-up        -0,20 -0,27 -0,08* ns -0,20 
Table 17. Pairwise correlations between math self-efficacy, openness, perseverance and math ability 
scored objectively (PISA test) and subjectively (math familiarity scale). Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
The selected measures are positively related to measures of OCT accuracy, however the relation with 
IRT-scored reals is stronger than to d’-measured ability to discern reals from foils. However, the scale 
scores are not related negatively to measures of OCT bias: IRT-scored foils and c. The pattern of these 
relations is very similar between d’ and c (small, positive correlations), whereas in case of IRT score for 
foils all coefficients are zero or close to it. However, to test the possibility that OCT bias acts as 
suppressor regarding the predictive validity of the above scales on math ability a regression analysis 
was run in order to check for each scale’s unique predictive validity controlled for overclaiming 
tendency measured by IRT score for foils. 
Parameter B p 
math familiarity (reals) 22,77 *** 
bias (foils) -11,10 *** 
self-efficacy 44,70 *** 




experience: pure tasks 5,51 * 
perseverance - ns 
giving-up - ns 
R2 level1 0,47 
R2 level2 0,62 
Table 18. Regression of math self-efficacy, openness, perseverance and math familiarity scale on math 
ability scored objectively (PISA test). Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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The results in Table 18 show that from this set of self-report scales only math familiarity, overclaiming 
bias, experience with pure tasks and, to the largest extend, math self-efficacy have retained their 
predictive validities on math ability when controlled for other variables. 
7.2.3 Discussion 
Hypothesis 2 presumed that math ability will be related positively to OCT accuracy and negatively to 
OCT bias. The results presented in Tables 11-14 confirmed this claim regarding IRT-scored OCT indices, 
however the hypothesis was not corroborated regarding SDT (and “common sense”) indices. Such 
patterns of results suggest that indeed math ability is related positively with both measure of math 
familiarity and measure of differentiation between reals and foils. However, regarding the 
traditionally-used bias measures, math ability correlates negatively with claiming familiarity with foils 
and correlates positively with a tendency towards “answering <<yes>> strategy” in math familiarity 
task (as measured by c and IE). However, this last relation may be mainly driven by the unbalanced 
character of the PISA 2012 OCT. With the data at hand it has to be said that the results obtained seem 
to confirm rather the metacognitive account than memory biased theory, as overclaiming seems to be 
an effect of lack of knowledge and failed metacognitive monitoring of the task rather than 
confirmatory bias stemming from large knowledge and overly liberal accepting of associations 
between real terms and foils. 
Hypothesis 3 assumed that the self-report scales measuring other aspects of math ability (self-efficacy, 
experience) and cognitive functioning (perseverance and openness in problem-solving) will correlate 
positively with OCT accuracy and negatively with OCT bias. No such a pattern was observed in the data. 
The self-report measures correlated positively with OCT accuracy and positively with c, but did not 
correlate at all with the purest measure of overclaiming- IRT score for foils. This result further points 
that the so-called memory-based overclaiming theory was again disconfirmed. It seems that answering 
to foils is a distinct process, relatively unrelated to answering to other self-report scales, including reals 
from the same scale (but see subchapter 7.7 on more on this topic). This also seems to suggest that 
method variance between foils and other self-report scales is low.  
When predicting math ability, both OCT accuracy and bias maintained their validity even controlled for 
other scales. Among all other scales analysed only self-efficacy yielded significant and substantially 
meaningful regression coefficient on math ability, other scales failed to reach statistical significance 
when controlled for OCT scores. When comparing Table 17 with Model 3 from Table 12 it becomes 
evident that self-efficacy has a large role in predicting math ability, but both OCT indices remain their 
predictive validity when controlled for this variable. In contrast, the predictive validity of all other 
scales analysed here was reduced to zero, when controlled for self-efficacy and OCT scores101.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that math ability and self-reported mathematical skills will yield similar pattern 
of correlations with OCT scores. Comparing data from Tables 11 and 16 it has to be concluded that 
regarding SDT indices the pattern is indeed similar (positive correlations with both indices), but 
regarding the IRT indices it is not. Moreover, it has to be noted that correlations with objective math 
ability are higher than with subjective scales, including the relations with self-efficacy scale which 
yielded the highest relations to OCT accuracy and no relation to OCT bias. These results disconfirm 
Hypothesis 4 and also ask new questions about the role of self-perceived knowledge in overclaiming 
studied previously by Atir and colleagues (2015).  
 




This pattern of results warrants for a further (exploratory) check of the self-perceived knowledge and 
memory-based accounts of overclaiming by testing its domain-specificity versus domain-generality. To 







bias (foils) d’ c reversed 
math ability 0,57 -0,11 0,34 0,16 
reading ability 0,47 -0,15 0,33 0,07 
science ability 0,47 -0,12 0,32 0,10 
Table 19. Cross-domain relations of overclaiming. Note: zero-order correlations, all ps < 0.001. 
Table 18 above indicates that OCT indices are related to a similar degree to each of the PISA 2012 
domains. It is a clear evidence that OCT measures are related to a domain-general phenomenon 
instead of a domain-specific one. 
It is noteworthy to compare the above results to the outcomes presented by Jerrim and co-authors 
(2019) who also analysed relations between self-efficacy, openness, perseverance and overclaiming. 
However, they did not use continuous OCT measures, employing instead a quartile split of OCT bias 
and comparing only the extreme groups (lowest OCT bias versus highest OCT bias). This dichotomised 
measure yielded significant relations with self-efficacy, openness and perseverance measures, with 
participants scoring high on OCT bias noting higher, more socially desirable, scores on these measures. 
Replicating these analyses in this work yielded similar results in case of openness and a subscale of 
perseverance (giving up). However, there is ample evidence that such splitting of continuous data is 
not recommended as it increases both Type II error (through loss of power) and Type I error 
(MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & Rucker, 2002; McClelland, Lynch Jr., Irwin, Spiller & Fitzsimons, 2015). 
Moreover, when controlling for c, such quartile results ceased to be significant102 suggesting that any 
observed differences are spurious, driven probably by stylistic factors (e.g. ERS). These ideas will be 
further addressed at the end of this chapter. 
To sum up: the above analyses suggest to support the metacognitive monitoring over memory-biased, 
overgeneralised associations account as a possible mechanism of overclaiming (cf. Paulhus & Dubois, 
2014). They also show that overclaiming is related to domain-general phenomena, as it is not related 
to other self-report measures of math ability and it is not limited to one cognitive domain only. This 
also disconfirms memory bias hypothesis and suggests alternative explanations. 
7.3 Overclaiming and motivated response biases- Hypotheses 5, 6 & 7 
7.3.1 Method 
If not commented elsewise all the methodological details were similar as in the above analyses. 
In order to test hypotheses 5 and 6 the following scales were employed: 
• instrumental motivation to learn math (st29) 
• interest in math (st29) 
 
102 Consult Online Appendix C for details. 
152 
 
• social norms regarding learning math: parents (st35) 
• social norms regarding learning math: friends (st35) 
• math anxiety (st42) 
• math self-concept (st42) 
• math learning work ethic (st46) 
• intention to learn math in future (st48) 
• math-related behaviours (st49) 
All these scales were used as coding various aspects of math importance, desirability and positivity 
(emotions related to learning math). 
In order to test hypothesis 7 the following scales were used: 
• locus of control (attribution of success in learning mathematics) (st43) 
• attribution of failure in school context (st44) 
• attitude towards school utility (learning outcomes) (st88) 
• attitude towards hard work at school (st89) 
• success control in school (st91) 
Save the intention to learn math in future items all other scales used four response categories. All 
scales employed (in a sense) reversed scoring, where high scores (answering “4”) were related to low 
traits level, while low scores (embracing categories “1”) corresponded to high trait levels. To avoid 
confusion all scales were reversed so that high scores indicate high trait levels. High trait levels in case 
of the attribution of failure scale meant attributing the failure to internal causes. The intention to learn 
math in future scale (st48) used dichotomous scoring, where low scores (“1) coded intention to learn 
math, whereas high scores (“2) coded intention to learn other subjects. The scale coding was reversed 

























bias (foils) d’ c reversed 
instrumental 
motivation 
0,29 0,30 0,09** ns 0,23 
math interest 0,26 0,29 0,11** ns 0,24 
math anxiety -0,54 -0,44 ns -0,16 -0,23 
math self-concept 0,55 0,44 0,09** 0,12 0,23 
work ethic 0,14 0,29 0,08* ns 0,27 
learning 
behaviour 
0,13 0,24 0,12 ns 0,22 
future intentions 0,25 0,18 0,07* ns 0,16 
norms: parents 0,14 0,18 0,08** ns 0,15 
norms: friends -0,18 ns 0,08* -0,09 0,08 
Table 20. Pairwise correlations between math interest, importance and effort and math ability, scored 
objectively (PISA test) and subjectively (math familiarity scale). Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no 
* p<0.001. 
The above results brought some confirmation for Hypothesis 5: OCT bias is indeed related positively 
with math desirability, as evidence by almost all scales presented in Table 19. The sole exception was 
























d’ c reversed 
control of 
school success 
0,12 0,13 ns ns 0,09** 
attribution of 
failure 
0,19 0,22 0,09* ns 0,19 








0,08** 0,17 ns 0,05 0,18 
Table 21. Pairwise correlations between school control, locus of control and school-related attitudes 
and math ability, scored objectively (PISA test) and subjectively (math familiarity scale). Note: ns p> 
0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
Most of the presented scales yielded very small or even non-significant correlations with OCT indices. 
The strongest pairwise relations were established with attributing failure towards external causes 
(instead of internal) which correlated negatively with math ability and positively with bias, as measured 
by IRT index for foils. This last result, albeit tiny in size, confirmed somewhat predictions from 
Hypothesis 7 regarding OCT bias. Also in line with this hypothesis is the general correlation between 
control of school success and OCT accuracy measures.  
7.3.3 Discussion 
Hypothesis 5 was confirmed to some extent as it was evidenced that item desirability was indeed 
related with overclaiming. However, the correlations with foils index were not high and some of them 
were significant only at the 0.05 level. This seems to suggest that self-enhancement tendencies indeed 
played some role in overclaiming familiarity with mathematical concepts. This result point to the utility 
of including an OCT in the questionnaire and also that it is advisable to measure individual item 
desirability as it is predictive of response biases.  
Lack of relation between math anxiety index and OCT bias disconfirmed Hypothesis 6. However, this 
result may stem from the specificity of the math anxiety scale used in the PISA 2012 questionnaire. 
The PISA version of this scale has good psychometric qualities but the content covered is very restricted 
in comparison to other, more established math anxiety scales, e.g. Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale 
(AMAS; Cipora et al., 2015; 2018). It was assumed that math anxiety was negatively related with 
desirability, but it is possible that the negative correlations between these scales should not be 
interpreted in this way (“I am afraid of math, so I do not think it is important”) and that alternative 
explanations should be employed (e.g. relation due to mutual correlations with math ability). 
It is interesting to observe that the scales did not correlate with d’ but all of them correlated with c 
and math familiarity. This points to special care that needs to be paid for OCT scoring system and its 
implications as it may bring non-trivial interpretations for overclaiming nomological network. Again it 
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was evidenced that c cannot be treated as a pure measure of bias, to which goal an IRT-scored foils 
are much better (see similar thoughts in Atir et al., 2015). It is also interesting that c, as an indicator of 
a general tendency towards answering “yes” to items is more strongly related to the wide spectrum of 
scales than d’. It turns out that the ability to discern reals from foils is based on processes that are very 
loosely related to high scores in other math-related scales. Thus, it is possible that d’ is a context-
specific index that should not be used in every analysis. Moreover, it is to be determined whether the 
relation between c and other scales is driven by stylistic (e.g. ERS or ARS), motivated (SDR, S-E) or 
substantial (math ability) factors. 
Hypothesis 7 was confirmed only to a very limited degree as only the failure attribution scale correlated 
with OCT bias. It is unclear why of the three scales measuring (in theory) similar concepts in the area 
of locus of control103 only this one was related with OCT bias. The internal locus of control was 
previously related with overly positive biases, mainly unrealistic control (Hoorens & Buunk, 1993). 
However, other research linked external locus of control with academic cheating and dishonesty 
(Coleman & Mahaffey, 2000). The results presented by Griffith and colleagues (2006) yielded a very 
complicated pattern of dependencies between locus of control and faking, as in some domains it was 
internal locus of control predicting faking, whereas in others it was external that was correlated with 
faking. 
Regarding the scales analysed in Table 20 it is important to notice that some of them had low 
psychometric quality (see Online Appendix B) and was based on a minimal number of items- three. 
These factors lower the utility of these scales and potentially also had impact on the pattern of results 
presented in Table 20. 
An interesting result obtained is the correlation between utility of school outcomes with OCT bias- this 
may be an indication of SDR as in general it is not socially correct for a 15-years-old student to openly 
admit that school has given him/her nothing. Hence, this positive relation may be a measure of 
“politically correct” answering to the items from the school outcomes scale. This interpretation is 
further corroborated by correlations yielded by this scale with SDT indices- the relation with d’ is 
negative, whereas correlation with c is positive. This translates to an interpretation that high scores in 
this scale are related to higher claiming familiarity with foils, less differentiation between foils and reals 
and general tendency to use more positive response categories. All this points to an SDR distortion in 
this scale. Moreover, this pattern may be a key to distinguish distorted scales- they should probably 
jointly correlate with d’ (negatively) and c (positively) as correlations with only one of the SDT indices 
may not be diagnostic (Paulhus et al., 2003).  
7.4 Overclaiming and motivated response biases- Hypotheses 8, 9 & 10 
7.4.1 Method 
The general methodological approach related to testing these hypotheses is similar to this elected in 
the above subchapters. However, in this part also data from school questionnaire will be analysed and 
data from school principals will be confronted with students’ answers. 
The following scales from the student questionnaire will be used in subsequent analyses: 
 
103 Locus of control is a psychological trait indicating the degree to which people attribute life outcomes to 
internal versus external causes. An example of an internal locus of control is a student attributing a high score on 
a math exam to her hard work and good preparation. A student with external locus of control would attribute 
such success to luck or test easiness, while failure would be attributed e.g. to teacher’s unfairness, bad luck, test 
difficulty, etc., namely causes beyond student’s control. 
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• truancy (st08, st09, st115) 
• school disciplinary climate (st81) 
• teacher-student relations (st86) 
• sense of belonging to school (st87) 
All of this scales used a four-point response scales. In case of truancy items high scores indicated high 
levels of truancy (skipping classes, coming late to school, etc.). In case of the remaining scales high 
scores indicated low levels of traits, hence they were all rescaled so that higher scores indicated better 
school climate, teacher-student relations and higher sense of belonging. 
The school questionnaire scales employed in this part were: 
• use of assessments in school policy (sc18) 
• use of assessment results in accountability process (sc19) 
• school disciplinary climate (sc22) 
• parental pressure on high academic achievement (sc24) 
The sc18 and sc19 scales used dichotomous scoring, school disciplinary inventory employed four-
category response scale, while parental pressure consisted of just one item with three possible 
response categories. All scales were coded and scaled so that high score indicate high trait level. The 
three truancy items were joint to form one scale. The sc19 and sc24 did comprised less than three 
items, hence they were used as single items indicators. 
To calculate discrepancy between principals’ and students’ views on school climate two methods were 
used: a) calculating difference between two scores, b) employing a suppression model. 
7.4.2. Results 









d’  c reversed 
truancy -0,16 -0,17 ns -0,09 -0,08 
teacher-student relations -0,06* ns  0,08** -0,08* 0,14 
sense of belonging ns    0,10** 0,07* ns 0,13 
disciplinary climate 
(students) 
ns 0,15 ns ns 0,10 
assessments in school policy ns ns ns ns ns 
school climate (principals) ns ns ns ns ns 
accountability: public 0,11 0,11* ns ns ns 
accountability: authority ns ns ns ns ns 
parental pressure ns ns ns ns ns 
Table 22. Pairwise correlations between school climate and school accountability and school-related 
attitudes and math ability, scored objectively (PISA test) and subjectively (math familiarity scale). Note: 
ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
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Higher truancy correlated negatively with math ability, both objectively and subjectively scored, but 
did not correlate with OCT bias. This measure did correlate with SDT indices but yielded a slightly 
unexpected pattern of negative correlations with both d’ and c. It means that students reporting higher 
truancy had lower ability to differentiate reals from foils and also had lower tendency to answer “yes” 
in OCT scale. 
The three scales related to school discipline yield only minimal correlations to OCT indices. 
Interestingly, two of these scales correlated positively with OCT bias. Especially the pattern of the 
teacher-student relations scale correlations was interesting as it showed positive correlation with OCT 
bias, but negative with OCT accuracy (and math ability). 
The scales from the principals’ questionnaire failed to correlate with anything. The sole exception were 
small correlations yielded between using achievement data publicly and math ability. It may be 
indicative of some motivational effect or of using this accountability procedure only by certain type of 
schools. 
Neither of the analyses using discrepancy index between principals and students views on school 
discipline yielded significant results. The details can be found in Online Appendix C. 
7.4.3 Discussion 
Hypothesis 8 assumed that participants reporting less school-related problems (e.g. truancy, 
disciplinary troubles) would also yield higher OCT bias. This hypothesis was partially confirmed as 
participants reporting higher school-belonging and better teacher-student relations also had higher 
OCT bias and lower OCT accuracy (in case of the teacher-students relations scale). This may be 
indicative of an SDR distortion of their responses. Similar results and similar explanation was offered 
by Jerrim et al. (2019), thus further corroborating this line of interpretation. 
Similarly as in the paper by Jerrim and co-authors (2019) truancy was not related to OCT bias. This is 
certainly a surprising result, as truancy is, in theory, a non-desirable behaviour which is not expected 
of “good” students. Yet, these scales seem not distorted by any kind of self-enhancing tendencies. It is 
a question for future research projects why is it so. Perhaps students do not see these behaviours as 
“bad” and, consequently, item desirability of such scales is low and does not ignite SDR tendencies? 
Comparing self-reported truancy with more objective data, e.g. from school administration records, 
would also help to disentangle this puzzling example.   
It is also important to notice that most of the relations in this part is small, which may point to non-
substantial interpretations, e.g. method variance causing these tiny correlations (cf. Khorramdel & von 
Davier, 2014). Some of the variables presented here was also based on single items from the school 
questionnaire so at best they can be treated as slight indications of future research directions, not firm 
evidence. 
Hypothesis 9 was not confirmed as difference between principals’ and students’ views on school 
disciplinary climate did not correlate with any of the OCT measures. It is concluded that this idea of 
research seems a good idea of a thorough investigation, preferably in a design enabling application of 
the multi-trait, multi-method model (MTMM) (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). In this work using such 
models was not possible due to lack of adequate data (only one similar questionnaire rated by both 
students and principals). 
Hypothesis 10 was not confirmed as no information on school policy correlated with OCT measures. 
Only use of achievement data in school accountability correlated positively with math ability but this 
effect is beyond the scope of this study and will not be discussed further on. 
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7.5 Overclaiming and careless responding- Hypotheses 11 & 11a 
7.5.1 Method 
Pairwise correlations, regression interaction terms and analysis of cut-off points were employed in 
order to test relations between various C/IER measures and OCT scores analysis. 
Among the C/IER measures proposed in literature a wide plethora of post-hoc indices was calculated 
(remedial internal methods in the terminology of the subchapter 4.5). However, only one external 
remedy measure was possible to employ, simply because only one such set of items was included in 
the PISA 2012 student questionnaire. 
Altogether the following indices were calculated and applied in analyses: 
• Mahalanobis distance 
• dr* distance 
• psychometric synonyms 
• even-odd consistency/Cattell’s sabotage index 
• multiple fixed individualised chance score (MFIC) 
• IRT personal fit statistics for polytomous data: G, U3, lz 
• intra-individual response variability (irv) 
• long-string measure 
• average string length 
• self-reported effort invested in solving PISA tasks (clcuse301, 302, deffort) 
Outlier indices 
Mahalanobis distance and dr* distance measures represent examples of outlier method analysis, 
popular in regression diagnostics. Mahalanobis distance returns a value indicating distance from data 
centre in a multivariate distribution. This measure serves for finding outlier, aberrant participants in 
the dataset. Dr* is a generalisation of Mahalanobis distance for ordinal self-report data recently 
proposed by Mansolf and Reise (2018) to serve as a person-fit measure. 
Other person fit statistics, G, U3 and lz, are extensions of IRT person fit measures for polytomous data. 
They serve in order to identify and flag aberrant response vectors in the data analysed.  
G is also known as Guttman errors and it is a number of response categories embraced that violate 
certain assumptions of an underpinning IRT model. Each step (response category) on a ordinal scale 
has its estimated difficulty parameter, thus it is assumed that a respondent has to have a given trait 
level in order to pass a given step. For example, on a math efficacy using four-category rating scale (0-
to-3, with “3” denoting maximum trait level) item “I can solve integrals” is almost certainly more 
difficult (on average in the whole sample) than item “I can calculate how much cheaper a TV would be 
after a 30% discount”. Hence, respondent embracing category “3” in the “integrals” item and selecting 
only category “1” in the “TV” item has yielded an unexpected pattern, as she embraced a very high 
(difficult) response in an item of high difficulty but failed to reach such a high response on a much 
easier item. Thus, this respondent would have committed a Guttman error. The precise number of 
Guttman errors is calculated as a number of easier steps missed (categories not selected) when more 
difficult item steps were passed (categories selected). The higher the number of Guttman errors, the 
more aberrant the response vector is assumed (Emons, 2008). 
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U3 is based on a very similar idea as Guttman errors and also denotes the number of easy steps missed, 
while more difficult steps were embraced. The index is scaled to a 0-1 range, with values closer to “1” 
indicating higher misfit (Emons, 2008). 
Lz is a person-fit statistics based on a value of standardised log-likelihood for an observed vector of 
responses. The index has its critical values set on the basis of distributional assumptions at a given level 
of significance (Emons, 2009). Small values of this statistic are indicative of aberrant responses. 
Individual consistency 
Psychometric synonyms index resides on finding pairs of items that are on average correlated with 
each other above certain criterium (e.g. at least 0.5). When such pairs are found in the whole sample 
a within-person correlation is calculated for all such pairs to form a value of the psychometric 
synonyms index. In this work two thresholds were used: 0.5 and 0.4. 
The even-odd measure alias Cattell’s (sabotage) index, known also as intra-individual reliability, is a 
within-person correlation between scores calculated for even and odd items separately. The two 
measures are conceptually very similar but have been calculated using different methods: even-odd 
index just calculated the within-person correlation between the two scores, whereas the Cattell’s index 
was based on residuals from a model where even items’ score was regressed on odd items’ score (cf. 
Fronczyk, 2014). 
Invariability methods 
Intra-individual response variability (irv) is a within-person standard deviation calculated for a given 
set of data. Low values of this index may be indicative of straightlining, while very high values may 
suggest (pseudo)random responding (Dunn, Heggestad, Shanock & Theilgard, 2018; Marjanovic, 
Holden, Struthers, Cribbie & Greenglass, 2015). 
Long-string measure is a number of identical responses in a row (uninterrupted string of identical 
responses). If few such strings are present in a given participant’s response vector the highest number 
of them is given as this measure’s value. Average string length indicates average number of identical 
responses in a row in a given vector. 
MFIC is an index derived from calculating the proportion of a given response category used in the scale. 
The index is higher when some response categories are used more often than others. 
A consummate source of information on C/IER and its indices can be found in the article by Meade and 
Craig (2012). Other sources offering sumptuous information on the matter are e.g. Curran (2016), 
Fronczyk (2014), Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki and DeShon (2012) or Johnson (2005). 
External remedy methods 
The PISA 2012 student questionnaire included two items measuring self-reported students’ 
engagement in solving PISA tasks. In one of these items students assessed their effort put in PISA on 
the 1-to-10 scale (with “10” indicating the highest effort), while in the other they assessed their effort 
if the PISA was a high-stakes exam. The PISA 2012 database also includes a difference between these 
two items as a measure of attitude towards PISA test (how motivated a student was in comparison to 
a “real” test) (see more details on this matter in OECD, 2019). 
Measure of respondents’ fatigue 
Due to the PISA rotational design participants solve item booklets that contain partly overlapping 
content but often in different order. The design for the PISA 2012 student questionnaire was 
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schematically shown in Table 5. Math familiarity scale was included in forms A and C of background 
questionnaire booklets, where in form A it was placed at the very end of questionnaire, while in form 
C it was placed in the middle. It was assumed that participants in form C could display less C/IER due 
to lower fatigue. If OCT scores are affected by respondents’ fatigue they should also differ between 
the two forms. 
C/IER indices cut-offs  
Apart from using the C/IER indices in their continuous form they were also employed to flag aberrant 
response vectors in the math familiarity scale. In order to flag such respondents cut-offs logic was used, 
namely participants exceeding certain values on a given index were flagged as potential outliers. The 
person-fit measures were calculated using the “PerFit” R package (Tendeiro, 2018). In case of the 
remaining indices the criterion of two and half standard deviations was used: participants with values 
on a given index above or below its value (depending on the side of distribution diagnostic for aberrant 
responses) were indicated as potential careless respondents. The criterion-related validity of the math 
familiarity scale as well as values of OCT measures were compared between the outlying (careless) and 
“regular” (attentive) participants. Similar approach to flagging C/IER outliers was recommended e.g. 
by Reise et al. (2016). 
Software 
The R package “careless” (Yentes & Wilhelm, 2018) was used to calculate most of the C/IER indices, 
save the person-fit measures that were estimated using the “PerFit” R package (Tendeiro, 2018) and 
MFIC and even-odd measures which were brought by calculations performed in Stata on the basis of 
equations provided by Fronczyk (2014). The dr* index was calculated in R using the code provided by 













104 I would like to thank Paweł Grygiel and Grzegorz Humenny who obtained the code from the authors and 














d’ c reversed 
Mahalanobis 
distance 













0,39 0,43 -0,32 0,48 -0,11 
even-odd 
correlation 
-0,26 -0,28 0,25 -0,33 0,06 
long-string -0,12 -0,07 0,21 -0,15 0,13 
average 
string 
-0,15 ns 0,30 -0,23 0,23 
G person-fit 
statistic 
-0,27 -0,42 0,08 -0,22 -0,16 
Gr -0,30 -0,47 ns -0,16 -0,25 
Lz person-fit 
statistic 
0,17 0,12 -0,39 0,35 -0,29 
lzr 0,09 0,08 -0,17 0,13 -0,13 
U3 person-fit 
statistic 
-0,23 -0,30 0,20 -0,27 ns 
U3r -0,17 -0,22 0,10 -0,13 ns 
dr* 0,23 0,30 -0,21 0,26 -0,10 
Cattell’s 
index 
ns ns ns ns ns 
MFIC 0,29 0,24 -0,44 0,52 -0,26 
effort PISA ns ns ns -0,05* 0,05* 
difference 
effort 
ns ns ns ns ns 
Table 23. Zero-order correlations between C/IER indices, OCT measures and math ability (objectively 
and subjectively measured). 




Most of the C/IER indices yielded significant zero-order correlations with math ability and OCT 
measures. These relations go in the predicted direction, e.g. lz correlates positively with bias which is 
perfectly predictable taking into consideration that low values of this statistic are indicative of aberrant 
responses, while U3 correlates negatively with OCT bias and positively with OCT accuracy which is also 
predictable as high values of this index indicate outlying patterns. 
The highest correlations with OCT measures were yielded by MFIC, lz, irv, average string length and 
psychometric synonyms (threshold 0.4), whereas the lowest correlations were noted by G and 
Mahalanobis distance. Cattell’s index failed to correlate with anything. Problems with this measure 
where communicated earlier on (e.g. O’Dell, 1971) so most likely more research is needed on its 
calculation and theoretical foundation to claim its utility. 
Also self-reported effort and difference between self-reported effort on PISA test and high-stakes test 
did not correlate with any other measures. The minimal correlations yielded between self-reported 
effort and OCT measures were not significant when correction for multiple comparisons was applied. 
This result points to further research on self-reported measures of effort as their utility still seems 
questionable. 
After analysing zero-order correlations, moderator roles of C/IER indices were tested in regression 
equations for reduction and moderator effects on OCT bias measures. Cattell’s index and self-reported 
test effort were not included in these analyses. Moreover, due to high correlations between certain 
indices105 only some of the indices were included in regressions. Only cases with no missing values in 
the math familiarity scale vector were included in the below analyses (cf. Reise et al., 2016). 
Standardised versions of the C/IER indices were used in order to ease the interpretation of regression 
coefficients. Original (raw scale) measures differ greatly in their scales, ranges and standard deviations. 
Math ability was regressed on math familiarity (IRT index for reals), overclaiming (IRT index for foils) 
and a given C/IER index. Two models were compared: 1) model with only OCT measures included, 2) 
model with C/IER index and interaction term C/IER index*OCT bias added. R2 change was omitted as 


















OCT bias B 
change (in %) 
interaction term B 
Mahalanobis distance -5,40** 2,29% ns 
irv (intra-individual 
response variability) 
5,60* -24,42% ns 
psychometric 
synonyms 0.5 
10,68*** -42,10% -3,86* 
psychometric 
synonyms 0.4 
12,75*** -85,50% ns 
even-odd -4,89* -23,81% ns 
long-string ns -12,77% ns 
average string ns -16,50% ns 
G person fit statistic -5,95** -3,28% 5,23** 
Gr -5,70** -1,25% 4,49** 
lz person fit statistic ns -16,00% ns 
lzr ns -3,46% ns 
U3 person fit statistic -6,75** -9,02% 3,72* 
U3r -5,31* -3,75% ns 
dr* 4,15* -9,23% ns 
MFIC 9,94*** -44,52% ns 
 
Table 24. C/IER indices as moderators of OCT bias. 
Note: r- index calculated only basing on reals, foils excluded; ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
Adding C/IER indices to the above-mentioned regression equation resulted in reduction of the OCT 
bias coefficient. The coefficients for the added C/IER indices were not of particularly high value. This 
seems to suggest that most of the C/IER indices acted like a redundant predictor, adding which to 
regression equation results in reduced weighted validity of other predictors. Such interpretation is 
corroborated by insignificant changes of R2 parameter. 
The above regressions were also calculated for SDT indices. The results were essentially the same, 
hence their presentation is omitted here. 
Interestingly, some of the C/IER indices yielded significant interaction terms with OCT bias (G, Gr, U3, 
psychometric synonyms 0.5). Marginal effects for the interaction between OCT bias and G (Guttman 





Figure 7. Marginal effects for OCT bias* Guttman errors interaction. 
It is evident from the figure above that the higher the value of G (indicating increasingly aberrant 
pattern of responses) the lower the predictive validity (represented by regression weight) of OCT bias 
on math ability. Such pattern of results would suggest that C/IER is indeed related partially to 
overclaiming of mathematical terms. Some of the high values of OCT bias may be derived from careless 
responding instead of other mechanisms, typically linked with overclaiming, e.g. positivity bias or 
memory bias. 
The above analyses showed that C/IER indices share some portion of variance with OCT bias but do 
not act as suppressors in regression equations. Most of the C/IER indices do not moderate the OCT 
bias’s relation with math ability neither, with a notable exception of G, U3 and psychometric synonyms. 
It was observed that in the area of distribution of C/IER index indicating aberrant patterns OCT bias 
loses its predictive validity on math ability. However, most of the C/IER indices were not developed for 
treating them as continuous variables but were rather built up in order to flag abnormal patterns of 
responses and foreclose them from further analyses.  
Such approach was undertaken in next analysis where OCT measures predictive validity was compared 
for normal and aberrant response patterns. Even-odd, dr* and MFIC measures were dropped from 
these analyses, because only a handful of participants exceeded the limit of two and a half standard 
































































48,54 -14,02 3,23% left 2 SD 
long-string 38,61 
ns 





50,85 -13,56 3,33% right 2.5 SD  




50,13 -15,41 2,46% right 2.5 SD  




49,46 -15,01 11,00% right 
individual fit 
cut-off value 
Gr person fit 
statistic 
ns ns 
49,84 -15,25 2,53% right 2.5 SD  
lz person fit 
statistic 
ns ns 
49,93 -15,08 2,81% left 2.5 SD  




49,75 -14,69 8,96% left 
individual fit 
cut-off value 




49,48 -14,63 2,53% left 2.5 SD  




51,01 -15,27 2,64% right 2.5 SD  




50,02 -14,73 7,95% right 
individual fit 
cut-off value 




50,85 -14,89 2,53% right 2.5 SD   
Table 25. Regression weights of OCT accuracy and OCT bias on math ability in aberrant (careless) and 
normal subgroups. 
Note: r-statistics calculated only for reals, foils excluded. ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no * p<0.001.  
Cut-offs for psychometric synonyms were set as values below -2 standard deviation as there were too 
few cases below -2.5 standard deviation to estimate the needed model. For G, u3 and lz apart from 
calculating the values for standard deviation cut-offs also cut-off values based on these statistics’ 
distribution were calculated (Tendeiro, 2018). 
All statistics brought largely comparable results as the subgroup flagged as outlying yielded much less 
predictive validity of OCT measures on math ability. In some cases (psychometric synonyms, irv, long-
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string and perfit measures with distributional/individual fit cut-offs) the regression coefficient for OCT 
accuracy was not drastically different between the two subgroups, but in most of the cases these 
coefficients were seriously underestimated in the aberrant group. In all cases the flagged group had 
severely distorted OCT bias coefficients that were close to zero in most of the indices. It is interesting, 
that person-fit measures with cut-offs set on the basis of individual fit values, despite flagging a much 
larger percent of the sample than other measures, yielded similar results but with important 
difference: the OCT accuracy coefficients in this subgroup were much closer to the coefficients 
obtained from the normal subsample, but OCT bias coefficients were still aberrant in this case. This 
points to a conclusion that much larger variance of OCT bias was related to C/IER than in case of OCT 
accuracy and that this is especially true in the 5-10% of the most aberrant response patterns.  
As an exploration of this conclusion the correlation between OCT accuracy and bias was calculated in 
the deciles of lz statistic (each decile counted 288 respondents). The results of this exploration are 
presented in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 8. Correlation between OCT accuracy and OCT bias depending on the lz decile. 
The correlation is a bit lower in the left tail of the lz distribution but the confidence intervals106 (95%, 
light blue in the figure above) are largely overlapping, indicating that the differences between deciles 
are not huge and mostly not significant. However, there is a certain trend towards lower relation 
between these scores in the area of the lz statistic that may denote C/IER. 
The above analyses for SDT indices of OCT are essentially leading to the same conclusions, thus they 
are not presented in order to avoid redundancy. 
Respondents fatigue and overclaiming 
Multilevel regression with the fatigue condition as 0-1 variable was added in order to account for the 
PISA rotational design effect on OCT measures: 
 
 





























IRT OCT indices B p 
math familiarity (reals) 54,88 *** 
OCT bias (foils) -17,08 *** 
fatigue - ns 
fatigue*math familiarity -9,40 ** 
fatigue*OCT bias - ns 
SDT OCT indices B p 
d’ 60,99 *** 
c reversed 42,10 *** 
fatigue - ns 
d’*c reversed 10,24 *** 
fatigue*d’ -11,44 ** 
fatigue*c reversed - ns 
d’*c reversed*fatigue - ns 
Table 26. Respondents fatigue as induced by PISA rotational design and OCT measures. Note: B- 
regression weights, PISA scale where 1SD=100; ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Fatigue was not significant as a main effect, nevertheless, it turned out to yield a significant interaction 
term with measures of OCT accuracy: math familiarity IRT index and d’. In case of both indices fatigue 
condition decreased OCT accuracy predictive validity by around 20%. Surprisingly, fatigue has no effect 
on OCT bias measures. Fatigue also indicated significant zero-order correlations with C/IER indices that 
went into predicted direction- the fatigue condition was related to more C/IER as compared to the 
non-fatigue condition. The coefficients were of very similar size r~|0.09|, p<0.0001, but failed to yield 
any significant main or interaction terms with C/IER indices in a series of multilevel full factorial 
regression equations of math ability on OCT measures, C/IER indices and fatigue condition107. 
7.5.3 Discussion 
The C/IER indices turned out to be a useful addition for modelling relations between OCT measures 
and math ability. Most of the indices yielded zero-order correlations with these variables into the 
predicted direction. However, few of them failed to produce significant correlations with any of the 
measures (e.g. Cattell’s index), others brought in relations in counter-logical direction (e.g. even-odd). 
Self-reported measures of test effort did not yield any significant correlations with OCT measures, 
however, it is rather a result that points to the limited utility of such measures (especially one item 
ones) and not that OCT bias cannot be driven by C/IER (cf. Jerrim et al., 2019). 
In most of the cases the careless responding indices failed to act as suppressor or moderator variables 
in multilevel regression equations. When introduced into regressions they only reduced the regression 
weight of OCT bias but failed to bring in unique variance. Thus, they can be assumed as largely 
redundant predictors in these equations (Conger, 1974). However, some of them produced significant 
and substantially meaningful interactions with OCT bias measure- bias’s predictive validity was 
seriously decreased in the areas of the C/IER index distribution indicative of distorted responding. 
Thus, it was assumed that indeed overclaiming is partially related to careless responding and that C/IER 
could be validly considered as mechanism creating OCT scores. However, experimental designs are 
 
107 These results are omitted due to redundancy. 
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indispensable to test such theories and verify their verity. For now it is impossible to conclude anything 
more than a trace of such relation has been found and it is ready for further scrutiny. 
Moreover, also the C/IER indices themselves require further research as some of them seem of dubious 
utility or yield surprising, counter-predictive results (if not to say non-sensical). Interesting option for 
further investigation is how different C/IER indices should be combined in order to bring maximum 
efficiency of identifying aberrant patterns in the data (cf. Meade & Craig, 2012). 
Fatigue, as induced by the PISA rotational design, correlated with C/IER indices (more C/IER in the 
fatigue condition) and moderated predictive validity of OCT accuracy. Surprisingly, it was not related 
to OCT bias scores. Moreover, it did not produce significant interaction terms with C/IER indices in 
regression equations. More research is needed on this topic, especially with the use of experimental 
studies with fatigue manipulated both between and within conditions. 
To sum up: both Hypothesis 11 and 11a were confirmed. Moreover, interesting results were identified. 
Careless responding is a potential mechanism responsible for some part of the OCT bias variance. 
Furthermore, C/IER indices moderated correlation between reals and foils in OCT. This is an interesting 
track for future investigations in this area. 
7.6 Overclaiming and response styles- Hypothesis 12 
7.6.1 Method 
Among the available methods of RS modelling the IRTree method was chosen due to its well-
established position and a growing body of evidence of valid results it yielded (Khorramdel & Von 
Davier, 2014; Khorramdel et al., 2019; Plieninger, 2020a). 
The IRTree method, introduced by Böckenholt (2012), resides on recoding the observed responses into 
a set of binary variables, called “pseudo-items” or “pseudo-responses” (Plieninger, 2020a). This is done 
in order to disentangle different variance sources underlying the observed responses. In this approach 
it will be assumed that there are three such sources: the target trait, extreme response style (ERS) and 
midpoint response style (MRS). ERS is a tendency to use only extreme response categories (e.g. “1” 
and “5”), whereas MRS is a predilection towards middle response categories (e.g. “3”). The pseudo-
items construction and coding process follows logic depicted below: 
 

















It is assumed that at first a respondent decides whether she is embracing a middle response category 
(m choice) or not. If “3” is chosen than the whole decision process ends and respondent passes to 
another item. If “3” is not chosen (1-m choice), then respondent decides whether she possess trait 
measured by the item (e.g. agrees with the item, claims familiarity, etc.). This is a t choice (have trait) 
versus 1-t choice (do not have trait). In the next step the respondent has to take yet another decision: 
whether she decides to use the extreme response category (e choice) or not (1-e choice). If an extreme 
option is chosen than the respondent embraces “1” or “5” (depending on the t choice made). If an 
extreme option is not chosen then the respondent embraces “2” or “4” (again depending on the 
previous choice t versus 1-t). This decision tree is used to map respondents’ choices in the so-called 
mapping matrix. The above coding is only one of the many proposed in the field (Falk & Cai, 2016; 
Plieninger, 2020a), but the most researched one so far (Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014). 





x X trait X extreme X midpoint 
5 1 1 0 
4 1 0 0 
3 - - 1 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 
Table 27. Pseudo-items mapping matrix. 
The R “mirt” package (Chalmers, 2012) was chosen as a software used to calculate multidimensional 
IRT models and “ItemResponseTrees”108 wrapper was used to model mapping matrices for the pseudo-
items (Plieninger, 2020b). Two models were estimated for further comparisons: a) model with ERS, 
MRS and trait responses (three-dimensional model that assumes ERS and MRS presence in the data), 
b) one-dimensional GRM with no RS modelled (it is assumed that there are no RS in the data). Both 
models were estimated by the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm and by the Metropolis-
Hastings Robbins-Monro (MH-RM) algorithm (Cai, 2010). The results were literally identical as the 
estimations for RS factor scores correlated on the level 0.9996. Thus the two estimations will not be 
compared here and the estimates from the EM algorithm will be reported. The data was weighted by 
applying the final student weights. Three estimates for each student were made: a) estimate for trait 
“ability”, b) estimate for ERS “ability, c) estimate for MRS “ability”. In case of both models the trait 
responses were modelled by the GRM, while in the three-dimensional model the RS factors were 
estimated using PCM, as it was assumed that every item contributes to the RS dimension equally 
(Plieninger, 2020a). 
In order to deepen the analyses and explore differences between in-subscale and across-subscale RS 
(Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014) three sets of RS scores were calculated: a) where both reals and foils 
from the math familiarity scale were used to calculate them, b) where only reals were used, and, c) 
where only foils were used. 
 




The estimated RS results will be correlated with OCT scores in order to check if any relations between 
these processes exist. The Stata package -repest- was used to calculate these correlations. 
7.6.2 Results 
Comparing fit between the one-dimensional (no RS in the data) and the three-dimensional model (ERS 
and MRS in the data apparat from the construct of interest) is a necessary first step in any RS analysis 
(Pokropek et al., in preparation): 
 









9075094,56 9075810,44 -4537478,28 80 2881 3 
Table 28. Goodness of fit for models modelling response style presence in the data. Note: RS- response 
style, ERS- extreme response style, MRS- midpoint response style. 
Analysis of the goodness of fit measures showed that the three-dimensional (3-d) model fitted the 
data better than the one-dimensional (1-d) model, hence confirming that RS are present in the data, 
as it was expected for the PISA 2012 dataset (Khorramdel et al., 2017). 
The correlations between the scores for three pseudo-items are presented in the table below: 
 Pseudo-
item score 
trait ERS MRS 
trait 1 - - 
ERS 0,18 1 - 





trait ERS MRS 
trait 1 - - 
ERS -0,54 1 - 





trait ERS MRS 
trait 1 - - 
ERS 0,35 1 - 
MRS -0,47 -0,48 1 




These pattern of results is also expected, as typically trait of interest (construct variance) correlates 
negatively with MRS and positively with ERS, moreover, the two RS measures are most often negatively 
associated (Plieninger, 2020a; Pokropek et al., in preparation). What is interesting in this particular 
example is that the latter correlation is rather small in size, as in some examples MRS and ERS 
correlated much more negatively with each other (e.g. Pokropek et al., in preparation: ~-0.80), though 
it is also has to be admitted that any evidence in the field of RS is rather thin (e.g. Plieninger & Meiser, 
2014 also obtained Ers-MRS correlation in the range of ~0.50). Furthermore, trait and ERS seem to be 
slightly less related to each other than it was previously reported (e.g. Plieninger & Meiser, 2014; 
Pokropek et al., in preparation, obtained this correlation in the range of 0.4), though the matter was 
never systematically scrutinised as so far. Probably the specificity of the math familiarity questionnaire 
(foils presence chiefly) plays some role in shaping these relations. 
Correlations between RS scores for foils yielded some interesting differences when compared to such 
correlations for indicators estimated solely from the reals responses: in case of foils, trait and ERS 
scores correlated negatively and trait and MRS correlated positively, whereas in case of reals these 
relations were reversed. 
Nevertheless, the main point of interest is to gauge the relation between RS and OCT measures. These 











d’ c reversed 
trait 0,30 0,68 0,42 -0,07** 0,79 
ERS 0,37 0,53 -0,17 0,39 ns 
MRS -0,27 -0,43 0,08 -0,27 -0,10 
trait: reals 0,39 0,75 0,30 0,11 0,70 
ERS: reals 0,40 0,60 -0,08** 0,32 0,13 
MRS: reals -0,32 -0,52 ns -0,24 -0,22 
trait: foils -0,07** 0,21 0,73 -0,65 0,78 
ERS: foils 0,15     0,07** -0,51 0,56 -0,46 
MRS: foils -0,13 -0,07 0,37 -0,42 0,32 
Table 30. Correlations between RS scores and OCT measures. Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no 
* p<0.001. 
ERS yielded positive relation to math ability (both measured objectively and subjectively), whereas 
MRS was negatively associated to it, which is a typical pattern for zero-order correlations of RS scores 
(Plieninger & Meiser, 2014).  
Interestingly the construct indicator for foils correlated negatively with OCT accuracy as measured by 
d’ but positively when measured by IRT score for reals- this result suggests that there is a common trait 
underpinning responses to both kinds of these items. ERS for foils correlated negatively with OCT bias, 
both SDT and IRT scored. This result is surprising at the first glance but it is probably driven by a large 
proportion of “1” responses for foils in the sample (such response loads ERS but correlates negatively 
with both measures of OCT bias; see also Figure 5 for further comparisons). From the comparison of 
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MRS scores correlations for reals and foils it can be suggested that MRS correlates positively with a 
trait variance when it denotes an above-average response, but correlates negatively when it denotes 
a below-average response. A substantial in size negative correlation between d’ and trait score for foils 
would suggest that in this OCT version avoiding false alarms was a much more important loading of 
OCT accuracy (SDT scored) than scoring hits. Table 29 also informs that answering to foils was 
marginally related to math ability, with claiming familiarity with foils being a negative predictor of math 
attainment. 
7.6.3 Discussion 
In contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis 12 ERS was related positively only to OCT accuracy, 
but not OCT bias. In fact, this indicator was related negatively to OCT bias, regardless whether it was 
calculated solely from reals, foils or from both type of items together. On the other hand, MRS 
calculated from foils only yielded negative relations to OCT accuracy and positive to OCT bias. It seems 
that a lot of foils variance stems from midpoint responses. It is up to discussion whether these stem 
from a genuine conviction of some familiarity (substantial response) or whether they are a result of 
avoidance, careless responding, puzzlement or confusion caused by “strange” items (stylistic 
response). Nevertheless, there is no evidence for overclaiming as a side-effect of ERS, however, in this 
OCT version it was MRS that was related to claiming familiarity with non-existent math concepts. 
 
7.7 Latent structure of the PISA 2012 overclaiming scale- Hypothesis 13 
7.7.1 Method 
Structural validity is one of the aspects of construct validity (Messick, 1995). Modelling the OCT’s latent 
structure precisely would help to answer questions related to the mechanisms underlying the 
observable OCT scores. Performing such an analysis makes possible to further inform an important 
question: whether participants use same, similar or dissimilar mechanisms when answering to reals 
versus foils? The first assumption would mean that only one factor should emerge or, alternatively, 
two, strictly correlated factors should form. However, using dissimilar processes to answer reals and 
foils should lead to an emergence of two (or more) relatively unrelated factors. It is also interesting 
whether such factors would yield any cross-loadings, indicating that certain foils might be considered 
as reals by participants and vice versa: some reals could be treated as foils (cf. Leite & Cooper, 2010).  
Hence, in order to determine the PISA 2012 OCT structure the following models were compared: a) 
one-factor model with all indicators loading on it, b) two-factor model, with one factor for reals, one 
for foils, c) higher order solutions. The best fitting model would be considered the most applicable for 
the PISA 2012 math familiarity scale for the Polish sample. 
To perform all the necessary calculations Mplus 8.2 software and Stata 14.2/SE standard procedures 










Before fitting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was applied in 
order to scout the math familiarity internal structure. EFA yielded a two-factor oblique structure of the 
data109. The table presenting factor loadings is presented below: 
 
 
Item Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness  
st62q01   0,35 0,73 
st62q02 0,65   0,55 
st62q03   0,44 0,67 
st62q04   0,45 0,64 
st62q06   0,63 0,56 
st62q07   0,35 0,73 
st62q08   0,88 0,34 
st62q09 0,63   0,53 
st62q10 0,90   0,31 
st62q11   0,79 0,49 
st62q12 0,91   0,28 
st62q13   0,57 0,70 
st62q15 0,57   0,61 
st62q16   0,51 0,75 
st62q17 0,80   0,42 
st62q19 0,61   0,60 
Table 31. Factor loadings matrix from EFA. Note: Loadings < 0.30 are suppressed. 
The solution shows a somewhat surprising image: two correlated (r=0.43) factors emerged, but the 
classification of items to factors does not resemble anything we would have expected for basing on 
the theoretical scale structure. First of all, reals and foils do not form separate factors, instead, all three 
foils are clustered within Factor 2 but accompanied by a bunch of reals. Moreover, few items (st62q01, 
st62q07, st62q16) have really high uniqueness, indicating that they do not share much variance with 
other items of the scale. 
The above analysis indicates that the scales’ structure may be more complicated that thought 
previously. The models displayed below were estimated using the Weighted Least Square Mean and 
Variance (WLSMV) estimator hence no direct comparison of the models, e.g. through AIC/BIC statistics, 
is possible. However, the comparison of the goodness of fit statistics displayed below gives a good 




109 Maximum likelihood estimation used, promax (power=3) rotation applied to the factor matrix. 
110 In all models the SRMR statistic equaled to 0.176 on the between level (school-level) as no additional school-














χ 2 7863,762 6372,519 5522,442 1149,684 
df 208 206 204 192 
p *** *** *** *** 
RMSEA 0,113 0,102 0,095 0,042 
CFI 0,696 0,755 0,789 0,962 
TLI 0,65 0,715 0,752 0,953 
SRMR-
within 
0,175 0,154 0,139 0,052 
 Table 32. Goodness of fit statistics- comparison between the estimated CFA models for math familiarity 
scale. Note: *** p < 0.001. 
The comparison between the single order models clearly favoured a non-unidimensional solution. In 
the two-factor model mathematical ability and responding to foils and factors were correlated with 
each other (~0.60)111. Subsequently, a series of analysis with higher-order models was performed. A 
bifactor model with one general factor, one specific for foils (plus item st62q08 which loaded more on 
the foil factor than math factor) and one specific for reals was estimated. This model did not yield any 
spectacular increase in goodness of fit. Subsequently, a bifactor model with one general factor and 
two specific factors: one for easy112 items, one for hard items, was estimated. This was the first model 
which yielded goodness of fit statistics close to the acceptable values113 (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1999). It was 
assumed that this was a satisfying version of the math familiarity scale model as it informed the basic 
research questions114. 
 
111Moreover, neither of the models fit the data well (RMSEA ~ 0.150, CFI/TLI~0.750, SRMR>0.100). Compare with 
similar observations in Pokropek (2014). 
112 Easiness or difficultness was assessed basing on the items’ means in the sample. Items of means above 3 were 
classified to the “easy” specific factor. 
113 Of course the “accepted values” were achieved only regarding the descriptive statistics of goodness of fit. The 
χ2 goodness of fit test was still significant, yielding insufficient similarity of the model-implied covariance matrix 
to the empirical covariance matrix. However, the seriousness of this misfit is still debated in the field: some 
proponents claim that this test is impractical due to its shortcomings (e.g. dependence on the sample size and 
model complexity) (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger & Muller, 2003; Tanaka, 1987), others reject it completely, 
especially in large sample (N > 1000) studies (Barret, 2007). However, there is a group of researchers who strongly 
opposes such treatment of the χ2 goodness of fit test. For example, the team centred around Leslie Hayduk (e.g. 
Hayduk et al., 2007) points to a great importance of this test and orders strict treatment of it- a failed χ2 test 
means that a model has failed. Such models should be discussed in categories “why did it fail” and not as if they 
were “OK anyway”. Moreover, Hayduk et al. (2007) contend that a failed χ2 could be indicative of serious casual 
model misspecification. However, the working consensus in the field seems to reserve from the two above 
propositions and the general advice is to treat this test only as one of many sources of information on the 
goodness of fit (e.g. MacCallum, 2003). Jöreskog & Sörbom (1993) advocate dropping the dichotomous approach 
towards the test (fit/no fit) and treat it as a descriptive statistic with large values indicating bad fit and lower 
values- better fit. See also the discussion in Konarski (2009, pp. 328-335). Taking this latest advice it is evident 
that Model 4 from Table 32 displays much better fit than other verified models as evidenced by a large drop of 
the χ2 value. 
114 The correlated-factors model was also specified and estimated but it did not converge with the use of the 
WLSMV estimator. Hence, it was decided not to include its results in these analyses. The model probably did not 
converge due to only two level-1 factors. 
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These analyses indicated that items were most likely were sorted between the factors mostly on their 
difficulty, not OCT type (foil vs. real). Especially items st62q08 and st62q04 were eager to “change 
sides”: the former was more related to the bias factor, whereas the latter to the math ability factor 
(see also subchapter 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). Definitely, the PISA 2012 OCT was not a unidimensional scale, 
however, reals and foils did not form stable separate factors. It seems that to many of the respondents 
reals and foils looked much alike and there is no trace of any specific variance part that could be 
attributed to responding to the foils only. 
The below table presents the individual-level factor loadings and item R2 (item residual variances are 












st62q01 0,55 -  0,24 0,36 
st62q02 0,74 0,24  - 0,61 
st62q03 0,57  - 0,33 0,43 
st62q04 0,60  - 0,34 0,48 
st62q06 0,49  - 0,54 0,53 
st62q07 0,56  - 0,25 0,37 
st62q08 0,28  - 0,80 0,71 
st62q09 0,71 0,30  - 0,59 
st62q10 0,61 0,66  - 0,80 
st62q11 0,06  - 0,89 0,79 
st62q12 0,62 0,70  - 0,87 
st62q13 0,22  - 0,59 0,39 
st62q15 0,65 0,31  - 0,52 
st62q16 0,29  - 0,46 0,30 
st62q17 0,63 0,56 -  0,72 
st62q19 0,57 0,44  - 0,52 
Table 33. Factor loadings and R2 for the bifactor solution of the math familiarity scale- individual level. 
The above table reveals that despite modelling each item by two factors some of them still have a 
rather low R2 (e.g. st62q01, st62q13- a foil, or st62q16), meaning that the model still does not account 
for their variance very well. Moreover, it is evident that some of the foils load quite well on the general 
factor (deemed as math ability), e.g. st62q04. 
As the model accounted for the clustered nature of the data also the between-level item statistics 
were generated. They are displayed in the subsequent table: 
 
 









st62q01 0,39 hard 0,15 
st62q02 0,94 easy 0,89 
st62q03 0,55 hard 0,30 
st62q04 0,40 hard 0,16 
st62q06 0,24 hard 0,06 
st62q07 0,57 hard 0,32 
st62q08 0,21 hard 0,04 
st62q09 0,80 easy 0,64 
st62q10 0,92 easy 0,84 
st62q11 ns hard 0,14 
st62q12 0,87 easy 0,75 
st62q13 ns hard 0,12 
st62q15 0,85 easy 0,73 
st62q16 0,35 hard 0,12 
st62q17 0,93 easy 0,86 
st62q19 0,71 easy 0,51 
Table 34. Factor loadings and R2 for the bifactor solution of the math familiarity scale- school level. 
Note: ns- loading was not statistically significant. 
It is striking that the school-level factor did not account for any variance in foils st62q11 and st62q13 
(non-significant factor loadings). Moreover, the model estimated accounted in general very well for 
the school-level variance of the easy items, but not for the hard items. It seems that school-level is not 
related to foils responses (see also subchapters 7.8 and 7.9 on this topic), on the other hand, the 
between-school variance of the easy items is well accounted for by the model. However, the between-
school variance of the hard items116 remained largely unaccounted for by the model. Answering to this 
question is beyond the scope of the present work. 
Bifactor ancillary statistical indices117 
In order to enhance model’s interpretation the so-called bifactor ancillary statistical indices were 
calculated (Rodriguez, Reise & Haviland, 2016). To this end automatic scripts embedded in the 
Dueber’s (2017) calculator were used. 
 
116 It is possible that items’ difficulty is further convoluted with items wording complexity as some of the items 
are dyadic, consisted of two words. These dyadic items, e.g. “complex number”, “linear equation”, etc., could 
have yielded substantial common variance with foils due to the sole fact of their complex structure. It is to be 
reminded that all foils constituted of two terms, just like as these items did. It is thus possible, that complex, 
dyadic items were for some reason more difficult (more suspicious?, more difficult to process linguistically?) for 
participants which led to their low embracement and clustered them together with foils in one factor. It is also 
conceivable that the reals’ content, pertaining to algebra or geometry, could also generate some confounding 
variance, although the analysis of specific factors seems to promote items’ difficulty and then complexity, not 
represented area of mathematics, as main reason of items’ sorting between the factors (see also OECD 2014a). 
117 These indices are new developments and to the best knowledge of the author their properties were not 
thoroughly tested in the multilevel contexts. However, such indices are indeed used and reported in the 


















0,292 0,600 0,877 0,527 0,601 0,878 0,933 
Table 35. Factor-level ancillary bifactor indices. The measures are on the 0-1 scale. 
The explained common variance (ECV 1 & 2) indicates what is the proportion of common variance 
explained by the general factor. Values above 0.80 are considered indicative of an essential scale’s 
unidimensionality. In case of the PISA 2012 overclaiming scale the value of ECV for general factor 
(0.522) clearly indicates that this scale should not be modelled by a one-dimensional model. The ECV 
1 values show that both specific factors account for significant portions of the common variance (0.186 
and 0.292 for easy items and hard/SDR items respectively). Moreover, the ECV 2 values indicate that 
the specific factors account for an even more significant portion of the common variance in case of the 
items loading on them- values of 0.362 and 0.600 are almost double in comparison to the ECV 1 ones 
(see Stucky & Edelen, 2015 for more information on ECV 1 & 2). 
Omega indices for both general and specific factors, representing internal reliability under the model 
fitted to the data, indicate good reliability of all three factors specified in the model as they are well 
above the 0.80 threshold (Reise, Bonifay & Haviland, 2013). However, omega hierarchical, denoting 
what proportion of variance in total (factor) scores can be attributed to the general factor, yielded a 
much lower value of 0.642. The comparison between the values of ω and ωH in this model shows that 
around 29% of the total variance can be attributed to the specific factors (ω-ωH) and around 7% to 
random error (1-ω ; see Rodriguez et al., 2016 for more on these indices). Omega HS index reflects the 
reliability of a specific factor score after controlling for the variance attributable to the general factor 
(Rodriguez et al., 2016). The values of 0.310 and 0.527 show that scores of the specific factors are not 
very reliable and using them as outright variables e.g. in an SEM model is not warranted in this case. It 
is mainly due to the fact that little variance resembles after accounting for the general factor (see 
DeMars, 2013 for more on score interpretation in bifactor models). 
The H values, which denote construct replicability, namely how well is a given latent variable 
represented by the set of observable items and how well is this latent variable expected to replicate 
in other studies (Hancock & Mueller, 2001), indicate that all three factors can be quite successfully 
replicated in future studies, as they all exceeded the 0.70 threshold advocated by the authors of the 
measures (and the general factor and the specific factor for hard/SDR items even exceeded the more 
demanding 0.80 threshold). The factor determinacy (FD) statistic denotes the correlation between 
factor scores and the factors, with values above the 0.90 threshold indicating that respective factor 
scores can be used as variables on their own (e.g. in a regression or an SEM model). Again values for 
the general factor and the specific factor 2 indicate better “trustworthiness” of these scores, but the 
value for the specific factor 1 (easy items) is not far from the 0.90 threshold (Rodriguez et al., 2016). 
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The ancillary bifactor statistics comprise also item-level statistics that are displayed in the table below: 
  
Item IECV ARPB 
st62q01 0,84 0,004 
st62q02 0,91 0,039 
st62q03 0,75 0,047 
st62q04 0,76 0,048 
st62q06 0,45 0,292 
st62q07 0,83 0,009 
st62q08 0,11 1,286 
st62q09 0,85 0,001 
st62q10 0,46 0,348 
st62q11 0,01 8,117 
st62q12 0,44 0,403 
st62q13 0,12 1,118 
st62q15 0,82 0,02 
st62q16 0,28 0,528 
st62q17 0,56 0,232 




Table 36. Item-level ancillary bifactor indices. Note: IECV- item explained common variance, ARPB- 
absolute relative parameter bias. 
The item explained common variance (IECV) values act as a measurement of item-level 
unidimensionality with values above 0.80-0.85 indicating sufficient representation of the general 
dimension by the item variance. As it can be seen in the above table only a small subset of the PISA 
2012 overclaiming scale would be successfully modelled by a unidimensional model. Items such as 
st62q01, st62q62q02 or st62q09 are represented enough by the general factor, however, items like 
st62q08 or st62q16 are poorly accounted for by this dimension. It is interesting that among the three 
foils two are almost not represented by the general factor at all (st62q11 and q13), whereas the 
remaining st62q04 is fairly well accounted for with the IECV value of 0.76. 
The absolute relative parameter bias (ARPB) denotes differences between item loadings in the 
unidimensional solution and in the bifactor model (Dueber, 2017). Large discrepancies are indicative 
of unsuitability of the unidimensional model to account for a given item set. In this case the averaged 
ARPB shows that the differences between the two models are too large to accept unidimensional 
model as an accurate model for the PISA 2012 overclaiming scale (values around 0.10-0.15 are 
considered maximal for the average ARPB if a given model is to be accepted as a unidimensional one; 





Hypothesis 13 was somewhat confirmed as math familiarity scale indeed better fitted to the multi-
factor solution than to a unidimensional structure. Moreover, the two emerging factors were 
correlated, as predicted in the hypothesis. However, this structure did not fit to the observed data (cf. 
Pokropek, 2014) as a closer examination of the factor structure revealed that the assumption that foils 
are a pure measure of bias, whereas reals constitute a pure measure of math ability is not justified. 
The EFA and CFA analyses revealed items loading on different factor that they were supposed to do or 
even an entirely different structure than expected. On this level of knowledge about OCT it is 
impossible to definitively discern what mechanism stood behind the observed pattern.  
Moreover, it is possible that the math familiarity scale’s latent structure was best modelled by a 
bifactor solution due to its superior ability to account for spurious variance in the data (Reise et al., 
2016). Furthermore, there is also a certain arbitrariness in specifying the lower order factors, that were 
constructed in a more exploratory than confirmatory process and may not hold for a different set of 
items118. However, it is worthy to point out that both bifactor solutions tested in the model, the one 
with specific factors for reals and foils as well as the one with specific factors for hard and easy items, 
were theoretically justified (Goecke et al., 2020; Pokropek, 2014), nonetheless, neither of them was 
empirically tested to date. From the analysis conducted above it could be inferred that item difficulty 
resulted to be much more important than items’ ontic status. It is for further analyses to discern what 
item characteristics exactly play key role in self-report of skills. It is noteworthy, that such studies 
would be informative not only for the OCT research field but also for any survey using self-report of 
skills as these characteristic interact with the processes used to respond to foils and reals alike.   
Other higher-order models, e.g. random-intercept EFA models (Aichholzer, 2014; 2015), seem a 
promising avenue of future studies on OCT structural validity. Such endeavours would also benefit 
from the enhanced design of the OCT itself, e.g. only three foils is an absolute minimum of indicators 
for any kind of EFA/SEM analysis and this number should probably be higher in the next versions of 
the method. Moreover, both reals and foils should be also carefully piloted and matched on their 
difficulty and other characteristics such as word length, composition and similarity to other concepts 
(cf. Goecke et al., 2020). Linguistic studies on word recognition offer here an ample source of 
knowledge from which future designs of OCT should not hesitate to dip up. Moreover, such studies 
should also account for the crossed characteristics of items in the PISA 2012 math familiarity scale 
were all foils were consisted of two words (dyadic items), whereas reals consisted of both dyadic and 
simple items. Furthermore, the scales used in ILSAs are notorious for their latent structure problems 
as they are usually not developed to have simple structure but to cover the substantial content (van 
Dijk, Datema, Welten & van de Vijver, 2009). 
Another important direction for future is to clarify the now tangled interpretation of the correlation 
between reals and foils. The above analyses show that it probably has a substance (e.g. math ability) 
substrate but what other variance causes this relation is a matter for future research to pinpoint. 
However, the relation between objective ability and reals-foils correlation (interactional model with 
ability as a moderator of the reals-foils relation) was rejected in a recent study of Goecke and 
collaborators (2020) where general intelligence (gc) failed to moderate such correlation. It is up for 
further studies to establish the nature of this relation and its contextual covariates. 
 
118 See Urban, Szigeti, Kokoneyi & Demetrovics (2014) for a study where method factor specification was much 
eased by the previously gathered evidence. 
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Moreover, it would be interesting to verify how math ability level influences the observed 
relationships. Whether foils are just difficult reals for both high-achieving and low-achieving students? 
Interestingly it was suggested before, although with the use of different items, that existent, but just 
very difficult items may also work as foils in an overclaiming measure (Steger et al., 2020). It seems 
that this effect has been somewhat replicated here as foils and difficult reals formed one specific 
factor. Such a pattern of results points that more knowledge should be gathered on the implications 
of various foils construction rules (see also Franzen & Mader, 2019 and Goecke et al., 2020 on a similar 
topic). An experimental study that would more systematically compare results for different types of 
foils (cf. Hargittai, 2005) and contrast them with responses to very difficult reals (e.g. concepts that 
could be hardly expected to be known in a given sample) would potentially bring valuable data on the 
processes observed in the above analysis. Others important item characteristics, e.g. word frequency, 
word length, similarity to existing terms, content area, etc. should also be tested in a similar way (cf. 
Goecke et al., 2020 for some ideas on this matter).  
The ancillary bifactor indices offered additional support for the bifactor structure, indicating that 
unidimensional model was not appropriate for the data modelled and that the general factor was a 
reliable and replicable representation of the general variance in the data. However, both specific 
factors, but especially the specific factor for the easy items, did not reach that high levels of reliability 
as the main factor did, indicating that their scores (residual scores of the common variance controlled 
for the general factor; DeMars, 2013) should be treated with more care than the general factor scores 
when used as dependent or independent variables in other models, e.g. regression equations or SEMs. 
7.8 School-level overclaiming correlates- Hypotheses 14 & 15 
7.8.1 Method 
The below analyses are planned in order to verify hypotheses relating overclaiming to school-levels of 
traits related to math ability, pressure to math-related achievements and rule breaking. Variables were 
selected from the PISA 2012 dataset on the basis of previous, individual-level analyses presented in 
subchapters 7.2 to 7.4. Specifically, self-efficacy, variables enlisted in subchapter 7.3.1 (save control-
related variables that failed to produce significant effects on individual-level) and variables enlisted in 
subchapter 7.4.1. 
The school-level variables were achieved by averaging the individual scores on a given variables. The 
final student weights were applied and standard errors were clustered at the school level (cf. Jerrim et 
al., 2019). 
Pairwise zero-order correlation coefficients were used in order to explore dependencies between 
these variables and OCT measures and multilevel regression equations were employed to analyse first-
order associations. In order to analyse the individual- and school-level effects separately the method 
of contextual effects was used (Christ et al., 2014). Identifying such effects would mean that school-
levels of certain variables (e.g. math anxiety) are related to the modelled dependent variables 







The results of zero-order correlations of variables related to math achievement with OCT measures 
















ns ns ns ns ns 
norms: friends ns ns ns ns ns 
self-efficacy 0,35 0,27 -0,06* 0,19 0,05* 
work ethic ns  0,07* ns ns   0,06** 
learning 
behaviour 
ns ns 0,06* ns   0,07** 
future 
intentions 
0,09*  0,09** ns ns ns 
math interest ns 0,06* ns ns ns 
instrumental 
motivation 
ns  0,09** ns ns   0,05** 
math anxiety -0,26      -0,20** ns -0,14 ns 
math self-
concept 
  0,23** 0,17** ns 0,11* ns 
Table 37. Correlations of school-level means of math achievement-related variables and pressure 
towards mathematic attainment with math ability and OCT measures. Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
All the variables analysed yielded non-significant or minimal relations with OCT bias indices. 
Interestingly, math work ethic, learning behaviour and instrumental motivation were related to OCT 
accuracy measured by IRT index for reals and were associated to c, but were not related to objectively 
measured math ability. Such pattern may be indicative of spurious relations, probably driven by ERS 
or ARS as suggested by positive relation with c reversed (indicating higher tendency for affirmative 
responding). It is also worthy to comment that OCT accuracy measured by IRT index of reals was related 
to a higher number of variables than OCT accuracy measured by d’. Regarding the very small size of 
these relations it can be concluded that they are of probably spurious nature. D’ seems to be a measure 




















d’ c reversed 
disciplinary climate 
(students-reported) 
0,10* 0,12 ns ns 0,07 
truancy ns -0,05* ns ns -0,06** 
sense of belonging ns ns 0,04* ns 0,07** 
teacher-student 
relations 
ns ns ns -0,05* 0,06** 
Table 38. Correlations between school-level rule violation, math ability and OCT measures. Note: ns p> 
0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
From the indices analysed only sense of belonging to school was related to OCT bias measured by IRT 
score for foils: the higher the school belonging, the higher the bias. However, it is probably only a 
spurious relation, due to its small size and simultaneous relation with c. Among other results school-
level truancy produced a negative relation to OCT accuracy. However, this relation is also very small in 
size. 
7.8.3 Discussion 
Hypothesis 14 was not confirmed as evidence for the relation between school competitiveness and 
pressure for math achievement with overclaiming was very scarce. Hence, it is another small and 
indirect evidence against considering overclaiming as an effect of positivity bias. 
Hypothesis 15 was not confirmed as school-level rule violation was related to OCT in an only very 
limited way. Hence, there is no firm evidence for an association between prevalence of undesirable, 
immoral behaviours and overclaiming (cf. Fell & Koenig, 2016; 2020). 
7.9 Overclaiming correlates- Hypotheses 16, 17 & 18 
7.9.1 Method 
The below analyses comprised using the following variables:  
• gender (st04q01) 
• socio-economic status (escs) 
• school type: private versus public (sc01q01) 
• school location size (sc03q01) 
Gender was coded by a dichotomous variable with “0” indicating girls and “1” indicating boys. 
Socio-demographic status of students’ families was estimated using the PISA index of economic, social 
and cultural status (ESCS). The index is calculated on the basis of students’ parents: occupational 
status, as indicated by the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), highest 
educational level achieved (in years of schooling), family wealth, home possessions (e.g. computer, 
own room for participant at home, household appliances, etc.), classical cultural possessions (e.g. 
classical books, paintings) and educational resources (e.g. educational software, high-speed Internet 
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connection). The ESCS is scaled as a continuous variable with the mean of zero and standard deviation 
of one among the OECD countries. 
School type was coded by a dichotomous variable with “0” indicating public schools and “1” private 
schools. 
Location size was coded by an ordinal variable with five categories coding in order: village (1), small 
town (2), town (3), city (4), large city (5). 
Pairwise correlations, multiple multi-level regression and IRT differential item functioning (DIF) 
analyses were used to verify Hypotheses 16, 17 and 18. DIF was estimated using the Stata -uirt- 
package (Kondratek, 2016/2020). In order to deepen the regression results IRT differential item 
functioning (DIF) analysis was conducted, with gender and escs (median split) as grouping variables. 
DIF is an analysis trying to detect any between-group differences in item parameters which are 
conditional on ability (trait) distribution in these groups. It is important to notice that DIF analysis does 
not serve to identifying differences in between-group trait distributions nor between-group 
differences in item parameters (e.g. whether item “i” was easier in group f vs. group r). DIF statistics 
were generated from the GRM model to which the math familiarity scale was fitted in subchapter 
6.2.3. Two such statistics are presented below: a) DIF significance test based on IRT likelihood ratio 
test (IRT-LR test), b) effect size statistic as given by IRT P-DIF effect size measure. The LR test is 
interpreted as any other test of this kind, however, especially in case of large samples analyses, this 
test tends to be liberal and indicates DIF presence even if this effect is of trivial size. Because of that 
DIF is always accompanied by an effect size measure which helps to decide whether the difference is 
of any meaningful size. The DIF effect size is most often classified to three categories: “A”- trivial 
difference, “B”- medium difference, “C”- substantial difference. In practice only “B” and “C” type DIFs 
are analysed further on (e.g. in order to revise item’s contents). More on DIF analysis and formulas for 
the statistics mentioned above can be found in Kondratek, Skórska and Świst (2015).   
Moreover, the intra-class coefficient (ICC) for overclaiming was computed in order to measure school-
level differentiation of overclaiming (Jerrim et al., 2019; Merlo et al., 2018). 
7.9.2 Results 













gender: boys ns -0,12 0,13 -0,10 -0,04* 
socio-economic 
status (escs) 
0,41 0,30 -0,05** 0,18 0,07 
school type: 
private 
0,10 0,07 ns    0,06** ns 
location size 0,22 0,13 -0,08 0,15 ns 
Table 39. Correlations between socio-demographic variables, math ability and OCT measures. Note: ns 
p> 0.05, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
According to predictions boys yielded higher OCT bias (IRT scored) and lower OCT accuracy (both IRT 
and SDT scored). 
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Socio-economic index proved to correlate positively with OCT accuracy and brought in a small negative 
relation with OCT bias (IRT scored) and a slight positive correlation with c. 
Going to private versus public school was related with a slightly higher math ability but was in general 
unrelated to OCT measures, yielding only a marginal association with d’. 
Location size was related to OCT bias- the larger the settlement in which school is located the lower 
the bias and the higher the accuracy (and math ability). 
These zero-order correlations were further investigated in a regression equation in order to control for 
math ability influence on gender and escs. However, before calculating the regression models with 
predictors, the so-called null models were estimated in order to calculate the intra-class coefficient 
(ICC) for OCT measures. The ICC values produced from these models are summarised in the last row of 
the regression analysis table. Values for IRT indices were averaged across five PVs. 
The table presented below summarises four regression equations where OCT measures were 
regressed on math ability and the set of socio-demographic variables commented above: 
 
Variable 
OCT bias (foils) 
coefficient 








math ability -0,32 0,41 0,61 0,44 
complementary OCT 
index119 
0,38 -0,69 0,25 -0,61 
gender: boys 0,33 -0,22 -0,29 -0,24 
socio-economic status 
(escs) 
ns     0,06** 0,09 0,06** 
school type: private ns ns ns ns 
location size: village 
(referential group) 
 - -  -  -  
location size: small town ns ns ns ns 
location size: town ns ns ns ns 
location size: city -0,17** ns ns 0,16* 
location size: large city ns -0,15* ns ns 
ICC- null model 0,02 0,02 0,13 0,06 
Table 40. OCT measures regressed (standardised regression weights) on math ability and socio-
demographic variables- results of a multilevel regression with ICC values. Note: ns p> 0.05, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, no * p<0.001. 
Gender remained a significant predictor of OCT measures even when controlled for math ability and 
other socio-demographic variables. Boys yielded higher OCT bias, higher tendency to answer “yes” to 
items (as measured by c reversed) and lower OCT accuracy. 
 
119 For OCT bias (foils) it is OCT accuracy (reals), for OCT bias (c reversed) it is OCT accuracy (d’) and vice versa. 
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Higher socio-economic status was related to marginally higher OCT accuracy and also higher tendency 
to answer affirmatively to items (c reversed). 
When controlled for other variables school type was not a significant predictor of OCT measures. 
Location size also failed to produce a coherent set of relations with OCT measures when controlled for 
other variables in the model. 
ICC analysis 
ICC values from null models were low, especially for OCT bias measures. This result may indicate that 
overclaiming is mainly dependent on individual-level variables and school clustering does not have 
much relation to it (cf. Jerrim et al., 2019). 
Differential item functioning (DIF) analysis 
Among the 16 items of which the PISA 2012 math familiarity scale is composed 13 yielded a statistically 
significant value of the LR test (< 0.05) but only four out of them approached the non-trivial value of 
the DIF effect size (P-DIF > 0.25; cf. Kondratek et al., 2015). The item parameters and DIF statistics for 
these items is presented in the table below. All statistics for all items along with ICCs is available in 
Online Appendix D. 
 
Item LR test p P-DIF GR P-DIF GF 
st62q03 37,97 *** -0,238 0,243 
st62q08 72,68 *** -0,292 0,305 
st62q11 112,56 *** -0,385 0,397 
st62q13 41,24 *** -0,303 0,314 
Table 41. Significance and effect size for DIF analysis across gender. GR= boys, GF=girls. Note: *** p < 
0.001. 
Table 41. displays information about DIF significance and effect size. It is worthy to know that out of 
four items that have approached the “B” DIF size two are foils and two are reals. The third foil, item 
st62q04, yielded significant DIF but of only marginal size. Hence, four items were much easier for boys 
than girls conditional on the level of math ability (as measured by math familiarity scale). Thorough 
analysis of items’ thresholds indicated that boys were more prone to claim some familiarity with the 
identified items (e.g. select response “2” or “3” instead of “1”) but not more prone to embrace the 
highest responses (e.g. “4” or “5”). The information on item parameters in two groups conditional on 
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Parameter GR (boys) GF (girls) Item 
a 1,33 1,39 
st62q03 
b1 -1,72 -1,29 
b2 -0,82 -0,44 
b3 0,06 0,25 
b4 0,88 1,07 
a 0,87 1,05 
st62q08 
b1 -0,77 -0,10 
b2 0,61 0,99 
b3 1,91 2,05 
b4 3,40 3,79 
a 0,48 0,72 
st62q11 
b1 -0,31 0,84 
b2 1,57 2,05 
b3 3,57 3,25 
b4 5,43 5,11 
a 0,69 0,67 
s62q13 
b1 -1,58 -1,04 
b2 -0,25 0,29 
b3 1,03 1,67 
b4 2,40 3,29 
Table 42. Item parameters for DIF-flagged items over gender. Note: a- discrimination parameter, b- 
difficulty parameter from the fitted polytomous IRT model. 
Item discrimination seems roughly even between the two groups, only item st62q11 is characterised 
by a slightly more steep ICC among boys than among girls. It seems thus that the DIF present here is 
of uniform nature (difference only in item difficulties). Threshold analysis shows that these items were 
easier for boys than for girls conditional on trait distribution in two groups. It looks like the difference 
is more pronounced in the lower than higher thresholds. 
Similar analyses were conducted for median-split socio-economic status (escs). It is of course a 
suboptimal analysis as such forced categorisation of continuous variables is not recommended, 
however, it is the only way to perform DIF analysis across escs. 
Among 16 math familiarity scale items only two did not reach statistical significance in DIF analysis but 
only two approached the substantive effect size. Basic information on them is summarised in the tables 
below: 
 
Item LR test p P-DIF GR P-DIF GF 
st62q04 54,41 *** -0,25 0,25 
st62q13 52,31 *** -0,27 0,28 
Table 43. Significance and effect size for DIF analysis across socio-economic status. GR= low escs, 




Parameter GR (low escs) GF (high escs) Item 
a 1,27 1,04 
st62q04 
b1 -2,35 -1,99 
b2 -1,12 -0,87 
b3 -0,04 0,28 
b4 1,30 1,72 
a 0,57 0,52 
st62q13 
b1 -1,87 -0,99 
b2 -0,16 0,61 
b3 1,53 2,22 
b4 3,54 3,89 
Table 44. Item parameters for DIF-flagged items over socio-economic status (escs). Note: a- 
discrimination parameter, b- difficulty parameter from the fitted polytomous IRT model. 
Items st62q04 (“proper number”) and st62q13 (“declarative fraction”) appeared again in this analysis. 
It seems that they were the root of most of the differences observed between low and high status 
groups. It is worthy to note that both items st62q04and st62q13 were embraced more eagerly by lower 
escs group in comparison to higher escs group conditional on trait distribution in the two groups. 
Comparing escs and gender DIF it is evident that there were more and more pronounced differences 
for gender than for escs. 
As item st62q13 seemed to cause the most “trouble” in psychometric modelling of the math familiarity 
scale let’s take a look at its ICCs, both across gender and socio-economic status group: 
 
Figure 10. Item characteristic curve (ICC) of item st62q13 for DIF analysis over gender. GR= boys, GF= 




Figure 11. Item characteristic curve (ICC) of item st62q13 for DIF analysis over socio-economic status 
group. GR= lower status, GF= higher status. Ψ(Θ)= trait distribution. 
Both figures above show two main things: a) participants responded to this item mainly using two 
extreme options: “1” and “5”, b) boys and lower escs group, conditional on trait distribution, tended 
to embrace other categories than “1” more often than girls and higher escs group. 
7.9.3 Discussion 
Hypothesis 16 was confirmed as boys indeed overclaimed more (higher OCT bias) than girls. This effect 
remained significant even when controlled for math ability and other variables, hence confirming part 
of Hypothesis 18 as well. Such an effect is also a direct confirmation of results obtained by Jerrim et al. 
(2019) on a group of Anglo-Saxon participants of the PISA 2012 cycle. This result would point towards 
positivity bias explanation of overclaiming as there are no differences in objective math ability between 
the two genders, but the overall social opinion and students’ attitude is that math is a “boy thing” (as 
it was presented in subchapter 5.3.8). This mindset may consequently lead to “knowing math stuff” 
being more expected from boys than from girls which could lead to overclaiming. DIF analysis showed 
that this difference was not very pronounced as only four items yielded significant between-group 
difference conditional on math ability. 
Hypothesis 17 was partially confirmed as participants higher in socio-economic status did not 
overclaim more than their counterparts of lower status but have noted higher OCT accuracy. This result 
is in contrast with the Jerrim and colleagues’ findings (2019) that high escs participants overclaimed 
more. It is hard to explain such cross-country differences120 without generating more evidence in the 
 
120 Jerrim et al., 2019 used responses from the Anglo-Saxon countries participating in the PISA 2012 cycle: USA, 
UK (separate samples for each of the constituting countries), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland. 
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matter. Similarly as in the study by Jerrim et al. (2019) it was observed that item st62q04 (“proper 
number”) displayed largest differences between groups differing in socio-economic status. Moreover, 
it was observed that in the Polish sample the group of higher escs yielded tendency towards more 
extreme responding and towards less midpoint responding. The nature of such relationship warrants 
further studies as up to date it is not clear where these associations stem from. It is possible that this 
result is linked to the results presented by Anderson and co-authors (2012) who related high social 
status to being (over)confident in both social relations and self-reports.   
Regarding second part of Hypothesis 18: socio-economic status retained its positive relation to OCT 
accuracy even when controlled for math ability (and gender). These relations were, however, small in 
size. 
Moreover, the data from the Polish sample confirmed observations by Jerrim et al. (2019) that 
overclaiming has low ICC, namely that it is rather evenly distributed through schools. This urges for 
more studies on individual-level and group-level correlates of overclaiming as the phenomenon varies 
greatly on individual level, seems to have almost no school-specific variance (see also subchapter 7.8) 
but on the other hand the cross-country (cross-culture) differences are huge (Vonkova et al., 2018), 
even among the countries using one language version and sharing a common cultural root (Jerrim et 
al., 2019).  
7.10 Individual differentiation of overclaiming scores- Hypothesis 19 
7.10.1 Method 
Finally, an analysis of individual differentiation of overclaiming scores was planned. In order to study 
this topic latent class analysis (LCA) was used. LCA fits a set of latent clusters to observable response 
patterns in order to identify discrete groupings of participants (McCutcheon, 1987). 
 LCA can be used in either exploratory or confirmatory approach, here it will be applied to confirm the 
data pattern obtained by Yang et al. (2019; see 5.2.9 for more details on this study). This end 
determined the design and procedure of this study as they were tailored to resemble the procedure 
of Yang et al. (2019)121. A set of five plausible values for overclaiming, math familiarity and math ability 
were used as latent classes manifest indicators. Original PISA 2012 PVs for math ability (OECD, 2014b) 
were rescaled to the scale (0,1) (see Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017), whereas overclaiming and math 
familiarity were represented by the variables created in the steps described in part 6.2.3 of this work. 
The data were weighted and accounted for the clustered PISA design. 
LCA assumes within-class independence between the variables as a default option (Clark et al., 2013; 
McCutcheon, 1987). This assumption was relaxed in this analysis for PVs of the same variable as they 
are obviously highly correlated by design. MPlus 8.2 “mixture” analysis type was used and restricted 
maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator was applied to estimate the model parameters. 
In order to compare differences between classes on a set of variables, class membership, based on 
class probabilities of the best fitting model, was saved and used as an independent variable in mixed 
regression analysis. Margins were used to calculate variables’ means in a given latent class, controlling 
for the PISA design. Significance of the inter-class differences were calculated on the basis of the 
estimated regression coefficients.  
 
121 The exact similarity was probably not achieved as Yang et al.’s paper lacks certain relevant method data. The 
corresponding author did not respond to an e-mail with a plea to share more details.  
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This way of way of estimating these covariate effects is not optimal as class membership does not 
account for uncertainty related with class probability (Pokropek, 2016) but this way of proceeding was 
adopted in order to ease the calculations. Moreover, similar course of action was implemented by 
Yang et al. (2019) and as latent class covariates can influence posterior class probabilities it was used 
as a second argument not to include covariates in class identification stage. Furthermore, there were 
no clear conceptions on how to specify models with covariates due to lack of previous data. 
7.10.2 Results 
Model fit 
Models differing in number of latent classes were fitted to the observed dataset. In order to decide on 
the number of classes to which the dataset was divided the following source of information were used: 
a) information criteria (AIC, BIC, sample-size-adjusted BIC), b) entropy parameter, c) Lo-Mendell-Rubin 
test (LMRT; Lo, Mendell & Rubin, 2001), d) theoretical model interpretation with a special regard on 
the solution proposed by Yang et al. (2019), e) model parsimony. The below table summarises these 
















1 class 72538,26 72899,63 72708,99 - - 60 -36209,1 
2 class 71690,23 72147,97 71906,49 0,586 0,0001 76 -35769,1 
3 class 71265,74 71819,85 71527,53 0,687 0,0008 92 -35540,9 
4 class 70962,34 71612,81 71269,65 0,715 0,0786 108 -35373,2 
5 class 70768,19 71515,03 71121,03 0,732 0,6693 124 -35260,1 
Table 45. Model fit statistics for the LCA analysis. 
The statistics gathered in the above table display situation typical for LCA- model fit indicated by 
information criteria increases with the increase of the number of latent classes (Clark et al., 2013; 
Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017). In order to circumvent this problem the number of the classes fitted 
to subsequent analyses was decided on the basis of the LMRT which indicated three-class solution and 
theoretical interpretation which also pointed for this resolution. The four-class model consisted of very 
similar classes as the more parsimonious model with the additional, fourth class being simply split of 
one of the classes identified in the three-class solution. Moreover, these additional, offspring classes 
had very similar profiles suggesting that the differentiation between them was largely spurious (Clark 
et al., 2013). Finally, and most importantly, the three-class solution directly corresponded with the 
previous model adopted by Yang et al. (2019). Hence, three-class solution was elected and subjected 
to further scrutiny122123. 
 
 
122 The value of entropy parameter for this model, 0.687, also indicated that this model assured sufficient class 
separation. It is worthy to note that this value is higher than the entropy value in the accepted model in the study 
by Yang and colleagues (2019) where it amounted only to 0.549. 
123 Complete results for the four-class solution are available in Appendix F. 
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 Latent class profiles 
















Average latent class 
probability (based on 
most likely 
membership) 
1 0,42 1271 0,42 0,865 0,857 
2 0,09 259 0,08 0,856 0,787 
3 0,49 1521 0,50 0,843 0,862 
Table 46. Estimated posterior probabilities for class membership. 
Two largest classes accounted for more than 90% of participants. The comparison between estimated 
probabilities based on posterior distribution probability and most likely class membership proved to 
be similar to each other which positively attests for the stability and adequacy of the chosen solution. 
Means of the indicators in given classes are presented in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 12. Latent classes’ profiles 
The smallest of all three classes class 2 (representing only 9% of participants) seems to resemble the 
“overclaiming” class discerned by Yang et al. (2019). This group is characterised by the highest 
overclaiming and math familiarity scores but its scores on the objective math ability test do not seem 
to corroborate such a high opinion on their abilities. Class 1 can be described as low achieving class 












class1 mean class2 mean class3 mean
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some of the high overclaiming scores were noted by participants endorsing midpoint response 
category when responding to foils in a way to, allegedly, show their confusion with the “odd items”. 
This hypothesis seems corroborated by low scores of this group on math self-report and math ability 
alike, indicating their overall accurate self-description. Finally, the largest class in the model, class 3, 
yielded response pattern that could be commented as class of reasonably high mathematical ability, 
low overclaiming and adequate claims on the math familiarity scale (accurate self-report regarding 
math abilities). 
Inter-class differences on relevant variables 
Mixed regression models were used to study inter-class differences on a set of predefined variables. 
Variables were qualified on the basis of two premises: a) Yang et al. (2019) paper, b) correlations with 
OCT measures obtained in the previous analyses (see subchapters 7.2-7.9). The below table 
summarises findings provided by these models and presents marginal means in each class: 
Variable/class 















-0,47 2,3 0 1 0 1 




-0,2 2,3 0,26 1,3 0,08 1,2 
work ethic -0,29 2,3 0,31 1 0,16 1 
learning 
behaviour 
-0,2 2,3 0,39 1,3 0,11 1,2 
math interest -0,26 2,3 0,48 1,3 0,23 1,2 
instrumental 
motivation 
-0,22 2,3 0,4 1 0,33 1 
math anxiety 0,49 2,3 -0,69 1,3 -0,36 1,2 
self-concept -0,54 2,3 0,64 1,3 0,27 1,2 
attitudes 
activities 
-0,13 2,3 0,22 1 0,08 1 
attitudes 
outcomes 
0 2 0,17 1,3 0 2 
school 
belonging 




0 2 0,17 1,3 0 2 
Table 47. Marginal means for latent classes’ covariates. Note: all variables on a standardised scale with 
SD=1; diff- yields number of the class or classes that differ significantly from the class indicated in the 
column header to the left. All variables, save gender, were measured on a scale with mean equaled 
zero and standard deviation of one. Gender is given as a percent of boys in a given class.   
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The “low skilled, accurate self-report” class comprised larger percent of male students than any other 
class and was characterised by lower than average scores on most of the variables, including socio-
economic status. This group noted average results only on scales measuring school attitude (attitude 
towards outcomes, school belonging and teacher-student relations) and a markedly above-average 
score on math anxiety. 
The ”overclaiming” class did not differ in case of gender and socio-economic status from the “high skill, 
accurate self-report” class. It did noted however significantly higher scores on most of the self-reports, 
yielding a very desirable profile of a highly competent and socially successful student. 
The last class yielded a favourable profile but to a much lesser extent than the “overclaiming” class. It 
is noteworthy that the last class did not differ in the scores describing social relations from the “low 
skilled” class but noted lower scores than the “overclaiming” group. 
7.10.3 Discussion 
Comparing the results obtained to the findings of Yang and colleagues (2019) it has to be said that in 
general the pattern of findings is similar. The “disengaged” class from the Yang et al. study largely 
resembles the “low, accurate” class from this study, with the exception that this class grouped around 
20% of participants in the Yang’s study in comparison to 42% in this study. Moreover, the 
“overclaiming” class in the former paper counted more than 20% of the students which was more than 
twice the number obtained in the latter work (only 9%). Finally, the “high, accurate” class was also 
marginally larger in the Yang’s study (around 60%) than in the above presented work (almost 50%). 
This shows that the main difference resides in the “overclaiming” class being much larger and the “low, 
accurate” alias “disengaged” class much smaller in the American in comparison to the Polish sample. 
Regarding the variables regressed on class membership the inter-class differences seem similar when 
comparing the two studies. It seems that the LCA confirms that males are characterised by higher 
overclaiming and that overclaiming is a feature related rather to higher, not lower, social status (cf. 
Jerrim et al., 2019). The latter result reminds the findings obtained by Anderson et al. (2012) who 
pointed to the role of self-assurance, even if not congruent to reality, in winning social position. In 
general the “overclaiming” class yielded similar profiles in American and Polish samples, with a 
somewhat more extreme, desirable profile of the “overclaimers” in the latter one. It is probable that 
the Polish “overclaiming” class, being smaller than the American one, comprised only “die-hard 
overclaimers”. 
Some differences between the studies can be most certainly attributed to the cultural differences 
between the USA and Poland. Large proportion of the American students in the “overclaiming” class 
found by Yang and co-workers (2019) is not surprising as Jerrim and colleagues (2019) assessed that 
students in the USA overclaimed their mathematical skills to the greatest degree among all the Anglo-
Saxon countries in PISA124. However, Vonkova et al. (2018) obtained similar values of accuracy and 
exaggeration indices for the two countries compared here. Thus, it seems that data at hand enables to 
predict that both countries should yield a notable “overclaiming” class but do not offer much 
suggestion on how to explain any observed differences between the USA and Poland125. 
Interestingly, the “low, accurate” class yielded similar OCT scores but lower math familiarity scores 
than the “high, accurate” class (this result is practically identical when compare Yang’s study and this 
work). This effect can be interpreted just as the floor effect but more scrutiny would be warranted to 
 
124 Save Canada which noted the same results as the USA. 
125 It is also possible that at least some of the differences are attributable to the slight methodological 
discrepancies between the two studies instead of substantial factors. 
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exclude other explanations, e.g. MRS. Studies with the use of other data sources, e.g. qualitative 
interviews or eye-tracker data, would bring great help to understand the differences between the 
classes more fully. 
The performed LCA yielded three classes, largely similar in profile to the classes obtained by Yang and 
colleagues (2019) on a different sample. The “overclaiming” class was characterised by unwarranted 
high level of self-report math skills and math-related abilities, yielding a very desirable and (overly) 
positive profile. However, this group did not have higher math abilities in comparison to the other class 
which noted high abilities but yielded much more moderate self-report scores. Nevertheless, the 
“overclaiming” group counted only 9% of the participants, a proportion much lower than often cited 
30% in the literature (or 20% in the Yang’s study; see subchapter 4.4 for a detailed discussion on this 
topic). It is probable that more studies with the use of non-US samples will help to shed more light on 
this proportion. It is notable that one of the very few studies that compared accuracy of self-report in 
comparison to objective test on a non-US sample also obtained a slightly lower proportion of 
overclaimers (16%; Koniewski et al., 2019). More research is warranted on cross-cultural differences 
and covariates of overclaiming. LCA studies are also recommended as they seem to bring interesting 
insight into the investigated matter. The above studies development, e.g. with the use of factor (IRT) 




















Chapter 8- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Results’ summary 
Suppression effect and OCT scoring 
Obviously, the analyses performed could not answer all the questions related to the overclaiming 
technique. However, the approach of small research steps (Kalton & Schuman, 1982) enabled to inform 
on certain research problems, advancing a middle-level theory and laying ground before any further 
research attempts in this area. 
First of all, it was determined that including OCT bias index in a regression equation indeed results in 
a suppression effect, namely in enhancement of predictive validity of a subjective math ability on an 
objective math test. However, in contrary to predictions, the revealed pattern was not of classical 
suppression but of mutual suppression in which OCT bias was negatively related to math ability in a 
zero-order relation and where both OCT bias and OCT accuracy indices boosted their predictive validity 
when introduced into regression equation. 
Comparing to the radical improvement of self-reports predictive validity and interpretability achieved 
in cross-country context (Khorramdel et al., 2017; Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013) the results of suppression 
analysis for the within-country, inter-individual context was much more modest. 
Nevertheless, the enhancement of regression weight was statistically significant but increment in its 
size was rather moderate, especially in case of IRT indices where the regression weight risen only of 
about 7% and R2 increased by 10%. These values were dwarfed by the increment noted by SDT indices, 
where predictive weight of the subjective math ability was boosted by 200% and R2 was almost 
doubled. Common sense indices brought increments of a medium size, somewhat between IRT indices 
and SDT measures.  
Important conclusions were reached regarding OCT scoring. Three scoring approaches were 
compared: IRT indices, SDT indices and “common sense” indices (Paulhus et al., 2003; Vonkova et al., 
2018). It was determined that indices differ in their exact interpretation and that misinterpretation of 
the c parameter is very likely due to the common confound caused by the minus sign in the equation. 
This minus sing was commonly dropped in some studies but a browse through the literature indicates 
that not in every study it was reported properly which often could distort results’ interpretation.  
Moreover, the common sense indices do not seem to offer equal measurement characteristics as SDT 
indices. More comparative research in this topic is warranted, but for now the common sense indices 
should be used with extra care. Furthermore, it is not known, as it was not tested in this work, how a 
wide family of ad hoc OCT indices, often used in the field, would behave in such analyses. Basing on 
psychometric knowledge of the properties of sum scores (von Davier, 2010) or difference indices 
(Zumbo, 1999) their use should be limited in favour of more advanced and theory-based scores such 
as IRT or SDT indices. What is more, it was revealed that including interaction between SDT statistics 
d’ and c leads to further increase in predictors’ criterion-related validity and variance accounted for by 
the model (as measured by R2). This issue also calls for future exploration as interactions between OCT 
bias and accuracy scores were not analysed in previous studies. Bypassing this term in regression 
equations could result in model miss-specification (specification error) and biased estimates. 
Furthermore, as it was evidenced in the subchapter 7.2, using different OCT scoring may lead to 
different research conclusions. 
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Interestingly, it seems that SDT indices’ interpretation as pure measures of OCT bias I and OCT accuracy 
(d’) needs to be revised. Both indices most likely confound information on accuracy and bias. Especially 
the c statistic should be interpreted more as warranted by the SDT theory- as a tendency towards 
certain type of responding, which, in case of responding to Likert-type rating scales, not necessarily 
equals to bias. It appears that SDT measures should be only interpreted together, as they do not make 
much sense apart from each other. Moreover, as it can be assumed from the interaction analysis 
shown in the subchapter 7.1, that any responses yielded from respondents should be interpreted in a 
2 x 2 matrix for a more precise interpretation. It is suggested that truly accurate respondents are those 
scoring high on both d’ and c (at least in the context of rating-scales), whereas participants scoring low 
on d’ but high on c are those yielding positive bias. This issue is related with interpreting correlation 
between OCT bias and accuracy. These value differs greatly across indices (see subchapter 7.5) but also 
across studies and samples (e.g. Ziegler et al., 2013).  
Another, as yet unaddressed issue with SDT indices, is their reliance on assumptions derived directly 
from the Signal Detection Theory, e.g. normal distribution of both signal and noise and equal variances 
characterising these information. It is unlikely that breaking these assumptions (which is evident in 
case of overclaiming tasks applied to rating scales) is without the consequences for psychometric 
quality and interpretability of SDT measures in the OCT field. Such a direct transplant from a very 
different theory is a welcome contribution, broadening the field of social sciences, however, it is 
advised to deepen our knowledge on consequences of using these indices for rating scales. It is likely 
that in this context most of the SDT’s basic assumptions are broken (cf. Goecke et al., 2020). Moreover, 
SDT’s use in the context of social sciences was lately criticised as the theory was deemed an 
“oversimplified metacognition model” (Paulewicz & Blaut, 2020). New extensions of SDT for non-
dichotomous data are needed and may prove an important addition for response biases research. Such 
extensions for Bayesian models (Paulewicz & Blaut, 2020) and multilevel techniques (Wright, Horry & 
Skagerberg, 2009) were proposed lately. Both methods await their validity studies in the framework 
of social sciences, in particular in the field of self-reports. 
Mechanisms of overclaiming 
Dunlop and colleagues (2017) proposed four possible mechanisms causing overclaiming: a) motivated 
positivity bias resulting in self-enhanced self-presentation, b) faking/impression management/lying, c) 
memory bias, d) careless responding. This proposition was taken as a guideline to plan hypothesis 
testing that could provide indirect evidence on the veridity of these mechanisms. As no measure of 
deliberate response distortion (e.g. faking) was available in the PISA dataset this option remained 
untested. However, it was well evidenced that such an explanation of overclaiming is neither necessary 
(Greenwald, 1985; Kozielecki, 1981) nor likely to explain overclaiming in low-stakes assessments 
(Paulhus, 2002; Ziegler, 2015). 
Memory bias account was partially tested by analysing relation between math ability and OCT indices. 
This analysis enabled to compare the overgeneralisation account, claiming that participants higher in 
ability should overclaim more due to interference from other terms stored in the long-term memory 
(Kuncel et al., 2012), with the metacognitive account, linking overclaiming with insufficient control 
over one’s knowledge, which predicted that participants lower in ability should yield larger bias (Atir 
et al., in preparation; Paulhus & Dubois, 2014). Moreover, relations between openness and OCT bias 
were tested, in order to inform the discussion on memory bias further on, as positive relation between 
openness and bias would offer support for the overgeneralisation account, whereas no relation or a 
negative one would disconfirm it.  
197 
 
The results presented in the subchapter 7.2 negated the overgeneralisation account as math ability 
was related to less overclaiming, instead of more, thus offering support for the metacognitive account. 
Furthermore, openness was related only to OCT accuracy (positively) but failed to produce any 
significant relations to OCT bias as measured by IRT score for foils. It is important to note, that in this 
analysis c and IRT score for foils again were linked with discrepant results- openness or self-efficacy 
were not related to the IRT score but were positively related to c. Similar result was obtained by Bertsch 
and Pesta (2009) where IQ did not correlate with c, but was negatively associated with mean score for 
foils. 
These results seem to corroborate studies finding negative relation between cognitive ability and OCT 
bias (e.g. Atir et al., in preparation; Franzen & Mader, 2019; Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013; Paulhus & 
Dubois, 2014), against opposite propositions (Kuncel et al., 2012) or null results (Bing et al., 2011). 
Moreover, no relation between openness and OCT bias was found, further disconfirming the 
overgeneralisation hypothesis. The obtained results showed positive relation between openness and 
OCT accuracy but no relation with bias, yielding similar pattern to many previous studies (e.g. Dunlop 
et al., 2017; Ludeke & Makransky, 2016; Swami et al., 2011). However, positive relation between 
openness and OCT bias was found by some researchers, e.g. Ziegler and co-authors (2013). It is possible 
that these relations differ across overclaiming tasks, e.g. domains they measure, and specific facets of 
openness (Christensen et al., 2019; Schwaba et al., 2019). Future studies should further explore this 
topic as the relations between personality and cognitive functioning may possibly help to clarify 
relations between response process in OCT and a general style of forming judgments (both self-
judgements and judgements about OCT terms). Atir and colleagues (in preparation) claim that using 
automatic, fast decisions when assessing one’s familiarity with OCT terms is positively related with OCT 
accuracy and negatively with bias, whereas deliberative processing yields more bias. Moreover, these 
researchers also claim that participants noting low bias scores do not generate many associations with 
foils. These results further disconfirm overgeneralisation theory and suggest that the relation between 
openness (more associations with foils) and OCT bias predicted by some accounts (Ziegler et al., 2013) 
seems at best characteristic of some very limited contexts only. Furthermore, it would be interesting 
to deepen our understanding of how participants form judgements about themselves and about OCT 
items. Integrating Kozielecki’s (1981) and Lewicka’s (1978) research on judgements formation with the 
recent research presented by Atir et al. (2015; in preparation) and Klimoski and Hu (2011) seems 
especially promising.  
Finding evidence that overgeneralisation account does not hold in front of the above results of course 
does not eliminate the memory bias hypothesis entirely. First of all, the supported metacognitive 
theory also contain memory-related component (although to a lesser degree than the 
overgeneralisation account), moreover, other non-motivated memory biases may play role in 
overclaiming, e.g. hindsight bias. Muller (2019, Study 3; see also Muller & Moshagen, 2018) claims that 
OCT bias is due to reconstruction, not recollection bias, thus participants embrace foils, because they 
are genuinely convinced that they have previously heard about them126. It is important to note, that 
this process should be even more elevated in the PISA 2012 OCT version, due to the foil construction 
rules- two real math terms were joint to form a non-existent term. However, the role of foils’ 
verisimilitude is scarcely known- Franzen and Mader (2019) reported that more plausible foils were 
claimed more often than less plausible ones but Calsyn and others (2001) showed that using “more 
familiar” foils led to higher claiming of reals, but NOT foils. Atir and co-workers (in preparation) 
presented results were foils embedded in one list with more known (easier to claim) reals were 
embraced more often than the same foils surrounded in a list by less known (more difficult to claim) 
 
126 Cf. with the results presented in subchapter 7.7. 
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reals. The researchers attributed this result to the assimilation-contrast effect (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 
1979). Other possible explanations of such an effect entail engagement of cognitive control in more 
difficult list of items, similarly, as it is done in cognitive control tasks (e.g. Stroop or flanker tasks) or 
semantic priming (Tillman & Wiens, 2011). These accounts were impossible to comment on in this 
work due to lack of data in the PISA dataset, however, they call for experimental verification in the 
nearest future. 
In the subchapter 7.2 it was also evidenced that subjectively-measured math ability produced distinct 
relations with OCT measures in comparison to objectively-measured math test. This result points to 
further scrutiny over positive relations between OCT bias and self-reported math-related traits, 
evidenced in previous research (e.g. Atir et al., 2015; Jerrim et al., 2019). It is possible that such 
relations have stylistic rather than substantive explanation as c should not be treated as a pure OCT 
bias index. Moreover, such relations seem to vanish when controlled for c, which further suggests that 
they are based only on spurious variance (e.g. method variance, RS, etc.). However, it is up to further 
studies to determine whether such self-concept scales could possibly act as a moderator of the OCT – 
math ability relation. 
Another analysis concerned the alleged domain-specificity versus domain-generality of overclaiming. 
The results gathered point rather to a domain-general character, as OCT bias and accuracy measures 
were related to all three PISA domains (math, reading, science). It is thus assumed that it is rather 
general cognitive ability than specific domain knowledge that is related to OCT scores (cf. Atir et al., 
2015). This results is in some contrast with the fact that OCT items are notorious for low inter-domain 
correlations, namely foils and reals from different domains, e.g. math and fashion, tend to correlate at 
best modestly with each other (e.g. Calsyn et al., 2001; Franzen & Mader, 2019). This is a somewhat 
puzzling result that could not be addressed in this work due to only one domain (math concepts) of 
which the PISA 2012 OCT version consisted. 
Another set of hypotheses was related to OCT bias as a result of motivated positivity bias, e.g. self-
enhancement. To this end scales measuring individual math-related attitudes (importance, motivation, 
interest, anxiety) were correlated with OCT measures. The results obtained may be carefully 
interpreted as supporting the role of positivity bias in driving OCT scores. Math-related attitudes 
correlated positively with bias (both IRT- and c-scored) and were not related to OCT accuracy as 
measured by d’- a pattern indicating relation to response bias (Paulhus et al., 2003). Moreover, 
external attribution to failure correlated positively with OCT bias, just as it was found in the works of 
Paulhus and John (1998) who related external locus of control to narcissism and motivated self-
enhancement. Another corroboration for positivity bias being source of OCT scores came from the 
positive correlation of the school outcomes scale127 with OCT bias (IRT-measured) and negative with 
OCT accuracy (d’). This relation could be explained by a socially desirable responding tendency, as 
embracing such items is obviously against the social consensus that school is a wonderful place for 
each and every young person. Hence, there is a certain evidence that OCT scores are indeed at least 
partially correlated with positivity bias. The effects are small in size though, which warrants further 
research with the use of locus of control, failure attribution and school outcomes scales in order to 
replicate the above findings. 
Motivated biases embrace not only exaggerating positive traits but also concealing vices, sometimes 
this effect is called defensiveness (Paulhus & John, 1998). Analysis of school-related rule violations, as 
perceived and reported by students and principals, was performed in order to test relations of such 
processes with OCT measures. Moreover, discrepancies between principals’ and students’ views on 
 
127 Which measured attitudes to items like “School has been a waste of time.” 
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school discipline were analysed to a similar goal. The results brought in another slight evidence for a 
relation between socially desirable responding and OCT bias as the respondents seem to overclaim not 
only their familiarity with math concepts but also their school belonging and relations with teachers. 
Both concepts have obvious SDR, even sensitive questions connotations, thus a positive association 
with OCT bias (and negative with d’ measure of OCT accuracy) falls exactly into the established pattern 
of positivity bias in OCT scores (negative or null relation with accuracy, positive with bias) and, most 
importantly, into a theory-predicted model of relations.  
However, no principal-reported data correlated with any of the OCT scores, neither did difference 
between school headmasters’ and students’ view on school discipline. Such relations are worthy of 
future studies, e.g. with the use of school administrative data, e.g. on school-level of truancy, discipline 
or safety. Use of parent- or teacher-reports also seems a promising idea to explore in future research 
projects, e.g. with the use of MTMM matrices. Moreover, it is also up to future endeavours to 
disentangle certain contradictions between the school-level discipline breaking (no relation to OCT 
bias) with country-level rule violation (more violation, more OCT bias; cf. Fell & Koenig, 2016; 2020; 
Fell et al., 2019). There is also a certain caveat to overly-optimistic interpretations of the relations 
found- as they are small in size, their stylistic explanation is still viable (cf. Khorramdel & von Davier, 
2014). Same comment appertain to the analysis of school-level (contextual) effects of social norms and 
school-level rule breaking which both failed to yield coherent relations with OCT measures. 
School accountability procedures turned out to be unrelated to OCT scores. The yielded correlation 
with math ability (both self-reported and objectively measured) is a very interesting effect but its 
explanation falls beyond the scope of this work. 
Another mechanism possibly standing behind OCT scores that was suggested by Dunlop and others 
(2017) concerned stylistic responses (RS) and careless responding (C/IER). C/IER indices were found to 
be related to OCT scores and it is possible that certain participants, those indicated as yielding 
aberrant, outlying response vectors, may indeed generate their OCT scores unknowingly, simply as a 
by-product of careless responses. It was also evidenced that C/IER indices moderate OCT scores 
characteristics, e.g. size of the correlation between bias and accuracy. Person-fit measures seemed to 
interact with OCT scores to the highest degree, thus it seems that further research should especially 
concentrate on these measures and their relations to OCT (see similar results in Ludeke & Makransky, 
2016). However, the framework of careless responding is still rather in its infancy as many methods 
are under-researched (cf. Fronczyk, 2014) and there are more unknowns than knowns in the field, 
despite tremendous advancements done recently (e.g. Meade & Craig, 2012). 
PISA rotation design enabled to conduct a “natural experiment” regarding significance of respondents’ 
fatigue on OCT measures. However, the fatigue condition was not related to OCT bias but yielded a 
significant interaction with OCT accuracy- fatigue decreased the OCT accuracy’s predictive validity on 
math ability. Fatigue was also related to C/IER indices, although the size of the zero-order correlations 
produced was small. Further empirical research in this very much forgotten are of survey methodology 
is needed (Herzog & Bachman, 1981; but see recent revival of this topic, e.g. Yan, Fricker & Tsai, 2020). 
IRTree approach towards measuring response styles (Böckenholt, 2012; 2014; Khorramdel & von 
Davier, 2014) was adopted in this work. The estimated values for ERS and MRS produced significant 
relations with OCT measures, however the pattern was different as predicted. ERS was related 
positively to OCT accuracy whereas MRS was related positively to OCT bias (more MRS, more bias). 
These results are not in concert with the findings of Dunlop et al. (2019) where ERS was related 
positively to both OCT accuracy and bias, a result predicted also in this work. However, different RS 
generation as well as dissimilar OCT scoring precludes any decisive comparisons. It seems though, that 
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specific ERS coding elected by Dunlop and others (2019), where only the highest positive category was 
coded as extreme (cf. Khorramdel & von Davier, 2014), was the main motor of such pattern of results. 
Different RS mapping matrices could be used in order to test their relation towards OCT scores 
(Böckenholt, 2014; Falk & Cai, 2016; Plieninger, 2020a). Counter-predictive results may also stem from 
the specificity of the OCT task used in PISA 2012. Participants may yield stylistic responses to foils as 
an expression of confusion towards terms they never heard of. This result calls for further analyses of 
these relations, both with the use of RS indices but also with more qualitative approach, e.g. cognitive 
interviews that could help to solve the mystery of how participants react to foils and what meanings 
are ascribed to responses to these very specific survey items. 
Altogether, the possible origin of OCT scores is most probably heterogenic, as memory biases, 
metacognitive processes, positivity bias (both self-enhancement and SDR) and stylistic variance (C/IER, 
MRS) all play important role as OCT scores’ likely originations. Their disentanglement and 
quantification (what is the dominant source of OCT variance?) is a task for future studies. However, 
the analyses presented in the subchapter 7.7 indicate that before such endeavours will be undertaken 
it is warranted to research consequences of certain OCT design characteristics such as number of 
items, number of domains, foils-to-reals ratio, foils construction rules and foils risk of confusion 
(Franzen & Mader, 2019). More knowledge acquired about this initial step would aid to obtain more 
interpretable, stable and psychometrically sound results in future studies (see also Steger et al., 2020). 
Establishing overclaiming’s nomological network 
Male participants were found to overclaim more and obtained lower accuracy in the PISA 2012 OCT 
than female respondents. This pattern of relations seems prevalent in the literature, as it was already 
established by Noelle-Neumann (1974; men yielded less conformist responses), Bishop and others 
(1986; men offered more opinions on non-existent topics) or Ones and Viswesvaran (1998; men 
achieved higher distortion of scores in faking paradigms). Jerrim and colleagues (2019) also confirmed 
this relation on the PISA 2012 data for the sample from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
However, the precise nature of this relation remains elusive. Nevertheless, in contrast to e.g. C/IER 
and RS relations with OCT, associations between gender and OCT are much better researched. It seems 
that there are three main group of effects that are possible explanations to more overclaiming among 
men: a) domain, b) personality and c) memory effects.  
In case of the first group of effects it is warranted to conclude that importance, desirability and relation 
to identity of a given domain all predict more overclaiming. In example, Rynko and Palczyńska (2018) 
obtained higher overclaiming among men in comparison to women in math-related tasks, but no such 
effects in ICT-related tasks. Moreover, math, as a part of academic world, is one of the typical examples 
of an agentic domain, which are overclaimed more by men in comparison to higher bias in communal 
domains among women (Paulhus & John, 1998). Furthermore, math is regarded as a “boy thing” 
among Polish students (cf. Baczko-Dombi, 2017; Cipora et al., 2015; 2018), hence, it is a domain more 
central to male self-identity which predicts higher OCT bias in this group, precisely as it was shown in 
this work. This line of inter-gender research is also able to inform on the domain-specific (Ziegler, 2011) 
versus domain-general (Paulhus, 2002) character of overclaiming. It is justified to assume that 
overclaiming, as a function of positivity bias, may take place in any domain but domain characteristics 
are potential moderator of its appearance and size. 
Another possible solution of the gender differences in OCT remains in the personality framework. 
Paulhus (1984) identified personality basis of overclaiming as a “convolution of high self-esteem and 
low anxiety”, a profile characterising men more commonly than women. Moreover, higher levels of 
overclaiming were linked with high, but unstable self-esteem (Kernis, 2003), competitive worldviews 
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(Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Schilling et al., 2020), risk-taking (Ziegler et al., 2013), grandiose narcissism 
(Zajenkowski et al., 2019) and intellectual humility, which Krumrei-Mancuso and others (2019) labelled 
as “healthy confidence of one’s knowledge”. Most of the inter-gender differences in these traits point 
into male respondents as more prone to overclaiming. 
Finally, gender differences in memory effects also seem to indicate towards higher proneness of men 
to memory biases (which may lead to overclaiming, see Muller, 2019). First off, women are 
characterised by better memory of details, e.g. prices (Barzykowski, Leśniak & Niedźwieńska, 2010). 
Moreover, women’s memories tend to be more vivid, detailed, emotional and more focused on 
interpersonal relations than men’s (Niedźwieńska, 2003). Women are also less susceptible to memory 
biases in test probes recollection (Bridge, 2006) and are better at recall of lists of objects presented 
(Baer, Hayes, Trumpeter & Weathington, 2006). All these differences may eventuate in higher OCT bias 
scores obtained by men. 
Another variable related to OCT bias was the socio-economic status of participants’ families which was 
related positively to OCT accuracy (small, but robust effect) and was not related to IRT score of OCT 
bias. These results are not in parallel of what Jerrim et al. (2019) found in the Anglo-Saxon sample 
where socio-economic status correlated positively with OCT bias. More research is needed to solve 
these differences and inform on the role of social status and response biases. One theoretical link 
predicts positive relation between higher social status and overconfidence which may be related to 
OCT bias as well (Anderson et al., 2012). Moreover, school location size (village, town, city) and school 
type (private versus public) were not related to OCT measures. 
Distribution of variance between levels 
OCT measures yielded considerable variance on the individual level, however, as was evidenced by the 
analyses presented in subchapters 7.7-7.9, they yielded almost no variance at the school-level. 
Moreover, this effect confirms findings of Jerrim et al. (2019) for different subsample of the PISA 2012 
dataset. Thus, it seems that overclaiming is almost completely independent from the school-level 
variance and that overclaimers are not clustered together in the same schools. More research is 
needed in this field, especially as the between-countries differences in overclaiming seem huge 
(Vonkova et al., 2018), moderating the predictive validity of math self-reports on the country-level 
(Kyllonen & Bertling, 2013) and depending on country-level variables as e.g. GDP, corruption level and 
rule-breaking tolerance (Fell & Koenig, 2016; 2020; Fell et al., 2019). It certainly warrants further 
investigation why no school-level norms seem to be related with OCT bias. It is possible that simply 
school is not a medium of OCT-related variance which may be entirely independent from educational 
part of lives of (junior) high-school students or may group on different levels of analysis, e.g. 
classrooms. Research on bullying and school discipline shows that indeed classroom level of analysis 
may be more suitable to gauge any school-related social relations (Dijkstra, Lindenberg, & Veenstra, 
2008; Pozzoli, Gini & Vieno, 2012). Additionally, twin studies on both RS (Kam et al., 2013; Melchers et 
al., 2018) and OCT (Luo et al., 2019) proved that only few percent of these measures’ variance was 
related to the shared environment. Perhaps this is another suggestion that school, which is a good 
example of shared environment for many twins, is not a medium of  response biases variance. 
Internal structure and individual differentiation 
The internal structure study yielded the bifactor structure as the best fitted to the data. General factor 
was interpreted as math ability while two specific factors were tentatively given a technical 
interpretation, namely, they were interpreted as method instead of substantial factors. Such 
interpretation in case of bifactor models is common and leads to accounting for method variance, 
which is one of the assets of the bifactor model (Reise et al., 2016). Examples of such method, technical 
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factors comprise positive vs. negative wording of items (Marsh, Scalas & Nagengast, 2010; Woods, 
2006) or non-substantial item content differences (Brouwer, Meijer & Zevalkink, 2013). 
During the analysis three model solutions were assumed: a) items grouped into reals and foils specific 
factors, b) items grouped into dyadic and single factors (some items were compounds consisted of two 
words, some of just one), c) items grouped into hard and easy factors. The last option yielded the best 
model fit of the three solutions (and an acceptable model fit overall). Regarding the three options 
tested, the first had an obvious substantial interpretation of specific factors (different response 
processes used to answer reals and foils), the second had only method interpretation (e.g. linguistic 
processing could be different in case of dyadic and single items), whereas the third option can be given 
either method or substantial interpretation. Item difficulty is a known moderator of self-report validity, 
with hard items being more overclaimed than easy items. Altogether, the general factor accounted for 
almost 70% of the total common variance, whereas the specific factors accounted for slightly more 
than 20% of it. The remaining variance can be attributed to random (or unmodelled) sources. 
Nevertheless, this analysis showed that OCT cannot be modelled by a unidimensional solution. 
It is interesting that some foils were responded to like they were just difficult reals (item st62q04), 
while there were also some reals that were responded to like if they were foils (e.g. item st62q08). 
Similar situation was observed by Steger et al. (2020) where respondents overclaimed they knowledge 
to real but very difficult items. Many methodological differences between the two studies preclude 
from drawing any firm conclusions from the Steger et al. (2020) study but it seems warranted to check 
if any difference can be obtained in an OCT that would include foils, reals and very difficult reals. Such 
an OCT version could also contain items without correct answer, items with an explicit “don’t know” 
response option (category) or an additional answer confidence measure (cf. Anderson et al., 2012; 
Bensch et al., 2017). This study design could prove to be an interesting development of the standard 
OCT version with lesser risk of memory biases and RS or C/IER variance. Moreover, it would be very 
interesting to verify who will be ready to admit his/her ignorance by choosing the “don’t know” option? 
LCA study discerned three latent classes, one of which can be interpreted as an “overclaiming” class. 
This grouping was characterised by high foils embracing and overly positive self-report that was not 
warranted by their objective abilities. Moreover, also in other self-reports this group yielded overly 
positive responses, unlikely given their objectively-measured characteristics. This analysis confirmed 
relation between overclaiming and gender as well as socio-economic status. However, it also brought 
some discrepant results regarding relation of math ability and OCT scores. When the whole sample is 
analysed together math ability is evidently related negatively to OCT bias, however, the “overclaiming” 
group is characterised by higher, not lower than average math abilities. Nevertheless, when this 
relation was modelled inside of every latent class the relation still held, indicating that within the 










The hypotheses and the results of their verification are briefly summed up in the table below: 
 
Hypothesis Verification 
1. OCT is a suppressor of the self-
report-objective measure 
relation. 
Confirmed: OCT bias measure indeed acts as a 
suppressor, enhancing the relation between self-
report and objective measurement of skills 
2. Objective domain ability is 
related to overclaiming. 
Confirmed: Objective ability is related positively to 
OCT accuracy and negatively to OCT bias. 
3. & 4. Subjective domain ability is 
related to overclaiming. 
Failed: Subjective ability assessments were not 
related to OCT bias. 
5. & 6. Domain desirability is 
related to overclaiming. 
Confirmed: Higher domain desirability (e.g. higher 
motivation to learn maths) was related positively to 
OCT bias pointing to a motivational character of OCT 
bias. 
7. Locus of control is related to 
overclaiming. 
Confirmed: External locus of control was positively 
related to OCT bias, but the magnitude of relation 
was very small. 
8. & 9. Withholding negative 
information is related to 
overclaiming 
Failed: Rule violation measures were not related to 
OCT scores. 
10. School pressure on domain 
achievement and overclaiming. 
Failed: School-related variables were found to be 
mostly unrelated to OCT scores which presented only 
a very limited variance across schools. 
11. Careless responding and 
respondents' fatigue are related 
to overclaiming. 
Confirmed: Careless responding was moderately 
related to OCT scores: negatively to accuracy and 
positively to bias. 
12. Response styles are related to 
overclaiming. 
Partially confirmed: Relation between response styles 
and OCT scores was found to be very dependent on 
technical aspects of such analysis. More research is 
needed in order to generalise these findings. 
13. Latent structure of 
overclaiming scale: two factors 
will emerge, one for reals, one for 
foils. 
Partially confirmed: Bifactor solution with two 
specific factors (hard vs. easy items) fit the data best 
among the theoretically justified models tested. 
General factor was interpreted as math ability, foils 
and reals do not seem to be responded to using 
different processes. 
14. & 15. School-level social 
pressure on domain achievements 
and school-level rule violation are 
related to overclaiming 
Failed: No relation was found due to minimal across-
school OCT scores variability. 
16., 17. & 18. Socio-demographic 
correlates of overclaiming. 
Partially confirmed: Male students yielded larger OCT 
bias than female students. Socio-economic status was 
only marginally related to OCT scores. 
19. Exploring latent class structure 
of overclaiming: Can overclaiming 
class be identified? 
Confirmed: Three latent classes were identified, one 
of which can be interpreted as an overclaiming class. 
It consists of 9% of the total sample size. 





Nonetheless, the study presented above has its certain inherent limitations. First of all, it is a 
correlational study, so no evidence on the causal order of dependencies was provided. Although 
certain suggestions and conclusions on such relations can be inferred from the results presented in 
chapter 7 this is an obvious boundary to conclusions that can be taken from the information gathered. 
Such causal relations should be addressed in further experimental studies. It is worthy to note, that 
experimental manipulations in the field of OCT research are quite rare128 (e.g. Atir et al., 2015; Atir et 
al., in preparation; Muller & Moshagen, 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Paulhus et al., 2003; Steger et al., 2020) 
and correlational designs constitute a predominant part of evidence.  
Moreover, all presented analyses were cross-sectional ones, so no information on longitudinal effects 
of the presented associations can be formed. Such data is available for other response biases, 
especially important evidence was obtained with the use of longitudinal designs in RS research were 
large temporal stability of response patterns was found (He & van de Vijver, 2015b; Weijters et al., 
2010). Wetzel, Luedtke, Zettler and Boenhke (2015) established that even up to 50% of RS variance 
can be attributed to trait-like source, which was stable for a period of over 8 years. The analysis 
comprised ERS and ARS analyses and introduced important information that RS may be of substantial 
interest too. 
What are longitudinal patterns of OCT should be set up in future studies. The data at hand is scarce, 
but some interesting suggestions can be drawn from the research of Barber and others (2013) and 
especially from the evidence presented by von Hoyer, Pardi, Kammerer and Holtz (2019). In the latter 
study it was found that the tendency to overclaim increased during learning process (the participants 
had to learn about weather phenomena formation), which may point to memory bias driven by 
repetition effect (the overclaiming items were repeated several times during the task in few distinct 
time points). Moreover, overclaiming was related to overconfidence (r~ 0.40), especially in being 
confident of answer correctness when in fact an incorrect answer was provided. Negative relation 
between OCT scores and “metacognitive sensitivity”, operationalised as difference in confidence 
between correct and incorrect answers, was also established. The relation between OCT scores and 
overconfidence effects disappeared after the learning process, but foils embracing increased as the 
result of the process. These results correspond to the finding of Atir and others (in preparation) who 
found evidence that foils are overclaimed to a larger degree when presented in a list of more familiar, 
in comparison to less familiar items. Both studies by Atir and colleagues, as well as von Hoyer and 
collaborators point to a significant role of memory processes in responding to foils. It is also worthy to 
link these results with the ones presented in subchapter 7.7 where foils were fitted in one factor with 
difficult items. Longitudinal studies would also help to answer questions about the test-retest reliability 
of OCT which may be low due to significant cognitive substrate in the task (on low intra-individual 
reliability of cognitive measures: Schubert & Frischkorn, 2020). 
PISA 2012 characteristics 
Furthermore, as the PISA 2012 cycle was one of the last ones to be held in paper-and-pencil mode no 
paradata data is available. As evidenced by e.g. Steger et al. (2020) such information may prove very 
useful in interpreting OCT scores. Future research endeavours should consider using RT, log-data or 
 
128 Of course if quite numerous instructed faking studies are to be treated separately (e.g. Bing et al., 2011). 
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mouse clicks. As PISA now also moved to computer-based mode such paradata is available for this ILSA 
too (though no PISA cycle since 2012 returned to the use of OCT again). 
Moreover, also using the PISA data has its inherent limitations. First of all PISA is not the best for 
individual-level predictions and larger precision of estimates could be achieved if longer measurement 
tools (both cognitive tests and self-report questionnaires) could be used. PISA is also a low-stakes test 
which has its boundaries, e.g. stemming from problems with low motivation of certain participants. 
Furthermore, OCT in only one domain- academic knowledge in mathematics- was used in the study 
which confined analyses on the domain-specific vs. domain-general character of overclaiming. Further 
still, only data from one country was used which precludes any cross-culture and cross-country 
comparisons. Such studies, as evidenced by e.g. Fell and Koenig (2016; 2020) are very fruitful in 
interesting findings and certainly should be in the heart of researchers’ interest in future studies (see 
Vonkova et al, 2018 for cross-country differences in the PISA 2012 OCT). However, this one-country 
approach (see also Yang et al., 2019) was necessary to build up evidence and theory before launching 
cross-country analyses. Many areas of OCT knowledge are still seriously under-researched and basic 
network of relations needs to be sketched before any confirmatory research will be possible. Finally, 
it is feasible to overcome PISA rotation design and impute the missing-by-design data that would rise 
the studies sample size and power (from around 3050 to 4600). However, most probably such step 
would not change the results obtained (cf. Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019). 
Methodological limitations 
Most importantly, more sophisticated OCT measures that would better account for the ordinal 
character of Likert-type data are worthy of investigation. It is especially important if SDT measures 
should be still used in the response bias field. Their introduction to social sciences seems very 
promising, however, further research on their measurement and use are needed (especially for non-
dichotomous data; also see Paulewicz & Blaut, 2020; Wright et al., 2009). More research is also needed 
to enhance interpretation of OCT scores, e.g. what is the meaning of correlation between the SDT 
scores, which is commonly obtained in empirical studies? 
Moreover, many theoretically important variables were not measured in the PISA 2012 study or were 
measured only by non-established proxies (e.g. math anxiety). More studies using theoretically valid 
and methodologically sound measures of self-esteem, self-efficacy, math anxiety, locus of control, SDR 
scales, dark personality, personality (honesty-humility, openness to experience, competitive 
worldviews, conformity, unmitigated agency and all of these measures gauged on the facet/subscale 
level) are needed. Furthermore, not only zero-order correlations between these variables and OCT 
scores should be studied but also interactions between these variables need to be established, 
preferably in the structural equations modelling framework. 
Another restraint of the analyses presented above is the fact that math ability was only measured by 
means of cognitive test. Such measure gives high-quality information on math achievement, but does 
not inform on other aspects of cognitive abilities, e.g. working memory, semantical fluency, etc. 
Combining such measures with OCT (e.g. Paulhus & Dubois, 2014) is warranted in order to broaden 
the knowledge about the relations between cognition and overclaiming. 
8.3 Future directions 
Theoretical advancements 
Further research on the OCT relation to memory biases is needed. Especially warranted are research 
attempts aiming at understanding the role of repetition, false recognition and assimilation-contrast 
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effects. Also Roediger and McDermott (1995; 2000) offered suggestions for future studies on false 
memories attribution, semantic networks and false recognition effects (Is it familiar? Yes? Then I 
remember it!). Interesting knowledge on repetition effect comes from the Deese’s (1959) list learning 
paradigm, where participants claim to recognise previously unstudied words if they are semantically 
related to the list studied (e.g. “needle” when studying medical terms list). Roediger and McDermott 
(1995), Roediger (1996) as well as Gallo et al. (1997) offer more information on this paradigm and the 
so-called “memory illusion”. The relation between this paradigm and OCT seems obvious and worthy 
of further exploration. It could also bring some more light on the relation between OCT and hindsight 
bias (Muller, 2019; Williams, Paulhus & Nathanson, 2002) and foil plausibility (risk of confusion) 
manipulation (Calsyn et al., 2001; Franzen & Mader, 2019). Pennycook and Rand (2020) drive attention 
towards processing facilitation due to repetition and increased “truth-likeness” due to repetition 
(Whittlesea, 1993). This effect does not depend on neither explicit memory nor warnings against 
foils/fake news presence, moreover, it is not moderated by cognitive ability or style (De keersmacker 
et al., 2018). Repetition effect is thus steered by low-level cognition in which high-level cognition does 
not seem to intervene. Moreover, there is a communality between OCT accuracy and response time 
latencies in cognitive tasks (short RT=less accuracy) where intuitive, reflexive answer leads to incorrect 
response (exactly that was showed by Williams, Paulhus & Nathanson, 2002). Probably OCT may be (at 
least partially) also explained by similar processes. However, as indicated by Nichols and Loftus (2019), 
there is no evidence for a “false memory” trait as three different false-memory tasks do not share 
variance between them, yielding null or very small correlations. Hence, memory distortions are 
ubiquitous, but they do not seem to be driven by same mechanisms (see also Teovanović, Knezević & 
Stankov, 2015 for an account of generally low correlations between cognitive biases- the correlation 
coefficients are usually around 0.20). It is for future studies to investigate which memory biases 
underpin overclaiming and related effects.  
Of course trivial memory slips, like forgetting or mistakes, are also possible in case of OCT (Bing et al., 
2011), so it would be important to differentiate such overclaiming as a by-product of cognitive slips, 
fatigue, C/IER and RS from overclaiming driven by motivated biases (e.g. self-enhancement, SDR). To 
do this further research on how to generate and use C/IER indices is needed. Answering questions like: 
whether to generate them from the whole vector of responses the participant generated or only from 
the scale that is in the focus of interest (cf. Conijn et al., 2016)? What cut-off values to which conditions 
should be adopted? How to develop existing measures to the specific requirements of rating-scales? 
Similar questions appertain to the RS framework, e.g. what are the theoretical interpretations of 
different mapping matrices (Plieninger, 2020a)? How different RS should be modelled (Falk & Cai, 
2016)? Do RS have substantial interpretations (Wetzel et al., 2015)? Why certain participants seem not 
to respond stylistically (Khorramdel et al., 2019)? How to differentiate a RS from a mere straight-lining 
as a result of satisficing? 
Another problem waiting for further scrutiny is the reverse of overclaiming- underclaiming. 
Underclaimers are poorly researched but they were evidenced to exist- e.g. John and Robins (1994) 
found that 35% of the sample overestimated, but 15% underestimated. The distribution is thus tilted 
towards positivity but it does not cancel out the fact that underclaiming skills and knowledge is a 
certain mystery for scientific inquiry, especially as so far only minimal attention was devoted to 
studying underestimated self-evaluations. The results of Yang et al. (2019) show that a predominant 
group among low achieving students is not overclaiming- hence it is a challenge for Krueger-Dunning 
effect and similar explanations. These results, especially when linked with the ones obtained by Jerrim 
et al. (2019), where groups of higher socio-economic status overclaimed more, points to the existence 
of new, poorly researched groups: underclaimers, but also overclaimers of high cognitive abilities and 
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social status, which complement the most researched group of less cognitively skilled overclaimers 
(Bishop et al., 1986). 
An interesting direction of future studies is to link the research on metacognitive abilities to assess 
one’s self-knowledge (Tobias & Everson, 2002) and motivation to accurate self-knowledge (Brycz & 
Konarski, 2016; Brycz, Wyszomirska-Góra, Konarski & Wojciszke, 2018; Konarski & Brycz, 2017) with 
the positivity bias field. Such linkage would serve to further expand the nomological network of OCT, 
of course along with measuring other relevant variables, e.g. personality variables, creativity, etc. (see 
Goecke et al., 2020). 
Methodological refinements 
Apart from theoretical advancements, more research on design of overclaiming task is recommended. 
The method was so far proved to be robust to changes in design as in example Atir et al. (2015) showed 
that changing the main questions stem (“Do you know these things?”, instead of “Are you familiar 
with…?”) brought no significant difference into results. Similarly, including a “don’t know” option also 
did not introduce any effects (Calsyn & Winter, 1999). Also foils-to-reals proportion is thought to have 
no effects on OCT measures (Paulhus et al., 2003), however both recent results presented by Atir et 
al. (in preparation) and knowledge on conflict resolution in cognitive conflict tasks (e.g. Stroop task, 
flanker task, etc.; Bugg & Crump, 2012) call for revisiting this question in a series of experimental tasks. 
Any influence of proportion of foils on OCT measures would point to a larger role of conflict resolution 
in this task that previously thought (cf. Robins & Beer, 2001). Interestingly, warning participants of foil 
presence seems to lower the bias, mostly by shifting participants strategy towards more conservative 
responding (Atir et al., 2015). More inter-domain comparisons would be also welcome, in order to test 
theories pointing to a motivated bias (e.g. SDR) as the main underpinning of overclaiming. Categories 
such as domain (item) importance, centrality, desirability and social prestige should be compared in 
experimental designs (Paulhus, 2011). Foils and reals construction rules is yet another topic worthy of 
more studies, if not for theoretical findings then definitely for guaranteeing methodological soundness 
of the research tools. Hargittai (2005) formulated a preliminary classification of foil-types but no 
differences between their different functioning was ever tested. This seems as an important research 
task to be realised, as OCT is a task that needs extensive piloting for both reals and foils. The latter can 
easily become obsolete, as can be seen by a look at the foils included in the OCT version by Randall 
and Fernandes (1991) or Philips and Clancy (1972). More inspiration for foils construction rules can be 
found in the works of Dubois (2015), Goecke et al. (2020) and Zimmerman et al. (1977; non-word 
construction rules). 
Moreover, extending overclaiming tasks to other than rating-scales response format would be an 
interesting innovation. For example, OCT in multiple forced-choice (MFC) format would be very 
interesting (Wetzelf & Greiff, 2018), as well as embedding OCT logic into cognitive tests, e.g. through 
offering tests with no true answers but with a “don’t know” option included (see a somewhat similar 
idea in Steger et al., 2020). Both response formats would predict lower OCT than rating-scales and, 
most importantly, would enable to restrict much of the (alleged) influence of RS and C/IER on OCT 
scores. 
Additional sources of information that would be possible to correlate with OCT measures are also 
needed. Multi-method studies in which informant (other- vs. self-) ratings and more objective sources 
of information (cognitive tests, administrative data) along with qualitative studies (cognitive 
interviews) could bring more insight into respondents’ perception of the OCT tasks. Obviously, 
combining self-reports with other measures such as paradata (RT, mouse clicks, navigation through 
web survey map, etc.), eye-tracker and both neurocognitive and psychophysiological measures. 
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Especially, the EEG use could yield interesting results on cognitive processes underpinning OCT 
responding. Psychophysiological correlates of mind-wandering, conflict resolution, semantical 
consolidation and word recognition all could immensely inform on OCT mechanisms (e.g. Arnau et al., 
2020; Ryals, Yadon, Nomi & Cleary, 2011). Finally, it would be beneficial for the field if another ILSA or 
at least NLSA would include OCT into its questionnaire with a large-scale split ballot experiment being 
an especially interesting option. 
Practical applications 
The most direct and hoped-for effect of OCT refinement would be using it as a valid indicator of 
response biases in any research using self-reports, be it experimental small-sample research or a 
worldwide ILSA like PISA.  
However, research on overclaiming and related effects could also have more direct, applicative 
deployments. For example, Lamba and Nityananda (2014) pointed into problems that self-deception 
can cause in financial and educational research. The researchers argued that promoting overconfident 
individuals129 in societies may lead to catastrophic results such as economic crisis, wars and spreading 
of anti-communal values in societies (cf. Anderson et al., 2012). Stephens and Ohtsuka (2014) showed 
that cognitive, self-deceptive illusions (illusion of control) are one of the main characteristics of 
aggressive drivers. Such dependencies would be probably also found in other professions in risk of 
overconfidence (bankers, lawyers, medical doctors). Lamba and Nityananda (2014) concluded with 
proposing methods to identify self-deceived individuals as part of risk management in social 
institutions and companies, including schools, armies and banks (see also Gorlin & Otto, 2017). 
Overclaiming task is a potential option for such a measurement tool.  
Methods identifying self-deceived and/or overconfident individuals could also help in educational 
process where they could be used to inform students whether their self-judgements, e.g. on school-
related abilities, are adequate or not. Using such methods to teaching students to have more valid self-
perceptions would be another worthy application (see Foster et al., 2017; Kim, Chiu & Zou, 2010). 
Pennycook and Rand (2020) also called OCT “conceptually related” to reflexive responding, hence its 
relation to fake news and bullshit receptivity. Relation between OCT and overconfidence is also based 
on the tendency to be driven by gut-feeling instead of analytical thinking. Atir and colleagues (in 
preparation) also explained assimilation effect on the basis of automatic rather than deliberate 
thinking. Relation of OCT with accepting bullshit and propensity to fake news may also mean not a 
“memory bias” sensu stricto, but a general proclivity to claim familiarity with things or accepting things 
as making sense (despite they do not). This framework was called “reflexive open-mindedness” and is 
dedicated to research on being overly open to new ideas and deficits of criticism towards incoming 
information. Pennycook and Rand (2020) corroborated these ideas by a correlation between OCT and 
bullshit receptivity, fake news gullibility and less analytic thinking. Littrell, Risko and Fugelsang (2020) 
found a relation between overclaiming and persuasive (0.30) and evasive (0.19) bullshitting. It is 
interesting, that they definition of both types of “bullshitting” are in accord with personality correlates 
of overclaiming presented above. Moreover, individual differences in the trait-like construct called “an 
illusion of familiarity”, an inherently subjective feeling, that interacts with prior experiences and 
knowledge of respondents were related to OCT bias (Paulhus, 2011; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000; 
2001; see also “feeling of knowing” explanation by Clariana et al., 2016). Such effects can also explain 
the significance of foil plausibility manipulation done by Franzen and Mader (2019). Moreover, OCT 
potentially could be used in teaching participants how to discern true from faked news, which seems 
 
129 Due to self-deception, impression management or both. 
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as an important challenge before educational systems worldwide (see Nygren & Guath, 2019 for such 
attempts in the Swedish educational system). OCT could be sued to identify overclaimers which 
potentially are one of the groups in risk of increased fake news gullibility (cf. Pennycook & Rand, 2020). 
8.4 Conclusion 
The presented dissertation had three main aims. In order of importance: 
• to assess utility of the overclaiming technique (OCT) to account for spurious variance in self-
reports of skills in low-stakes, self-administered self-reports 
• to investigate probable mechanisms of overclaiming by testing the proposed relationships in 
a cross-sectional, correlational design and by fitting latent variable models 
• to expand the nomological network of overclaiming by presenting a wide gamut of 
correlations, both from individual- and school-level (where school was a basic clustering, as 
defined by the PISA design) 
In order to formulate a set of verifiable hypotheses a thorough integration of the previous empirical 
and theoretical research was undertaken. Research fields like socially desirable responding, positivity 
bias, self-presentation, self-consciousness, self-knowledge, self-motives with a special attention on 
self-enhancement, response biases (e.g. response styles and careless responding) and self-reports 
validity were reviewed with the aim of finding relevant results to inform hypothesis generation in order 
to fulfil the three main aims. In order to test possible mechanisms of overclaiming three accounts were 
tested: a) overclaiming as a result of memory bias, b) overclaiming as a result of motivated bias, c) 
overclaiming as by-product of stylistic or careless responding. Moreover, confirmatory factor analysis 
and latent class analysis were fitted in order to explore latent structure of the PISA 2012 overclaiming 
scale. The analyses conducted resulted in following conclusions and findings: 
1. Measure of OCT bias indeed can act as a suppressor, leading to enhanced predictive validity 
of self-report of skills on objective skills measurement. The established suppression model is 
of the reciprocal, not classical suppression due to non-zero raw correlation between OCT bias 
and objective skills measures. The magnitude of the predictive validity enhancement greatly 
depends on the OCT scoring system adopted with IRT and SDT measures leading to slightly 
different conclusions and need of different regression model specification. Special care is 
needed when interpreting OCT results as conclusions may differ greatly depending on the 
scoring system and the exact measures used. 
2. Correlations between OCT measures, objective math ability, openness, perseverance and self-
report indices of math ability (self-efficacy, experience with math problems scales) were 
tested in order to indirectly verify memory bias as mechanism of overclaiming. The obtained 
results pointed to positive relation between math ability and OCT accuracy and negative with 
OCT bias. Moreover, objectively-measured math ability was related to a higher degree with 
OCT scores than subjective reports on math ability. Furthermore, openness, perseverance and 
subjective math self-assessments were not related to OCT bias. This pattern of results seems 
to contradict the overgeneralisation account of memory bias hypothesis which states that 
overclaiming is a characteristic of more proficient respondents as they tend to overgeneralise 
the possessed knowledge accepting foils on the false premises that they resemble some 
chunks of veridical knowledge. In contrast, the results obtained appear to support the 
metacognitive account of memory bias hypothesis which states that overclaiming is 
characteristic for less proficient participants as a result of insufficient metacognitive control 
over the possessed knowledge. Finally, these results showed that OCT foils (untrue items used 
to elicit overclaiming) do not share much of the common variance with other self-report 
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scales. Is it due to the lack of shared substantial or method variance it is to be settled in future 
research projects. 
3. In order to test relation between OCT and motivated bias of self-perception (positivity bias) a 
group of variables (e.g. declared math self-interest, motivation, social norms, learning ethic) 
was used as proxies of domain desirability which is a predictor of motivated bias. The obtained 
results pointed to a small in size, but robust positive relation between domain desirability and 
OCT bias pointing to the role of motivated bias of self-perception in emergence of 
overclaiming skills. However, the small size of the effect precludes from considering positivity 
bias as the main source of OCT variance. Moreover, perception of success control was related 
to OCT scores as previous theories suggested that less perceived control is related to more 
positivity bias that may serve as self-esteem protection from negative real-life outcomes. 
Indeed, external locus of control (belief that luck, coincidence or higher powers have greater 
influence over one’s life than hard work, skills, etc.) was positively related to OCT bias, but the 
magnitude of this relation was again very small. Furthermore, motivated bias can be also 
fuelled by social expectations towards high achievements. An analysis of relations between 
social expectations, parental pressure and school policy regarding achievements (as reported 
by students and school principals) and OCT scores did not yield any significant results.   
4. Motivated bias is related not only with exaggerating desirable virtues but also with concealing 
vices, e.g. social rule breaking. Hence, a group of variables indicating rule violation (truancy, 
school discipline) or social relations at school (e.g. teacher-student relations, sense of 
belonging to school) was related to OCT scores. Small evidence for relation between OCT 
scores and motivated bias was again found as OCT bias was related to claiming higher school 
belonging and better teacher-student relations. Both topics are typically perceived as socially 
desirable or even sensitive which corroborates such an interpretation of the patterns 
observed in this analysis. 
5. School-level variables were also related to OCT scores. In this analysis variables like divergence 
between students’ and school principals’ opinions on school discipline, school-level social 
expectations for high math abilities and school-level rule violations were related to OCT 
measures. The results obtained no significant relations between any of the principal-reported 
variables and individual OCT levels. Moreover, the correlations found between school-level 
variables and OCT bias were very small in magnitude. Further scrutiny revealed that only a 
very limited portion of the OCT variance was attributable to the school-level of analysis. This 
pattern of results seem to suggest that social norms are either irrelevant to OCT scores or that 
these norms are non-variant across schools in Poland. 
6. The analysis of overclaiming as a by-product of response styles and careless responding 
demonstrated that indeed more bias and lower OCT accuracy can be attributed to careless 
responding. However, the magnitude of this relation was only moderate. Moreover, some of 
the careless responding indices displayed internal problems which warrants further research 
in the field of inattentive responding to polish up careless responding indices methodology 
and interpretability. Self-report measures of inattentive responding were not related to OCT 
scores. Respondents’ fatigue lowered OCT accuracy but did not influence OCT bias.  
7. Response styles were measured using the IRTree framework and by fitting an IRT 
multidimensional model to the data. The results were a bit surprising at the first glance as 
extreme response style (preference for extreme response categories, e.g. “1” and “5” on a 1 
to 5 rating scale) correlated negatively with OCT bias (and positively with OCT accuracy). It 
seems that at least in this overclaiming scale participants were very conservative when 
claiming familiarity with foils. This interpretation was corroborated by a positive relation 
between midpoint response style (preference for the middle response category on a response 
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scale) and OCT bias. This relation was again driven by strong respondents’ preference for 
keeping to the negative side of the scale when assessing familiarity with OCT items. These 
results point that any relations between response styles and overclaiming may be very 
dependent upon the technical details of a given measurement tool as e.g. mapping matrices 
of response styles (way in which stylistic responses are coded), domain assessed, overclaiming 
scale characteristics (foils number, foils creation rules) and response scale features (e.g. 
number of categories, labelling). More knowledge on these issues need to be gathered in 
order to formulate any generalisable conclusions about the relation between response styles 
and overclaiming. 
8. Multilevel confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the PISA 2012 overclaiming scale’s 
latent structure. This analysis was mainly performed in order to gauge whether reals and foils 
form the same or different latent factors. The conducted model fitting process yielded the 
bifactor solution with two specific factors: one for easy items and another for hard items and 
foils together. It seems that some foils were processed by participants more like reals while 
some reals were processed more like foils. Thus, it can be suggested that the ontic status of 
OCT items does not have decisive influence on how respondents respond to them. It appears 
that (subjective) item difficulty is much more important for the pattern of responses yielded. 
This analysis also corroborated that only a very low OCT variance proportion is attributable to 
the school-level. 
9. It was found that boys overclaimed more than girls and that students coming from families of 
higher socio-economic status overclaimed less than students of lower status. The gender 
relation was independent from math ability, however, the socio-economic status did not keep 
its relation with OCT bias in a multiple regression equation when controlled for math ability. 
Various explanations for this pattern of results were suggested, e.g. indicating greater male 
susceptibility to memory biases, personality traits predicting overclaiming being more 
frequent among males and higher desirability of maths among male students in comparison 
to their female counterparts. 
10. LCA examination yielded three latent classes, one of which was interpreted as “overclaiming” 
class due to a very positive self-report which was not warranted by objective abilities. 
Membership in this class was related to being male, of above-average socio-economic status 
and yielding very desirable profile also on other self-report scales. However, this group 
comprised only 9% of the total sample analysed. 
Main contributions of this work entail thorough testing of suppression models and turning attention 
into different properties of various OCT scoring systems. Moreover, the dissertation gathered novel 
evidence on potential mechanisms of overclaiming under the memory bias, motivated bias and 
careless responding hypotheses. Furthermore, the results confirming low importance of school-level 
variables for overclaiming were gathered for the first time showing these relations in an in-depth way. 
Also for the first time a detailed study of overclaiming scale’s latent structure was conducted with 
important suggestions for future studies regarding foils responding and proportion of variability 
accounted for different variance sources. Finally, relations between overclaiming and a large group of 
psychological and socio-demographical variables were gauged with some interesting finding regarding 
locus of control or gender role in explaining OCT scores. Furthermore, it was one of the very few 
positivity bias studies conducted on high school students in educational context and in other than 
Northern American culture which enlarged the generalization of the results gathered to date. 
The study is also characterized by serious limitations, mainly by its cross-sectional, correlational design. 
Moreover, it analyses data from only one country and with the use of some non-standard 
measurement tools. However, these limitations are not that serious as large sample size and overall 
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high quality of the rich data gathered by the PISA 2012 study contributes to the sound quality of the 
evidence provided. 
More experimental studies with the use of OCT are warranted especially to inform more on the 
mechanisms of overclaiming. However, apart from the research aimed at advancing theoretical 
knowledge a lot of studies targeted at expanding knowledge about the importance of technical details 
of overclaiming scales, especially character of foils (how are they constructed), proportion of foils to 
reals in a task or using other response formats than rating scales, are warranted due to large knowledge 
lacunas regarding even some most basic OCT characteristics. Moreover, response times analysis and 
measurement of psychophysiological data in overclaiming tasks is advocated as promising ways of 
advancing knowledge about this phenomenon.  
Apart from its utility for the survey methodology field OCT can also potentially have practical 
applicability in other fields of social studies. For example, measurement tools able to validly gauge 
individual-level propensity towards overclaiming ca be used to enhance students’ learning process, as 
they can inform students on the true level of their academic knowledge. Moreover, such tasks can help 
to monitor against overconfident decisions in fields where they could be especially costly (e.g. financial 
institutions, army, pilots, air control, etc.). Furthermore, overclaiming was evidenced to be a correlate 
of fake news gullibility. Hence, it is probable that OCT-like tasks can be used to train participants in 
order to improve their abilities to differentiate between true and faked information broadcasted. 
In sum, overclaiming technique seems a valuable for task for both basic and applied social research 
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These sections contain supplementary materials that expand information on results obtained in the 
analyses commented above. Each Appendix can be reached by clicking the below Dropbox links. Upon 
clicking the link a zipped folder will be downloaded on computer. The zipped folders will typically 
contain tables in the .xls format and figures and pictures in the .png format.  
10.1 Appendix A 
This Appendix contains item characteristic curves (ICCs) from the IRT scaling of the math familiarity 
scale described in the section 6.2. The ICCs are in .png format. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7lhnqfyt5qg6ch2/AAB1MEzJrZJtxVClv0QxbaW_a?dl=0 
10.2 Appendix B 
This package comprises .xlsx files in which basic psychometric qualities of the self-reports scales used 
in the work are displayed. Internal consistency and EFA results are presented. Also list of items used 
to create the scale is given. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/jzw9fzxa0e7n0gz/AADphpumQEYkbWt54g4FzZ3Ma?dl=0 
10.3 Appendix C 
In this Appendix all additional tables that were not presented in the main body of the text are supplied. 
Files in the .xlsx format. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/uqull1zj9pgn3hc/AADl5iBdyKPoq-7mTgfErUX6a?dl=0 
10.4 Appendix D 
This section offers ICCs from the DIF analysis described in the section 7.9.2. Pictures in .png format. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/tpfr68p7wqabr6m/AACtAqfsIgTJFz55THGObNUHa?dl=0 
10.5 Appendix E 
This Appendix contains additional tables and statistics for the CFA models analysed in the section 7.7 
of the work. Additionally, factor loadings diagrams are enclosed, both in .pdf and .dgm (MPlus 
diagrammer) format. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/0ntnsrllx3xpzig/AABGCm7Q-WifxqcMrNywVHTla?dl=0 
10.6 Appendix F 
This Appendix comprises materials for the four-class solution from the latent class analysis described 
in subchapter 7.10: MPlus output file and MPlus plot in .jpg format. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/pyqpirqmkxdb0zx/AAAScV2gYYNxmDU_wrRvzwMPa?dl=0 
 
